ShauryaT wrote:
So, what really are our options, if not for this deal, is the real question.
Fair question, but I think it puts the cart before the proverbial horse.
Before we look at options, we may have to look at the strategic imperatives and evaluate how each of these options affect our strategic imperatives...in the sense that we look at the effect of making each choice over a period of time and look at the best, medium and worst case scenarios.
It would be silly to start listing our options without stating what problem we are trying to solve and how that problem affects us in the long run.
Once this question is honestly answered, in sincerety, the answer to if this deal is worth it, will be self evident.
If a buyer asks a real-estate dealer about the "real" value/worth of a house, the honest answer the seller will usually get from an honest agent is "whatever you think this house is worth".
So if one places more weight on weapons programs as an indicator of strength, then the standards placed by the person on whether or not 123 meets their requirements of "guaranteed protection of nuclear weapons program" is bound to be high enough to recommend walking away from 123.
I think we will agree that, after 123, India's program is only guaranteed to the extent that GoI politicians and babus do not knife indigenous R&D and scientific programs and institutions in the long term. As long as those programs are funded and functioning efficiently, nothing has been lost by virtue of signing up for 123. Some events and actions may have been put to sleep temporarily for a few decades, but as long as one is alive, waking up from sleep (morarjitorium) is only a matter of changing intent after developing all the necessary capabilities.
OTOH, if we consider USSR's trajectory from superpowerdom, we realize that the real strength of a country comes from empowered and economically independent citizens, and IMO this must be considered a "strategic imperative", not necessarily in the bleeding heart sense but in the sense that if this goal is not achieved, it does not matter if India has a jillion well-tested and working nukes.
I understand that the question of testing is a more nuanced one, but the real implication of 123 on that front is "if India tests, it must be able to withstand the consequences of any sanctions imposed by US law". Is India's ability to withstand such consequences going to increase or decrease if US dependency on India increases rather than remaining in the current plateau?