114 HU never became AAC. 114 HU was and remains with IAF. AAC has a separate unit for the same role in Partapur and both complement each other efforts.chaanakya wrote:If I am not mistaken, 114 HU became AAC in Army later. Or IAF still operates 114 and IA has got AAC?
Reading Siachen by Gokhale was revealing. That was the ground breaking effort by IAF supporting IA that got IA its AAC.
Expanding the role of AAC to include fixed-wing Aircraft
Re: Expanding the role of AAC to include fixed-wing Aircraft
Re: Expanding the role of AAC to include fixed-wing Aircraft
Thanks. I was reading about its stellar role in Siachen. It is mentioned in that book that Leh is "mecca' for Heli pilots for nowhere in the world you will fly as high as here.
Re: Expanding the role of AAC to include fixed-wing Aircraft
The AAC squadron is 666 Utility Helicopter Squadron. It operates the Dhruv for various roles under 14 Corps.deejay wrote:114 HU never became AAC. 114 HU was and remains with IAF. AAC has a separate unit for the same role in Partapur and both complement each other efforts.chaanakya wrote:If I am not mistaken, 114 HU became AAC in Army later. Or IAF still operates 114 and IA has got AAC?
Reading Siachen by Gokhale was revealing. That was the ground breaking effort by IAF supporting IA that got IA its AAC.
Re: Expanding the role of AAC to include fixed-wing Aircraft
Thank Rohit.rohitvats wrote: The AAC squadron is 666 Utility Helicopter Squadron. It operates the Dhruv for various roles under 14 Corps.
Nice to know that the Partapur Unit has changed over to Dhruv. They operated the same type as the Siachen Pioneers (114 HU).
Re: Expanding the role of AAC to include fixed-wing Aircraft
Army should be allowed to order 36x4=144 LCA for CAS if IAF goes for 36 Rafales for Strategic / long range role.
Re: Expanding the role of AAC to include fixed-wing Aircraft
With the utmost respect to the posters here, it occurs to me that most of the suggestions on this thread are a case of 'cutting the nose to spite the face' type solutions.
What I mean is that the two problems that most people here are identifying are:
(a) Lack of coordination between IAF and IA, and
(b) IAF being more focused towards strategic air ops, and CAS being more closely tied with ground ops.
The solution being urged is to essentially give the IA an entire air force of its own (Indian Army Air Force perhaps? a wording thats about as ironic as PLAAF). And worse, to give the IA LCAs, with the claim that it'd be a good aircraft for CAS.
What isn't being answered is how this whole set up will actually work? Will it create more problem that it'd solve? Who'll train the pilots? Who'll handle maintenance? Will we have separate airfields? Logistics chains? Who controls and directs the airspace to ensure there's no confusion? What happens to theater level operations that require larger force levels that even the augmented AAC cant provide, thus requiring larger IAF and AI coordination.
These are tough questions that we will have to seriously consider before jumping into suggestions.
We need to go about this from the other direction and ask the real question - What does IA's CAS requirements entail. And based on that, whats the best setup and equipment?
1) Equipment:
I have nothing against the LCA. Its a wonderful aircraft. But its meant for a particular role, and excels in that. Given the kind of low-speed performance, payload abilities and loiter time that CAS aircraft need to have, the LCA seems ill-equipped for that role. Horses for Courses.
Combat aircraft like the LCA are optimized for supersonic, (and mostly high-altitude) flight. CAS requires low speed, low altitude maneuverability - the A-10 has a flat, long wing, and a top speed of only ~800 kmph, with a cruise speed of around 500 kmph.
Furthermore, In frantic theatre-level operations, CAS requests will occur from many locations at the same time, and in many cases, it might not require much weapons load to achieve the mission objectives. In such a scenario, an aircraft that can carry heavy loads with a long endurance time will be preferred, so as to remain in theatre longer. The B1 bomber has been used in this capacity, with 12 hr missions being commonplace in Iraq and A'stan. LCA on the other hand will have an endurance of about 2-3 hrs tops.
With regard to payload, for eg, the A-10, an aircraft that few would deny is the perfect CAS aircraft has a payload of over 7 tons. Thats almost as much as the SU-30!! And an absolutely devastating 30 mm cannon that the aircraft was basically built around.
There's tradeoffs though. A slower aircraft is also a more open target. The US can afford to operate A-10s because they have total air supremacy, with next to zero SAM threat. We won't have that luxury. In the presence of even a tiny SA threat, US deployed B-1s flying high and used JDAMs for precision bombing. Like swatting a mosquito with a sledgehammer. Ridiculously expensive, and heavy handed. But it worked for them. Won't work for us. In the presence of MANPADs, weaponized helos will find it tough to operate. Dedicated CAS aircraft might fare better.
So I'd go out on a limb here and say that there is definitely need for a dedicated, high endurance, heavy load, CAS aircraft like the A-10, but we'll have to be willing to bear higher operational risks when compared with the US, due to the environment being more saturated with SAMs and MANPADs. Heavier threats will require that we use frontline combat aircraft.
This leaves the second question of who will operate these machines.
2) Coordination:
I'll simply say that if the problem here is lack of IA-IAF coordination, then the solution is to fix that, rather than to go down the slippery slope of giving combat aircraft to the IA. I think the guiding principle here should be usage - weaponized Helos and LCH make sense for AAC because their sole purpose almost is to support infantry operations, and they share the same logistics and maintenance chain that other helos in Army service require.
Fixed-wing aircraft are a whole new leap, and it might just make more sense to have the squadron seconded to the theater commander of the Indian Army while being under IAF overall control during peacetime, etc. Having dedicated CAS aircraft would simplify that situation since they are meant for solely that purpose. One might argue that for this reason, we could as well place them under the IA. This will complicate the logistics issues I think. Solving the coordination problems is a far easier prospect than the pandora's box that the alternative would involve.
What I mean is that the two problems that most people here are identifying are:
(a) Lack of coordination between IAF and IA, and
(b) IAF being more focused towards strategic air ops, and CAS being more closely tied with ground ops.
The solution being urged is to essentially give the IA an entire air force of its own (Indian Army Air Force perhaps? a wording thats about as ironic as PLAAF). And worse, to give the IA LCAs, with the claim that it'd be a good aircraft for CAS.
What isn't being answered is how this whole set up will actually work? Will it create more problem that it'd solve? Who'll train the pilots? Who'll handle maintenance? Will we have separate airfields? Logistics chains? Who controls and directs the airspace to ensure there's no confusion? What happens to theater level operations that require larger force levels that even the augmented AAC cant provide, thus requiring larger IAF and AI coordination.
These are tough questions that we will have to seriously consider before jumping into suggestions.
We need to go about this from the other direction and ask the real question - What does IA's CAS requirements entail. And based on that, whats the best setup and equipment?
1) Equipment:
I have nothing against the LCA. Its a wonderful aircraft. But its meant for a particular role, and excels in that. Given the kind of low-speed performance, payload abilities and loiter time that CAS aircraft need to have, the LCA seems ill-equipped for that role. Horses for Courses.
Combat aircraft like the LCA are optimized for supersonic, (and mostly high-altitude) flight. CAS requires low speed, low altitude maneuverability - the A-10 has a flat, long wing, and a top speed of only ~800 kmph, with a cruise speed of around 500 kmph.
Furthermore, In frantic theatre-level operations, CAS requests will occur from many locations at the same time, and in many cases, it might not require much weapons load to achieve the mission objectives. In such a scenario, an aircraft that can carry heavy loads with a long endurance time will be preferred, so as to remain in theatre longer. The B1 bomber has been used in this capacity, with 12 hr missions being commonplace in Iraq and A'stan. LCA on the other hand will have an endurance of about 2-3 hrs tops.
With regard to payload, for eg, the A-10, an aircraft that few would deny is the perfect CAS aircraft has a payload of over 7 tons. Thats almost as much as the SU-30!! And an absolutely devastating 30 mm cannon that the aircraft was basically built around.
There's tradeoffs though. A slower aircraft is also a more open target. The US can afford to operate A-10s because they have total air supremacy, with next to zero SAM threat. We won't have that luxury. In the presence of even a tiny SA threat, US deployed B-1s flying high and used JDAMs for precision bombing. Like swatting a mosquito with a sledgehammer. Ridiculously expensive, and heavy handed. But it worked for them. Won't work for us. In the presence of MANPADs, weaponized helos will find it tough to operate. Dedicated CAS aircraft might fare better.
So I'd go out on a limb here and say that there is definitely need for a dedicated, high endurance, heavy load, CAS aircraft like the A-10, but we'll have to be willing to bear higher operational risks when compared with the US, due to the environment being more saturated with SAMs and MANPADs. Heavier threats will require that we use frontline combat aircraft.
This leaves the second question of who will operate these machines.
2) Coordination:
I'll simply say that if the problem here is lack of IA-IAF coordination, then the solution is to fix that, rather than to go down the slippery slope of giving combat aircraft to the IA. I think the guiding principle here should be usage - weaponized Helos and LCH make sense for AAC because their sole purpose almost is to support infantry operations, and they share the same logistics and maintenance chain that other helos in Army service require.
Fixed-wing aircraft are a whole new leap, and it might just make more sense to have the squadron seconded to the theater commander of the Indian Army while being under IAF overall control during peacetime, etc. Having dedicated CAS aircraft would simplify that situation since they are meant for solely that purpose. One might argue that for this reason, we could as well place them under the IA. This will complicate the logistics issues I think. Solving the coordination problems is a far easier prospect than the pandora's box that the alternative would involve.