Indian Nuclear News & Discussion - 28 Jul 2007

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NRao
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Post by NRao »

According to undersecretary Nicholas Burns, "we kept reminding the Indian side, and they were good enough to negotiate on this basis that anything we did had to fall within, and respect, the legal guidelines that Congress had set forth." For his part, national security adviser M.K. Narayanan has conceded: "The PM had always taken the view that if you have a legal problem, we will not try to ask you to break the law, but we should find the language that would meet the obligations of both sides." Semantic lollypops indeed are what India has been left holding.
Reiterating what US officials like Mr Ashley Tellis have been telling their Indian interlocutors for the better part of last year, Mr Mulford said the US law has been accepted by India “as something that was not going to changeâ€
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Post by ShibaPJ »

NR,
I won't lose sleep over it.. Ain't it US motto that "if there is a law, it can be broken"? India also has to master the political skullduggery played at this level. At this level, it is so much interpretation (fuzzy logic) than binary logic that everyone else practices at the high table (& the fun part is preaching the same to the choir :-? ). Having said this, can't wait to see the 123 fine print..
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Post by SaiK »

is there any side by side comparison if we sign this deal, and if we don't ? benefits and disadvantages? any comprehensive study done on the web? perhaps we should get there.. start tabling.
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Post by NRao »

IMHO, India should announce and test twice. Once just before signing off one the 123 and then again just after. India will have only the paper on which the 123 was printed to return.

SPJ,

I just find it very funny that the US amby to India can make these statements and when it comes to actually getting BLadin in Pakistan these same guys do not have the guts even when their own boys are killed.
Ain't it US motto that "if there is a law, it can be broken"?
That is the US can break it.

Besides, who in India will have the guts?
Last edited by NRao on 31 Jul 2007 22:41, edited 1 time in total.
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Post by ramdas »

What about the FMCT issue ? Are we bound to support the future FMCT as and when it comes up ?

It is important to focus on this issue.

Also, Arunji: How can we guess that 4000kg of WgPu already exists in our spent fuel ? Wont that require ~4000t Uranium that has undergone low burnup - i.e, if full burn-up would have led to around 5600t spent fuel, wont this mean that we have around 9000t of spent fuel ? Has our annual production of uranium not been around 250t ? For how long has it been at this rate ? Has there been a conscious effort to build up a stockpile of WgPu using unsafeguarded PHWR's even before 1998 ?
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Post by CRamS »

NRao:

US laws etc, when it comes to foreign policy dealings are only a rule of thumb. Depending on the excigencies of the situation, they are either upheld as a natural dictum, or they are not worth even used toilet paper. This is the inherent flexibiliy built into US conduct of foreign policy, with the only immutable being primacy of US interests, established through a broad consenus among its elite (recall how the gang rape of Iraq was designed and implemented). And most often, such rational flexibility works miracles for US.
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Post by Ananth »

Why is US so scared, that it is forced to remind us about their law? Are they afarid about our forgetfulness capabilities :twisted:?
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Post by SaiK »

  • they are afraid of our U233 capabilities.
  • they want to build 28 new reactors @ $5billion each sanctioned in the USA itself, but they experience thus far on building has come to zilch.. added insecurity.
  • they are afraid of our FBR and ADS business
  • they are irritated with our PAD kill capability
  • they are afraid of everything coming so cheap from us
  • they are afraid of our universities and drdo labs.
they want to use us for their objectives. that is not clearly happening.. hence they want to hammer us in some way or the other.
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Post by NRao »

bala
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Post by bala »

After poodle OZ declaration of help in NSG (even Japan may declare support) I think the NSG approval will happen quickly (barring of course China which could throw a tantrum and want TSP its massage pal in the deal). IAEA should be smoother since El Baradei has previously declared intent to work with what he claimed model behaviour India. So both approvals should be done in short order without any major hitch. The US will be batting for India at both forums.

US Congress with Obama (this guy is turning out to be the Osama of US politics, note his sympathetic approach to N.Korea, Syria, Iran and TSP) cheer leading the renegades might throw a few road blocks but eventually they will pass the US India Nuke deal. We need to track those who vote against India and make sure they dont get any campaign money.

This Mulford guy loves to throw a few mud tracks at India everytime he opens his mouth. Now he is raking up Iran and Nuke test. Time he shuts his trap and let the boss (Rice et al) speak for the US India Nuke deal.
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Post by NRao »

OK, ok.

On to IAEA.

The last communique on that front:



Benefits of Indo-US deal
01/01/2007


Nuclear renaissance in the offing
by O.P. Sabherwal

WITH the ratification of the enabling Bill on Indo-US nuclear cooperation by President Bush, the last hurdles for the nuclear deal to become a reality have to be tackled by the Indian leadership with support from the US administration. The two barriers still to be crossed are concurrence of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and negotiating an India-specific safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). No less challenging is the drawing up of the 123 Agreement — essentially a bilateral Indo-US agreement — spelling out the terms of the accord binding on the two governments.

It can reasonably be assumed that the first two hurdles will be successfully dealt with. The friendly — almost partisan — stand of France, Britain and Russia on the nuclear deal will smoothen the way to NSG concurrence. Most members of the group have indicated their willingness to terminate the nuclear sanctions imposed on India. Misgivings of the Scandinavian countries apart, the focus is on China and Japan.

All said and done, the Chinese leadership takes an enlightened view on global civilian nuclear issues and has given ample indication that despite its earlier reservations, it will enable the NSG to lift nuclear sanctions on India. Although Japan’s support should not be taken for granted, the Prime Minister’s visit to that country has paved the way for a positive stand. New Delhi has, however, to remove Japan’s lingering doubts that the nuclear deal might be used to boost India’s weapon capability.

As for the IAEA safeguards, negotiations are already on between IAEA Director-General Mohammed Al-Baradei and the Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Anil Kakodkar. Dr AlBaradei is a friend of India and has supported the Indo-US nuclear accord. But working out India-specific IAEA safeguards to fit the new dispensation for India has many complexities and needs careful working out.

IAEA safeguards in this instance are of a new variety — neither the safeguards that the IAEA applies to the five NPT weapon states nor the full scope intrusive safeguards for non-weapon member-states. India’s weapon status is being given tacit acceptance despite its being an NPT non-member. Its civilian and military facilities are being separated; the safeguards will be applicable only on the civilian facilities.

Apprehensions in India about the way the IAEA safeguards will be worked, especially in relation to the R&D centres and Indian scientists’ innovation, have to be removed. As of now, IAEA safeguards on India have been limited only to imported nuclear material and plants —Tarapur and Russian supported VVER light water reactors being built at Kudankulam and the LEU fuel imported for light water reactors. It is now proposed that in addition to this limited safeguards agreement, an additional India-specific protocol will be drawn up between the IAEA and New Delhi.



The civilian facilities listed out in the Indo-US accord will be placed under the IAEA safeguards. These include not only the present and future imported nuclear reactors, material and technology, but also 14 of the 22 Indian built (some under construction) civilian reactors, future civilian fast-breeder reactors (other than the fast-breeder test reactor and the upcoming 500 MWe prototype fast-breeder reactor), designated heavy water plants, part of the nuclear fuel complex and civilian R&D complexes like the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, the Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre, the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics and the Institute of Plasma Research, and the Prefree Tarapur Reprocessing Plant.

The nuclear military facilities will not be under the IAEA purview and will be entirely for India to operate. It is for India to name its military and civilian facilities. The facilities that India names as military — BARC, Kalpakkam’s IGCAR, FBTR and the upcoming 500 MW prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, the supporting infrastructure and reprocessing plants — will determine India’s strategic programme out of the IAEA safeguards purview. India is also free to build any fresh military facility to keep its nuclear deterrent in vibrant condition. The shape of the Indian nuclear deterrent is for the Indian government to comprehend and decide — based on its threat perception and global overview.

Some senior nuclear scientists — Dr P.K. Iyengar, former AEC Chairman, for instance — have criticised the inclusion of R&D centres under the safeguards regime. And also future fast breeder reactors. This, they contend, will stifle scientific creativity and serve as a conduit leaking Indian innovation abroad. Dr Iyengar also maintains that moratorium on nuclear tests should go: further tests are needed for India’s credible nuclear deterrent. Others are critical that not allowing the import of enrichment and reprocessing technology by India envisaged in the Hyde Act cripples US nuclear cooperation for India. Besides the civilian nuclear cooperation, critics apprehend that Indian foreign policy will become a tail of US global interests, as in Iran.

These are major concerns. But there are good reasons to believe that the Indian authorities — political and nuclear establishments — have taken care to deal with the issues raised. The Prime Minister has given clear assurance that innovation and research in R&D centres placed under safeguards will have no constraints. That is what an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA means. As for bringing 14 Indian-built reactors and future fast breeder reactors under safeguards, this is all to India’s benefit since curbs on uranium imports will go. There is assurance in the accord announced by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that uranium supplies for the safeguarded reactors will be available for lifetime, which is a major boost to the Indian nuclear power programme.

Bringing the TIFR, the VECC, the Institute of Plasma Research and the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics under safeguards has advantages too; the sanctions regime covered all these institutes and constrained their activity and creative work. Now, these constraints will be lifted. If the apprehensions are that research that has a bearing on India’s strategic programme will be affected, the answer is that the hub of Indian nuclear strategic build-up and research is the BARC and the IGARC. These are not in the purview of the IAEA safeguards. The only concern of the IAEA is to assure that imported nuclear material, reactors and technology are not availed of for expanding Indian strategic programme.

The 123 Agreement between the United States and India is the key requisite to give the Indo-US deal a legal shape; the terms of this agreement will be binding on both governments.

Drawing up the 123 Agreement is thus the most important task, and it should meet all valid concerns such as the specifics on the provision for uranium imports for the safeguarded nuclear facilities.. There can be no limitations on the use of India-built reprocessing plants. This has to be specified in the final Indo-US bilateral agreement, embodied in the 123 Agreement. It is necessary to speedily work out the agreement on the lines of the two statements of President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The event will usher in what might be called a new era in India’s nuclear programme. A nuclear renaissance, advancing the target of 20,000 MW nuclear power from 2020 in just five years, is on the anvil. A nuclear renaissance for the Indian economy, giving not only a vital input for growth at a crucial juncture, but also clean energy that does not add to global warming.

(The writer is a senior journalist specialising in nuclear affairs)
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Post by SaiK »

Obama & Osama intersection complements "BS"!

btw,

"the iyengar theory" can negate our thus far deterrence value of our reliable nfu weapons we already have. what if we can't do the nfu cause the theory says we need more testing.

added, the psy-op value loss.

and, we should have tested 50 odd times since pok 2, as of now.
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Post by nkumar »

The civilian facilities listed out in the Indo-US accord will be placed under the IAEA safeguards. These include not only the present and future imported nuclear reactors, material and technology, but also 14 of the 22 Indian built (some under construction) civilian reactors, future civilian fast-breeder reactors (other than the fast-breeder test reactor and the upcoming 500 MWe prototype fast-breeder reactor), designated heavy water plants, part of the nuclear fuel complex and civilian R&D complexes like the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, the Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre, the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics and the Institute of Plasma Research, and the Prefree Tarapur Reprocessing Plant.
Why has India agreed to bring its R&D facilities like TIFR into safeguards? This is absurd. I did not know that MMS & Co. has capitulated this much.
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Post by ramana »

Mulford will get recalled.
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Post by NRao »

I did not know that MMS & Co. has capitulated this much.
IIRC, AK was/is responsible for the separation plan.
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Post by ramana »

nkumar wrote:
The civilian facilities listed out in the Indo-US accord will be placed under the IAEA safeguards. These include not only the present and future imported nuclear reactors, material and technology, but also 14 of the 22 Indian built (some under construction) civilian reactors, future civilian fast-breeder reactors (other than the fast-breeder test reactor and the upcoming 500 MWe prototype fast-breeder reactor), designated heavy water plants, part of the nuclear fuel complex and civilian R&D complexes like the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, the Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre, the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics and the Institute of Plasma Research, and the Prefree Tarapur Reprocessing Plant.
Why has India agreed to bring its R&D facilities like TIFR into safeguards? This is absurd. I did not know that MMS & Co. has capitulated this much.
If an entitiy is not on the civil list it is assumed to be on the mil side and gets automatic sanctions on import of equipment etc. So the civil list includes the largest possible number of entitites so that they can import equipment etc as needed.

All this was discussed a year ago when the separation plan was published. So its not new info.
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Post by NRao »

Implementing India's separation plan
This is the text of the document titled "Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan" tabled in Parliament on March 7, 2006:

Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of
July 18, 2005: India’s Separation Plan
The resumption of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation between India and the
United States arose in the context of India’s requirement for adequate and affordable
energy supplies to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate and as recognition
of its growing technological prowess. It was preceded by discussions between the
two Governments, particularly between President Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, of the global energy scenario and the long-term implications of
increasing pressure on hydrocarbon resources and rising oil prices. These
developments led to the announcement in April 2005 of an Indo-US Energy Dialogue
that encompassed the entire spectrum of energy options ranging from oil and gas to
coal, alternative fuels and civilian nuclear energy. Through the initiation of a
sustained dialogue to address energy security concerns, the two countries sought to
promote stable, efficient, predictable and cost effective solutions for India’s growing
requirements. At the same time, they also agreed on the need to develop and deploy
cleaner, more efficient, affordable and diversified energy technologies to deal with
the environmental implications of energy consumption. India had developed proven
and wide ranging capabilities in the nuclear sector, including over the entire nuclear
fuel cycle. It is internationally recognized that India has unique contributions to
make to international efforts towards meeting these objectives. India has become a
full partner in ITER, with the full support of the US and other partners. India also
accepted the US invitation to join the initiative on Clean Development Partnership.
2. Noting the centrality of civilian nuclear energy to the twin challenges of energy
security and safeguarding the environment, the two Governments agreed on 18 July
2005 to undertake reciprocal commitments and responsibilities that would create a
framework for the resumption of full cooperation in this field. On its part, the United
States undertook to:
- Seek agreement from the Congress to adjust US laws and policies to achieve full
civil nuclear energy cooperation.
- Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil
nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to
expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at
Tarapur.
- In the meantime, encourage its partners to consider fuel supply to Tarapur
expeditiously.
- To consult with its partners to consider India’s participation in ITER.
- To consult with other participants in the Generation IV International Forum with a
view towards India’s inclusion.
3. India had conveyed its readiness to assume the same responsibilities and
practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries
with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. Accordingly, India for
its part undertook the following commitments:
- Identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in
a phased manner.
- Filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the IAEA.
- Taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards, and
- Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear
facilities.
4. Other commitments undertaken by India have already been fulfilled in the last
year. Among them are:
- India’s responsible non-proliferation record, recognized by the US, continues and is
reflected in its policies and actions.
- The harmonization of India’s export controls with NSG and MTCR Guidelines even
though India is not a member of either group. These guidelines and control lists have
been notified and are being implemented.
- A significant upgrading of India’s non-proliferation regulations and export controls
has taken place as a result of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of May 2005. Inter-
Ministerial consultations are ongoing to examine and amend other relevant Acts as
well as framing appropriate rules and regulations.
- Refrain from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do
not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread. This has
guided our policy on non-proliferation.
- Continued unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and
- Willingness to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty.
5. The Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, recognized that India is ready to assume the
same responsibilities and practices as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States. India has an impeccable record in nonproliferation.
The Joint Statement acknowledges that India’s nuclear programme has
both a military and a civilian component. Both sides had agreed that the purpose
was not to constrain India’s strategic programme but to enable resumption of full
civil nuclear energy cooperation in order to enhance global energy and environmental
security. Such cooperation was predicated on the assumption that any international
civil nuclear energy cooperation (including by the US) offered to India in the civilian
sector should, firstly, not be diverted away from civilian purposes, and secondly,
should not be transferred from India to third countries without safeguards. These
concepts will be reflected in the Safeguards Agreement to be negotiated by India
with IAEA.
6. India’s nuclear programme is unique as it is the only state with nuclear weapons
not to have begun with a dedicated military programme. It must be appreciated that
the strategic programme is an offshoot of research on nuclear power programme and
consequently, it is embedded in a larger undifferentiated programme. Identification
of purely civilian facilities and programmes that have no strategic implications poses
a particular challenge. Therefore, facilities identified as civilian in the Separation Plan
will be offered for safeguards in phases to be decided by India. The nature of the
facility concerned, the activities undertaken in it, the national security significance of
materials and the location of the facilities are factors taken into account in
undertaking the separation process. This is solely an Indian determination.
7. The nuclear establishment in India not only built nuclear reactors but promoted
the growth of a national industrial infrastructure. Nuclear power generation was
envisaged as a three-stage programme with PHWRs chosen for deployment in the
first stage. As indigenous reactors were set up, several innovative design
improvements were carried out based on Indian R&D and a standardized design was
evolved. The research and technology development spanned the entire spectrum of
the nuclear fuel cycle including the front end and the back end. Success in the
technologies for the back end of the fuel cycle allowed us to launch the second stage
of the programme by constructing a Fast Breeder Test Reactor. This reactor has
operated for 20 years based on a unique carbide fuel and has achieved all technology
objectives. We have now proceeded further and are constructing a 500 MWe
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor. Simultaneously, we have launched design and
development of reactors aimed at thorium utilization and incorporating inherent
safety features.
8. Concepts such as grid connectivity are not relevant to the separation exercise.
Issues related to fuel resource sustainability, technical design and economic viability,
as well as smooth operation of reactors are relevant factors. This would necessitate
grid connectivity irrespective of whether the reactor concerned is civilian or not
civilian.
9. It must be recognized that the Indian nuclear programme still has a relatively
narrow base and cannot be expected to adopt solutions that might be deemed viable
by much larger programmes. A comparison of the number of reactors and the total
installed capacity between India and the P-5 brings this out graphically:
Country Number of Reactors Total Installed Capacity
India 15 3.04 GWe (2.8% of the
total production)
USA 104 (103 operational) 99.21 GWe (19.9% of the
total production)
France 59 63.36 GWe (78.1% of the
total production)
UK 23 11.85 GWe (19.4% of the
total production)
Russia 31 21.74 GWe (15.6% of the
total production)
China 9 6.602 GWe (2.2% of the
total production)
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington DC
10. Another factor to be taken into account is the small capacity of the reactors
produced indigenously by India, some of which would remain outside safeguards.
Therefore, in assessing the extent of safeguards coverage, it would be important to
look at both the number of reactors and the percentage of installed capacity covered.
An average Indian reactor is of 220 MW and its output is significantly smaller than
the standard reactor in a P-5 economy. The chart below illustrates this aspect:
Country Most Common reactor Number of such
reactors
India PHWRs 220 MWe 12
USA 69 PWRs and 34 BWRs.
Most plants are in the
range of 1000-1250 MWe
51 Reactors in the range
of 1000 MWe to 1250 MWe
France PWRs of 900 MWe and
1300 MWe size
34 PWRs of 900 MWe and
20 PWRs of 1300 MWe
UK No standard size. AGR is
the most common in the
range of 600-700 MWe
14 AGRs
Russia 3rd Generation VVER-1000
PWRs and RBMK 1000
Light, Water Graphite
Reactors
9 third Generation VVER-
1000 PWRs and 11 RBMK
1000 Light Water Graphite
Reactors
China PWRs 984 MWe Four
Source: Uranium Information Centre, Melbourne
11. The complexity of the separation process is further enhanced by the limited
resources that India has devoted to its nuclear programme as compared to P-5
nations. Moreover, as India expands international cooperation, the percentage of its
thermal power reactor installed capacity under safeguards would rise significantly as
fresh capacity is added through such cooperation.
12. India’s approach to the separation of its civilian nuclear facilities is guided by the
following principles:
- Credible, feasible, and implementable in a transparent manner;
- Consistent with the understandings of the 18 July Statement;
- Consistent with India’s national security and R&D requirements as well as not
prejudicial to the three-stage nuclear programme in India;
- Must be cost effective in its implementation; and
- Must be acceptable to Parliament and public opinion.
13. Based on these principles, India will:
- Include in the civilian list only those facilities offered for safeguards that, after
separation, will no longer be engaged in activities of strategic significance.
- The overarching criterion would be a judgement whether subjecting a facility to
IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on India’s national security.
- However, a facility will be excluded from the civilian list if it is located in a larger
hub of strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that it may not be normally
engaged in activities of strategic significance.
- A civilian facility would therefore, be one that India has determined not to be
relevant to its strategic programme.
14. Taking the above into account, India, on the basis of reciprocal actions by the
US, will adopt the following approach:
i) Thermal Power Reactors: India will identify and offer for safeguards 14 thermal
power reactors between 2006 and 2014. This will include the 4 presently
safeguarded reactors (TAPS 1&2, RAPS 1&2) and in addition KK 1&2 that are under
construction.8 other PHWRs, each of a capacity of 220MW, will also be offered.
Phasing of specific thermal power reactors, being offered for safeguards would be
indicated separately by India. Such an offer would, in effect, cover 14 out of the 22
thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction to be placed
under safeguards, and would raise the total installed Thermal Power capacity by MWs
under safeguards from the present 19% to 65% by 2014.
ii) Fast Breeder Reactors: India is not in a position to accept safeguards on the
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactors (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR),
both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage and its
technology will take time to mature and reach an advanced stage of development.
iii) Future Reactors: India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian
thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India
retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian.
iv) Research Reactors: India will permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor, in
2010. It will also be prepared to shift the fuel core of the APSARA reactor that was
purchased from France outside BARC and make the fuel core available to be placed
under safeguards in 2010.
v) Upstream facilities: The following upstream facilities would be identified and
separated as civilian:
- List of those specific facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex, which will be
offered for safeguards by 2008 will be indicated separately.
- The Heavy Water Production plants at Thal, Tuticorin and Hazira are proposed
to be designated for civilian use between 2006-2009. We do not consider
these plants as relevant for safeguards purposes.
vi) Downstream facilities: The following downstream facilities would be identified
and separated as civilian:
- India is willing to accept safeguards in the ‘campaign’ mode after 2010 in
respect of the Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant.
- The Tarapur and Rajasthan ‘Away From Reactors’ spent fuel storage pools
would be made available for safeguards with appropriate phasing
between2006-2009.
vii) Research Facilities: India will declare the following facilities as civilian:
(a) Tata Institute of Fundamental research
(b) Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre
(c) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics
(d) Institute for Plasma Research
(e) Institute of Mathematics Science
(f) Institute of Physics
(g) Tata Memorial Centre
(h) Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology
(i) Harish Chandra Research Institute
These facilities are safeguards-irrelevant. It is our expectation that they will play a
prominent role in international cooperation.
15. Safeguards:
a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to
India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also
reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured
and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18,
2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from
the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to
adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary
conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including
reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several
nations.
b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is
prepared to take the following additional steps:
i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel
supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of
nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which
would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.
ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA
an India-specific fuel supply agreement.
iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic
reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over
the lifetime of India’s reactors.
iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India
occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of
friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France
and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel
supply to India.
c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific
safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for
safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian
use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to
ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of
disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian
nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an
appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.
16. This plan is in conformity with the commitments made to Parliament by the
Government.
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Post by nkumar »

I do not see the logic of bringing these facilities into safeguards. If US really wants India as a strategic partner and make it a super-power in the 21st century, then least it can do is remove the sanctions from these facilities.

Clever modus-operandi to monitor Indian facilities - first sanction them and then permanently monitor them on the pretext of N-deal. What is most humiliating is that they will be under safeguards in perpetuity. So if Indian scientists develop some critical technology, US gets the benefit through IAEA proxy. Agreed that we may invent something using imported instruments, but we will pay an agreed price for it, we are not getting them for free.
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Post by John Snow »

Some times it is better to put Lallu Memorial University (LMU) of Bihar on safe gaurd list for bargaining purposes, if unkil is not satisfied add Mulyam Memorial University of UP (MMU) as buy one get one free.
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Post by SaiK »

i guess we have discussed this.. if we were smart, we would have moved this of our (BR) discussions couple of years ago! onleee!. to very safe classified non-civilian facilities.
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Post by samuel »

A few questions pop-up:

1) Reprocessing:

To them, allowing reprocessing the spent fuel meant giving a blank cheque. So when we told them that we'll put all that reprocessing on the safeguarded and separate side, that concern vanished.

To us, having reprocessing is necessary to maximize fuel-use in the short-term, prevent excluding our own technology in the medium-term, and retain the strategic advantage in the long-term. For example, as the table points out, AHWRs can go to the civil side (say), and Pu produced from foreign U in foreign reactors could be used to start our own Th-Pu driver and complete the bootstrap. Who then cares if it is on the civil side so long as it is producing power for the people and we keep the means to reduce dependence on foreign Uranium?

But, as people see here, we obviously need to find a way to protect that technology and prevent exposure of strategic program. Is that the only risk we took on here, and is that a reasonable competitive risk to take given where we are? Also, I don't know how mature is our reprocessing technology is. I read that PUREX has been around, but what about THOREX on the large-scale, beyond the small-scale success now? Is this deal good in the imported reprocessing technology sense too, because we learn something from the foreign reprocessing technology useful for our three-stage program? Why is that not a "proliferation" concern to the US and, if it was, how do they think it is addressed?

2) Testing:

As Arun adds to Rye's code summary, it won't matter Y years from now that we test. Following the argument above, there is a way to jump from foreign-fuel+reactor+reproc, to indian!indian!indian. Thus, the nuke-deal is really a way to bootstrap the 3-stage process (on the large-scale), which is where we have the most difficulty today and which is what we always sought. In this sense, we only need all this NSG U etc. to get going.

The question in my mind is what is the time-scale Y we are talking about. Some fraction of that will be a highly vulnerable period for testing and deterrence. But we must've got that covered now, somehow, as Arun's summary indicate, but I don't exactly understand how.

In time, the success of "reinstating our primacy" with respect to this nuke deal will require us to stay on the guard, always. Right? With the foreign companies coming in, they may seek to do on a mass scale to our nuclear industry, what foreign defense contractors seek to do to our own defense industry. Time will tell whether or not that happens, and the prayer is that the nation's growing self-confidence will prevail. We'll have no one else to blame if we don't take advantage of this deal now.

Is this the right way to think about this deal?
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Post by Mort Walker »

When in the world are these guys going to release the FULL text of the "123 Agreement" ?:!: :!: :!:

THE WAIT FOR THE FULL TEXT IS EXTREMELY FRUSTRATING!
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Post by ramana »

It has to be tabled to the Lok Sabha ~ Aug 10th.
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Post by ShibaPJ »

ramana wrote:Mulford will get recalled.
Is this a wish? :wink: He has an uncanny habit of being so darn irritating!!
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Post by nkumar »

It has to be tabled to the Lok Sabha ~ Aug 10th.
I read somewhere that the text will be released anytime after 2nd Aug. I guess we should be able to see the text in the next 4-5 days
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Post by NRao »

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Post by Rye »

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/28128.htm

The bit that explains Mulchford's behaviour is the last sentence:
Dr. Mulford is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and is affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. ( a.k.a. NPA Central)
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Post by ramana »

New Delhi press briefing from MEA site

[quote]
Joint Press Conference by National Security Advisor, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and Foreign Secretary (27 July, 2007)


27/07/2007


Official Spokesperson: Good evening everybody and welcome to this Joint Press Conference by National Security Advisor, Foreign Secretary and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. We will first have opening remarks by the National Security Advisor and thereafter remarks by the Foreign Secretary and then we will open the Press Conference to questions.

National Security Advisor: Ladies and gentlemen of the press:
We are happy to inform you that the governments of India and the United States of America have finalized the text of the bilateral agreement for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. India and the United States are today issuing a Joint Statement on the conclusion of negotiations on this agreement.

The finalization of the text of this Agreement after five rounds of discussion is a significant milestone in the implementation of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush’s vision to transform the relationship between India and the United States, which was expressed in the Joint Statements of 18th July 2005 and 2nd March 2006. The commitments expressed in the Joint Statements of 18th July 2005 and 2nd March 2006 have been fully reflected in the final text of the bilateral cooperation agreement.



The purpose of the Agreement is to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle. The Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technologies, both parties having the same benefits and advantages. We are confident that the Agreement fulfills the terms outlined by the Prime Minister to Parliament on the 17th of August 2006.

The significance of the Agreement, which has become a touchstone of the transformed bilateral relationship between India and the United States, is that when brought into effect, it will open the way to bilateral cooperation between India and the United States in the area of civil nuclear energy.

The Agreement is also significant in opening the possibility of India cooperating with other countries in the world in civil nuclear energy. We look forward to this prospect. India regards international civil nuclear cooperation as potentially most important for energy security and for an environmentally sustainable pattern of development. India is ready to work with like-minded countries to fashion a new consensus on non-proliferation and realize the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world through universal nuclear disarmament.

In order to make cooperation in civil nuclear energy a reality, India will now negotiate an India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. The India-US bilateral agreement also opens up the possibility of an unconditional exemption for India from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines, as foreseen in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement.

The text of the Agreement will be made available to the public soon, at a time to be agreed by the two governments.



Foreign Secretary: I will now read to you the Joint Statement by Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Minister for External Affairs; and Dr. Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State on India and United States Complete Civil Nuclear Negotiations, July 27, 2007.

“The United States and India have reached a historic milestone in their strategic partnership by completing negotiations on bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, also known as the ‘123 agreement.’ This agreement will govern civil nuclear trade between our two countries and open the door for American and Indian firms to participate in each other’s civil nuclear energy sector.

The conclusion of negotiations on this agreement marks a major step forward in fulfilling the promise of full civil nuclear cooperation as envisioned by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The successful completion of the text permits us to move forward on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, first announced by the two leaders on July 18, 2005, and reaffirmed on March 2, 2006. The next steps include India negotiating a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and support for nuclear trade with India from the forty-five member Nuclear Suppliers Group. Once these additional actions have been completed, President Bush will submit the text of the agreement to the U.S. Congress for final approval.

Civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India will offer enormous strategic and economic benefits to both countries, including enhanced energy security, a more environmentally-friendly energy source, greater economic opportunities, and more robust nonproliferation efforts.



This achievement reinforces the growing bilateral relationship between two vibrant democracies. We are committed to the strategic partnership outlined by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and look forward to working together to implement this historic initiative.

Question (Parul Malhotra, CNN-IBN): This is a question for the National Security Advisor. Sir, you have been quoted as saying that the agreement is good but it is not the best that we could have got. What did you mean by that?

National Security Advisor: I said that the agreement is good but there is always something that you can always get better I can see that. I do not know from where you have got the quote unless it is this morning. We negotiated a text and I think the text is an excellent one. I did not want to be too presumptuous enough to say ‘the best possible’ because in a negotiation there is a certain amount of give and take on both sides. But what we have managed is that we have got all the commitments which our Prime Minister made to Parliament, they are fully safeguarded as far as this text is concerned.

Question (Mathew Rosenberg, Associated Press): How do you think is this agreement going to alter the balance of power in the region?
Foreign Secretary: This is an agreement for cooperation in civil nuclear energy. It is not about the balance of power in the region.



Question (Manish Chand, IANS): Talking of full civilian nuclear cooperation, would it also entail the transfer of technology related to reprocessing, heavy water reduction and enrichment? Also, some scientists have articulated apprehensions that the reprocessing formula that has been worked, that is setting a safeguarded facility, will expose the three-stage programme to international surveillance? What do you make out of that? The first question can be answered by Dr. Kakodkar.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: The objective of setting out this civil nuclear cooperation is to make sure that we benefit not only from the reactor and the fuel supplies that we get from outside, but also continue to benefit in terms of the enormous additional energy potential that would be there in the spent fuel. For that purpose this agreement gives advance consent rights for us to reprocess the spent fuel and reuse the material so recovered in national safeguarded facilities. So, as you can see, it allows us to derive the full benefit out of the cooperation. With regard to the domestic three-stage nuclear power programme, I think that is independent. That will be pursued in accordance with our own national programme and there is no interference of one into another.

National Security Advisor: I might just add, I presume that the question was whether the fast breeder programme would be interfered with. As the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission has just stated very explicitly, the fast breeder programme at the moment is not under any kind of international obligations.



Question: This is a question for either FS or NSA. Looking forward to the process of getting NSG exemption, what kind of assurances does India have so far and particularly what do you expect China’s position to be on this?

Foreign Secretary: I think it is a little premature because we have not actually asked the question of individual countries. So far we have briefed them about what we were hoping to do but without a finalized 123 agreement. We had not actually gone to any of these countries and asked, “What will you do if we ask that question?â€
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Post by Manne »

Any update on the scicom meeting that was to happen?

kgoan, namastubhyam. A rare post from you is better than regular posts from most others.

Would like to add one thing. People here would remember the report published by a wet-behind-the-ears bong PIO from Stanford under the guidance of David the NPA. If you recall the gist of that report, and read kgoan's post again, you will see what US is fast realising as slipping out of their hands. When AK had talked of India helping out US nuclear industry it was not taken very seriously - or, rather, was taken seriously without understanding what he was getting at. Now, put that in perspective with the fact that India is looking at specific reactors from overseas. Now, piece that puzzle together.
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Post by SaiK »

Question (Rahul Bedi, Jane’s Defence Weekly): What are the Americans getting out of this deal?
what a chep-o question! and a nice answer!.
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Post by John Snow »

NNS version of the samvadata /Vilikarala sambhashan.

Question (Mathew Rosenberg, Associated Press): How do you think is this agreement going to alter the balance of power in the region?

Answer: Hopefully With this agreement India will be able to meets its power requirement by synchronizing the electrical grids. It will also deter power grabbers in way.


Question (Sheela Bhatt, Rediff.Com): Dr. Kakodkar, we do not know much about your Department. But we would like to know how jubilant are your scientists or what is the exact reaction of the scientists.
Are they celebrating this as an award or not?

Answer> The deal is so good that DAE scientists have gone critical.
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Post by SaiK »

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Post by mandrake »

nkumar wrote:
The civilian facilities listed out in the Indo-US accord will be placed under the IAEA safeguards. These include not only the present and future imported nuclear reactors, material and technology, but also 14 of the 22 Indian built (some under construction) civilian reactors, future civilian fast-breeder reactors (other than the fast-breeder test reactor and the upcoming 500 MWe prototype fast-breeder reactor), designated heavy water plants, part of the nuclear fuel complex and civilian R&D complexes like the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, the Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre, the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics and the Institute of Plasma Research, and the Prefree Tarapur Reprocessing Plant.
Why has India agreed to bring its R&D facilities like TIFR into safeguards? This is absurd. I did not know that MMS & Co. has capitulated this much.
what the hell is this? VSCC , SINP all under SAFEGUARDS? means forget any DEW weapon research!!! I guess?

And why are they bringing upcoming new Indian FBR's under IAEA safeguards? this is ridiculous!! So this means out entire FBR programme under safeguards?
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Post by SaiK »

joey shaant ho jao!.. mms-manio bade log will help us achieve those under safeguards as well. :twisted:
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Post by mandrake »

SaiK wrote:joey shaant ho jao!.. mms-manio bade log will help us achieve those under safeguards as well. :twisted:
c'mon dude tell me if all future reactors including our fbr programme under safeguards? this was CLEARLY NOT what kakodkar sir spoke before??
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Post by SaiK »

unfortunately yes.. AK has given up on this FBRs being in perennial non-civilian sector. All future FBRs will be put into safeguards. yes. that is what I read too.

That means, we have to come into a reality that we describe our military ones as not fast breeders but some other type of breeder. call it desh breeder reactors.

again, there is nothing i have read or heard that talks about the future time line. so releax.

The x years could be really looooooooooong.. depending on our strategic needs. And the technology behind DBR (desh breeder) will be classified.
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Post by ksmahesh »

After a prolonged phase of "negativistic hormonal state" I have realised that deal is infact good. Babudom's (to my astonishment) performance has exceeded my most optimistic expectations. Perhaps it is due to "AK effect". However before gulping down Nathuram's peda I shall wait for fine print to be made public.

Positives:
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: The objective of setting out this civil nuclear cooperation is to make sure that we benefit not only from the reactor and the fuel supplies that we get from outside, but also continue to benefit in terms of the enormous additional energy potential that would be there in the spent fuel. For that purpose this agreement gives advance consent rights for us to reprocess the spent fuel and reuse the material so recovered in national safeguarded facilities. .


Meaning the threat of bullying tactics by withholding supply to reactors has been eliminated. US cannot hold supply of fuel to pressure us on their whim and fancy.
National Security Advisor: I might just add, I presume that the question was whether the fast breeder programme would be interfered with. As the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission has just stated very explicitly, the fast breeder programme at the moment is not under any kind of international obligations.
Feeling much better now.

problems:
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: As I mentioned, any civil nuclear programme has the reactor activity and the fuel cycle activity. Now, this agreement would, as I said, allow us to derive full benefit out of the reactor and associated fuel cycle activities as a kind of uninterrupted chain. You also know that India has its own full capability in all areas. So, what is important is that we are able to derive full benefit out of whatever cooperation we get from outside and we do not have any issues left in terms of not knowing what will happen to spent fuel and things like that. So, it is fully provided for.
We are not yet out of ban on dual usage tech. Hopefully babu's might be able to persuade NSG members (atleast some) for the repoc tech components. However this is not very troubling as we have our own well developed tech (AK's answer).
National Security Advisor: This deal deals primarily with the civil nuclear cooperation. There is no reference here to detonation or to any test. So, what happens in the event of a test, we will come to that position later on. This one is with regard to civil nuclear cooperation. Both sides are agreed on what they need to do in terms of policy guidelines. If India decides that it has to test, I think Article 14 carries a whole multilayered thing on what we need to do. But as of now there is no particular reference to testing or non-testing as far as this.
What is this "Article 14" ? Have we (Babus) minimised the potential riskes wrt testing?

On the whole the deal seems decent (my litmus test is AK's satisfaction).
[/u]
Last edited by ksmahesh on 01 Aug 2007 03:37, edited 1 time in total.
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Post by Gerard »

The most efficient reactors for Plutonium production are graphite moderated, gas cooled ones.
These would be more suitable for the military side than a breeder.
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Post by SaiK »

wasn't the chernobyl graphite moderated?

also in desh case, we need to really know what type of fuel composition and enrichments are to be used.
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Post by Sparsh »

How many bloody times does someone have to keep repeating this:

The GoI will decide which future DAE facilities including future FBRs are civilian and which ones are not.

Why is it so hard for people to understand such a simple thing?
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