Poor IAF role in R&D, manufacture - HAL/IAF tiffs to blame?

[maitya]

I guess you have not read the LCA aerodynamics discussion especially the contradiction between ITR and STR and the wing shapes coupled with underpowered engine?

But I did.

Where the line of argument is that if the LCA does not meet STR and ITR parameters, it must be because IAF indulged in 'best of brochure' activity. And all this is basis assertion by one BRF member (@maitya) who has gone to the extent of claiming that IAF deliberately drafted performance expectations which can never be met and were meant to kill the LCA program!

Let me ask you a couple of very straight forward question:

(a) If the LCA design choice means that ITR and STR as specified in ASR cannot be met (and are actually contradictory as per wisdom of BRF), then how come LCA Mk2, which involves minimum design changes, will meet these ASR requirements?

(b) Is the engine on LCA Mk1 under-powered or is the aircraft overweight? The CAG Report on the LCA Program clearly shows that LCA is 1,366 Kg overweight with fuel load. And 1,370 kg overweight as basic empty.
...
<snip>

Was trying not to respond, as per certain directives ... but since names are being used, I guess it's ok to be seen as "forced to respond".

Basic understanding of science would have made the answers (to the questions asked above) quite self-explanatory as answers for these were there in those posts as well ... and that doesn't really need aerodynamic expertise really, as the answers were provided in layman words etc.

But then again when emotions run high, logic etc will always be in short supply.

Why will LCA Mk2 meet the ASRs? It won't ... not the ones set out in 1993 etc.
It will attempt to meet the impossible-ASR-specified-STR by getting more Thrust from a more powerful engine (which will also increase weight) - as STR is more about amount of Thrust available to overcome the drag of a certain wing geometry (alongwith fuselage and fuselage-wing interface design etc).
And that design itself is necessitated because of High ITR specification of the ASR itself ... but if the intended role was of "replacing MiG-21" itself, plus some additional ground-attack capability, then specifying a high ITR is quite expected.

But then the planform can't be designed to neglect this @primary requirement of high ITR - so in comes delta planform. And alongwith comes the attended higher drag (but other benefits as well) and thus the need of higher and higher thrust to overcome it, so that STR figures can be achieved.

That's the reason for going to a higher thrust engine ...

Never mind the F414 was originally a Navy requirement, a higher thrust level required to offset the inevitable weight creep due to heavier landing gear, higher acceleration required for carrier T/O etc ... too much of H&D issue for IAF to allow the Navy folks being able to specify "realistically" and maybe even saving the program.

But how will Mk2 meet the rest of the original unobtanium ASR of 5.5Kg empty weight. dimensions of a MiG-21 etc - it can't and it won't!!

Was Mk1 overweight? Or Mk1 post ASR revisions overweight?
Answer is yes and yes ... when you do an ab-initio program like this, with no experience whatsoever, some amount of weight creep is inevitable. LCA Mk1 pre-ASR revision was over-weight, with an attended goal of reducing that margin as it's productionised ... all contemporary A/C dev programs have had this issue anyway. And LCA of early 2000s was no exception.

But IAF kept changing the requirements - the serious-most was asking the outermost station to be R73 class (so say about 120Kg weight level) from being R60 class (so approx 50Kg class). The entire wingbox structure would require significant redesign and strengthening when such dramatic increase happens. The structural weight and thus the whole platform weight is bound to go up quite a bit and it did ...

Plus what about internal SPJ class self-protection system etc etc ... except for dginn tech etc, weight is bound to go up and it did (and killed the Kaveri program as well). Where is the reason to be surprised now?

(Note: I for one, would support such incremental changes for a program such as this - but to not acknowledge the consequence of such asks and worse, to turn around and blame the program precisely for it, is plain intellectual dishonesty, to put it mildly.)

And all this is basis assertion by one BRF member (@maitya) who has gone to the extent of claiming that IAF deliberately drafted performance expectations which can never be met and were meant to kill the LCA program ...

Betw nice try building consensus via falsehoods such as highlighted above ... the mood of the forum can easily be judged via open-minded reading posts of other forum members, even if it doesn't match the make-believe puny world of yours.

Rest of you post is not worth responding ...

[ramana]

LCA Mk1 is both under powered and over weight. Its an aero thing. By specifying so many requirements which are contradictory, the LCA is and will be three legged cheetah as the knowledgeable AVM said.

Yes DRDO/ADA were morons to agree to the impossible ASR and should have let the powers be import whatever they want for that is their nature.

Would have avoided all these bakwas threads which defend the indefensible, where forces can do no wrong nor the scientists.

Both are at fault and working to fix it which is the good thing.
I am surprised why Kevlar was chosen. May be its familiarity with it.
Also underestimated the RF transparency needed for LCA radar.
What is the power transmission of LCA radar?
And range at which it has to sense targets?
Is it greater than Harrier/Jags which use same ELta 2052 radar?


Bye the way, new path in Systems Engineering is Requirements review in a team environment.: customer, designer, mfg, QA and accountants etc.

----
Shiv, Getting more Su-30 MKIs is excellent for the IAF. this light fighter plane requirement is oxymoron. LCA is no light fighter! It carries quite a payload. and with under powered engine and bad wing shape is sluggish too!!!

[fanne]

SU30MKI is the only thing in IAF right now that can win over any challenge from TSPAF and PLAAF. It comes less than half the cost of Rafael and over its life time even taking higher opex will cost lot lower than Rafael. It has the infrastructure built, so adding extra will not be costly. The major drawback, that all eggs are put in one basket (and a russian basket), cancel Rafel, and put some money in indigenousing whatever is left in SU30MKI to be indigenoused. That way that risk is mitigated. Have 400 of them. That 150 extra over current orders should make things better for us in a two front war.

[shiv]

(Note: I for one, would support such incremental changes for a program such as this - but to not acknowledge the consequence of such asks and worse, to turn around and blame the program precisely for it, is plain intellectual dishonesty, to put it mildly.)

In fact Maitya it is not intellectual dishonesty. It is plain ignorance of a macho-fighter-jock run air force of basic engineering issues. This sort of ignorance is not good for the country.

[shiv]

this light fighter plane requirement is oxymoron. LCA is no light fighter! It carries quite a payload. and with under powered engine and bad wing shape is sluggish too!!!

ramana that is an interesting comment. One can go into a long debate about what the IAF liked and what made them go for "light fighters". I have seen no debates about this so let me post a few thoughts

The IAF did not deliberately wake up one morning in the late 1950s and say "We need a light fighter". I think they were on the lookout for a replacement fighter and found that the Gnat was cheap enough and technologically appropriate for India. I am sure the IAF which operated a large number of Gnats built up infrastructure in many airfields to take a small aircraft. Hangars, pens etc were probably built small. The MiG 21 came as another "small fighter" that slotted itself in. So from 1958 until 1980 the IAF was hooked on small fighters and these small light fighters had served well

They were small, agile, stealthy (because of size) and once the IAF corrected or compensated for faults they performed well. Despite being "fighters" (ie. interceptors, and very lightly armed at that) they served in attack roles as well in 1965 and 1971. In parallel to this the IAF acquired in the 1950 to 1980 period a fair number of medium and large aircraft. The Canberras were already there, but the Su-7s, MiG 23s and MiG 27s were acquired in parallel to the MiG 21. By the mid 1980s the IAF was predominantly MiG 21 - (which went back to 1962) and the MiG 23, MiG 27s, Jaguars and Mirage 2000 - all of which were "younger" than the MiG 21. So it was the "light fighter" MiG 21 that was to be replaced.

Did the IAF ask for a medium or large sized twin or single engine replacement? Or was the primary requirement a fighter that would slot into the existing infrastructure? Having frozen the LCA's definition as a "light fighter" it was hobbled from day 1 as technoloogy took a "great leap forward" from the 1980s.

[Karan M]

If the LCA is sluggish, is underpowered and has a bad wing shape etc etc. Then how is it that:

Air Marshals speak on the LCA

10:29, Fali Major says "giving the devil it's due, the LCA is turning out to be a MUCH MUCH better aero plane than the MiG series but even then it does not meet or come under the category of thr Multi Role Combat Aircraft "

At 12:03- "and I'm not saying that the LCA should not come, the LCA should come, in the numbers proposed, but it cannot replace the capabilities of an MMRCA like the Rafale

PV Naik said that the "LCA is a MiG-21++, it's got tremendous potential, it's got tremendous capability, but that capability has to come through, it has to be operationalized and then we need a large number of these LCAs"

At 19:22-"as far as the LCA is concerned, the aircraft is top class, and all my colleagues and the Test Pilots who've flown it, swear by it.."

In short lets be clear here, all this breast beating about the LCA Mk1 is not exactly accurate.

The LCA ASRs were cobbled together in a contradictory fashion and were very ambitious. Water under the bridge.

NFTC Head AC Muthanna noted "to give AHQ its due, they were very futuristic and are relevant even today". Sort of admits the issue but can't get into specifics. Commander Mao said much the same thing.

The LCA Mk1 however can be improved on to meet those ASRs. The IAF has a choice. Either take substantial numbers of Mk1 and Mk2, or hold out for a Mk2 which is better than Mk1 and have a smaller Light Combat Aircraft fleet and standardize on mostly heavier aircraft to offset the greater number of aircraft in the PLAAF and PAF fleets, cost efficiency be darned. They want to follow the latter strategy.

Not enough? LCA critic Matheeswaran takes square aim at the L part itself and says the program should be dropped and a new fighter built to a M class started (never mind the challenges and issues and lack of commitment from AHQ).

Consider, of a 800 strong fighter fleet - 756 aircraft total split across 42 squadrons, their acquisition plans are:

1. 270 Su-30 MKI spread around 15 squadrons
2. 126 (actual plan 189) around 7-11 squadrons
3. 144 FGFA around 8 squadrons

So, 30 in all.
. Now we know the LCA plans are around 126 LCA total (at this point). That's 7 squadrons.

Thats 37 squadrons.

Leaving 5 squadrons for an AMCA (if AHQ had its way, Rafale a hedge there).

So simple point is that its not Mk1 being this or that which is an issue. The larger issue is AHQs move to a heavy-medium fighter force and leaving the light fighter force in the past.

The LCA at the end of the day will still be a viable program if AHQ stops behaving as if infinite funds are available and rebalances its strategy. Even otherwise, Navy plans for 50 odd Mk2s so thats a plus.

Let alone the contribution to AMCA etc. Thankfully the CAG report etc will act in a way that spurs indigenization of even subassemblies (as will the Mk1 orders) and the key programs that failed (MMR & Kaveri) are being resuscitated. MMR is now in a new AESA form (Uttam) and the Kaveri will exist for IUSAV.

The main focus now should be to make LCA Mk1 in quality and in numbers & if the Rafale remains out of reach, the IAF will have to wake up and take what's available.

PS - Modi will more or less announce a FGFA strategy/joint venture when he visits Russia. Expect it. That means R-money will remain limited. Question is whether AHQ makes the LCA a success by making it an all or nothing effort and leaning on MOD to lean on HAL or still goes around hoping some vendor someplace will give them an easy way out.

[ramana]

SHiv, Fair summary as usual. See below.

KaranM, i think world has moved beyond light fighter era in which the ASR was drawn up. We await what can be done with what we got.
Its the reality.
Will read CAG report fully.

[vsunder]

A few small comments. AVM Harjinder Singh was very much against the Mig-21 and made very strong attempts that India should buy the English Electric Lightning. But eventually Krishna Menon prevailed. Till then IAF was very British centric, essentially all the aircraft was British and a few American like the C119, Flying Boxcar that arrived after 1962. Now it's French and Russian centric.

The book by PC Lal has some sections dealing with the Gnat deal. He was a pilot that was sent to both France and UK to evaluate fighters including the Gnat. He mentions an amusing account of Petter the Gnat designer, who initially advised Folland to not sell the Gnat to India as he thought Indians had turned Commie. A chance conversation between PC Lal and Petter about cricket swayed him. Roshan Suri who crashed the first flight of the HF24 was also on this evaluation team. Incidentally Petter also designed the English Electric Lightning.

[Sanjay]

Is the Tejas really sluggish ? OK it does not meet ASR for ITR/STR but "sluggish" is another term entirely.

Do we have anything to say that STR is less than 16 deg/sec ?

[shiv]

Is the Tejas really sluggish ? OK it does not meet ASR for ITR/STR but "sluggish" is another term entirely.

Do we have anything to say that STR is less than 16 deg/sec ?

Sanjay ramana has used the term sarcastically

[Karan M]

Ramana sir, the problem is very zimble in that a heavy/medium onlee fighter strategy will be very cost prohibitive. I mean, most AF abroad with richer economies than ours (in GDP/capita) and lesser needs (for investment in infra/health/people) are unable to fund large fleets of these fighters even though they make them in the country/s. IAF hence to talk of taking a gold plated fleet imported from across the world & sustain a huge fleet is simply untenable. IM(H)O, we have to basically use the LCA as our workhorse platform for the PAF and tactical needs vs the PLAAF & secondly, we need to fix the Su-30 fleet & get it to highest possible, all up combat serviceability. The latter will automatically take away much of the need for the MMRCA & former will give the IAF serious punch as versus all those MiG-21s (non upg) and MiG-27 (non upg) which are vulnerable in a modern AD environment.

[Sanjay]

Is the Tejas really sluggish ? OK it does not meet ASR for ITR/STR but "sluggish" is another term entirely.

Do we have anything to say that STR is less than 16 deg/sec ?

Sanjay ramana has used the term sarcastically

Oh - Understood. However, question still stands. If STR is 16 (what is the Tejas ITR ?) that is good - not great but good.

All said and done, ADA/HAL have their share of the blame but the IAF as you have pointed out is being obtuse.

[Karan M]

Sanjay saar, I dont get why you are asking the same question time and again, as you have access to the same data we do including Vivek Ahujas simulation. The real data is classified and obviously nobody on this forum can give you an answer until it comes out. However in an era where sure shot Python-5/R73Es are common with HMS one may well wonder what the pure STR value actually translates to, otherwise the T-38 Talon would be tops.

[ramana]

Sanjay, We don't know. However going by IAF 'textualism' most likely not per ASR.

StR is needed for ~500 yards gun sight ranges. IOW IAF doesn't believe even BVR AAMs.
What is needed is Hawker Hurricane or its follow on typhoon!
Vsunder, French provided Ourugan (Mig 15 type, F-100), Mystere, Mirage. Not to forget Alize and Aloutte.

Yes very Western European pedigree.

KaranM, Page2 31 & 32 give the MMR and Radome saga.
Look at time lines and decision making points.

Also despite Ericsson's inputs the MMR got redesigned twice: Once with Ericcson and second with ELtA.

meantime ASL which didn't have radome expertise got awarded!

From all available literature, CSIR- NAL are the SME's having built radomes for Jag etc.

And ASL chooses Kevlar without preliminary subscale or panel RF tests.

Odd thing is NAL says it makes quartz fiber radomes with polyester resin.
Due to high speed, BMI resin might be needed.
Good thing is NAL process is Resin transfer Matrix (RtM)

You want follow up in Radar thread?

[Sanjay]

Yes Ramana that is a good idea.

Karan M, Ramana, the whole point is this - IF STR ASR is missed by say 2 deg, ITR missed by 2-3 deg - and radar, RWR are not failures but works in progress, the IAF position is nonsensical.

IF STR missed by 5-8 deg, ITR by the same and radar and RWR are complete failures, then IAF has cause to be reluctant.

From everything on BRF and from Vivek Ahuja, we see that the 1st rather than 2nd scenario exists.

We can speculate eternally but the solution has to come from the top down - a directive that you will accept and get this thing to work.

INSAS, Arjun and Tejas have all faced the same enemy - an intractable, self-righteous media-military combine that is not prepared to partner with development agencies.

Note: If we examine all testimony, the actual users (as opposed to the military decision makers) of all of these items seems positive so the rot is from the top.

[Karan M]

KaranM, Page2 31 & 32 give the MMR and Radome saga.
Look at time lines and decision making points.

Also despite Ericsson's inputs the MMR got redesigned twice: Once with Ericcson and second with ELtA.

I don't have the data on hand, but originally per what I remember LCA & Gripen were hand in hand. Both programs shared similar suppliers & Erricson was a chosen partner for both MMRs. However, in our case our cooperation with them was very limited. We dropped them soon after, incidentally that's when we were going through our forex crunch. IMO, they probably helped us with overall design aims & "architecting" and thereafter it went nowhere.
As regards ELTA, its basically an ELTA radar with an Indian scanner. UTTAM is basically a restart of the airborne FCR drawing upon (I think) mostly from the AEW&C work + XV-2000/2004 A2A modes.

meantime ASL which didn't have radome expertise got awarded!

From all available literature, CSIR- NAL are the SME's having built radomes for Jag etc.

And ASL chooses Kevlar without preliminary subscale or panel RF tests.

Odd thing is NAL says it makes quartz fiber radomes with polyester resin.
Due to high speed, BMI resin might be needed.
Good thing is NAL process is Resin transfer Matrix (RtM)

You want follow up in Radar thread?

From what I understand, this was a "legacy decision". ASLs got the work (same as HAL got the MMR) because at the time, it was the only game in town regarding the radomes. Now, NAL's radome unit is the best we have. Same way LRDE has actually grown to be a development area in terms of radars but at the time the LCA program was launched, it only had INDRA-1 to its credit and even that was being redesigned for an INDRA-2 which actually made it to service.
IMHO, the LCA program has a fair amount of legacy decisions baked in, which the program managers don;t touch till it becomes obvious it wont work out. One gent mentioned its the audit fear, take no risky decisions and just do the same old.
In case of radome, they never managed to verify it for "full performance" since the MMR itself led by HAL never got past its A2A functions. Last I checked, it was having issues with STT (Single Target Track) in A2A which is required for BVR shots, though it managed MPRF TWS etc. A2G never validated. So only after they got the ELTA radar did they clearly check & find the radome was unacceptable. In a more synchronized program with the customer fully onboard the decision to drop the MMR and for an ELTA one should have been done eons back and the issue fixed.
Which is why I want Mr Balaji as the head. He can take these issues to the services and get immediate buyin. Not a bunch of scientists pushing files around afraid to go to the AF and say ok, plan A didn't work, so plan B. In turn IAF support will hold off CAG.
The lack of trust between the triumvirate of ADA-HAL-IAF is what leads to all these issues. On a more positive note, radar itself shouldn't be an issue since we have integrated 2032 on Harrier, Jaguar and Harrier with Derby, Jaguar with Harpoon.

[Sanjay]

Karan, we integrated the Jaguar with Derby ? Any source ? Excellent news if true.

[Karan M]

Harrier with Derby, Jaguar with Harpoon & also (will integrate) ASRAAM.

[ramana]

So who designed and made radome for Jaguar? Which year? I think ASL got picked in 1989. And went on silo mode. Come 2006 we find MMR no good. Get Elta and find radome no good.2014 Cobham picked.

[Karan M]

NALs been doing Jag, Jag upg, Mirage 2000 radomes.

[Sanjay]

Question - has any Jaguar IS been upgraded with radome and radar ? The first upgrade was an IM.

[shiv]

Another one bites the dust!!! Army again
Indian Army scraps the world’s largest assault rifle tender

Just read the details!!

But the solution to the INSAS’s quality issues was to ask for a weapon so expensive with specifications so outlandish that it raised questions on the Army’s competence in framing General Staff Qualitative Requirements.

The Army wanted a rifle with interchangeable barrels firing different calibers, the 5.56 mm INSAS round and the 7.62 mm AK-47 round.

The requirement originated in the present practice of soldiers in counterinsurgency operations using AK-47s and switching over to INSAS rifles in peace stations.

Army officials say the specifications were deeply flawed. Five international firms — Beretta of Italy, Israeli Weapons Industries (IWI), Colt Defense of the US, Ceska Zbplojovka of Czech Republic — were shortlisted.

All the weapons they presented for the trials were prototypes, meaning, none of them were actually in service with their respective armies.

The contract appeared doomed right at the start in 2012 when the Army first delayed the technical evaluation of the rifles. Companies then began asking for extensions for sample submission. As of 2015, no trials of the competing weapons were conducted.

A whiff of corruption accompanied the contract. It was speculated that the GSQRs were tailor-made by Army brass to favour one of the vendors.

Another concern the Army had was cost. At over Rs 2 lakh a piece, each multi-caliber assault rifle with a conversion kit cost twice the price of a regular imported assault rifle and six times the cost of a Rs 35,000 OFB-made INSAS rifle.

A General called the MCAR contract the equivalent of equipping a mass transport taxi service with Mercedes S-class saloons.

[Sid]

^^Some massive house cleaning is required. Current situation is not sustainable.

[shiv]

cross post
http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 005_1.html

The outgoing ADA director is even more bullish about the AMCA, which the IAF is supporting enthusiastically - a change from its opposition to the Tejas. The AMCA's configuration is finalised, and preliminary design is about to commence. That would provide a clear indication of how much funding the AMCA project would need. "I am confident that the AMCA project would cost less than any fifth generation fighter project anywhere. My estimate would be in the region of $4 billion (Rs 25,000 crore)," says Subramanyam.

Good. If true

[ramana]

Maybe IAF realized it has to support the AMCA or they will be reduced to a transport plane service for rescuing people from disaster areas.
I like the AMCA internal load capability.

[Abhay_S]

^^ ramana sir thats a good point.

A 4.5 gen bird is costing around $200 Mil with TOT. what a 5th gen plane will cost is anybody's guess. Cost alone is pushing fighter aircraft into the domain of strategic weapons. Maybe the bosses in IAF realize that there is no other option.

[shiv]

Maybe IAF realized it has to support the AMCA or they will be reduced to a transport plane service for rescuing people from disaster areas.
I like the AMCA internal load capability.

ramana in the AMCA whine thread I have posted a link from Vijendra Thakur - ex IAF I think - who claims that IAF is not happy with AMCA specs. Unfortunately this is a Vijendra Thakur is ex IAF. I wonder if he is lifafa? Or there are some others in the Air Force who are shooting their mouths off and saying abominably stupid things?

[ramana]

KaranM or anyone else, Please post links to CAG reports from 2005 onwards.
We can post who were the MoD, IAF chiefs while PSS was ADA chief from 2005.
I want to create a timeline of critical decisions and milestones to get a better understanding of roles & players.

[rohitvats]

A question to learned jirga - Any thoughts on why did not Navy ever demand and launch a project to develop an indigenous conventional submarine? May be, something like LCA in 80s/90s which would be available for induction in 15 year time-frame?

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>

And all this is basis assertion by one BRF member (@maitya) who has gone to the extent of claiming that IAF deliberately drafted performance expectations which can never be met and were meant to kill the LCA program ...

Betw nice try building consensus via falsehoods such as highlighted above ... the mood of the forum can easily be judged via open-minded reading posts of other forum members, even if it doesn't match the make-believe puny world of yours.

Rest of you post is not worth responding ...

Why snip the post at a convenient point? Why remove the context of the point made by me? The 'one' was specifically with respect to the alluding at ASR for ITR and STR came after looking at different brochures.

The least you can do is stand by your own post. And conviction.

BTW - You wrote this on 17th April 2015, didn't you?

KaranM-ji, as far as scope-creep is concerned, you know very well what happened back in 2003/4 … suddenly IAF mandated the outboard pylons would need to be able to carry 105Kg class WVAAM (R-73) from an original scope of a 45Kg class WVAAM (R-60).

Given a platform needs to be stressed to 12G atleast (9G load is for the pilot etc), safety margins included, you could do the maths as to the level of torque-stress withstanding that now needs building in to the airframe/wings.

But this also not only gives a chance to the IAF to whine about platform-weight-creep, and also effectively takes away whatever output thrust margin that was available on an ab initio turbofan development.

Mind you, with the benefit of hindsight, atleast I’m completely convinced (as if that matters in any shape or form) with these types of scope-creep in requirement.

But that also brings out an uncomfortable question:

Why was original requirement in early 90s (I know people will come out and talk about 80s when req were defined – most are incorrigible to argue with, so I don’t even try) from IAF talked about R-60 WVAAM? Was/Is IAFs ability to project/foresee battle-field scenarios limited to only a decade?

I simply won’t be able to believe this – the IAF that I know of, is far more capable and strategic thinking when it comes to forward thinking these kind of tactical/operational scenarios (MMRCA tech evaluation parameter setting, is one such example).

So is it that, IAF simply wanted these SDREs to get off their back wrt this business of specifying requirements etc and get along along with some set of requirements on some “science project”? Specifying turn-rates of two different platforms with two diff type of wing-planform design are another such pointer (Cdr Mao-sir also alluded to it to Kartik in AI many moons back).

And when they got surprised, by the SDREs, with a working platform, having now to test it etc – quick comes out these types of IFR, new-radome, higher AoA type of requirement changes.

That’s the irony of all this!!

The 'mood' of the forum has been polluted by half baked assertions like above.

There is hardly any information which comes from official sources on any topic like LCA Program - more so from Services. In absence of this, we have wild speculations where it easier to blame the Services for all the ills of Indian MIC than undertake an objective analysis.

On top of it, we've the R&D establishment now leaking information through few people which gives the issue(s) a particular spin. Last was lamenting about LCA being made to do too much for FOC when the gem about Radome change appeared along with IFR!!!

Comments like IAF asking for last minute changes in Radome are but a small example. As is the example of IAF asking for R-73 missile change in 2004. Read that CAG Report - it was raised in 1997, acted on by ADA in 2004 and completed by 2006.

But I did not see any discussion or breast-beating on delay in LCA Program due to MMR related issues or delay in work undertaken by various laboratories. With worthies on BRF had their way, including Forum Moderator, half the IAF would have been already cashiered or faced Court Martial.

Any similar recommendations for those who utterly and completely misread India's and their own ability to produce a weapon system on time? And made the choices they made?

People talk fondly of Navy and DRDO and success of this relationship.

The reason? Navy does not go by what DRDO says can be done and in the given timeline! The technological base in IN allows it reign the flights of fancy in DRDO and stick to what can be done. There is a deep reason in Navy being 90% self sufficient in Float, 70% in Defense but only 30% in Offense.

Any guesses why IN never commissioned a project for development of replacement of SA-N-X series of SAMs on its capital ships? Why was there no complementary program under Akash SAM project for Navy?

[ramana]

Rohitvats Previous version of Radar thread circa 2006 chronicles the HAL MMR woes. Its in the archives.

[rohitvats]

Rohitvats Previous version of Radar thread circa 2006 chronicles the HAL MMR woes. Its in the archives.

Chronicling issues and doing an objective analysis along with healthy criticism is one thing - and that is how the discussions should be. But what we generally have - and ONLY in case of Services - is breast-beating and wailing about the 'evil' Services stymieing the domestic R&D effort.

Has anyone used the same language for R&D folks as gets used for IA and IAF? Now that we have the CAG Report, will BRF remove the posts where IAF was called names and recommendations made to cashier IAF senior staff because of speculation that things have gone wrong and continue to go wrong ONLY because of IAF? And that there are no serious project management issues at the R&D establishment end? Or that delays ALSO happened because of technology choices which R&D establishment made?

Service folks are quite open to criticize their own parent organizations and point out various issues like GSQR framing, lack of involvement and pro-active push to domestic MIC. Where is the corresponding literature from R&D folks? Or everything is all nice and dandy at HAL and DRDO and other DPSU?

How come we're not open to discuss that especially in case of IAF and IA, R&D establishment has tried to overachieve w/o factoring into account the technological base of the country and the operational requirements of Services?

We're enamored by IN and its involvement in domestic R&D effort. Has anyone bothered to check the IN model? Because if they did, they'd find out that had it been for IN, the LCA program as it was conceived would not have been there in the first place!

That is why I had asked a question - ever wondered why this country did not have a domestic SSK program? Something which would've been equivalent of LCA for IAF?

My submission is please, by all means, evaluate and undertake objective analysis of what is wrong in IAF/IA when it comes to interaction with domestic R&D establishment but temper the language. And be more objective. Especially, when there is lack of credible information on projects or only one side of story via leaks et all.

[ramana]

Yes similar language was used and people left in a huff and some got banned for dissing civilian scientists on BRF.


Whining, waling rhona/dhona is due to missed opportunity and not malice as you seem to imply.

Once a word is written it has its own life and power doesn't kill it. So censoring/editing is Western apology bokwas.

We have IN thread.

[rohitvats]

Yes similar language was used and people left in a huff and some got banned for dissing civilian scientists on BRF

Will BRF extend the same courtesy to those dissing the Services? Especially when you've now information available to the contrary?

Whining, waling rhona/dhona is due to missed opportunity and not malice as you seem to imply.

It turns into malice when you attribute the 'missed opportunity' to ONLY IA and IAF. And do not factor into account issues at other end.

[geeth]

Well.. Nobody, as far as I can see, has claimed R&D folks to be angels from heaven. In fact people ridicule the scientists day-in and day-out for their lack of commitments, delays, screw ups etc. Even the Navy is not always not right everytime. But their ATTITUDE from available information is a 1000 times better than IA or IAF..so much so that the Minister of state Pallam Raju had even wondered whether there was any active support from Army for sabotaging the Arjun project..Heavy Vehicles factory also have complaint against Army. Similar accusations are there against IAF also, if not outright sabotage.

In such circumstances, services do face criticism...I can vouch Army is corrupt because I am a victim of their corruption and suffer from it on a day-to-day basis. I know, so are other organisations including DRDO HAL IAF NAVY and a lot of other organisations.

It is criminal not to support home grown programmes for the security and well being of our nation and IAF and IA cannot claim to be innocent.

[tsarkar]

A question to learned jirga - Any thoughts on why did not Navy ever demand and launch a project to develop an indigenous conventional submarine? May be, something like LCA in 80s/90s which would be available for induction in 15 year time-frame?

A conventional submarine is a very compact war machine - silent like a sniper - and a force multiplier when used effectively.

A nuclear submarine is easier to build. It is like a tank or artillery battery carrying immense loads. Because there is limitless power, so size & weight considerations are not there. When it launches missiles, the noise can be detected from afar, however, it has the infinite energy to sprint away at high speed.

The reason IN never went in for SSK is because it was complex to design & build, and we did not have the necessary skills or materials.

Same with minesweepers - whose hull construction is highly specialized - since the hulls need to withstand shock & vibrations of exploding mines.

Coming to Tejas, my view is that it was a science project before 2001-2005, and making it a fighter started thereafter.

The reason I call it a science project is specifically because of "Light Combat Aircraft" and the R-60 / R-73 missile issue.

Now, to the best of my knowledge, IAF never specified weights or how the aircraft was to be built. IAF specified only performance specifications like speed, range etc.

The decision to use composites was ADA's idea. Advertising it as light combat aircraft at empty weight 5500 kg was also ADA's idea.

Now, because we were doing it for the first time, viz, building a aircraft & using composites to do so, the parts were heavier because of reasons like safety tolerances and the plane turned out heavier. That would've been mitigated if the airframe was less draggy. Unfortunately, it wasn't, and overall performance suffered.

Now, to the due credit of ADA, efforts have been taken for aerodynamics & weight optimization, and those efforts have yielded success.

However, if we assess dispassionately today, decision to use composites did not yield any of the perceived benefits. The composite Tejas does as well as the metal Gripen and JF-17. Material is immaterial to the user (pun intended), who needs to fly a CAP or drop bombs at 300 km radius.

you know very well what happened back in 2003/4 … suddenly IAF mandated the outboard pylons would need to be able to carry 105Kg class WVAAM (R-73) from an original scope of a 45Kg class WVAAM (R-60). Given a platform needs to be stressed to 12G atleast (9G load is for the pilot etc), safety margins included, you could do the maths as to the level of torque-stress withstanding that now needs building in to the airframe/wings.

In the 80's when we were flying MiG-21 & MiG-23, then R-60 was the standard CCAAM. LCA was supposed to enter service in the 90s, hence the specifications were reasonable in that context.

Now, developers typically keep margins. Every ship is designed with margins for new radars & weapons. Like the Brahmos VLS fitted to INS Ranvijay in lieu of Volna magazines.

In 1997, we had firmed up plans for Su-30 and R-73 became standard for Su-30, MiG-29 & MiG-21 Bison. R-60 was going out of production. To be fair, IAF had intimated ADA when its plans were being firmed up. No Su-30MKI or Bison had been inducted other than the loaner Su-30Ks.

The fact that there were no margins for Tejas's outboard pylons shows how far the developers were from operational reality. BTW, Tejas was heavy & draggy before R-73 was specified.

And we may commit similar mistakes in the AMCA. One ADA highlight I read was fly-by-light for AMCA. Again, its an exotic unproven concept not adding any value operationally.

The IAF went offboard because of the science project approach. Where I do blame the IAF is for not owning the project or decisively owning the project, partly because civilian leadership had the political patronage then. What the Navy did differently was going to CCS and firmly putting Balaji in the driver's seat. What benefitted Navy was that DRDO too viewed LCA Navy as a sideshow, and did not have any understanding of carrier operations, and let the Navy drive it.

Here are some facts from the ATV project.

S1 refers to the original reactor vessel being built by DRDO/BARC under oversight from PMO. That project was in doldrums when Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat demanded a technical audit. While he was fired, IN was able to firmly get into the driver's seat.

IN then roped in L&T in 2001 to build the hull, got Russian assistance with the reactor, and the sourcing organization in Hyderabad worked to buy or build the sub-components.

http://www.thehindu.com/2004/05/27/stor ... 480100.htm Note how the Chief of Materials was tipped to head the project. Because of the need for sourcing for such a large project.

http://teleradproviders.com/nbn/story.php?id=NTQ5Nw==

Issue Date- 16th July , 2001

The Indian Navy has roped in a construction and engineering major, Larsen and Toubro (L&T), for its top-secret programme to develop a nuclear-powered submarine, official sources said. The Navy sources said the Mumbai-based L&T had been engaged to work on the development of the nuclear submarine’s hull.

[ramana]

Did IAF second an officer like Cdre. Balaji to ADA for work on LCA and did they stick around? On another note does IAF value technical officers in its ranks?

I Madras IIt, IN officers were attending M tech courses from long time that I know.

[tsarkar]

Agree with you, Ramana, that IN put in the Program Management required to balance requirements with technology that can be delivered.

Which is also why IN wanted to take its cadets out of NDA after two years instead of three and putting them in the INA. Because IN felt NDA is not inculcating a culture of technology appreciation in cadets. In INA, B Tech subjects for cadets are Mechanical, Electronics or Naval Architecture. So builders are nurtured from cadets.

I also agree that those issuing exotic rfps like Multi Caliber rifles are far fetched from reality. One cannot field strip and change a rifle, and common parts do not offer any logistics advantages.

Same with the Armoured Corps who've a fetish for light. They bought light AMX-13 in the 60s, that were butchered in 1965, and the heavy Centurions saved the day. The heavy Centurions & T-55 spearheaded the advances in 1971. And yet we see an unfettered fetish for light.

A heavy tank will need logistics & engineering support, but the firepower & protection is worth it. Like the Poona Horse held Basantar against numerous Pakistani armoured and infantry counterattacks. Had it been AMX-13 instead of Centurions, the tankers would've been knocked off long before, the position would've fallen and the strategic thrust blunted.

There was significant support from the sappers in that battle.

http://defencejournal.com/oct99/barapind.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Basantar

Armoured Corps too had good leaders like Hanut Singh & Shankar Roychowdhury, who served in the same regiment as Major Bhaskar Roy, who with one squadron fiercely beat back the Pakistani thrust of two regiments at Chamb in 1965 before the IAF destroyed his ammunition resupply trucks.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanut_Singh_Rathore
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shankar_Roychowdhury

[vina]

The reason I call it a science project is specifically because of "Light Combat Aircraft" and the R-60 / R-73 missile issue.

Since I was the one who "discovered" the weapon spec issue and brought it to light in public for the first time here (yes, the issue became public first in BR before it was picked up elsewhere including the DDM ,because I connected the dots), I think we should lay some canards to rest here.

1. I was wondering why the LCA was doing all those flight tests without the carriage and separation trials . You don't need radar and sensor to be integrated into the airplane to do these tests.

2. I looked up the weapon specs of the LCA from that time and I saw the R60 and some pretty old specs going back to the initial days and frankly that weapon spec was outdated. I looked up the difference between the R60 and R73 and found a significant weight difference

3. I speculated that the reason the why carriage and separation trails are not happening were that there must have been a weapon spec revision (not just the R73, the entire works, and a whole set of stuff would have got updated) the wing was not aero-elastically in sync with the updated spec, there would have been a re-design and testing and qualification and that it would have been a 2 year delay laid squarely on the IAF's doorstep.

4. This was confirmed by a former structural engg who worked on the program, and said that yes, this was indeed the case and they had to stiffen the wing and a few layers of carbon fibre was added in the right places and this was all a negligible weight add from this.

So let us not fly a canard saying that the wing redesign added to significant weight gain. It didn't. It however added around 2 years of time delay. The bigger delay was with the MMR issues that delayed a whole host of things per the CAG report.

[srin]

Just wondering if "agile" development is applicable to aerospace as much as it is in software. You develop a product in multiple iterations - at the end of each iteration, you have a viable product but not the end product you really need.
In some cases, it can actually result in lot more delays that a "waterfall" model, but you are de-risking it at each stage. Does require really disciplined and engaged program management.

In case of LCA, you take the first stab with what you know and have (maybe Marut or Mirage as the starting points) and then progressively change things - FBW, engines, radar - with each change developing in parallel and integrating and testing taking a (say) 2-year sprint. It may still take 20-25 years to get the plane you want, but you have a viable plane at each point.

One issue that I can foresee is certification and re-touching all the testpoints at each iteration.