Bharat Rakshak

Considering the simple fact that by the time there are several foriegn reactors up and running in india, cutting off the power to india may backfire on them in more ways than one.

Ok, fine. PPL have issues with the word Sell out. Smile . Reminds me of something Churchill said - Don't blame on conspiracy, things you can blame on incompetence.

Should I feel warm and fuzzy if India' leaders are like Bahadur Shah Zafar, and not like Mir Jafar? Razz

Ok, fine. PPL have issues with the word Sell out.

Point wise:
1. >>But WHY do all desi top babus like him assume that India cannot protect the military/ strategic research program
The reason why people are pissed off with the intrusion is that we do not need that self satisfied sweeperpower to keep looking over our collective shoulder. The deal will add irritants to India's nuclear program (civilian, I might add) that are not needed.

2. >>the "cooperation" consists of them giving up nuke weapons, and the P-5 giving them zilch in return
Exactly. If the NPT did not help the NNWS, then this 'NPT-like' deal will also not help us either. And, so the question remains, why the hell did we do this deal?

3. >>So what these guys claim the US is not giving, may be something the US doesn't give anyone.
And, so the question remains, why the hell did we do this deal?

The worry that I had is coming back. This deal is nothing but NPT is sheep's disguise. Our hard won nuclear/energy independance is about to be given away by the MMS team. This deal is still a sell out.

What the yanks could not force us to give up by becoming our enemies, they are now take away by pretending to be our friends.

By separating civlian and strategic there are two things that happen:

1) The civilian side can never subsidize the strategic directly, and
2) The way it is set up, outsiders can more easily make the civilian side so cheap that the strategic side - over a long period of time - become prohibitively expensive

Dr, Prasad's article is not an isolated incidence. AK IIRC used the word "Satisfactory", when asked about this deal.

2) The way it is set up, outsiders can more easily make the civilian side so cheap that the strategic side - over a long period of time - become prohibitively expensive

We didn't have energy self-sufficiency.

Let us send LALU & J. JAYALALITHA

4) MMS and Company being bean counters want Powe by cheap peggybacking on unkils coat tails.... remember MMS quivering in his boots (pyjamas) at the thought of PVN testing....

There is a need for a three-track approach. First, to keep pressing ahead in our quest for nuclear self-sufficiency so that we can produce one day all the nuclear power we need through our own resources and efforts. Second, to force open the doors to international nuclear commerce so that we can buy our requirements of power stations and related technologies till such time as we reach the goal of self-sufficiency. The recently-concluded agreement with the US is one of the initial steps in our attempt to break open the doors, which are till now shut against us. And third, to keep ourselves mentally and in other ways prepared to meet a situation in which the doors might again be closed against us before we reach the goal of self-sufficiency. A comprehensive exercise to cater to these three tracks is the need of the hour.

Unfortunately, the national debate on this subject has got stuck in a "for or against" syndrome. If one is for it, one can think of dozens of reasons for supporting it. If one is against it, one can equally find dozens of reasons for opposing it.

More than the agreement itself, the circumstances surrounding the negotiations which preceded its finalisation and the changing attitude to the US amongst the present political leaders in power in New Delhi and the small group of officials and non-official intellectuals advising them should be a matter of concern to public opinion. The negotiations and the background against which these were conducted brought out certain defining characteristics of the leaders and their advisers. Firstly, the lack of transparency. All governments in India have tended to be less transparent than they ought to have been, but none has been more opaque in policy-making than the present one. Second, the noticeable contempt for those expressing reservations about the present policy of the government towards the US in general and this agreement in particular.

The US has ruled out any civil nuclear co-operation agreement with Pakistan on the ground that India is a special case. Will Beijing, piqued by perceptions of India letting itself be used by the US against China, treat India as a special case in the NSG and agree to lifting the restrictions on India without simultaneously lifting those on Pakistan? These are questions which have not been adequately addressed in the debate on the US-induced new directions in our foreign policy.

He wasn't merely protesting. He was being obnoxious and abusing everybody around. If you have read some of his posts, they are not really the wordsof a man who knows how to respect other people.

He helped himself out of the forum.

Shri Raman's questions in the end seem a little weird since it assumes that China has a lot of clout in the NSG...IIRC, China joined the NSG only 3 years ago or less...

Nuclear deal: India has no leverage

A N Prasad | August 06, 2007 | 18:53 IST

Ever since it was released on August 3, the much-awaited text of the India-United States nuclear deal has been profusely commented upon and covered in the media.

It is obvious the text has tried to accommodate diverging interests and constraints of both the parties by clever use of language -- to give an illusory impression that the concerns are duly reflected.

For the sake of public comfort, both parties are saying loudly that they are free to hold on to their respective rights and legal positions.

It means hardly anything as far as India is concerned. Up against the Hyde Act standing like a Rock of Gibraltar, India has no leverage to force any of the issues during the innumerable consultations suggested in the text.

In fact, our case was compromised to a large extent when this American act was passed, our prime minister's assurances to the contrary notwithstanding.

We are now in effect reduced to a mere recipient State mandated by the Hyde Act to carry out a set of dos and don'ts and to strive to earn a good behaviour report card to become eligible to continue receiving what the Americans can offer.

In the process, slowly but surely, they can gain control and remotely drive our nuclear programmes in the long run.

This deal, through the Hyde Act, gives far too many opportunities to penetrate deep into and interfere even in our three-stage programme to slow down the realisation of our goal of harnessing our vast resources of thorium for long-term energy security.

Two points in support of this, which have largely missed notice:

One, the revelation by Nicholas Burns, US under secretary of state during his interview to the Council on Foreign Relations: 'It had been an easy "strategic" choice for Washington when faced with the question -- should we isolate India for the next 35 years or bring it in partially now ( under safeguards inspection) and nearly totally in the future.'

Two, Article 16.2 of the text says the 123 Agreement shall remain in force for a period of 40 years and at the end of this initial period each party may terminate by giving six month's notice. There is no in-built provision for terminating before 40 years even if we were to suffer for any reason in the implementation of the deal.

These 40 years are expected to cover the period by which we intend to take thorium utilisation to a commercial reality. A coincidence?

It is naive to judge the merits of the deal based purely on the language of the text. The underlying undercurrents and intentions of the controlling party are important and cannot be wished away as hypothetical or as their internal matter when they do actually have serious repercussions on our long-term interests.

There has been a careful balancing of US commercial interests with the goal of bringing India into the non-proliferation hold, an American obsession ever since the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into existence in 1970.

There have been overt suggestions in the Hyde Act to the American administration to not only attempt to cap but also try to eventually roll back our strategic programme and report to the US Congress.

Try they will; but whether we are smart enough to thwart their designs or they manage to succeed -- given the tremendous access they get through this deal � is something time will tell.

Let me turn to some of the most contentious issues that have not been satisfactorily resolved.

Reprocessing

This has been stated to be the most hotly debated issue. Let me therefore deal with it in some detail in simple terms to put things in perspective.

Reprocessing is at the core of our three-stage nuclear power programme. It is the interface between the first and the second stage and again between the second and the third stage.

In the first step, it facilitates extracting plutonium from the spent uranium fuel and feeding to the fast breeder reactors in the second stage as fuel -- where thorium fuel is also introduced.

When thorium is converted into fissile uranium in the fast reactors, the same is extracted by reprocessing to be fed into third stage reactors where large-scale thorium utilisation occurs.

It was once estimated that with the limited resources of uranium in the country more than 350,000 MW of electricity could be produced through thorium utilisation, ensuring long-term energy security. The steady progress India is making with starting the construction of the first 500 Mwe prototype fast breeder reactor is an envy of many in the advanced world.

Recognising the key role of reprocessing, development activities were started as early as 1959 -- much before even the first nuclear power reactor became operational at Tarapur in 1969.

While the first power reactor was imported from the US, the first reprocessing facility was built entirely through indigenous efforts and went into operation in 1965.

The irony is, the US -- knowing fully well our four decades of experience in reprocessing and aware of its importance in our three-stage programme -- has sought to create impediments and make us beg for reprocessing consent, that too after accepting us as strategic partner.

What hypocrisy! Should we call this nuclear cooperation or non-cooperation?

Is it not obvious that their intention is to place hurdles on our thorium-utilisation programme right from the beginning?

In fact, even though there is what is called a fast reactor nuclear fuel cycle, not a word is mentioned in the Agreement on fast-reactor coop eration. The text calls for all future fast breeder reactors to be put under the civilian list for applying safeguards in perpetuity -- just because plutonium extracted from imported uranium spent fuel is fed into these reactors.

It is a pity our negotiators have chosen not to pursue extending the cooperation into the area of fast reactors at least to the extent that we should be able to access the international market for equipment and components which otherwise have to be produced by Indian industry with considerable effort

The way the reprocessing issue has been resolved certainly does not give any comfort. What has been agreed to is consent in principle, with the arrangements and procedures to be agreed in the future. Having offered a dedicated facility for reprocessing imported fuel, we should have got unconditional upfront consent to be made effective on satisfactory conclusion of safeguards.

The intent of the American legislation is to deny reprocessing rights to NPT countries that don't already have this technology. We cannot be equated with Japan, which�� Burns reportedly said has been used as a model for resolving this issue. I can say from personal knowledge that Japan was totally unhappy in dealing with the US while negotiating procedures and arrangements in the late 1970s for their reprocessing plant.

We should watch out.

Also, in the entire fuel cycle, application of safeguards on reprocessing is the toughest. The point of concern is that Burns keeps harping that the dedicated facility, though not mentioned in the text, has been offered by India as a state-of-the-art facility. This is a possible conflict point during the consultations on safeguard-feasibility, as there is no reference standard on the design of such a facility in the world. Information on the less than a handful of facilities operating in the world at present is kept secret and not shared.

Perhaps the dedicated plant we have offered will be the first plant to be wide open to the outside world. The US will definitely have a good look at it!

Being a dedicated facility committed to full safeguards, it should be our endeavour to obtain special items of equipment and hardware components from the international market.

Full civil nuclear cooperation

In spite of the prime minister's assurances, the issue of full civil cooperation has not been resolved in our favour. The text has allowed an unfair definition of this term, with the result that embargoes will continue on the most complex part of the fuel cycle facilities -- such as enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water.

Though we may not need to import technology as such, there should have been an opportunity to access the world market for specific low quantity dual-use items which otherwise have to be produced by Indian industry.

This historic deal not being able to get rid of sanctions, despite India taking on a whole lot of burdens on safeguards and other aspects, is a big disappointment.

Testing

This is a much-talked-about topic, and any further discussion is like flogging a dead horse.

Suffice to say, irrespective of what is said or unsaid, we have surrendered our decision -- though not the legal right -- for all practical purposes. Talk of multi-layered consultations and actions is all an eyewash and public relations exercise.

Fallback safeguarded safeguards

It is surprising that such a hypothetical issue has found specific mention in the text, contrary to the prime minister's assurance. There is every likelihood that this can be invoked. Though it is the bounden duty of the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply safeguards in member States in a cost effective manner, there is a large inflow of extra-budgetary grants for this activity.

With a huge spurt in safeguards load from India, whose cost substantially has to be met by additional extra-budgetary grants, there could well be a move in future to create a situation that due to paucity of funds the IAEA puts its hands up for the US to step in.

At that point the US inspectors will roam around in our nuclear plants, irrespective of what our prime minister has assured.

The bottom line

With the proposed deal we have in our hands, one statement baffles: 'This Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages.'

How I wish this had been really true! It is hard to find any point on which we have the leverage to dictate with a position of strength in this deal, in spite of being rightly labelled as a State possessing advanced nuclear technology.

Dr A N Prasad, a distinguished nuclear scientist and an international authority on the issue of safeguards, is former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre.

http://www.rediff.com///news/2007/aug/06guest1.htm

With a huge spurt in safeguards load from India, whose cost substantially has to be met by additional extra-budgetary grants, there could well be a move in future to create a situation that due to paucity of funds the IAEA puts its hands up for the US to step in.

At that point the US inspectors will roam around in our nuclear plants, irrespective of what our prime minister has assured.

At that point the US inspectors will roam around in our nuclear plants, irrespective of what our prime minister has assured.

The US has to meanwhile ensure that India gets alternate supplies.

VP Singh rejects N-deal draft

Statesman News Service
NEW DELHI, Aug 5: The Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation deal continues to evoke suspicion among political parties. The draft agreement was today rejected by the former Prime Minister, Mr V P Singh, who said it was a "charter for dependence on the US."
Instead of going in for a "hollow" agreement with the US, the former Prime Minister favoured India setting up more thermal power plants using imported coal.
He said the draft 123 agreement to operationalise the Indo-US nuclear deal gave Washington "unfettered" rights to terminate the pact and seek return of all material supplied by it.
Raising the issue of financial viability, Mr Singh said the government should make public the cost involved in the use of nuclear power and the percentage of energy requirement it would fulfill in the future. He said "Currently, nuclear power comprises just three per cent of the total power produced in the country. I have been told by experts that this figure would go up to seven per cent once this deal is operationalised."
Mr Singh said the deal would make India dependent on the US for uranium supplies for power plants, "surrender" the rights to conduct an atomic test and reprocess spent fuel and open up nuclear facilities for American inspection.
"We can instead import coal which can be done without any conditionalities and set up thermal power plants along the coastline," he said.

http://thestatesman.org/page.news.php?c ... &id=165268

This is a lie...the US will not do any such thing even if it has agreed to do so in paper in the 123.

"We can instead import coal which can be done without any conditionalities and set up thermal power plants along the coastline," he said.

moratorium on Nuke Test

Also another point that has not been discussed is why BJP committed India to a moratorium on Nuke Test. This I feel is the sole reason for all the major paper roadblocks in the 123 agreement. Bush et al keep harping on this point. They want moratorium to hold.

6. Furthermore for power generation via coal to really increase to China like numbers, GOI has to take on the entrenched mafia and trade unions in the nationalized coal mines and the farmers lobby who are used to free power. Neither the UPA nor the NDA have the testacular fortitude to take on both of these entities.

As a measure of how much Washington acceded to India on the reprocessing issue, which he identified as the one which 'bedeviled' talks, Burns pointed out that Japan and Euraton alone among US allies had been accorded reprocessing rights, and the agreement with Japan ran into 400 pages.