Expanding the role of AAC to include fixed-wing Aircraft

[chaanakya]

http://defencesecurityindia.com/urgent- ... -aviation/

The following recommendations are made to enhance the combat potential of

Army Aviation:

• AAC must have a mix of small fixed wing aircraft and a full complement helicopter fleet comprising attack, utility and light helicopters.

• Fixed wing aircraft are needed by AAC for communications duties, as airborne command posts, for reconnaissance and surveillance, for casualty evacuation and similar other tasks.

• The helicopter fleet should consist of attack helicopters; armed helicopters (gun, ships); heavy, medium and light lift utility helicopters; observation helicopters; and helicopters for communications, electronic warfare and as aerial command posts.

• One or more composite squadrons specially dedicated for functioning with the Special Forces are essential.

• Headquarters Commands and Corps need to have aviation brigades and divisions should have aviation squadrons. Armoured divisions need to have attack helicopter squadrons in addition.

• UAV’s need to be integrated with the AAC for optimum results.

• All logistics functions need to be integrated within the AAC and the present system of control of logistics manpower by different corps needs to be dispensed with.

• Besides hardware, manpower upgrade, to include a separate aviation cadre, increased intake of aviators; recruitment and training of technical as well as non-technical manpower; revision of war and peace establishments; and introduction of new trades needed.

• Other changes include modernisation of aviation bases, raising of aviation brigades and logistics units; restructuring of training establishments; enhancement of air field support services; dedicated communication systems; and the upgrade of the Army Aviation Directorate, which is now manned by an additional director general level officer

[Indranil]

Abhibhushan ji,

First of all, thank you for your distinguished service.

I did not go through the "design your fighter" thread (my sincerest apologies Hakimji). But your Kiran-based strike aircraft caught my attention. Incidentally, it was just yesterday that I was thinking that HAL went the wrong with the IJT. They should have just refined the Ajeet trainer. It would have been a much less riskier proposition. A modern turbofan engine (AI-222 or Al-55I) and modern systems would have increased the range substantially, obviating the need for those almost permanent wing-fuel tanks.

Now coming back to your Kiran-based plane. I think this is what HAL/IAF are trying to achieve with the attack Hawk. Probably, that is the lowest hanging fruit. The airplane is modern, they just need to change the subsystems. But the Hawk airframe (like Kiran) is not ideal for this role because of the compromises to accommodate two pilots. I also feel that the plane would be underpowered for the strike role.

What do you feel about a ajeet-based attack aircraft? The fuselage can be lengthened to fit the F-125IN, and the wing area can increased proportionately. Such a plane would have much better payload and endurance. It will be cheap to procure and maintain. The subsystems can be directly adapted from the attack Hawk. Besides, on dumping all the payload, the pilot has a fighter in his hands if he gets into trouble.

[Abhibhushan]

What do you feel about a ajeet-based attack aircraft? The fuselage can be lengthened to fit the F-125IN, and the wing area can increased proportionately.

My short answer is no. The Ajeet/Gnat is extremely optimized. Not much scope is left for incremental improvement. It had no sensors, no electronic Defence, very rudimentary communication. It was a very clever mechanical design, hanging all the loads on a single frame, and it was a delight to fly within its happy envelop . It was however very jumpy at speeds exceeding 450 Knots. By today's standards, it is not a weapon system of choice.

[Abhibhushan]

Continuing Indranil's line of thought, if I was to design an advanced trainer cum CAS aircraft, I would have blindly and shamelessly copied the Hunter. With a composite body, modern avionics, un reheated Kaveri as the power plant, modern communication, LCA level of self protection suit. It would be a world beater in the high subsonic low level beat.

Reverse engineer in 36 months, test prototypes for the next 24 months and then produce 120 copies quickly!

ps. Even if I succeeded in this attempt, it will not still be the A-10 wannabe that I will still need. I will have get down to design a UCAV for that need.

[sudeepj]

Air support for the purpose of CAS by fixed or rotary aircraft is very risky for expensive platforms and is also expensive simply because the cost of training pilots to do CAS and the cost of fuel/other consumables in providing such support. The future is precision guided tube fired munitions. I am not talking about first generation projectiles such as Krasnopol or the copper head, but about the second generation PGM kits for 155mm artillery shells, such as XM1156. These fuses are screwed onto the nose of the shell replacing a normal air burst fuse.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM1156_Pr ... idance_Kit

"A conventional unguided M549A1 155 mm artillery projectile has a circular error probability (CEP) of 267 m (876 ft) at its maximum range, meaning that rounds can be expected to land within 267 meters of their intended target. This has made unguided artillery dangerous to use in close combat for fear of friendly fire and collateral damage. The M982 Excalibur was fielded as a guided shell that effectively hit within 6 m (20 ft) of a target, but the Army developed the XM1156 as a cheaper alternative. The PGK fuse can be screwed onto existing M549A1 and M795 projectiles, be fired from M109A6 Paladin and M777A2 Howitzer artillery systems, and hits within 50 m (160 ft) of the target at any range.[5][6]

Small aerodynamic fins pop out of the system to steer the shell on target. Its GPS receiver compares the PGK's flight pattern to the coordinates of where it should hit, and the fins adjust its path to match where the round will actually impact. A fail safe exists where if the shell does not impact within 150 m (490 ft) of the intended target, it will land but not explode; the PGK "decides" five seconds after launch whether it expects to impact close enough to detonate. This safety feature is expected to give soldiers more confidence when calling in artillery support close to their position.[5][6]

The PGK is compatible with various 155 mm artillery stockpiles to reduce dispersion. It was demonstrated on German DM111 shells in September 2014 fired from a PzH2000 self-propelled howitzer. From a distance of 27 km (17 mi), 90 percent of the PGK-equipped German shells landed within 5 meters of the target.[7]"

This is the future, era of the CAS guys rescuing infantry grunts from tricky situations is over. The newer platforms being acquired now - Rudra, LCH, Apache are likely to be used for to provide weapons capabiilty in areas the infantry guy can not see, to influence the battle a few kms behind the front line, disrupting supply columns, armor concentration areas, fuel/ammo dumps and so on.

If it were up to me, I would develop a PGK for the tail kit of a projectile from an 81 mm mortar tube.

[srin]

Yeah - now that I think about it a bit more, an HTT-40 may not cut it as a CAS. By the time you put in armour in the cockpit and stock some 500 30mm rounds, and quad ATGM launchers, its probably going to be overweight.

How effective is a 30mm gun - of say Mig-27, A-10, Apache - against tank armour ? Is anti-tank limited to ATGMs (helinas and hellfires) or is the gun an effective alternative ?

[Gyan]

What about something like Textron Scorpion aircraft for CAS?

[shiv]

Reading stories, war memoirs, watching videos etc I can recall the following "most frequent" calls for CAS support. I am not talking about a planned assault which probably should involve air support in the planning stage itself, but I am referring to stories of ongoing land battles where air support has been called in. Needless to say most stories relate to US experiences and I tried to dig into my memory to recall instances of CAS in Indian wars in the thick of a land battle.

I could recall only two - one being Longewala and the other Kargil. But there are some stories of IAF close support from the eastern/Bangladesh side. I will refer and post later. Famous tank battles like Asal Uttar of 1965 and Shakhargarh in 1971 where Lt Arun Khetarpal got a posthumous PVC seem to have had no CAS component. Having said that, reading the Pakistani side of the story the PAF was not present either to support their troops and credit for that goes to the IAFs SEAD role that left the PAF, particularly in 1971 in "run away from battle" state. I do vaguely recall CAS Vampires in 1965 being shot down. The stories of IAF attacks within Pakistan are legion and the IAF flew 500 sorties a day in 1971.

One remark by a then serving IAF officer after the Kargil war was that in case of a war across a very long front the IAF would simply not have the assets in the numbers and types they used in Kargil.

On the other hand CAS stories from Vietnam and Afghanistan are a dime a dozen. Typically it is of soldiers on the ground needing a troublesome machine gun emplacement silenced, or accurate mortar fire that was keeping them pinned down to be stopped by air support. On the other had there are many stories of Indian soldiers in valiant hand to hand combat taking out enemy bunkers. In retrospect I wonder if CAS in such instances would have saved lives.

So there is a powerful argument for an Army-demanded CAS role. Judging from the stories I have heard/read - it's not invariably tanks. Very often it is a bunker with heavy machine gun, mortar or artillery taht needs to be taken out. Air to ground rockets and strafing with cannon are both effective and a light aircraft that is capable of agility near ground level even if "ground level" is at 15,000 feet would be an essential component. I personally see no reason why armed helos cannot do this role. There are good standoff weapons they can use and they can hide from fire using terrain.

More important IMO is the communication and coordinates. Ideally sensor fusion between air support and army unit would be useful. I can recall a few IAF-army incidents where the IAF could not locate the enemy. I used to react with irritation at what I thought was a stupid Wiki error in claiming that HF 24s took part in the Longewala battle. But I learned recently that a unit of HF 24s from some other base were sent out too and could not locate the Paki tanks. We know from IAF interviews that the first Hunter pilots who hit tanks were worried that they had hit Indian tanks. It was only when Major Atma Singh in his AOP aircraft confirmed that they were Paki tanks that the IAF got a boost.

[shiv]

Here is a data point from an analysis of Manpad attacks on turboprop aircraft
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Fi ... .pdf[quote]
Overall (see Table 2), aircraft with piston or turboprop engines (whether multiple engines or not) are much more vulnerable to MANPADS, suffering both hits and crashes to a greater extent than jet-propelled aircraft.[/quote]

[eklavya]

I could recall only two - one being Longewala and the other Kargil.

Also Operation Pawan

A bloodied accord

Apart from the mines, the highest number of IPKF casualties were from LTTE snipers located in buildings and even tree-tops, equipped with sophisticated, high-powered rifles with telescopic infra-red sights. At least five helicopters of the Indian Air Force were badly damaged by snipers when they were dropping troops in designated areas. Finally, the IPKF had to induct six armour-plated Mi-24 helicopter gunships since none of the Mi-8s or Chetaks could fly below 2,000 ft without the risk of being shot at.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mil_Mi-24

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987–90) in Sri Lanka used Mi-24s when an Indian Air Force detachment was deployed there in support of the Indian and Sri Lankan armed forces in their fight against various Tamil militant groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It is believed that Indian losses were considerably reduced by the heavy fire support from their Mi-24s. The Indians lost no Mi-24s in the operation, as the Tigers had no weapons capable of downing the gunship at the time.[23][26]

Helicopter Operations in Sri Lanka

The tactics adopted by the IPKF had tremendous impact on the counter-insur­gency phase of these operations. The inherent flexibility of the Akbar and its ability to bring fire at short notice together with the tactical mobility provided by the Mi-8 proved beyond doubt, a real force multiplier. Because of the guerilla tactics of the militants, the organic weapons of eight to ten kilometre range with the ground forces could not be utilised fully or brought to bear in time. By the time own field guns, with road clearance and allied problems, could be brought close enough, the ground situation had changed. The Akbar then became the only means of ready fire power available. The physical and psychological impact of this weapon system on the militants aside, the effect on the morale of own troops at the sight of an Akbar coming in to provide them much needed close support and well-direc­ted fire power, can not be quantified.

[shiv]

**Thanks eklavya

But I need a slap on my wrist and must make an apology.

I just re visited parts of Jagan's 1965 air war book and I find that while army-air force communication was poor the IAF did give plenty of CAS to the Indian army in the deadly Chhamb sector and in the Kasur region (remember Asal Uttar?)

The IAF destroyed scores of tanks and soft skinned vehicles and shoot up the Pakistanis. All fixed-wing aircraft - Vampires that got shot down easily. Mysteres and Hunters

[Philip]

There is a real case for the IA to operate its own fleet of attack helos to ensure seamless support for ground troops in the shortest time possible. In fact,attack helos should be used in concert with armored formations as their heavily flying tanks.The KA-52 attack helo,naval version as well,is supposed to have ejection seats for the pilots,another v.valuable feature. IPKF and UN peacekeeping ops have showed us the value of these "flying tanks". In the current context of proliferation of MANPADS,anti-air arty, etc.,heavily armoured attack helos with stand-off ATGMs,etc.will be a fundamental requirement for the IA. All attack helos should under IA control. Light attack aircraft like the Scorpion ,Tucanos,Hawks or A-10/SU-25 class GA aircraft could be operated by the IAF.

[shiv]

Going back further in history, to the 1947-8 Kashmir war, the IAF played a stellar role in CAS with all sorts of inadequate fixed wing aircraft.

So fixed wing aircraft have played a major CAS role in every war. The only question germane to this thread is to what extent it would be desirable and feasible for the army to acquire some fixed wing aircraft.

The questions that come to mind are whether the army, with its very "local" frontline worries would in fact shoot itself in the foot by concentrating on CAS rather than deep interdiction and suppression of enemy air defences so that the adversary cannot get supplies or air cover. If army air assets keep getting shot down, or if the enemy has a continuous and abundant supply of men and material - what sort of air force would the army require to take care of that. If the Air Force is to tackle the latter then at what stage would the army have to draw the line and say "This is our domain"?

In a big war across a long front all air assets would be spread fairly thin and only US levels of equipment would allow robust force levels for everyone everywhere. The US is a huge complication. It is the strongest and the wealthiest and what the US does is often an example that everyone wants to follow but cannot actually follow because no one has US like resources either in money, innovation or industry

[shiv]

On the question of "Which fixed wing aircraft is suitable for CAS" - here is an old (posted on BRF before) article - a rant against the retirement of the American A-10.

For us mango people the article is a bit like Brad Pitt and Tom Cruise arguing about the best way to attract women, but if we ignore the specific aircraft types and look at the risks and capabilities we get a good idea of who is saying what. What I found interesting is that not everyone is America is saying "Avoid getting shot at. Stay at a safe distance." And the reasons are listed. Clearly there are different viewpoints on how to handle the issue of CAS.

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-us ... 1562789528

[Pratyush]

IMO, the best platform for CAS ought to be a large autonomous drone that can stay airborne for 2 or more days and be given the charge of one particular sector. Should be armed with PGM,s of different types to deal with different types of targets.

Propulsion type to be decided by the experts.

The standard load on terms of LGB per sortie ought to be the following,

1) one 2.5 ton bunker buster, for deeply buried target.
2) 2, one ton Iron bombs for other types of targets
3) 6 500 KG Bombs for other strong points.
4) 24 Brimstone type munitions for tanks and other armored vehicles.

In short I am asking for the endurance of global hawk and the load carrying capacity of A 10.

This vehicle should be under the control at the brigade / regimental level. The fire control should be under the control of the Brigade commander. The asset may or may not be operated by the AAC.

[deejay]

^^^ There is repeated mention of A10 whenever CAS is spoken about. Just to be sure everyone is on the same page:

CAS will not only involve dropping ammunition from what I know. It is the whole utilisation of aerial platforms for Close Air Support to ground Operations. A10 is just one way to do things.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Close_air_support
and as per this CAS is:

In military tactics, close air support (CAS) is defined as air action by fixed or rotary-winged aircraft against hostile targets that are close to friendly ground or naval forces, and which requires detailed integration of each air mission with fire and movement of these forces.[1]
Conversely, deep air support (DAS) is air action directed on objectives not in the immediate vicinity of friendly forces for the purposes of neutralizing and destroying enemy reserves and weapons, and for interfering with enemy command, supply, communications, and observations.
The determining factor for CAS is detailed integration, not proximity. CAS may need to be conducted far from friendly forces, if the mission requires detailed integration with the fire and movement of these forces. A closely related subset of air interdiction, battlefield air interdiction denotes interdiction against units with near-term effects on friendly units, but which does not require integration with friendly troop movements. The term "battlefield air interdiction" is not currently used in US joint doctrine.
Close air support requires excellent coordination with ground forces. In advanced modern militaries, this coordination is typically handled by specialists such as Joint Fires Observers, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC)s, and Forward Air Controllers (FAC).

So A10 or fire power from air of the kind A10 brings is just one aspect of CAS. There is a whole lot more required to be done under CAS.

[Philip]

"Rolling Thunder" was the name given to the US's sustained aerial bombing campaign against N.Vietnam. It also is a good name for what the IA should do in any future war with Pak,a continuous rolling barrage of arty coupled with air strikes against Paki ground forces,using a variety of weaponry,right from heavy mortars,ATGMs,MBTs/SP armour,arty,MBRLs from Pinaka to Smerch,tactical SR SSMs coupled with requisite integral attack helo support and CAS aircraft. Deeper raids into enemy territory using strike aircraft and PGMs,stand-off weaponry ,etc. are related but parallel to the effort at the tactical level. Enemy forces should be overwhelmed with such a saturation campaign.Tactical missiles will definitely be used extensively in the next war with Pak.

The IAF will be better equipped to deal with targets deeper into enemy territory and all fixed wing CAS assets should be under its control. Attack helos all with the IA for faster ,synchronised support on the battlefield.

[shiv]

deejay thanks for making the point about the A-10. I was apprehensive about bringing up the subject but decided that if I don't bring it up - it will come up anyway.

That said, I do not see unmanned aircraft taking over CAS anytime soon. For so many reasons battlefield air support requires the discrimination of the Mk 1 eyeball and pilot on the spot. It seems like a royal caste system to have men under fire on the ground calling for support while the pilots keep off because they are so precious and have expensive machines that can get shot down. I know for a fact that this is not the way the IAF thinks even if it attracts the comment that they will get shot down. I liked that article I posted because it says pretty much the same thing.

In a dicey situation with men only dozens of meters away from a threat it requires a pilot to decide whether he must use rockets, a Hellfire or guns and what direction he must approach from to avoid hitting friendlies. And in the air he can see if there are any other targets of opportunity.

From the article I posted earlier:

It would seem that the supersonic, pointy nosed fighter jet culture that has always prevailed in the USAF's top echelon only praises the A-10 when they desperately need it, then when such a time passes, it returns to being their budgetary sacrificial lamb.

important but under-realized issue that does pose a serious threat to our ground forces, especially in mountainous, jungle or hilly terrain. An F-22 or F-15 is poorly suited for flying at extremely low levels and searching canyons and valleys for enemy attack choppers that may be operating in a dispersed manner.

Traditionally, fighters like the F-16, F-15E, and eventually the F-35, strike from medium altitude using precision guided weapons and come down for strafing and show of force runs momentarily, and probably not at all against an enemy with robust air defenses. This remoteness in relation to the battle below means it takes more time for an aircrew to build up a picture of what is going on and who is exactly where, and this added time can mean lives lost.

[chaanakya]

What I could understand from above series of posts and the last one by Hakim saheb is Airforce assessment of requirement would not always meet the needs of ground forces in need of CAS. i.e. while Airforce may take into account the macro picture of war , the micro level details for CAS requirement is missed. Also needs of Ground forces are secondary consideration than the BVR/STR/ITR or weapons mix.
If we want to segregate the role of IAF and IA and provide fixed wing aircraft to IA we would require to think of Battlefield envelope comprising of 3-D visualisation of Armed forces engaging the enemy on the frontline within which Air elements of IA would operate and beyond which IAF would operate. Logistics, Networking, Communication, Awacs etc being the common element. Some overlapping would inevitably happen but that can be managed by keeping these elements shared.

With limited capability and range and weapons mix and being under powered , could LCA be configured to become CAS Plane??

Does it have TFR??

[shiv]

If we want to segregate the role of IAF and IA and provide fixed wing aircraft to IA we would require to think of Battlefield envelope comprising of 3-D visualisation of Armed forces engaging the enemy on the frontline within which Air elements of IA would operate and beyond which IAF would operate. Logistics, Networking, Communication, Awacs etc being the common element. Some overlapping would inevitably happen but that can be managed by keeping these elements shared.

This is the only way forward - although it still does not address the logistical issue of how and where the Army is going to end up maintaining a fixed wing fleet. If you look at the infrastructure that the air force needs separately - there is a training command, a maintenance command etc. Are all these going to be duplicated by army or shared? There are no easy answers. It may be best to maintain status quo other than letting the army have a helicopter fleet and a small transport fleet. Just speculating.

With limited capability and range and weapons mix and being under powered , could LCA be configured to become CAS Plane??

Does it have TFR??

There is no reason why the LCA can't be used for CAS.

I don't know what TFR is but I think that is an unfair question. You have taken all the allegations made in the media and converted them into the accepted truth and are asking what can be done based on that accepted truth.

It is important to define "limited capability"
What is the real range and what is the reason for calling it "limited"
What is the exact role of the words "weapons mix" in the question? What is the problem with the weapons mix?
Underpowered for what? What is the data?

The question is like asking someone "Knowing that your wife to be cannot bear children, how do you propose to go about your life"

This is all OT here and should go on the LCA thread but the question was remarkable

[shiv]

"Rolling Thunder" was the name given to the US's sustained aerial bombing campaign against N.Vietnam. It also is a good name for what the IA should do in any future war with Pak,a continuous rolling barrage of arty coupled with air strikes against Paki ground forces,using a variety of weaponry,right from heavy mortars,ATGMs,MBTs/SP armour,arty,MBRLs from Pinaka to Smerch,tactical SR SSMs coupled with requisite integral attack helo support and CAS aircraft. Deeper raids into enemy territory using strike aircraft and PGMs,stand-off weaponry ,etc. are related but parallel to the effort at the tactical level. Enemy forces should be overwhelmed with such a saturation campaign.Tactical missiles will definitely be used extensively in the next war with Pak.

The IAF will be better equipped to deal with targets deeper into enemy territory and all fixed wing CAS assets should be under its control. Attack helos all with the IA for faster ,synchronised support on the battlefield.

Yeah Philip. Here is a video of an Su 30 dropping 26 x 250 kg bombs.4 of then should be able to send a lot of stuff to jannat in powdered aerosol form
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UktvbWMJmI

[chaanakya]

With limited capability and range and weapons mix and being under powered , could LCA be configured to become CAS Plane??

Does it have TFR??

There is no reason why the LCA can't be used for CAS.

I don't know what TFR is but I think that is an unfair question. You have taken all the allegations made in the media and converted them into the accepted truth and are asking what can be done based on that accepted truth.

It is important to define "limited capability"
What is the real range and what is the reason for calling it "limited"
What is the exact role of the words "weapons mix" in the question? What is the problem with the weapons mix?
Underpowered for what? What is the data?

The question is like asking someone "Knowing that your wife to be cannot bear children, how do you propose to go about your life"

This is all OT here and should go on the LCA thread but the question was remarkable

I essentially referred to three things.
1. Range of 400 Km. Obviously it is limited if IAF wants Refueling capability. Can't do deep strike , blah blah etc.
2. Weapons mix being limited due to weight creep issue and Radome issue. Like R60 Vs R77 or BVR vs WVR
3. GE404 vs GE414 as requested by IAF. Does it mean being underpowered or overpowered
These are being discussed here and not something I take it from Journos. I don't even follow them unless link is present here.
Not accepted truth hakim saheb but what is requested by IAF before LCA gets FOC. Or is that why we ask for MK-II and not ready to accept MK-1 or 1.5.


My question is whether IA would be able to accept something which IAF may not accept unless at least three requirements are met.
IA may have lessor requirements for CAS.


TFR is Terrain Following Radar. Needed for Low level flying in conjunction with Terrain Avoidance and Warning System or whatever else it is called. AESA seems bot look ahead and look down radar and hence gives better picture. I would think so.

[Abhibhushan]

TFR..., CAS...

I am a bit confused here. Let me admit the I have not been in the close air support environment for the last thirty years. However, the concepts of CAS predates my retirement by perhaps four or five decades? The terrain following radar is really needed for penetration at low level during night or in adverse weather. One would need it for deep penetration counter air or other offensive air strikes. i The role of a terrain following radar would be limited for the CLose Air Support role. Terrain avoidance information/warning will help in low level combat, but I see little benefit from a TFR while one is engaged in Close Air Support.

I beg to be forgiven if I have displayed my outdatedness by this intrusion, having been overtaken by technology and evolving tactics.

[Gyan]

I have been repeatedly emphasizing the possible role of Prahaar in CAS but neither BRF nor the Indian Govt is listening to me.

[chaanakya]

TFR..., CAS...

I am a bit confused here. Let me admit the I have not been in the close air support environment for the last thirty years. However, the concepts of CAS predates my retirement by perhaps four or five decades? The terrain following radar is really needed for penetration at low level during night or in adverse weather. One would need it for deep penetration counter air or other offensive air strikes. i The role of a terrain following radar would be limited for the CLose Air Support role. Terrain avoidance information/warning will help in low level combat, but I see little benefit from a TFR while one is engaged in Close Air Support.

I beg to be forgiven if I have displayed my outdatedness by this intrusion, having been overtaken by technology and evolving tactics.

Abhibhusanji, You are quite right. I also indicated that TFR is for low level flying. There are varied terrain environment in which ground forces engage in combat . I would like to think that TFR would be useful for Mountains flying and providing CAS to troops engaged there in and not simply in plains where TFR may not be needed.

AESA might serve as both.

If not available then IAF might have to use "high end" "mercedes class" fighter planes to carry out precision bombing on CAS targets with PGMs/PGTMs

I asked the question about availability of TRF in LCA. If IAF has not so far asked they may like to get it before they give FOC. Who knows. Whether TFR would be useful or not in CAS is to be assessed. Mission requirements if for IAF or IA Aviation wings to indicate.

[shiv]

chaanakya your idea of the utility of terrain following radar and mine seem to be different. What utility do you believe it will bestow in CAS as opposed to its traditional utility in going from place A to place B without hitting ground features

If a plane flies well above ground level the pilot does not need TFR. At say 450-500 knots - a plane flying at 50 meter height can benefit from the insurance that a TFR might provide. In such cases do you believe that TFR would serve merely as ground proximity warning so the pilot can pull up manually or are you talking about automatic terrain following where the plane is on auto-pilot with the pilot having to do nothing as the plane deftly avoids ground features while remaining roughly 50 meters AGL?

If it is automatic and the plane is flying at say 800 kmph or 220 meters per sec - a ground target like a bunker, tank or machine gun site that he has to look for will pass by in a flash. This would assume that the pilot has already selected a target before he passes by and has already selected a weapon to take out that target with the weapon being released autonomously at the precise moment required to hit the target.

This sounds good in theory but when the pilot must locate a pinpoint target, what weapons would he use to make sure that he can hit the pinpoint target without hitting friendly forces as he flashes past at 800 kmph? Even weapons released from an aircraft flying at 50 meters using TFR will drop out of the plane at 220 meters per sec and hit the ground moving - and an undershoot or overshoot may hit friendly forces. Even assuming that he simply misses and does not hit friendlies - he will be dozens of kilometers away smoothly sailing along with his autopilot taking him with TFR, before he can get confirmation whether the target has been hit our not

In actual fact it is more likely that for CAS the pilot is on full manual (no TFR) and loitering/circling above till he either gets coordinates or spots the target and then chooses his weapon and therefore mode of attack. if it is a PGM then either the PGM has to be given the coordinates, or the target has to be illuminated by laser. Or else the pilot has to dive at the target and use rockets, cannon or something appropriate - on full manual and no TFR. For India it is more likely that the pilot has to aim the weapons manually because we do not have the systems in place that we red about so much that the Americans have. This is my mental picture.

What mental picture do you have? How will TFR actually help? If you flesh out the detail of one attack on one machine gun emplacement on a low hill troubling one platoon of troops from a distance of 150 meters north of their position while they hide behind rocks please describe how it would be taken out and the role TFR would play I would be better able to understand what you mean.

[nachiket]

I essentially referred to three things.
1. Range of 400 Km. Obviously it is limited if IAF wants Refueling capability. Can't do deep strike , blah blah etc.
2. Weapons mix being limited due to weight creep issue and Radome issue. Like R60 Vs R77 or BVR vs WVR
3. GE404 vs GE414 as requested by IAF. Does it mean being underpowered or overpowered

1. The LCA's range is not 400km. Its ferry range with drop tanks is 1700km. What you are referring to is the combat radius which includes time on station and will vary according to loadout as well.

The IAF has used Mig-21's for CAS pretty well. The LCA flies farther, carries more and is a hell of a lot easier to fly.

2. The LCA is already compatible with the R-73 and will be with the Derby. And what does this have to do with it's utility in CAS operations?

3. Again, it's power is more than sufficient for CAS operations.

[shiv]

A very timely article relevant to this thread

Air Power in the 1965 war
http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_9_3 ... tanWar.pdf

To reiterate, CAS/OAS missions are of two types: immediate and pre-
planned. As the name suggests, immediate sorties are provided when
a unit/formation of the army is faced with a sudden emergency, such
as an enemy offensive from an unexpected direction in large strength.
Pre-planned sorties are allocated on the previous evening after due
prioritisation to various units, usually when an advance or attack is
planned. Such sorties are first vetted by the army corps HQ and only then
passed on to IAF bases for execution the next day.
As is evident, this requires intimate planning and regular, if not
continuous, telecommunication between the army units/division/corps
HQ and the air force stations. Without such close and joint planning,
it is well-nigh impossible to provide any pre-planned support. Another
complaint of the army was that the sorties allocated to CAS were usually
fewer than demanded and that IAF did not dedicate a squadron for CAS
alone. This is difficult since in such cases, the so-called dedicated unit
would remain tied down on the ground and would be underutilised,
especially when communications were unreliable or even non-existent.
It is also not possible to maintain a round-the-clock CAP over
forward battle areas simply because it would require huge air resources.
In this war, the Indian Army fought in three areas: Kasur–Khem Karan,
Wagha–Bedia–Attari, and Sialkot–Chawinda–Phillora-Shakargarh. Take,
for example, a battle in Khem Karan, which is approximately 100–120
km from both Halwara and Adampur where Hunter and Mystere fighters
were based. When called for a CAP mission, it would take about 20
minutes in transit and just about 25–30 minutes over the target area since
the average sortie time of most IAF fighters was about 45 minutes, and
even less for Gnats.
It is easy to calculate the effort required to mount a continuous CAP.
On the other hand, if planned in advance, such CAPs or CAS missions
can easily be executed. Fifty years after the event, it is extremely difficult
for people, especially of the younger generation, to imagine how poor and
unreliable the communications between the IAF airfields and Tactical Air
Centres (TAC) co-located with army corps HQ were. Even fixed telephone
exchanges at the airfields were manually operated and a subscriber had to
go through the operator for even local calls. Signal messages were first
coded in the daily cipher and sent by wireless telegraphy (WT) or over
congested lines. Signals piled up at the receiving end for want of adequate
cipher-trained staff.

Also very very relevant to this thread

Joint Planning
This was conspicuous by its absence throughout. In his autobiography,
Air Chief Marshal (ACM) P.C. Lal, who was then Vice Chief, blames
General J.N. Chaudhuri for this lapse. Although Chavan held morning
meetings daily with the three Chiefs, and Defence Secretary and other
important officials, and the COAS often attended the ECC meetings, he
seldom took along the Naval Chief or the Air Chief.

I have heard similar complaints about the Army in Kargil - in their not being totally transparent and forthcoming with the Air Force in Kargil ops.

My comment: If the Army is exclusively allowed to operate and ignore the Air Force we can end up in a disastrous defeat
.
What is required is cooperation, maybe a CDS. Not a punishment of the Air Force by spite and allowing the Army to get Air Force type fixed wing assets

[shiv]

One more CAS story from 1965
Tank Busting In The Chamb
Relevant to the question of Terrain Following Radar aided flight during CAS

With Gnats giving top cover, our ground attack missions were highly effective and there are three missions which I recall vividly. The first when I was over the Chhamb area at very low altitude (Under 50ft) and suddenly flew over a Patton tank, too late for an effective attack. I made a wide circuit and came back but by the time I had relocated the tank, I was not settled in the dive. As I closed in to my surprise and satisfaction, saw the crew had abandoned their tank and were running away. I was so close that I could virtually see the terror on their faces. Sure that my target was static, I could take my time for a bullseye as if on a practice firing range. After this tank was blown up. I spotted another in a pond of water that too was a dead duck.

I once got separated from the rest of my formation owing to RT channel error. However two escorting Gnats and I were on the correct one and in contact. Hence I decided to carry on alone and found very large numbers of soft skin vehicles near some tanks. After firing the rockets, I went in with my cannon, one short burst each pass to conserve ammo and made about 0-10 such passes till such time as the Gnat leader (my course mate Mana Murdeshwar) called to say that they were running very low on fuel, and so made a quick last pass, really satisfying to see the vehicles brewing up one after another.

[chaanakya]

I essentially referred to three things.
1. Range of 400 Km. Obviously it is limited if IAF wants Refueling capability. Can't do deep strike , blah blah etc.
2. Weapons mix being limited due to weight creep issue and Radome issue. Like R60 Vs R77 or BVR vs WVR
3. GE404 vs GE414 as requested by IAF. Does it mean being underpowered or overpowered

1. The LCA's range is not 400km. Its ferry range with drop tanks is 1700km. What you are referring to is the combat radius which includes time on station and will vary according to loadout as well.

The IAF has used Mig-21's for CAS pretty well. The LCA flies farther, carries more and is a hell of a lot easier to fly.

2. The LCA is already compatible with the R-73 and will be with the Derby. And what does this have to do with it's utility in CAS operations?

3. Again, it's power is more than sufficient for CAS operations.

I referred to the limitations holding up FOC for IAF. And those limitations may not be a limitation for IA for CAS.
I know that 400 Km is combat radius which is for IAF and it finds it limiting factor.
Again R73 or R77 or BVR /WVR etc are for IAF. Their utility for CAS would be limited.
And I suppose power is currently not sufficient hence asking for 414. I would hink that 404 would be sufficient for CAS.

I hope we are on the same page.

[ShauryaT]

It is important not to confuse "any" ground attack mission as a CAS mission. One way to think about CAS is not as a function of an air force but like a flying artillery / special mission support for ground troops engaged in a very localized area, once air dominance of the battle area is achieved and enemy AD assets are under control. So, to my mind the characteristics needed are long endurance, slow speeds, armor and carry massive number of ammunitions. The AOR would not be much beyond the visibility limits from the ground on a clear day.

A fighter / bomber on a ground attack mission are not optimized for a CAS role for the most part to me, using the above criteria. The A-10 warthog is one that fits the above in that role. All others like Mig 27, Jaguar and the swing/multi role crafts used for ground missions and even bombers, are not really optimized for CAS, using the above criteria. They cannot stay in the area of battle for long (2+ hours), slow speeds - maybe, but not really optimized for it, no armor and most important carry limited ammo.

The key difference is how these ops are conducted by the two aircrafts. The high speed flying ground attack aircraft will come in fast and drop their munitions on the target and go away, leaving the troops to pray that the mission was achieved or ask for a re-run or in many cases, ask for more assets to do the job. While the CAS specialized craft will hang around and be in complete control of the ground commander. To the commander, it would be like just another piece of artillery and HMG ammunitions being delivered, from the air. The CAS craft will stay there to not only destroy the enemy tank, but if the tank is vacated, the CAS craft will hunt them down, just like a soldier.

I do not know, can this high risk role be transferred to a UAV, similarly designed for high endurance, armor, low speeds and massive ordinance delivery capabilities? Are the ATGM's/hell fires the most effective these days or is there a role for good old fashioned cannons and HMG and maybe even air delivered 105 MM artillery? Are there examples of UAV delivering simple canons and HMG munitions?

To my mind "true" CAS and a ground attack mission, maybe even in support of CAS are two very separate domains of operations and hence the need for a fixed wing CAS aircraft exists.

[chaanakya]

chaanakya your idea of the utility of terrain following radar and mine seem to be different. What utility do you believe it will bestow in CAS as opposed to its traditional utility in going from place A to place B without hitting ground features.

If a plane flies well above ground level the pilot does not need TFR. At say 450-500 knots - a plane flying at 50 meter height can benefit from the insurance that a TFR might provide. In such cases do you believe that TFR would serve merely as ground proximity warning so the pilot can pull up manually or are you talking about automatic terrain following where the plane is on auto-pilot with the pilot having to do nothing as the plane deftly avoids ground features while remaining roughly 50 meters AGL?

If it is automatic and the plane is flying at say 800 kmph or 220 meters per sec - a ground target like a bunker, tank or machine gun site that he has to look for will pass by in a flash. This would assume that the pilot has already selected a target before he passes by and has already selected a weapon to take out that target with the weapon being released autonomously at the precise moment required to hit the target.

This sounds good in theory but when the pilot must locate a pinpoint target, what weapons would he use to make sure that he can hit the pinpoint target without hitting friendly forces as he flashes past at 800 kmph? Even weapons released from an aircraft flying at 50 meters using TFR will drop out of the plane at 220 meters per sec and hit the ground moving - and an undershoot or overshoot may hit friendly forces. Even assuming that he simply misses and does not hit friendlies - he will be dozens of kilometers away smoothly sailing along with his autopilot taking him with TFR, before he can get confirmation whether the target has been hit our not

In actual fact it is more likely that for CAS the pilot is on full manual (no TFR) and loitering/circling above till he either gets coordinates or spots the target and then chooses his weapon and therefore mode of attack. if it is a PGM then either the PGM has to be given the coordinates, or the target has to be illuminated by laser. Or else the pilot has to dive at the target and use rockets, cannon or something appropriate - on full manual and no TFR. For India it is more likely that the pilot has to aim the weapons manually because we do not have the systems in place that we red about so much that the Americans have. This is my mental picture.

What mental picture do you have? How will TFR actually help? If you flesh out the detail of one attack on one machine gun emplacement on a low hill troubling one platoon of troops from a distance of 150 meters north of their position while they hide behind rocks please describe how it would be taken out and the role TFR would play I would be better able to understand what you mean.

Well I can not say that I can visualise all and answer aall. But I would try to .

I think CAS would be specifically at the request of troops in the frontline battle. I also think that coordinates of the areas of enemy concentration, machine gun emplacement or advancing troops would be relayed by the ground troops.
In such as situation, and not two situation would be same and require same tactics, CAS plane can fly low and slow and dump ammo on the pre requested target area. In such as case TFR may be useful in the sense that it would give ground picture and pilot can put it on manual or auto pilot. TAWS is one component to give proximity warning in case of manual and corrective measures in case of auto pilot leaving pilot free of doing other chores.

I would think that CAS battlefield envelope would be from ground up to certain heights beyond which IAf would have CAP.

As for machine gun emplacement I think their targets coordinates would be available for CAS plane and they may choose to drop ammo from relatively secure heights. or in mountains do TFR flying and either drop the ammo or strafe.
Say for Gilgit Airport where para commandos have landed and hemmed in by HMG from mountain side. That would be a difficult target to aim from high up. So a low level CAS plane could sneak up and do the strafing or ammo dropping.
Would that situation require TFR??


PS : when I asked if LCA has TFR I thought if it is not there IAF might spring it as a surprise requirement for deep penetration strike with low level flying like that of Shamsher, And I would like to think if CAS involves low level flying in any specific mission it would be a good idea to have one around for mission specific role.

Abhibhusan ji may like to comment ( minus IAF deliberately springing surprise ) if TFR would be useful feature in mountain flying as I would like to think.

Currently I am in mountainous terrain and internet is in bits and pieces. Himalayas are imposing. Whether it would facilitate any CAS for IA when facing China?? May be when we cross over.

[ShauryaT]

Do all these concepts of high level and low level flying, TFR even apply to a true CAS mission - that is purely in support of an area of battle. Maybe if air dominance is not achieved yet, then yes but otherwise does it apply? The AAC is not thinking on the best way to fly these things. TFR is great for long range ground attack missions but those missions are not CAS.

[shiv]

I think CAS would be specifically at the request of troops in the frontline battle. I also think that coordinates of the areas of enemy concentration, machine gun emplacement or advancing troops would be relayed by the ground troops.
In such as situation, and not two situation would be same and require same tactics, CAS plane can fly low and slow and dump ammo on the pre requested target area.

Let me repost a quote from an IDSA link I posted above:

To reiterate, CAS/OAS missions are of two types: immediate and pre-
planned. As the name suggests, immediate sorties are provided when
a unit/formation of the army is faced with a sudden emergency, such
as an enemy offensive from an unexpected direction in large strength.
Pre-planned sorties are allocated on the previous evening after due
prioritisation to various units, usually when an advance or attack is
planned. Such sorties are first vetted by the army corps HQ and only then
passed on to IAF bases for execution the next day.

When you speak of "coordinates being given to a pilot" you already have, in your mind, the mental picture of ground troops in trouble who have the necessary equipment to give accurate coordinates. I would not rule this out in the Indian army but the capability is still not widespread. Secondly if a group of men are under fire they may be able to know their own geo-location and may know the approximate direction and type of fire that is troubling them but they may not know the exact coordinates of the mortar or machine gun that is targeting them. So that will have to be located by visual surveillance by the pilot after locating the troops in trouble. This cannot be done by fast low fly-past using TFR. CAS is less of linear flying and more of circling and going up and down changing height, position and direction in a non-preprogrammed manner.

Flying low and slow and "dumping ammunition" as you describe has no real meaning unless you can say what "ammunition" you are going to dump and exactly where you want it to fall and what is the inherent utility and accuracy/inaccuracy of that "ammunition" being dumped. "Ammunition" generally refers to bullets fired from guns and perhaps it is more specific to say "cannon", "bomb", "rocket", "missile" or simply "ordnance", Each type has its own method of "dumping" and "low and slow" is not always necessary or appropriate

As for machine gun emplacement I think their targets coordinates would be available for CAS plane and they may choose to drop ammo from relatively secure heights. or in mountains do TFR flying and either drop the ammo or strafe.
Say for Gilgit Airport where para commandos have landed and hemmed in by HMG from mountain side. That would be a difficult target to aim from high up. So a low level CAS plane could sneak up and do the strafing or ammo dropping.
Would that situation require TFR??

Ah I get it. In this scenario you are thinking of CAS for special forces deep within enemy territory. We have been seeing a lot of this in the media in the last few years with the US in Afghanistan. The CAS I have been referring to is two armies fighting it out on a battle front where certain situations call for CAS. That is what India has had to handle in 1947-49, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Also operation Enduring Freedom. And Vietnam. Not the US spl forces in Afghanistan model

Did you read the tank busting in Chamb story I posted above?

There is no predetermined requirement for TFR in CAS. I think Abhibhushan has already said that although he has been modest in claiming that his info may be outdated. That was only a joke. The specific type of munition to be used and the specific height and direction that the CAS attack must come from depends on the type of target and how close it is to friendly forces. Bunkers or a tank may resist cannon fire and may need rockets/bombs/PGMs with capability to take on hard targets. The direction of attack and height may depend on a lot of factors none of which can necessarily be pre programmed into a computer without on the spot assessment of how the enemy is placed, and where the friendlies are and what direction the target is vulnerable. In fact the target may be vulnerable only from a spot where he can shoot back at the plane and that may require an attack from a direction that puts the pilot and plane at risk. True war stories from India Pakistan wars are chock full of situations like this. I do recommend lining Jagan's pocket a bit more and buying and reading both his books. The internet is too full of American stories from recent wars - even Vietnam has vanished.

[chaanakya]

Do all these concepts of high level and low level flying, TFR even apply to a true CAS mission - that is purely in support of an area of battle. Maybe if air dominance is not achieved yet, then yes but otherwise does it apply? The AAC is not thinking on the best way to fly these things. TFR is great for long range ground attack missions but those missions are not CAS.

True. TFR is needed for long range missions requiring low level flight for avoiding radar.

I am not sure if we would achieve total air dominance. In kargil IAF was asked not to cross loc. The then CAS explained how ridiculous this idea was.

Yes high level as well as low level flights may be required due to terrain. CAS explained why M2K was used in kargil . It could fly high yet deliver precision targeting on peaks. Other A/cs could not do that.

I could see few glimpses of that episode aired on victory day.

[chaanakya]

Shiv garu.

I think there could be different scenario for CAS requirement: both immediate and pre planned. Army might not like the vetting by AFHQ part.

I gave idea of immediate requirement.

Special missions may also require CAS eg transporting troops , para dropping, strike missions etc.Even secret missions may need CAS. Osmama episode comes to my mind.

Flying low and slow and "dumping ammunition" as you describe has no real meaning unless you can say what "ammunition" you are going to dump and exactly where you want it to fall and what is the inherent utility and accuracy/inaccuracy of that "ammunition" being dumped. "Ammunition" generally refers to bullets fired from guns and perhaps it is more specific to say "cannon", "bomb", "rocket", "missile" or simply "ordnance", Each type has its own method of "dumping" and "low and slow" is not always necessary or appropriate

Yes , it would require specifying what ammo could suit.

I agree that there is no pre determined requirement of TFR for CAS. And if LCA is not having it then Army might use it for CAS and leave High end versions with full set of specifications implemented for IAF.


Where could I buy jagan's book. I wouldn't mind lining his pockets.

Abhibhusanji is being modest. I have taken that remark in the spirit it deserves. I would rather have him on my side supporting LCA in CAS role for IA if IAF is not in a position to FOCed it.

[shiv]

Where could I buy jagan's book. I wouldn't mind lining his pockets.

Abhibhusanji is being modest. I have taken that remark in the spirit it deserves. I would rather have him on my side supporting LCA in CAS role for IA if IAF is not in a position to FOCed it.

Funnily enough - yet another Vayusena person who is on BRF now is equally modest and not dogmatic. Only I am immodest and pushy.

Jagan's books.
1965 Air War:
http://bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/books/pro ... paw65.html

Eagles over Bangladesh
http://bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/books/pro ... adesh.html

[deejay]

Shiv garu.


Special missions may also require CAS eg transporting troops , para dropping, strike missions etc.Even secret missions may need CAS. Osmama episode comes to my mind.

While I have no issues on who operates CAS let me add some information to what is quoted above.

The Osama Op is classic SHBO (Special Heliborne Ops). There are many SHBO which IA and IAF have been undertaking regularly in J&K, NE, etc. I believe even in Bhutan this kind of Ops happened.

I was part of a Mi 17 unit deployed near Jodhpur during Op Parakram. While we never went to war but we did come to a very high level of alert for war. Our job (entire Unit's) was to operate with SF for missions. We new which SF unit, we practiced with them day in and day out and spent a lot of time getting to know them.

CAS roles are primarily heliborne with fighter support either in Air to Ground fire power or EW as required. Even in peace time most helicopter flying (including Mi 17 and Mi 26 category) is undertaken for IA requirements. There is little doubt in anyone's mind within the helicopter fleet as to where and what most of us will be doing in actual ops.

BTW, IAF's 114 HU has an IA helicopter unit equivalent located in Partapur. Fantastic flying effort in the glacier by them.

[chaanakya]

Only I am immodest and pushy.

Jagan's books.
1965 Air War:
http://bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/books/pro ... paw65.html

Eagles over Bangladesh
http://bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/books/pro ... adesh.html

Is it because of JIPMER?

Thanks for links. BRF itself is treasure trove.

[chaanakya]

If I am not mistaken, 114 HU became AAC in Army later. Or IAF still operates 114 and IA has got AAC?

Reading Siachen by Gokhale was revealing. That was the ground breaking effort by IAF supporting IA that got IA its AAC.