MBT Arjun - News and Discussions

srai · Post by **srai** » 11 Aug 2015 03:55

srutayus wrote:Gentlemen,
It would be good to write a solid and hard-hitting article for a magazine such as Swarajya.
And once it is published, make sure that it gets distributed widely.
Does anyone know the editors to see if there is interest in publishing something like this?

...

I second that motion. Let's create a sticky thread like we did for the LCA article and then we can all contribute towards that end. All these articles that we write collectively should be put into a BR Blog. Then, BR could also send a simplified and condensed version to any number of newspapers/magazines for publishing to wider audience.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 11 Aug 2015 06:30

NRao wrote:I suspect the options are oil + Armata or less oil.

Read somewhere, past day or so, India interested in 4000 Armata. Cheap oil along with that too I am betting.

This has played a part for sure in the past dealings with the russians.
In the FSU days, there were a lot of bundled things that were loaded on with actual stuff to be bought, because of compatibility issues and russian pressure sales, and "the whole bundle or nothing" at friendship prices.

Corruption and Natashas are not the ONLY deciding factor as many allude to here. Sometimes these are political decisions due to compelling reasons.

But netas, babus and senior afsars need to think that while this has to be done to maintain international relations, why styme local industry? Indian industry grows together as a nation or not. Can't have islands of expertise anymore, it has to be everything, military included - and all export oriented too.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 11 Aug 2015 11:07

4000 Armatas? That sounds like someone has been puffing on something weird! Perhaps there has been an extra "0" added,400 would seem more appropriate for a first "bite". Anyway,the IA clearly seems to be junking the A Mk-2 since it does not have the bells and whistles of the latest gent in town the amazing Armata. The goalposts have again been moved.

member_29151 · Post by **member_29151** » 11 Aug 2015 11:34

We Know Very Little About AMARTA TANK .. and speculating Its Supriority With Arjun MK2 .Why ?? and how can You compare Two if have diffrent roles to play!! Arjun was Designed As Per IA need Not Amarta .. we Have too Much Lust For Videshi Maal

member_29151 · Post by **member_29151** » 11 Aug 2015 11:38

Philip wrote:If it has then the GOI has no alternative but to kick IA ass and order a second batch of Arjuns and also see that the required support,spares issues which the IA is complaining about are rectified..[/b]

I Wish GOI intervene And Kick Out That Videshi Tank Lover Sitting at DGMFO.

Hobbes · Post by **Hobbes** » 12 Aug 2015 06:10

Philip wrote:4000 Armatas? That sounds like someone has been puffing on something weird! Perhaps there has been an extra "0" added,400 would seem more appropriate for a first "bite". Anyway,the IA clearly seems to be junking the A Mk-2 since it does not have the bells and whistles of the latest gent in town the amazing Armata. The goalposts have again been moved.

I'd actually consider 000 Armatas appropriate for the first - and last - "bite". But then I've never been a fanboi of Nizhny Tagil....

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 12 Aug 2015 07:26

why do IA think Arjun MBT is not modular enough?

whatever modular aspects can be covered in Mk-2,.. no? or this they kept it secret so that they engage with Mk-2/3 version while placing a huge order with firangs.

makeInIndia must be 100% ToT enabled.

http://www.deccanherald.com/content/494 ... tanks.html

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 12 Aug 2015 12:18

The defence ministry has also agreed to procure 118 Arjun Mk-II, when it is finally ready.

Manish_P · Post by **Manish_P** » 12 Aug 2015 15:53

The defence ministry has also agreed to procure 118 Arjun Mk-II, when it is finally ready.

huh

The IA purchased 124 Arjun Mk1 and after making the DRDO make those 70 odd improvements/corrections, decide to purchase only 118 Mk2 Arjuns ???

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Aug 2015 17:43

4000 Armatas? That sounds like someone has been puffing on something weird!

It was a Russian web site, so perhaps Vodka.

Most of the news on India-Armata is from Russian sources. There are a handful of Indian think tankers stating that.

Besides, the Indian request is for 2025+, so I have no clue, how many tanks would India need to replace by then? Would an Indian Army planner consider getting rid of older T-90s to replace them with such new tanks - whatever they are ?

member_28454 · Post by **member_28454** » 12 Aug 2015 19:01

It is pertinent that the Arjun could have been inducted in 1995 itself. All the issues associated with it then are pretty typical for a new in service vehicle. And such teething deficiencies are best ironed out with the cooperation of the user. I have not found one solid reason why this could not have been the case.
If only the T-72BU(T-90) farce had never occurred.

Let us marshal our facts and get started.

Does someone have a good timeline for the Arjun project fro previous discussions etc.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 12 Aug 2015 19:15

Srut,the Arjun saga ,its history,has been thrashed bare for several years now.The issue is orders for A-2,which are neded to keep our prod line going,support for all Arjuns in service and R&D for future FMBTs.

The 118 fig may be for budgetary reasons. The A-2s are supposed to be more expensive than T-90s hence perhaps the smaller numbers than the A-1s in service.Remember the old reports of another 300 T-90s ordered around 2013. One report said that the IA wanted 4500+ MBTs by 2020.

Wik:

A ₹10000 crore (US$1.6 billion) purchase of 354 new T-90MS tanks for six tank regiments for the China border has been approved[25] which would take the total number of T-90 tanks in the Indian Army's inventory to 2011 and with a total of nearly 4500 tanks (T-90 and variants, T-72 and Arjun MBT) in active service, the world's third largest operator of tanks.

India plans to have 21 tank regiments of T-90s by 2020, with 45 combat tanks and 17 training and replacement tanks per regiment, for 62 total each.[26]

On 17 September 2013, India's Defence Ministry approved the production of 235 T-90 tanks under Russian licence for $1 billion.[27]

That fig means that local prod. of T-90s I approx. $4-4.5M per tank.A-2 approx. $5M

Each Arjun Mk-1 costs Rs 20 crore plus. Each Arjun Mk-2 with all improvements will cost approximately Rs 34 crore.

.

This is an old report ,4 years on,from the "F" mag,but after a visit to Avadi and worth repeating,the assumptions (operational logistics of A-2) however require confirmation.There's more info in the link with the CVRDE Dir.,Dr.Sivakumar's quoted.

http://www.livefistdefence.com/2012/08/ ... ealed.html

FORCE visited the Combat Vehicles Research & Development Establishment (CVRDE) for an exclusive insight into the programme. We learnt that while the Arjun Mk-2 is substantially improved and more capable than the Arjun Mk-1; it is too heavy, limiting areas where it can be deployed by the Army. And that renders it unsuitable for the army’s operational requirements for a Main Battle Tank (MBT). According to P Sivakumar, Director CVRDE, “the weight of the Arjun prevents it from being deployed in all the areas required by the Army”.

Keeping this in mind, the Arjun Mk-2’s improved performance seems to have put the Army in a spot. What does one do with a tank that is fast, can shoot accurately on the move and is relatively well protected but is too heavy to be deployed in the deserts near the Pakistan border as a replacement for the T-72 or T-90? Paradoxically, while the tank itself has demonstrated high speed and mobility, its weight precludes it from being able to operate anywhere the army wants it to. The Arjun Mk-2 will weigh around 67 tonnes and this fatally limits the tank’s operational effectiveness for the Indian Army.

The tank is too heavy to be deployed across the border with Pakistan. It is unable to effectively traverse terrain filled with natural and/or artificial obstacles. Or areas criss-crossed with rivers and canals. That rules out most places in Rajasthan, Punjab and the mountainous terrain of the J&K sector.

This has forced the army to identify areas where the Arjun can safely be deployed and its operational units based. This probably means the Arjun will not fight alongside the T-90s and T-72s. It will certainly not be part of the Indian Army’s strike corps formations, as it could get bogged down in unfamiliar terrain. This runs counter to the philosophy of armoured formations, which are designed for mobile offensive operations deep inside enemy territory. Unlike the T series tanks that have been airlifted to high altitudes like Leh and even out of the country, the Arjun cannot be airlifted by the IL-76 and C-130 J transports of the Indian Air Force (IAF). (?) The C-17 Globemaster to be inducted by the Indian Air Force (IAF) has a maximum payload of 75 tonnes — insufficient to airlift the 67 tonne Arjun Mk-2 with attendant support equipment.

During this correspondent’s visit to the CVRDE facility at Avadi in Tamil Nadu, it was evident that despite the best efforts of its highly committed team of designers and scientists, the Arjun is unlikely to ever be ordered in significant quantities by the Indian Army — which fields close to 3,500 tanks in its Order of Battle (ORBAT). The total orders for the Arjun as of today are 240 (124 Mk-1 and 116 Mk-2). For the Army, ordering more tanks would result in it having to devote more resources — something it seems loath to do.

As things stand presently, the first Arjun Mk-2 will roll off the production line at Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) Avadi, two and a half years (30 months) after the order is placed. With the orders likely to be finalized towards the end of the year, the first Mk-2 tank will enter operational service in 2016. With HVF Avadi looking at a production rate of 30 tanks a year, all 116 tanks will be delivered by 2020. If work on the Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) begins now in right earnest, then the first tanks could be ready for operational service circa 2025. Until then, the army would rather soldier on with its T-90 and upgraded T-72 tanks, which in any case have the required infrastructure in terms of training, manufacture and overhaul.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Aug 2015 19:32

Does someone have a good timeline for the Arjun project fro previous discussions etc.

Does not matter.

Two points of interest:

1) Funding. By buying Russian tanks that are considered cheaper than Indian ones, India is funding and sustaining Russian research. {Russian tanks are cheaper is a diff discussion thread _ I very much doubt that}

Point being ALL those funds should go to Indian agencies - now. 10 years of R&D, working out kinks, etc is a good lead time.

2) The bottom line question is does "India" - NOT the Indian Army - consider a "tank" a strategic asset. In line with say an LCA and nuclear subs.

IF "India" does, then all that matters is to design a tank, build it, work on getting the kinks out, build a solid supply chain, etc, etc, etc. This requires the Gov, Army and the rest to work together.

The Indian Army by releasing a RFI (or whatever) has broken this critical chain. So has RM Parrikar.

"Cost" should not even enter the discussions in the initial stages. Let the techs get hold first. Otherwise Russian tanks will *always* have an upper hand - why would they not? India is funding them.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 12 Aug 2015 19:53

I buy the arguments for indigenous independence,but costs do matter. They come out of our pockets! There cannot be a "blank cheque " given to desi DPSUs,as has been the case in the past,with little accountability both in terms of time and quality. We're talking about costs of the Rafale,unaffordable at approx. $7B for just 36 aircraft when desi built MKIs come at less than half that price. For every extra billion we spend on defence,we deny development in so many areas of the economy,esp. improving the lives of the rural folk,and the agricultural sector (that provides every India home with food) the backbone of the country.Do we want to go back to the infamous days of PL-480 where Lyndon Johnson used to blackmail India over food shipments?

The key Qs now with Arjun MK-2 are as follows:

1. Whether it has made the grade or not in the recent tests reg. its performance capability. The extra weight,dimension issues,etc. which the IA allegedly says prohibit the MBT from operating in many regions/logistic problems should be carefully examined and confirmed.
2.At what cost is an A-2 compared with a T-90 locally built.
3.Production rate/yr.

With answers to these one can then chalk out where the A-2 will fit in the IA's MBT order of battle. One further Q though.Is the latest IA statement about the A-2 not acceptable to it a demand to dump even the 118 agreed upon earlier?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Aug 2015 19:54

The "Armata" nor the new IA RFI discussion should never be based on nor related to the Arjun.

From an Indian Army PoV the two are totally different machines and time frames.

The 2025 IA effort should be post Arjun. A brand new effort to compete with the Armata. Given a chance Indian agencies can do it.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Aug 2015 19:55

but costs do matter

Which "costs". Specify them and then we can discuss. "Costs" is too wide a topic to insert in one sentence.

There is "cost" for doing something and a "cost" of not doing another thing.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 12 Aug 2015 20:17

Simple.Comparative costs for similar def. eqpt. The IAF decided on the Rafale against the Typhoon because it was cheaper. Is there any sense in not considering buying a reliable and affordable piece of firang eqpt. which can easily be supported at home,that comes in far cheaper than a desi product? But if one wants to protect desi wares, then why limit it to only defence eqpt? Why are we importing cheaper power eqpt from China for example,our mortal enemy?! The same yardstick should be used across the board.

There are some reports that the A-2 will cost $8m.Now that is twice that of a T-90.

Arjun MK 2 MBT tank to Roll out by 2015 and Cost about 8 Million dollars Each

Given a fixed budget,what do you think the services will opt for in a similar situation? They need weapons with which to fight and frankly (in most cases) don't give a damn from where they come as long as they work well ,do the business and are reliable and come at reasonable,affordable cost. As for the argument that buying Russian wares help Russia,so does every firang acquisition help its own country! C-17 orders kept the production line going for a few more years and US congressmen v.happy! We know from the latest exposes how the Westland (junk) helo deal was thrust upon us by Maggie T under the guise of Brit "aid",in reality helping Westland. Then what about Barak-8? Whom does it really benefit,India or Israel? Did not Israel also benefit from Indian money for its R&D for the missile?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Aug 2015 20:32

omparative costs for similar def. eqpt. The IAF decided on the Rafale against the Typhoon because it was cheaper.

I am dead sure India could buy pretty much everything much cheaper from most other nations. Nuclear subs, planes, guns, etc. Why even bother to have a MIC? Let others do the research, invest in R&D, perhaps once in a while ask Indians how tall are their pilots, what color do you want on the interior of your frigates (sorry we only have green left), .........

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Aug 2015 20:38

There are some reports that the A-2 will cost $8m.Now that is twice that of a T-90.

Who reported that? I am rather add sceptical at this pint about "reports".

Then has anyone costed similar situations WRT t-90 and Arjuns. Say buy same featured , 2000 tanks? And next step: if Russians buy say 4000 t-90s for themselves and export another say 2000, what would cost for a similar scenario for the arjun? How much would India sell 4000 arjuns to Russia and export 2000 arjuns.

That would be a fair comparison.

srai · Post by **srai** » 12 Aug 2015 20:51

Philip, what's the true costs of the T-90s? Bunch of stuff, like Shotra, TI etc, were omitted when bought to show lower cost per unit. Huge costs have subsequently occurred with multiple TI failures in high temperatures, jacked up prices for Refleks/ammo and their license, etc. Investments in support infrastructure and assembly, costs of ToT (some backtracked like gun technology or ammo but paid for), DRDO R&D to replace parts, guns, ERA/armor, air conditioner/cooler for electronics etc.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 12 Aug 2015 21:24

philip, i disagree on the generic idea about costs do matter. when it comes to establishing home-grown products, you can't cost by the basis of r&d expenses which is zilch when you buy it from firang nations. they know how to get back money from services (like low priced cars).

there is no value to the number of jobs a home grown product provides.
yes.. let it become expensive!~

SanjayC · Post by **SanjayC** » 12 Aug 2015 21:45

Philip wrote:Is there any sense in not considering buying a reliable and affordable piece of firang eqpt. which can easily be supported at home,that comes in far cheaper than a desi product?

The whole money paid for buying "expensive" home-grown products circulates in the Indian economy, not in the economy of another country. That is a big enough incentive.

Gyan · Post by **Gyan** » 12 Aug 2015 21:46

Refusal to order second batch of Arjun is to kill the possibility of India developing an industrial Eco system conductive for developing any AFV now or in Future.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 12 Aug 2015 22:26

Is there any sense in not considering buying a reliable and affordable piece of firang eqpt. which can easily be supported at home,that comes in far cheaper than a desi product?

The one person I had hoped that would provide some direction was Parrikar. And, he let the cat out of the bag when he made that statement in parliament - the deepest cut of them all. He, IMHO, had a chance to support the Indian industry, but he did not. Forget "Make", this would have been "Made" in India.

It is for that reason that I think this has a huge political leverage. This leverage was too much even for a person like Parrikar. IMHO of course.

Thus the "cost" is beyond the $ figure quoted and accepted. There are political, industrial dev, educational, economic, etc "costs".

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 12 Aug 2015 23:36

I think there is a deep lack of confidence and support for Make In India and Home grown products.
Maturity can only come when we begin providing feedback.. we have to increase the tranche mode of product development on a 2 year cycle basis.

srai · Post by **srai** » 13 Aug 2015 05:05

Gyan wrote:Refusal to order second batch of Arjun is to kill the possibility of India developing an industrial Eco system conductive for developing any AFV now or in Future.

The IA doesn't get it, or it doesn't give a damn!

member_29151 · Post by **member_29151** » 13 Aug 2015 10:01

srai wrote:
Gyan wrote:Refusal to order second batch of Arjun is to kill the possibility of India developing an industrial Eco system conductive for developing any AFV now or in Future.
The IA doesn't get it, or it doesn't give a damn!

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 13 Aug 2015 14:54

The T-80 Is Russia’s Most Overrated Tank

This '80s design cost way too much and had a serious design flaw

The T-80 Is Russia’s Most Overrated Tank

August 10, 2015

S.K. Au-Yeong

The T-80 is a glaring lesson in why heavily-armored tanks can hide major weaknesses. Once considered a premium tank by the Russian military establishment, T-80s suffered savage losses to lightly armed guerrillas during the First Chechen War. The tank’s reputation never recovered.

It wasn’t supposed to be this way. The T-80 was the last main battle tank to come out of the Soviet Union. It was the first Soviet tank to mount a gas turbine engine, giving it a top road speed of 70 kilometers per hour and an efficient power-to-weight ratio of 25.8 horsepower per ton.

This made the standard T-80B one of the most nimble tanks to come out of the 1980s.

The Chechen rebels’ combat prowess–and poor Russian tactics–was more responsible for the T-80’s losses than the inherent design. Though, it did have one major flaw. But in the end, it was too expensive and guzzled too much fuel. The Russian military grew to favor the more economical T-72 series instead.

WIB icon

The T-80 was an evolution over its predecessor, the T-64. As the most modern tank design of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the T-64 was a departure from the Soviet penchant for simple armored vehicle designs, such as the T-54/55 and T-62.

For instance, the T-64 was the first Soviet tank to replace human loaders with mechanical autoloaders, reducing the crew from four to three. The T-64’s second trend-setting innovation was the introduction of composite armor, which layered ceramics and steel together to provide superior resistance compared to only steel.

Further, the T-64 had lightweight, small diameter all-steel road wheels in contrast to the large, rubber rimmed ones on the T-55 and T-62.

The first mass produced variant, the T-64A, mounted the huge 125-millimeter 2A46 Rapira main gun, which was so popular that it came included on all subsequent Russian tanks … up to the T-90. Remarkably, the T-64A packed all of this potential into a petite 37-ton package–relatively light for a tank of this size.

But as marvelous as these innovations were, the T-64 had a sensitive 5TDF engine and unusual suspension–both prone to breaking down. As a result, the Soviet army deliberately assigned the tanks to units stationed close to its manufacturing plant in Kharkov.

Even worse, rumors circulated that the T-64’s new autoloader chomped off the arms of crew members who strayed too close. It’s a plausible scenario given the T-64’s tiny internal space.

While fixing the T-64A’s automotive maladies, the Soviets developed an interest in developing a new tank with a gas turbine engine. Gas turbines have high acceleration and an efficient power-to-weight ratio, can start quickly in cold weather without prior warm-up–a necessity in Russia’s frigid winters–and they’re lightweight.

On the downside, gas turbines guzzle fuel and have higher susceptibility to dirt and dust owing to their voracious air intake compared to conventional diesels.

The original base model T-80 didn’t enter active service until 1976–much later than planned. The Soviet tank industry had its hands full working out the T-64A’s kinks and gearing up for producing the T-72 as a cheaper backup option. At the same time, the Soviets were building more T-55s and T-62s for Arab allies which had lost hundreds of tanks during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The early-model T-80s also had their problems. In November 1975, the USSR’s then defense minister Andrei Grechko blocked the tank’s production because of its wasteful fuel consumption and few firepower advancements over the T-64A. Five more months passed before Grechko’s successor, Dmitriy Ustinov, authorized the new tank to go into production.

The original T-80’s production line continued for two years–not long–as it was already outclassed by the T-64B tank, which featured a new fire control system that could fire 9M112 Kobra missiles from its main gun. More serious, the T-80 was nearly three-and-a-half times more expensive than the T-64A.

The T-80B succeeded the baseline model in 1978. As the most advanced “premium tank” in the East, the Soviets beginning in 1981 assigned most T-80Bs to its highest risk garrison–the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Its high speed earned it the nickname “Tank of the English Channel.” In Soviet war game calculations, T-80Bs were able to reach the Atlantic coast within five days–assuming that they didn’t run out of fuel.

This new variant borrowed from the T-64. In addition to firing conventional sabot, shaped charge and anti-personnel fragmentation shells, the T-80B’s 125-millimeter 2A46M-1 smoothbore gun could launch the same 9K112 Kobra missiles.

Since this anti-tank guided missile was considerably more expensive than regular tank shells, the tank only carried four missiles compared to 38 shells. The missiles were intended to swat down attack helicopters or ATGM-capable vehicles beyond the range of the T-80B’s conventional gun rounds.

A co-axial 7.62 x 54-millimeter PKT and 12.7 x 108-millimeter NSVT Utes machine gun for the commander’s cupola rounded off the tank’s anti-personnel weapons.

While the T-80B boasted advanced composite armor, it had even greater protection through its Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armor, or ERA. Arranged in the same horizontal layers as late production T-72A tanks, ERA-equipped T-80Bs were called
In 1987, the T-80U succeeded the T-80B in production, if not absolute numbers.

Externally, the T-80U mounted Kontakt-5 reactive armor. This was an improvement over Kontakt-1–which used an add-on array of explosive filled shingles. Instead, Kontakt-5 was a factory applied set of plates pointing forward to maximize the deflection angle of incoming rounds. Kontakt-1 was only useful against shaped charge warheads, while Kontakt-5 added resistance to kinetic energy sabot rounds as well.

Internally, the T-80U traded the T-80B’s 1A33 fire control system for the more advanced 1A45. The engineers swapped out the Kobra missiles with the laser-guided 9K119 Refleks guided missile–a more reliable, longer range and harder hitting weapon. T-80Us crammed in seven more rounds of 125-millimeter shells than the T-80B.

But the T-80U didn’t last long in production. Its new GTD-1250 turbine was still too fuel hungry and maintenance heavy. In its place came the diesel powered T-80UD. This represented the last T-80 variant to be produced in the Soviet Union. It was also the first of its kind to see action outside of a training school … if “action” meant blasting tank shells into the Russian parliament to settle the October 1993 constitutional crisis.

The December 1994 separatist war in Chechnya was the first action for the T-80 where the shooting was going both ways … and it was an epic disaster.

When rebels in Chechnya declared their country’s independence, Russian president Boris Yeltsin ordered troops to bring the former Soviet republic back to the fold by force. These troops took T-80Bs and BVs with them. The soldiers had never trained with the T-80 before. Ignorant of the new tank’s gluttony for fuel, they ran their engines dry while idling.

The Russian advance into the Chechen capital Grozny was a near massacre for the invaders–nearly 1,000 soldiers died and 200 vehicles were destroyed from Dec. 31, 1994, to the following New Year’s Day evening. As the most advanced vehicle in the Russian assault force, the T-80B and T-80BVs suffered horrific losses.

While impervious to direct frontal hits, dozens of these tanks were destroyed in catastrophic explosions, their turrets blowing off after sustaining multiple strikes from the Chechen rebels’ RPG-7V and RPG-18 rocket launchers.
T-80UD during 1993 crisis

It turned out–the T-80’s Korzhina autoloader had a fatal design flaw. The autoloader stored ready propellant in a vertical position, with only the tank’s road wheels partially protecting it. RPGs striking the T-80 in the sides above the road wheels were likely to set off the propellant, resulting in the tank’s explosive decapitation.

In this respect, the T-72A and Bs–which received the same kind of punishment–had a marginally higher probability of surviving flanking strikes because their autoloaders stored propellant in a horizontal position below the rims of their road wheels.

A second major fault of the T-80, like previous Russian tanks, was minimal gun elevation and depression. The tank’s gun could not fire back at rebels shooting from upper story rooms or basements.

To be fair, T-80 casualties were more likely the fault of ill-prepared crews, inadequate training and disastrous tactics. Such was the haste of Russia’s rush to war that T-80BVs entered Grozny without the explosive filler in their reactive armor panels, making the armor useless. It was even alleged that some soldiers sold off the explosive inserts to supplement their salaries.

The Soviet army had long forgotten the hard lessons of urban warfare from World War II. During the Cold War, only Spetsnaz commandos and the Berlin garrison had trained for serious city fighting. Expecting little resistance, Russian forces drove into Grozny with infantry buttoned up inside their BMP and BTR transports. Their commanders got lost because they didn’t have proper maps.

Since Russian soldiers were reluctant to exit their transports and clear buildings room by room, their Chechen adversaries–who knew the weaknesses of Russian vehicles from Soviet-era conscription–were free to turn the tanks and other armored vehicles into crematoriums.

It was easy for the Russian high command to blame the T-80’s design for the Chechen disaster–as opposed to clumsy operational planning and tactical inadequacies. But ultimately, it was a lack of money which caused the cheaper T-72 to displace the T-80 as the preferred choice for Russia’s export sales and its post-Chechen wars.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia lost the T-80UD production plant in Kharkov to the newly independent Ukraine. The T-80U factory at Omsk declined into bankruptcy, while the Leningrad LKZ plant no longer made the earlier T-80BV.

For Russia to have three tank types–the T-72 (A and , T-80 (BV, U and UD) and T-90 (a rebrand of the T-72BU)–made no financial or logistical sense. Each tank had the same 125-millimeter 2A46M gun and similarly performing gun-launched missiles. But they all had different engines, fire control systems and chassis.

In simpler terms, these tanks offered commonality in capabilities but diversity in spare parts, rather than common spare parts and diversity of capabilities. Since the T-80U was far more expensive than the T-72B, it was only logical for a cash-strapped Russia to favor the T-72.

But Moscow continued to experiment with its T-80s, adding active protection systems–which use millimeter-wave radar to track incoming missiles before launching explosive countermeasures. The resulting T-80UM-1 Bars was revealed in 1997 but did not enter production, probably again because of budget cuts.

Russia did not use the T-80 during the Second Chechen War of 1999-2000, or the brief 2008 conflict with Georgia–as far as we know. T-80s have so far not joined the war in Ukraine.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 13 Aug 2015 18:39

I agree about reducing capability later on after a deal.It can't be done. Whatever is bought,has to perform to the promised specs./requirements handed out by the buyer. Our problem is that along the line,as we're seeing with the Rafale,"extras" are added.One can understand if these are small features and ones that cost v.little,but it raises suspicion that the "extras" have been factored in for "under-the-counter" reasons.

I still don't buy the argument about paying huge amts for desi wares when much cheaper firang ones are available.As I said,we are already doing it across the board,why must defence be exempted? There is now huge fear that with the Yuan depreciation,Chines egoods will flood the market,affecting textiles,steel,etc. France and EU nations heavily subsidise their agricultural sector,which is fundamental to their culture and way of life and employs the majority of the population! Unless we too are able to do that for all products,protecting Indian industry ,when there is a yawning deficit in export-import figures,the argument about other nations benefiting holds true. Apart from this,it is so clear that we do not possess the cutting edge def. tech in so many areas despite our v.laudable achievements in strat. missiles,rocketry and space tech. We have to rely upon foreign OEMs for outright,JVs and local manufacture of weapon systems,reducing the gap of import content year by year,making incremental progress.

We should look carefully at trade balance figs for each country/bloc .The simplest way to save $50B+ is to impose heavy duties on products from China,our enemy ("my enemies enemy is my all-weather friend-Pak") ,which is killing off Indian small and med. scale industry,with even majors now under siege.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 13 Aug 2015 19:02

I still don't buy the argument about paying huge amts for desi wares when much cheaper firang ones are available.As I said,we are already doing it across the board,why must defence be exempted?

Lot of flaws in you argument:

* India is NOT doing it "across the board". Nuclear subs, missiles, nuclear areas. Have not checked, but how about oil reserves?
* "Defense" cannot be outsourced (as too many other areas - manufacturing, chemicals, pharma, etc)
* You certainly do not get the point (even after you get it you do not need to agree), that "cost" includes a LOT of other things. It is NOT just $30 mil per Russian tank or $40 mil per Arjun. You are comparing what the Indian Army (may?) pay for a unit of "tank". There are other costs to consider. I guess you do not get that. ??????????? And, you have NOT addressed some of teh questions posed to you (while you repeat your old arguments)
* Finally as an extrapolation of the above bullet point: There is a cost for not doing something (like designing and building a tank in India) vs. the cost of doing something (like purchasing a tank from Russian). That cost - of NOT building an Indian tank - is FAR greater than purchasing a tank from Russia.

Why is it not possible for an Indian tank to be exported to Russia - has anyone thought of that? India should be able to produce a very good tank and much cheaper by 2025-30.

There is now huge fear that with the Yuan depreciation,Chines egoods will flood the market,affecting textiles,steel,etc. France and EU nations heavily subsidise their agricultural sector,which is fundamental to their culture and way of life and employs the majority of the population!

India should do what the French are doing and make building tanks in India a cultural think - if that is what it takes. Protect that sector.

member_28454 · Post by **member_28454** » 13 Aug 2015 19:47

You cannot achieve much price reduction and increase the proportion of indigenous sub-assemblies for the Arjun or any Mechanical product without economies of scale from a substantial order.
You cannot solve the teething issues and improve serviceability easily and quickly without a substantial order for the Arjun.
A substantial order also builds the ecosystem of ancillary companies which further decreases cost, increases indigenization, boosts the local economy and increases local expertise across the board.

There is nothing very complicated about what I have said above and it should be clear to anyone who has been in positions where such decisions are made.
The fact that the right decision was never made implies incompetence or something worse...

Manish_P · Post by **Manish_P** » 13 Aug 2015 20:07

That cost - of NOT building an Indian tank - is FAR greater than purchasing a tank from...

+1

Why is it not possible for an Indian tank to be exported to Russia

Seriously we need a like button (or a salute smiley).. on this here forum

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 13 Aug 2015 20:18

The acute problem you seem to ignore ,which you deliberately choose to ignore,is that despite a lot of money and enormous amounts of time spent as well,we have been unable to deliver on simple items like a BT,IJT,etc. We cannot even develop a single GT engine! Even the complex systems like the LCA and Arjun have significant amounts of foreign content,that too after decades of so-called "R&D". The Arjun is still using a German engine after decades of "development".We can't even produce a desi designed simple item like a combat rifle for the infantry and are now looking for a new firang one!

There seems to be a desire to perpetuate incompetence and mediocrity in the minds of some,wanting the DPSUs to continue their patchy performance at the cost of the taxpayer as well as the end-user,the services which need effective weapons to fight with not antiques or showpieces.

Delays are attributed to influence of "vested interests".There may be an element of truth in it,but who is the chief stakeholder? The GOI. If the various GOIs are unable or unwilling to make a breakthrough,then all our debate is futile.10 years from now as we did ten years ago,we may be still debating in the same manner the same issues,the LCA and Arjun.

The issue ,back to Arjun is whether it has made the grade in the recent tests ,if so order more,determine what prod. rate,and what unit cost will it come in at so that it can be effectively budgeted into the IA's future MBT numbers,4500 planned from reports.The last report about IA's unhappiness and unwillingness to buy more,even the 118 A-2s agreed upon earlier, needs to be confirmed and the DM/MOD to take a stand based upon the merits of the case.

PS:Why is not possible to export....to anywhere? This is an issue that is the subject of much discussion.Unless our defence eqpt, makes the grade,and comes in at reasonable cost,no one will buy them.We first have to develop and produce reliable eqpt. that we can also support.Ecuador exports of Dhruv had support issues.

Secondly,there must be a thrust from the GOI/MOD.Even Pak seems to export more than India! Let the MOD/GOI embark upon a huge export sales pitch and display Arjun,the LCA,ALH,LCH,LUH,missiles,etc. at all defexpos worldwide.Let's see how many nations will buy these items.They have to be competitive.The only Indian item in heavy demand,which we've not yet sold publicly,is Brahmos,the Indo-Russian JV and therein lies the answer ,how to produce a world-class product.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 13 Aug 2015 21:59

All I can say is that India - in the past - has worked wonders provided there was a Kargil. When Indians want something done, they can certainly do it. ISRO, Agni, strategic nukes and many, many more.

IJT, engines for Arjun, -40, etc are all examples for either not wanting to do it or more than likely a foreign entity that stands to benefit from making tons of money has intervened (that too actually is a fault with India).

It seems very odd - to say the very least - that Indians can go abroad and lead major efforts on designing engines and manufacturing them, including building automated plants (I know a few) and Indians in India cannot.

And then there is a thriving underground economy within India - some 3 times as large as that above - and there are no funds for absolutely needed Indian projects. But when a foreign company provides the very same product, the funds come out of nowhere.

#Conundrum.

Dunno. Indians need to solve that.

BUT, there is nothing there that tells me that an Indian tank cannot be design + built. Absolutely nothing. There is no need what so ever to import a tank. Parts of a design? Perhaps. Some techs to get it moving. Perhaps. Nothing beyond that.

Ashutosh Malik · Post by **Ashutosh Malik** » 13 Aug 2015 22:38

@Philip - If you don't mind, please reduce the usage of bold fonts. Comes across as if you are shouting. Certainly difficult to read.

Best regards.

member_28454 · Post by **member_28454** » 14 Aug 2015 01:45

The acute problem you seem to ignore ,which you deliberately choose to ignore...

It would be good for the forum if you read the umpteen posts from other posters who have replied to all your points Ad Nauseam.
It is tiring to repeat these answers when you repeat unsubstantiated calumnies against indigenous products that have been answered numerous times.
Please respect the effort that people have taken to answer you repeatedly and desist from abuse.

The superiority of the Arjun and the inferior standards to which imports from Russia have been held to vis a vis the Arjun are well established on this forum. You only have to read the forum to know this. Compared to a western style MBT such as the Arjun, it is the T-72BU(T-90) that would seem more more of a antique and a showpiece, especially as much of the Russian tank's components do not work as promised (again this very same forum has numerous references to this).

As for Assault Rifles or combat aircraft, such as the MICWS or the Marut: There are numerous good Indian designs. But if our Armed Forces prefer to import instead of adopting and nurturing them, there is not much more that DRDO or other agencies can do.

A pertinent observation: If ISRO was not its own customer and had to sell to the IA or the IAF, it's success would have been doomed from the start.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 14 Aug 2015 12:49

Sorry,highlighted sent's. only because ethey contain key info.

If you've read my many posts,there is little dispute as to the current dev. status of A-2. For T-90 acquisitions,read history.The tale has been told too many a time.What we need to know now is why the IA (from recent reports) does not want more Arjuns-it's given its reasons,and whether the MOD/DM agrees with them or not. There is also the supposed "shortage" of tanks according to some reports and a 4500 number reqd. by 2020. How is that going to be planned for and what types and numbers in the inventory. Cost figs,budgets,etc. also need to be explained to the taxpayer. There is a veil of secrecy over the MBT plans which needs to be lifted.

Read the other tds DRDO,delays,etc.,for a better understanding of the problem of the poor performance in general of the DPSUs,admittedly with patches of brilliance.

member_29151 · Post by **member_29151** » 17 Aug 2015 10:49

srutayus wrote:
The acute problem you seem to ignore ,which you deliberately choose to ignore...
It would be good for the forum if you read the umpteen posts from other posters who have replied to all your points Ad Nauseam.
It is tiring to repeat these answers when you repeat unsubstantiated calumnies against indigenous products that have been answered numerous times.
Please respect the effort that people have taken to answer you repeatedly and desist from abuse.

The superiority of the Arjun and the inferior standards to which imports from Russia have been held to vis a vis the Arjun are well established on this forum. You only have to read the forum to know this. Compared to a western style MBT such as the Arjun, it is the T-72BU(T-90) that would seem more more of a antique and a showpiece, especially as much of the Russian tank's components do not work as promised (again this very same forum has numerous references to this).

As for Assault Rifles or combat aircraft, such as the MICWS or the Marut: There are numerous good Indian designs. But if our Armed Forces prefer to import instead of adopting and nurturing them, there is not much more that DRDO or other agencies can do.

A pertinent observation: If ISRO was not its own customer and had to sell to the IA or the IAF, it's success would have been doomed from the start.

Exactly Sir,
the Best example is navy Which Believes And participate In a project from Starting !! they have Big plans for NLCA but on the Other hand See IAF And Army never Supports a Project ... and Once Its done ! make Silly excuses For Not Buying Them.
Wish Some day Some Admiral Becomes Defence Minister and take the charge From front!!

member_29151 · Post by **member_29151** » 18 Aug 2015 08:55

Cant we sell Arjun outside to other friendly countries like tajakistan, afganistan, vietnam... etc?? it would make a good and profitable tank for sale to other countries!!

niran · Post by **niran** » 18 Aug 2015 09:36

Kumar Vinod wrote:Cant we sell Arjun outside to other friendly countries like tajakistan, afganistan, vietnam... etc?? it would make a good and profitable tank for sale to other countries!!

around half a decade ago a Country in ASEAN was very much interested, so much so they had a team of their tankist in India evaluating Arjun for 3 weeks. but then GOI refused citing some ahinsa and kaansteatwoshun or some such gibbrish. the deal went to China but currently it is in limbo due to financial reasons, there is still a chance if Arjun is properly marketed.