Bharat Rakshak

Mohan Raju,

Good Stuff ...

I agree. The opening Dual / High tech technology, will have immence ramification for India and will augment Indian advances in the field of Science and Technology. This will greatly help India in strengthening it economy.

India has some of the smartest nuclear scientists in the world. I believe that the need for nuclear test in the near future is very low, Considering that have the simulation data for Pokhran 2 tests.

If under extreme circumstances India needs to test then so be it. That is a price we have to pay. Indian economy is strong to take it. mean while we have access to all sorts of technology from, US, Japan, Europe etc ....

If the need come to renegotiate the treaty arises in the future, India will have a more stronger and integrated economy to better the terms of the treaty.

Maybe you/others can answer my questions then :

1) If IAEA safeguards agreement has no mention of fuel supply guarentees is it acceptable to you ?
[quote]
Experts say the drafts of the safeguards agreement have gone back and forth between the IAEA and South Block.

They see no delay except in hammering out the India specific provisions relating to fuel supply.

Ex- ambassador to UN Arundhati Ghose said, “What we want to achieve is yes we will put it under safeguards this reactor for its lifetime but it must be matched by fuel supply for its lifetime.â€

geeth,

Dabhol and 123 cannot be compared. Even on strawman basis. There was something very wrong with Dabhol. OTOH, all points on 123 have been clarified. If we do not have the guts to follow the example of previous GoI decisions then the joke is upon us and not current GoI or GOTUS.

Ratan Tata is absolutely right. And not because his group stands to make a lot of money. This deal is not a litmus test of just US sincerity, it is also a litmus test of whether India is ready to command respect externally as well as internally.

From the PM-Tarapur link:


Folks, please read the bold parts together and try to understand where India stands in reactor construction despite all the denials.

Vijay Hirani: Thanks.



Thanks. My responses:

1. The assertion that "China got a better deal" is dubious (one analysis earlier in this thread asserts precisely the opposite), but in any case irrelevant even if true. India got the deal it asked for (J18/M02), and in fact better. What China got is irrelevant. There were always practical limits to what the US could offer India, because of this whole NWS/non-NWS thing (NPT, CTBT etc.). What we have achieved is a backdoor entry to de facto NWS status, which is precisely why the NPAs are frothing at the mouth. De jure recognition was not possible, and India's leaders/negotiators were sensible enough to recognize this fact.

2. Re. Tarapur: it is not unreasonable to say "The US screwed us in the past, they may do so again", but I would respond that the "may screw us again" would certainly be true if the deal were rejected by India. If the deal goes through, the US may still try to screw us if: (a) they feel their national interests require it, and (b) if they could sufficienlty punish India without paying a price themselves. Both these preconditions to cost-free US screwing of India could certainly be fufilled now (if the deal were rejected), but I would argue that they would be less and less achievable in future years if the deal goes through and India gets stronger and more confident (both vis-a-vis the US as well as the rest of the world). What I am saying is that India's bargaining position w.r.t. the US is a lot weaker now than it will be once the deal goes thorough and India makes the expected leaps and bounds of economic/military progress. In any case, the assessment of US desire to screw us in the future is a judgement call, and my judgement is that this desire will not exist in the future as it did in the past (or may well exist if we kick this deal to the curb).

America can and may screw anyone in the future. Only the fools would expect a deal where America cannot screw India. The only way America cannot screw India is ..if America becomes a weak country and that ain't happening any time soon or If India becomes very strong... And now thats where the guarantee lies in....with Indians. Its all in the hands of Indians to make India strong economically and militarily. The lefties are not helping.

Tilak:

All your questions re. negotiations with the IAEA are hypotheticals, hence impossible to answer, because India has barely started negotiating with the IAEA. What I feel about the IAEA and/or the NSG can be summarised as follows: any condition put by them on us that is more restrictive than this 123 deal would be unacceptable and should be rejected. Likewise, if in future the US Congress tries to do likewise, it should be rejected.

The concerns you have expressed were precisely my concerns until the 123 deal was reached, i.e. I was afraid that the 123 would be more restrictive than J18/M02. Thus, I advocated the rejection of such a 123 agreement. However, when the actual 123 came out, it was clear that all of J18's goals had been achieved, and then some, so I changed my calls for rejection to calls for acceptance.

Specifically, if (and this is of course a hypothetical) the Indian agreement with IAEA says something like "inspections will be in perpertuity, subject to fuel supplies being in perpetuity" (which I believe is the thrust of your question) that would be acceptable to me.



I hope this post answers your question.

Mohan Raju :

It sure did and thanks for the reply.

>How I wish the above were hypotheticals like you mentioned, I read from authoritative site, at work which I failed to bookmark . What it said was exactly what I've mentioned above[IAEA], and look at the following link as well which corroborates it. And that's the reason, i'm still fence-sitting until ...



PS: I'm also worried about rejecting a "~done deal" [after congress passes it], as it would be a huge setback diplomatically/credibility and it would make it all the more difficult if ~Govt. chooses to pursue it, at a later stage..

Mohan Raju, Maybe I am wrong but something tells me there is something quite wrong about this deal. I did congratulate KS on successfully negotiating this deal from the background but I am not sure that everything is overboard now. I don't like what Seema Mustafa , Notwar Singh were hinting at. Hyd is already paying for it.

Ramana:

What you are saying, in effect -- what Seema M. is saying -- is that this deal should be rejected simply because Indian Muslims hate America and will start terrorist acts to dissuade the govt from accepting the deal. In other words, Mecca/Tehran/Islamabad/Dacca get a veto on Indian foreign policy.

I don't know if this assessment is correct, but it would be interesting to see what conclusions Indians in general/BRF members in particular draw from this. I could say things in the heat of the moment, but it's better I not to.

Note that this is a forum which routinely calls for war against Pakistan with each new terrorist act in India. What to say of a situation of permanent dhimmifcation of the Indian state? Moreover, people like BC and BK have routinely vilified this GoI as well as its predecessor for an assumed position of weakness against Pakistan and Bangladesh. How ironic that they are now on the same side of the dhimmifiers, even if they do not themselves advocate dhimmification!!

P.S. Come to think of it, I don't think Seema M should get any free rides here. She should be asked specifically: "Are you advocating rejection of this deal to appease Muslim 'anti' sentiment, even if the rest of India accepts it? Are you predicting terrorist acts in India if the deal goes through?". What the hell! She is the one who has introduced a religious element to this argument. Why should she be the one defining how far this debate goes? Why not take it to its logical conclusion? Let the mullahs come out publicly in opposition, if that is their position?

Well said, Mohan Raju. The sub-text in the articles written by Seema Mustafa as well as her boss MJ Akbar is precisely that. That IMs are not happy with this deal. Let her and MJ Akbar state that explicitly instead of shadow boxing behind euphemisms.

Its a win win situation for IMs. Pre-partion Indian IMs according to certain theories stated here got the separate country of Pakistan to compensate for the formation of Israel. But at the same time, the IMs who either voluntarily/involuntarily chose to stay behind in India also get a continuing veto on India's domestic and foreign policy. Got to love this. Have your cake and eat it too!!.

Ldev well said. What the heck is with this dhimmification over each and every thing. And who gave these politicians/ lefty IMs to speak for the entire IM group as well? In logon ne kya election jeeta hain?
They are using the entire IM group to push their agenda. Pretty sure that many educated, reasonable IMs will actually support the deal as it means more jobs/ more economic growth for them as well.

MR and Ldev, you are getting angry at the messenger and not at the message. I would like to know that GOI is taking steps to address the message and not just Sachar report etc. I want GOI to sign the deal with its eyes open and not eyes shut closed. There will be fallouts and need to take care of them.
And don't blame the IMs. Blame those who agreed to the grand bargain. Otherwise they will go on and make other bargains that you and my progeny will have to pay.

BTW you have forgotten Natwar Singh and Uday Bhaskar who also alluded tot he message.

Ramana , nothing can be gained without paying price and all will be lost if price is not extracted from folks who want veto our India 's national policies.The matter need to be setlled now not latter. This Join Account fallacy of some Ashrafs need to be exorcised in full public view.
The whims of few minority leaders cannot override national security, economic and other strategic interests.

Exactly. If Seema M and her cohort had not exposed this we would still be in the dark. I want the account settled before moving forward.

If the bargain is true the INC has consciously retarded the progress of India in order to pander to the their vote bank. And the opposition was right after all.

Why hinge this deal on that account, though?

It will be more expensive later. Settle it while its inexpensive.

But this deal pits both the IMs as well as the Lefties, two strong and traditional vote banks of the INC against the INC. So maybe for once, dont you think that the INC is doing this for the national interest? And how ironic that if for maybe the first time an INC led government is doing something for India's national interest and while paying a price in terms of its traditional vote banks, the "nationalist" party, the BJP is fiddling while Rome burns.

Unless BJP fiddles this stuff wont happen. So here is where inaction is action.

How is the BJP's inaction at this stage helping India?

so why would MMS go to all the trouble of negotiating the Strategic Path Forward with the US, with collaboration on such a wide range of issues, if the intent is to then back out of everything because a few mofos start putting bombs in buses?

Why not save the time and go to Beijing instead? In fact, the one instance of MMS showing some class was in saying to the Chinis when they wanted India to be represented at PM level, as an OBSERVER in some scam that they were pulling.

Sorry, ramanaji, u r not making sense. Seema Mustafa is basically a Musharraf mouthpiece. If it is good for India, it is bad for Seema. MJ Akbar is also pandering to the Ummah 85% of the time.

The Hyderabad blasts probably have more to do with the '93 blast verdicts coming out, than with any nuclear or strategic deal. Or maybe some damn terrorist just felt like testing a new bomb design. Unilateral Moratorium lasted only 100 days.

Oh! I forgot. Probablhy H'bad blasts are retaliation for h'bad hosting Taslima Nasreen. H&D of Islamic Mard affected. 44 innocent lives is a small thing compared to that, isn't it?

I am amazed at people reading these grand plans into the actions of these violent rats with the microbrains up their asses.

Also, hasn't this whole discussion gone back into desi internal politics?

Enqyoob,It might be the combination of many valid factors as alluded by you and others . Still the issue/s raised by some Asharafs and their pets need to be settled before moving forward to realize the dream of strong India taking its own place among civilizational spheres. We cant keep watching our back in forward march. Not good to move 1 step forward and 1 step backward and remain in limbo hoping for best while enemies sharpen their knives to go for kill .Every setback is an oppertunity which need to to be exploited to further national interests and strength.

That's a matter of opinion. I think Seema M is more than just a messenger, she is an advocate of a point of view. But if this POV is so strong, it should be expressed out in the open, and challenged out in the open. None of this sniping from behind the scenes and then innocently saying "Who, me? Nonsense! I didn't say a thing. Just because some reporter said doesn't mean I agree". If the Commies and others have the guts to come out in the open and argue their POVs, IMs should be no different. No free rides for anyone.



Yes, I had forgotten that, but no problem -- I hereby call on everyone hinting at this IM factor to come out in the open and say it clearly, or STFU. None of this hints/innuendo BS. Put up or shut up!

We will never be able to move anywhere if we stay in the dunghole and try to fight it out with those who thrive in the dung. Like Pakis and other terrorists. or like arguing the merits of the nuclear deal on BRF with ppl who have NOOOOO intention of being fair in debate.

As for backstabbing, that goes on everywhere.

Sure, I too think that destroying the paki Army is essential for peace. But it isn't going to happen. No GOI is going to finish off Pakistan's Army, not NDA, not INC and most certainly not the Commies.

So best approach is to move forward, while maintaining a strong military and deterrence.

Anyway, I have no idea what ppl here mean by "settling" whatever problem involving Islamists etc. They are no more and no less than other Indian citizens, so why make a big deal about it?

Well this is outrageous stuff from Outlooks Mumbai Bureau Chief ?? who even defended attack on Tasleema Nasreen in an earlier article..
Loss Of Neutrons
The Indo-US nuclear deal draws a tacit mistrust from India's Muslims ......
Saba Naqvi Bhaumik
Outlook

:Apologies if OT:

I think it will be a bit premature to connect N-deal and Hyd-blasts. I tend to agree with PoV that these are regular blasts or in connection to Mumbai blasts verdict.

Let me take this opportunity to point out that Page 2 of this very thread has a post by member arun debunking this idea that all IMs oppose this deal. There is an article by a Muslim author Abusaleh Sharif making exactly this point. So if Seema & Co are saying that all or most IMs hate this deal, they should certainly be challenged on this. No automatic assumption of wisdom on anyone's part.

Bring on the debate!

IB intelligence to Andhra specifically noted chatter on cross-border comms. This was orchestrated from across the border. The link to the nuclear issue may be tangential, and driven more from a realization that the GOI is unlikely to retaliate strongly, than an expression of IM angst.

CCEA clears proposal for uranium plant[quote]Faced with questions about a possible linkage with the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal, he sought to clarify that the two were not linked. “This is our own uranium. We will mine it, we will process it, and we will use it.â€

I would say that Ramana's interpretation of what SM is saying is correct. That there is an oblique attempt to derail the deal by using the bogey of the "muslim anger".

Note here the issue isn't Indian muslims, it's a segment of the IM leadership threatening to unleash "their" muslims.

And I say, let them bring it on. We've had to face this for decades. What's the difference now?

Here's one key point: The "threats" such as they are, are *very* oblique, at least from the power players. And the only reason I can think of that they're so indirect is because the self proclaimed "leaders" lack the ability to actually make good on them.

Akbar acknowledges this in the last paragraph in his article where he understands that Congress is willing to go the polls on the issue.

In fact most of the loud-mouths on the left and the BJP have figured out the trap the Congress has set for them - and they're backpeddling and looking for a way out that gives them a face saver.

(Bidwai's latest article is hilarious. He literally begs MMS to "pause" the issue in return for a guarantee of left support.)

So far MMS seems to have refused.

>>Settling the account

This is pure blackmail. They want payment as usual for not making trouble. The answer so far from our establishment seems to be simple: "we don't think the trouble you can make warrants what you demand, so no payment, do what you can".

If the current blasts are linked to this, then they've lost. Because if that's all they can do, it's no different to the level of trouble Pak can make, and therefore does NOT warrant the blackmail payment.

See, this is crucial. The IM leadership's fundamental claim is: "If you think Pak is bad, we can do much worse".

Now if it turns out that they can't do much more than what Pak does, i.e. random terrors acts that do *CANNOT* damage the dynamics of our society, then they've lost.

SM et al have made a mistake. They've been drawn into a fight at their weakest. And they're to stupid to realise it.

So again, I would say, let them bring it on.

Being "inquisitive" is what I do for a living. You are the only one on this forum who seems to have gone through the science of the nuclear tests or at least in far more detail than others and also you have the background to understand it. Hence, my questions are targeted at you.
If the science was in my field I wouldn't bother to ask you.

Now about the point I am trying to make is what I have already made before. Sanctions are inevitable whenever we test. It seems many of those screaming for the deal right now do not understand how difficult it will be to test once this deal goes through. I am for the deal but only under the right circumstances. Also I have made the point that even the most brilliant experiment by the most brilliant scientist cannot be done in one shot. If our scientists are claiming to have done so then I say "bravo". So this is my point about the single H-test.

Now coming back to the paper. My scientific question was what were the doubts?

************
****************

What is point you are trying make? Why are you so inquisitive?[/quote]

N:

The issue isn't Indian muslims as such.

The issue is the astonishingly small set of self-proclaimed "leaders", who claim the right to speak on behalf of Indian muslims, and also claim that all "important" issues must go through them.

In effect the claim the right to be the interface and gateway to what *they* project as the monolithic bloc of Indian muslims.

The challenge to them is to prove that they have this degree of control. They clearly don't.

In a sense, they're the equivalent of the Pak RAPE class who 'interpret" Pak to the world.

Now this is the general case everywhere. There is always a small subset of people who claim to speak for all. The left claim to speak for the "poor". Once upon a time the so-called left also claimed to speak for the dalits. Until the Dalits began to speak for themselves.

We have similar situation here. The people that SM is speaking for claim certain rights based on who they *claim* to represent.

Let them prove their claim.

Something very interesting: Kapil Sibal explained to some Left leaders that 123 overrides Hyde Act. I wonder what Nick Burns have to say to that.

http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/videos.aspx?id=0

>>>So now you are talking about foreign policy influence rather than influence on the local program.

I am not talking about foreign policy NOW. I have said it in my previous post and I thought you wanted a clarification on that issue too.

>>>Is it anyone else's fault if India dos not capitalize on the manufacture of supplies etc. and kicks up the ability of the local industry to support future AHWR programs?

What do you mean by 'manufacture of supplies? Why are you llinking supply, manufacture & imported nuclear plants with AHWR?

Either you have not understood what I have said or just pretending not to know - I have mentioned clearly how the supplier of the plant can armtwist India - by way of not co-operating in technical support, supply of spares, supply of fuel etc. If you are saying domestic Industry can be kicked and made to supply parts for imported plants, you are stretching it a bit too far. Even if it happpens, it would be a tedious and long process. In any case, we will not be able to indigenise 100% parts

Only alternative is to import ALL the spares for the WHOLE life cycle of the plant. It is not practically possible. Cost of spares supplied will be another issue.

>>>If relations with the US are not good, as you posited, why should this be an issue. The Tarapur fiasco, did it weaken us or strengthen us?

I did not say the relationship with the US will not be good. They stopped the supply of Cryogenic engine when the relationship was good. Latest, they stopped supply of a particular fibre used in the manufacture of AGNI III, when MMS & Co are crowing that the relationship is at its Zenith. All I did was highlight the risks involved in doing business with the US.

When you talk of strength & weakness regarding Tarapur fiasco, what exactly is your point?

>>>And we will simply just hand it over to them, uh huh.

NO. They will forcefully try to take away. If they fail, they might try using those who are pliable.

>>>>You are appearing paranoid simply because you make the accusation but have not thought through how the US can indeed mess with the Indian program. Such an eventuality is surely possible, but it needs more than a vague fear that Indian babus and netas are pushovers who cannot protect India's interests.

First you say I am appearing Paranoid and in the next sentence you say such an eventuality is surely possible. These are contradictory.

It is not my vague fear about Indian Netas and Babus being pushovers. That is a possibility. More than that, my fear is about the ability of the US to push through whatever they want. Indian Netas and babus WILL have good intentions, but the free space available to them for manoevre will be curtailed to a large extent, with this kind of a deal. The only possiblity is to bypass Americans completely in future, chances of which are slim, IMO.

Not my problem what you do for living. If you have a line of reasoning on the subject or can increase wisdom of BRF than talk about it and enlighten; BRForum is a 2 way street. People who use it for learning are welcome to make use of what is available, but then do not dig or fish for information.

As for your question, sorry I don't know.

US NUCLEAR POWER SCENE -TODAY (JUST FOR A COMPARATIVE VIEW
AN WHAT WE ARE LOOKING AT)

The USA has over 100 nuclear reactors providing almost 20% of its electricity. These have a high level of performance.

With deregulation, both ownership and operation of these is becoming concentrated.

Extension of reactor lifetimes from 40 to 60 years is enhancing the economic competitiveness of plants.

The industry envisages substantial new nuclear capacity by 2020 and several regulatory initiatives are preparing the way for new orders.

Operationally, from the 1970s the US nuclear industry dramatically improved its safety and operational performance, and by the start of this decade it was among world leaders, with average net capacity factor over 90% and all safety indicators exceeding targets. Nuclear share of total electricity was 781 billion kWh in 2005, just under 20% of total.

This performance was achieved as the US industry continued deregulation, begun with passage of the Energy Policy Act in 1992. Changes accelerated after 1998, including mergers and acquisitions affecting the ownership and management of nuclear power plants. Further industry consolidation is likely.

Today the importance of nuclear power in USA is geopolitical as much as economic, reducing dependency on imported oil and gas. The operational cost of nuclear power - 1.66 c/kWh in 2006 - is slightly lower than that from coal and much lower than from gas.

From 1992 to 2005 some 270,000 MWe of new gas-fired plant was built, and only 14,000 MWe of new nuclear and coal-fired capacity came on line. But coal and nuclear supply 70% of US electricity and provide price stability. While investment in these two technologies almost disappeared, unsustainable demands were placed on gas supplies and prices quadrupled, forcing large industrial users of it offshore and pushing gas-fired electricity costs towards 10c/kWh.

The reason for investment being predominantly in gas-fired plant was that it offered the lowest investment risk. Several uncertainties inhibited investment in capital-intensive new coal and nuclear technologies. One third of US generating capacity is over 30 years old, and major investment is also required in transmission infrastructure. This creates an energy investment crisis which was recognised in Washington, along with an increasing bipartisan consensus on the strategic importance and clean air benefits of nuclear power in the energy mix.

The Energy Policy Act 2005 then provided a much-needed stimulus for investment in electricity infrastructure including nuclear power. New reactor construction is expected to start about 2010, with operation in 2014.

In February 2007 the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) reported that it saw a need for 64 GWe of new nuclear generating capacity in the USA by 2030 - 24 GWe of it by 2020, with nuclear representing some 25.5% of output by 2030.

After 20 years of steady decline, government R&D funding for nuclear energy is being revived with the objective of rebuilding US leadership in nuclear technology. In 1997 nuclear fission R&D was, at US$ 37 million, lower than in France, South Korea, or Canada - only 2% of total energy R&D, which compared pathetically with 68% (US$ 2537 million) of a much larger budget in Japan. From the 1999 budget, this situation has been turned around with various programs including the flagship Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) and also Plant Optimisation. The first 45 NERI grants were awarded in 1999, signalling a reinvigoration of the federal role in nuclear research, following successful conclusion of the advanced reactor program in 1998.

For FY 2008 (from October 2007) the Department of Energy is seeking $875 million for its nuclear energy programs. The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative for closing the fuel cycle and supporting the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership would receive $395 million of this and Generation-IV R&D would get $36 million, chiefly for the very high temperature reactor. The Nuclear Power 2010 program aimed at early deployment of advanced reactors would get $114 million.


There are now 104 fully licensed nuclear power reactors in the USA. Four more are partly built and have valid construction licenses. All US plants are either Pressurised Water or Boiling Water Reactors (PWR, BWR), generically: Light Water Reactors (LWR).
At the end of 1991 (prior to passage of the Energy Policy Act), there was 97,135 MWe of "operable" nuclear generating capacity in the United States. In March 2004 it was 97,452 MWe. The marginal increase conceals some major changes:


A decrease of 5,709 MWe, due to the premature shutdown of eight reactors
A net increase of 3,810 MWe, due to changes in power ratings
An increase of 2,315 MWe due to the start-up of two new reactors (Comanche Peak 2 and Watts Bar 1)
A general rule of thumb is that nuclear plants have to achieve total production costs below about 2.0 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) in order to effectively compete in a deregulated environment. Only one of the eight units prematurely shut down had production costs significantly below 2.0 c/kWh.
The net increase of 3724 MWe in capacity 1991-2003 resulted from many reactors with increases - some substantial, offset by 19 with decreases.

Advanced Reactors, Design Certification
Over the last two decades the industry has been working closely with the NRC on certification of advanced Generation-III reactor designs. There are now four which have final Design Certification so that they can be built anywhere in USA and attract only site-specific licensing procedures. These advanced designs are also being marketed actively overseas. Other designs are at various stages of the certification process, at pre-certification stage or pending.
Of those with design certification, one is the GE-Hitachi advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) of 1300-1500 MWe, several examples of which are in commercial operation in Japan, with more under construction there and in Taiwan.

Another, the Westinghouse System 80+, is an advanced pressurised water reactor, ready for commercialization. Eight System 80 reactors in South Korea incorporate many design features of the System 80+, which is the basis of the Korean Next Generation Reactor program and the APR-1400 design which is expected to be operating soon after 2010.

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) gave final design certification for both in May 1997, noting that they exceeded NRC "safety goals by several orders of magnitude". The ABWR has also been certified as meeting European requirements for advanced reactors.

A third, more innovative US advanced reactor is smaller - 600 MWe - and has passive safety features (its projected core damage frequency is so low as to exceed today's NRC requirements by 1000 times). The Westinghouse AP-600 gained final design certification from the NRC in December 1999.

These NRC approvals are the first such generic certifications to be issued and are valid for 15 years. As a result of an exhaustive public process, safety issues within the scope of the certified designs have been fully resolved and hence will not be open to legal challenge during licensing for particular plants.

Separate from the NRC process and beyond its immediate requirements, the US nuclear industry selected one standardised design in each category - the large ABWR and the medium-sized AP-600, for detailed first-of-a-kind engineering (FOAKE) work. The US$ 200 million program, was half funded by the Department of Energy (DOE).

The Westinghouse AP-1000gained final design certification by NRC as the first late Generation-III (Generation III+) type in 2005. It represents a scaling-up of the AP-600. Westinghouse said it was the result of a 1300 man-year and $440 million design and testing program. Capital costs of the 1100 MWe AP-1000 are expected to be competitive and modular design will reduce construction time to 36 months. It is under active consideration for building in the USA and the UK, has been selected for China and is capable of running on a core of mixed-oxide fuel if required.

Several more reactor designs are undergoing design certification or at pre-application stage:

General Electric - Hitachi's Economic & Simplified BWR (ESBWR) of 1550 MWe is developed from its ABWR and has passive safety systems. In submitting it to the NRC for design certification, GE said its 7500-page application represented a decade of work. Design approval is expected in 2008 or 2009, with certification following a year later. It is favoured in several plans for US new build.

France's Areva NP is working to adapt its advanced EPR nuclear units for the USA, though the design is said to exceed US safety requirements. Much of the one million man-hours of work involved in developing this US EPR is making the necessary changes to output electricity at 60 Hz instead of the original design's 50 Hz. A design certification application is expected early in 2008, and the first unit (with 80% US content) is expected to be grid connected in 2015. The main development of the type will be through UniStar Nuclear Energy, but other US proposals also involve it. The 1600 MWe Generation-III+ EPR is being built in Finland, is about to be built by EdF in France and has been selected for Guangdong, China.

Japan's Mitsubishi US-APWR design is expected to be submitted for design certification in March 2008. This is a 1700 MWe design developed from one which is about to be built in Japan and evolved from Westinghouse technology. The Japanese government is expected to provide financial support fort US licensing of both this and the ESBWR. The Washington Group International will be involved in US developments with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The US-APWR has been selected by TXU for Comanche Peak, Texas.

With inflation and the prospect of competition for engineering services and labour, US reactor vendors by mid 2006 had revised upwards their projected plant costs (overnight capital cost). Areva was now estimating US$ 1800-2000/kW capacity for US EPR, Westinghouse $1500-1800/kW for AP1000, and GE $1850/kW for ABWR and $1600/kW for ESBWR. At $2000/kW the cost of nuclear power would be likely to work out at 6 cents/kWh, higher than current short-term projections for coal or gas. Government incentives on offer for the first few GWe of new-generation plant could halve this however, and series construction would also reduce the cost.

Beyond these advances, the industry and DOE are starting to define "4th generation" reactor design criteria.

The USA ranks equal fourth in the world for known uranium resources in the category up to $130/kgU ($50/lb U3O8), with 342,000 tU (reasonably assured plus inferred resources, 2005).

In the 1950s, the USA had a great deal of uranium mining, promoted by federal subsidies. Peak production since 1970 was 16,800 tU in 1980, when there were over 250 mines in operation. This number abruptly dropped to 50 in 1984 when 5700 tU was produced, and then there was steady decline to 2003, with most US uranium requirements being imported. By 2003 there were only two small operations producing a total of under 1000 tU/yr.
Most US production has been from New Mexico and Wyoming. Known resources are 167,000 t U3O8 in Wyoming, 155,000 t in New Mexico, 2000 t in Texas and around 50,000 t in Utah, Colorado and Arizona, all to $50/lb. Production potential is about 45% in situ leach (ISL), 55% conventional mining.

In 2006 production from one mill (White Mesa) and five in situ leach (ISL) operations totalled 1586 tU (1870 t U3O8).

>>>Wrong! Opponents of the deal do not have valid arguments. (If they do, they’ve kept them well hidden). All they have, all they have offered up so far are phobias, paranoia and polticial rants.

>>>Here is a summary what pro-deal people list as the potential benefits of the deal:

>>> * It is an acknowledgement, by the US and the “international communityâ€

FRANCE -THE MOST NUCLEARISED POWER COUNTRY

France has 59 nuclear reactors operated by Electricité de France (EdF) with total capacity of over 63 GWe, supplying over 430 billion kWh per year of electricity, 78% of the total generated there. In 2005 French electricity generation was 549 billion kWh net and consumption 482 billion kWh - 7700 kWh per person. Over the last decade France has exported 60-70 billion kWh net each year and EdF expects exports to continue at 65-70 TWh/yr.

The present situation is due to the French government deciding in 1974, just after the first oil shock, to expand rapidly the country's nuclear power capacity. This decision was taken in the context of France having substantial heavy engineering expertise but few indigenous energy resources. Nuclear energy, with the fuel cost being a relatively small part of the overall cost, made good sense in minimising imports and achieving greater energy security.

As a result of the 1974 decision, France now claims a substantial level of energy independence and almost the lowest cost electricity in Europe. It also has an extremely low level of CO2 emissions per capita from electricity generation, since over 90% of its electricity is nuclear or hydro.

France's nuclear power program has cost some FF 400 billion in 1993 currency, excluding interest during construction. Half of this was self-financed by Electricité de France, 8% (FF 32 billion) was invested by the state but discounted in 1981, and 42% (FF 168 billion) was financed by commercial loans. In 1988 medium and long-term debt amounted to FF 233 billion, or 1.8 times EdF's sales revenue. However, by the end of 1998 EdF had reduced this to FF 122 billion, about two thirds of sales revenue (FF 185 billion) and less than three times annual cash flow. Net interest charges had dropped to FF 7.7 billion (4.16% of sales) by 1998.

In 2006 EdF sales revenue was EUR 58.9 billion and debt had fallen to EUR 14.9 billion - 25% of this.

TThe cost of nuclear-generated electricity fell by 7% from 1998 to 2001 and is now about EUR 3 cents/kWh, which is very competitive in Europe. The back-end costs (reprocessing, wastes disposal, etc) are fairly small when compared to the total kWh cost, typically about 5%.

From being a net electricity importer through most of the 1970s, France now has steadily growing net exports of electricity, and is the world's largest net electricity exporter, with electricity being France's fourth largest export. (Next door is Italy, without any operating nuclear power plants. It is Europe's largest importer of electricity, most coming ultimately from France.) The UK has also become a major customer for French electricity.

France's nuclear reactors comprise 90% of EdF's capacity and hence are used in load-following mode and are even sometimes closed over weekends, so their capacity factor is low by world standards, at 77.3%. However, availability is almost 84%.

The first eight power reactors were gas-cooled, as championed by the Atomic Energy Authority (CEA), but EdF then chose pressurised water reactor (PWR) types, supported by new enrichment capacity.

Apart from one experimental fast breeder reactor (Phenix), all French units are now PWRs of three standard types designed by Framatome - now Areva NP (the first two derived from US Westinghouse types): 900 MWe (34), 1300 MWe (20) and 1450 MWe N4 type (4). This is a higher degree of standardisation than anywhere else in the world. (Another large fast reactor - Super Phenix - was commissioned but then closed for political reasons.)

The 900 MWe reactors all had their lifetimes extended by ten years in 2002, after their second 10-yearly review. Most started up late 1970s to early 1980s, and they are reviewed together in a process that takes four months at each unit. A review of the 1300 MWe class followed and in October 2006 the regulatory authority cleared all 20 units for an extra ten years' operation conditional upon minor modifications at their 20-year outages over 2005-14.

In the light of operating experience, EdF uprated its four Chooz and Civaux N4 reactors fom 1455 to 1500 MWe each in 2003.

France has exported its PWR reactor technology to Belgium, South Africa, South Korea and China. There are two 900 MWe French reactors operating at Koeberg, near Capetown in South Africa, two at Ulchin in South Korea and four at Daya Bay and Lingao in China, near Hong Kong.

Framatome in conjunction with Siemens in Germany then developed the European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), based on the French N4 and the German Konvoi types, to meet the European Utility Requirements and also the US EPRI Utility Requirements. This was confirmed in 1995 as the new standard design for France and it received French design approval in 2004.

In mid 2004 the board of EdF decided in principle to build the first demonstration unit of an expected series of 1630 MWe Areva NP EPRs, and this decision was confirmed in May 2006, after public debate. The overnight capital cost is expected to be EUR 3.3 billion, and power from it EUR 4.6 c/kWh - about the same as from new combined cycle gas turbine at current gas prices and with no carbon emission charge. Series production costs are projected at about 20% less. EDF then submitted a construction licence application. Site works at Flamanville on the Normandy coast should be complete and the first concrete poured about the end of 2007, with construction taking 57 months and completion expected in 2012. EdF is aiming to firm up an industrial partnership with other European utilities or power users for its construction. (Finland is also building an EPR unit at Olkiluoto.)

In August 2005 EdF announced that it plans to replace its 58 present reactors with EPR nuclear reactors from 2020, at the rate of about one 1600 MWe unit per year. It would require 40 of these to reach present capacity. This will be confirmed about 2015 on the basis of experience with the initial EPR unit at Flamanville - use of other designs such as Westinghouse's AP1000 or GE's ASBWR is possible. EdF's development strategy selected the nuclear replacement option on the basis of nuclear's "economic performance, for the stability of its costs and out of respect for environmental constraints."

There have been two significant fast breeder reactors in France. Near Marcoule is the 233 MWe Phenix reactor, which started operation in 1974. It was shut down for modification 1998-2003 and is expected to run for a further few years.

A second unit was Super-Phenix of 1200 MWe, which started up in 1996 but was closed down for political reasons at the end of 1998 and is now being decommissioned. The operation of Phenix is fundamental to France's research on waste disposal, particularly transmutation of actinides. See further information in R&D section below.

All but four of EdF's nuclear power plants (14 reactors) are inland, and require fresh water for cooling. Eleven of the 15 inland plants (32 reactors) have cooling towers, using evaporative cooling, the others use simply river or lake water directly. With regulatory constraints on the temperature increase in receiving waters, this means that in very hot summers generation output may be limited

France uses some 12,400 tonnes of uranium oxide concentrate (10,500 tonnes of U) per year for its electricity generation. Much of this comes from Areva in Canada (4500 tU/yr) and Niger (3200 tU/yr) together with other imports, principally from Australia, Kazakhstan and Russia, mostly under long-term contracts.

Beyond this, it is self-sufficient and has conversion, enrichment, uranium fuel fabrication and MOX fuel fabrication plants operational (together with reprocessing and a waste management program). Most fuel cycle activities are carried out by Areva NC.

Uranium concentrates are converted to hexafluoride at the 14,000 t/yr Comurhex Pierrelatte plant in the Rhone Valley, which commenced operation in 1959. In May 2007 Areva NC announced plans for a new conversion project - Comurhex II - with facilities at Malvesi and Tricastin to strengthen its global position in the front end of the fuel cycle. The EUR 610 million facility will have a capacity of 15,000 tU/yr from 2012, with scope for increase to 21,000 tU/yr.

Enrichment then takes place at the 1978 Eurodif plant at Tricastin nearby, with 10.8 million SWU capacity (enough to supply some 81,000 MWe of generating capacity - about one third more than France's total).

In 2003 Areva agreed to buy a 50% stake in Urenco's Enrichment Technology Company (ETC), which comprises all its centrifuge R&D, design and manufacturing activities. The deal will enable Areva to use Urenco/ETC technology to replace its 10.8 million SWU/yr Eurodif gas diffusion enrichment plant at Tricastin.

The final agreement after approval by the four governments involved was signed in mid 2006, and the construction licence was approved by ASN in February 2007. The EUR 3 billion two-unit plant, with nominal annual capacity of 7.5 million SWU, will be built and operated by Areva NC subsidiary Societe d'Enrichissement du Tricastin (SET). The first stages of the first unit are expected to begin operating in 2009 and it will reach full capacity in 2014. The second unit will follow four years behind.

Enrichment will be up to 6% U-235, and reprocessed uranium will only be handled in the second, north unit.

When fully operational in 2018 the whole plant will free up some 3000 MWe of Tricastin nuclear power plant's capacity for the French grid - over 20 billion kWh/yr (@ 4 c/kWh this is EUR 800 million/yr). The new enrichment plant investment is equivalent to buying new power capacity @ EUR 1000/kW.

Fuel fabrication is at several Areva plants in France and Belgium.

JAPAN

Japan's Nuclear Program


Over three decades have passed since Japan's first commercial nuclear power plant began operation in Ibaraki Prefecture in 1966. As of March 2002, Japan has fifty-two reactors operating around the country with a total output of 45,742 megawatts (MW). Nuclear power accounts for approximately one-third of the country's total electric power output.

As an island country, it is impossible for Japan to exchange energy with neighboring countries through power transmission lines or pipelines. Japan is also energy-scarce, depending on foreign countries for about 80 percent of its energy resources. These conditions are completely different from those of Europe or the U.S.; therefore, the government of Japan concludes that it is rational to continue making the fullest possible use of nuclear power generation as one of the mainstays of the nation's energy supply. Nuclear power generation contributes to improved energy sufficiency and to the stability of the energy supply, in addition to playing an important role in reducing Japan's carbon dioxide emissions.

Of course, nuclear power represents only one cornerstone in a comprehensive energy policy; one designed to meet the growing energy needs of Japan and based on an ideal mixture that includes thermal power and hydroelectric power. Japan's electric power companies are prepared to meet this demand in the 21st century, and in the process, ensure that nuclear energy be used solely for peaceful purposes, and under the safest possible conditions.

While placing the highest priority on nuclear safety, Japanese electric power companies will continue their efforts to develop nuclear power generation as a base power source that plays an important role in Japan's electric power supply in order to secure a steady supply of electricity and address global environmental problems.

Indulging in a bit of self reference I see.

Your sarcasm when using words like EB, etc. betrays a tendency towards unfair arguments, saar.