Bharat Rakshak

So, its survivability *and* "command and control". Neither of these are being affected by any agreements presently being negotiated.[/quote]

I had three points; the above two and the quantum of damage making capabiliity which survives. That is purely a numbers game; basically how much is enough post a second stike.

Also I was thinking of deterrence independently so far and discussing it without getting other issues touching it. I was not thinking of any deals while thinking about deterrence so far; and since this is a ground which has been beaten till death already; I wish to not go into the details of my views on the "deal".

However for the record; two things

yes I agree that the above two aspects are not touched on directly by any deal currently under consideration

Now switching tracks; my opposition to agreements being negotiated from a startegic perspective is w.r.t. to
1) Possible warhead numbers (i.e. backdoor FMCT possibilty)
2) Strategic hold that it gives US.
3) Dubious benfiets
4) Oppertunity costs.

However I am exteremly reluctant to go into a discussion on deal making issues; since we will just reopen the can of worms which have killed the other threads before it.

Re: Backdoor FMCT - look at the RGP and do an estimate on how many weapons this means. Use 15 kg Pu per weapon to be conservative. Arun_S will say that 5 kg is more than conservative, but lets use the larger number.

How much separated and unseparated RGP does India have?

So, now what numbers of weapons do we get?

Well the current estimate is 200+ warheads I believe; from previous calculations of the same sort before on the thread. But a FMCT is a FMCT by any names; it is one thing to say that since we have enough we can stop; and another thing to say that we are getting capped by external forces. I see a difference in the two scenarios; further sorry for lack of clarity but I include degradation in existing wepon stocks due to lack of testing under the FMCT umberlla; this is a discussion that you have no doubt been following as well. Any how as I said before this is just one of aspects of my concerns with the deal; so I dont want to spend time on this as I said before.

I am sorry if I am missing something here; isnt the LIF and more generally the Stewardship program exactly to check if a pit is stable enough for reuse through remoulding and if so do the same?

So, this is about pride?

I guess its about flexibility. And independence of decision making

Just like, Unilateral Moratorium => CTBT. Oh c'mon we all know the current crop leaders don't have it to test. I'm sure there must be at least a dozen weapon designs that need validation by testing, with the GOI just sitting on it. So UM in effect means CTBT. But the option remains open (Just in case some avatar of IndraGandhi/ ABV ascends to the PM's Post)

Similar would be Minimal Credible == FMCT. Politically now ovvertly acceeding to CTBT or FMCT would not go down well with the public. But then covertly, India can be nudged into a similar arrangement under the more publically acceptable umbrella of UM and MCD. And that I think is the game of the US.

Calvin, the entire reserve is not just for weapons. The FBR needs to be fuelled from the same resource. Apart from the PFBR, we have announced two more FBR projects. Also, FMCT seeks to restrict fissile material and not RG Pu. Until, we have some confirmation, that a part of the RGP reserve, is being actively enriched to WGPu and/or reactors are being used in low burn mode, the assumption that, India does not have enough fissile material, for all its scenarios, shall remain.

I will be only too happy to know, these concerns have been addressed. The problem is the estimates the NPA's have given gel with, what is known from credible Indian public sources on estimates of Indian fissile material reserves.

Gerard: Secrecy of pit and weapon location is of utmost value, especially if # of weapons are few. Going that way requires increasing weapons inventory many fold. Thus re manufacturing IMHO is a No-Go.

It is primarily for requalification of aging pits.

The US DOE is concerned about


They also certify that remanufactured pits are identical to those originally produced.

A pit that has suffered chemical change can be sent back to the Pu reprocessing plant and dissolved in acid like a spent fuel rod. The Pu ingots that come out the other end are virginal.

But would not periodic warhead maintenance be necessary anyway? Can Tritium be replenished at the storage sites? What of other components?

The Agni missile garrisons and the ATV submarine base cannot be kept secret and it can be assumed that nuclear weapons will be located there. The NPAs have already located on satellite photos two IAF bases with unique double fenced weapon storage dumps suggesting strategic purpose.

As for the secret storage bunkers, the same methods used to mask the movement of personnel and the original delivery of weapons or pits can be used for the removal of a weapon for pit replacement after 15 years in storage.

With FMCT, these facilities would still be allowed since they would not involve reprocessing of spent fuel for weapons. They would be dedicated reprocessing facilities being used for the recycling of old Plutonium for weapons. No new fissile material would be added to the stockpile.

Why worry about stewardship of aging weapon pits when a Pu reprocessing (recycling) plant and casting/machining facilities gives you a brand new pit after 15 years?

And if you go down the U233 route, periodic recycling of pits is essential to keep down the level of hard gamma emitters. Third or fourth generation U233 pits will be superior to the 1st gen since they have smaller percentage of U232.

Kyon? bathroom jana hai kya. Koi problem nahin saab, aap aaram se jayiye, tension mat leney ka, nahin tho constipation hoga. Hum bas idhar hi honge.

Third strike by Mulford. He doesnt know he is supposed to be Mumford.

X-Post from nuclear articles thread.

Gerard: How does the position of campaign like safeguards gel/differ from the one's required by Hyde, under circular 540 for NNWS.

That's the strange thing.

There was supposed to be perpetual safeguards in exchange for perpetual fuel then under Hyde it was perpetual safeguards for "reasonable" fuel with the 123 absurdly implying US help to subvert its own legislation.

Now reports are of the IAEA declining India specific safeguards and using INFCIRC/66 campaign safeguards instead.
One wonders the American reaction to all this.

The IAEA position is understandable. It doesn't want to waste too many of its resources on the "fools errand" of inspecting some facilities in a nuclear weapons state while other facilities are busy producing weapons. The nature of the inspections clearly cannot be that used in a NNWS where the possibility of diversion of kg quantities of fissile material must be guarded against. With a NWS or SNW, who have tons of fissile material, this sort of auditing doesn't make sense. So campaign safeguards would actually suit India and the IAEA.

But will the NSG play along? The Ayatollahs will go ballistic

Actually it is the opposite assumption that operates. No enemy or aggressor can *afford* to assume that India doesn't have enough fissile material for the scenario that applies to them.

Again, at the end of the day, the question is not one of number of weapons, it is of the survivability of these weapons and the command and control associated with them.



Actually, *you* cannot be *sure* that is even one design that needs *validation*. Neither can a potential aggressor.

Every one of the tests in 1998 worked, including the sub-kT devices. What do you think was the purpose of the sub-kT devices?

Think, guys, think.

You cannot enrich RGP to WGP. The mass difference between Pu239 and 240 doesn't allow centrifuge or gaseous diffusion to separate the isotopes.

Only Laser Enrichment may allow this in the future...

The RGP can be 'laundered' in a Fast Breeder however.

It is fascinating to see the number of and type of bold statements being made by people who are not taking the trouble to read their own posts, and think about the implications of what they write. There used to be a time when you had to go to the University Library to actually gain access to journals and such. Today, google is at your fingertips. Use it.

Shiv has very accurately said, many times, on this thread and others that many participants are engaging in empty rhetoric - pointing to the posts/views ratio.

Abe Lincoln once said "it is better to remain silent and be thought a fool, than to speak out and remove all doubt"

On another occasion, after the Gettysburg address, he noted that if the train ride would have been longer, the speech would have been shorter.

IT IS NOT HOW MUCH YOU POST - IT IS WHAT YOU POST. THINK BEFORE POSTING, FELLAS.

Thanks for the gyan. My understanding is that the PFBR can produce WGP, only when "equilibrium" is reached. How much time, from 2010, before this happens.

If the understanding, is accurate, and if, low burn mode production of WG Pu, is not taking place, then it essentially becomes a race between FMCT time lines and the state of equilibrium of the PFBR?

Added: Please see slide 28, of this link, which prompted the question.

Oh dear there are so many terms here that I am not sure if they all refer to the same thing; for example remoulding and reconstitution and remanufacturing are the same thing right??

If they are; and as you say "They also certify that remanufactured pits are identical to those originally produced." how does replacing pit by reusing the WgPu avoid the need for certification and hence LIF and other stewardship program.

Further; if reconstituting a pit (without the need for LIF etc) is cheaper than the full steward ship program for us; why should it not be cheaper for US as well? Yes I realize that given a large number of warheads things should be cheaper as per economy of scale for US; but then the economy of scale should help them in case of effort needed to reconstitute the pits as well?

I may be missing something here due to the plethora of terms floating around so if something doesnt add I apologize.

In the end it is always about H&D; Maslow says so

More seriously as has been responded to already; strategic flexibility; the difference in you drinking a cup of tea because you feel like it and drinking a cup of tea at a hosts place out of politeness when you are not quite up to it is obvious to me. If you wish to say that I am merely quibbling and this is a foolish example; you are welcome to your view because I have not succeeded in explaining my POV; and I give up on further attempts.

Sanku, the pit business is probably for fission weapons. The whole gamut is for other types.

I see; but not quite; if only some one could explain better

>>But will the NSG play along? The Ayatollahs will go ballistic

Gerard, only the Ayatollahs will go ballistic. It is necessary for them to do so, much like some of our own hojatulislams are doing. Part of the diplomatic dance. USG will stay largely silent (someone might stroke the ayatollahs for appearances sake). NSG will play along (again there will be some negative comments here and there). As in Ayatollahs' case, it is part of the kabuki.

Or so I like to think

Calvin,

Purely for my education :



Why is this a strategic decision? What are the advantages of having excess capacity? Is this not a product of liberal policies rather than a conscious effort on the GoI part?

GoI never took that decision. The reason why we are a refining surplus country is solely due to Dhirubhai Ambani, who built the largest single refining complex in Jamnagar as he could foresee the demand for energy when India was still at -6% growth.

Advantages:
1. Exporting refined products brings in valuable forex.
2. World actually has a refining shortage right now, and that is the main cause of high energy prices.

Some in the US have argued that certification of older pits (TN primaries not fission weapons) with remanufacture of those that failed certification would be enough for stockpile stewardship.

But it isn't just about that... it is about the RRW and new warhead designs in a test ban environment....

In the Indian context, pit replacement would suffice. Ideally we would see two or three full yield proof tests of production warheads. That would assure reliability of the Indian deterrent for a couple of decades.

But we don't get to make that decision and we don't have the burden of dealing with the impact on the economy etc.

Why would you assume that? Dhruva and CIRUS are still operating and 8 PHWRs are designated as military... surely at least a portion of their cores must be reserved for low burn

Ah I see the propsensity of GOTUS to spend as much money as its Mil-Ind-Research complex can possibly soak up. But the certification itself would still need the LIF? Correct?

Doubtful. Though LANL would argue otherwise.

The majority of the last weapon tests by the US and Russia were aimed at qualification of primary designs. They were pretty much satisfied that their secondaries would ignite.

I don't think HEU encased secondaries are subject to the same aging concerns regarding Pu pits.

Their new supercomputer and laser toys are for working on new designs, for maintaining a cadre of working designers.

It'll be an epic waste to let go of N-Deal: FM



Very funny; my sides hurt.

OK I now finally understand the disconnect? I was basing my opinions on what I read from the labs; which of course paint a doom and gloom scemario short of multi B$ spend.

But for my education: short of LIF how else would you make sure that the primary pit is okay? Just assume based on the current historical data available? Or physical and chemical analysis which look for tell tale marks suffice.

For example Wiki says on RRW --

NIF is being built at LL, but I suppose LANL will be equally involved in it. Again as regards the much touted $30B-$40B cost, the official cost for completion now is $4.2B according to official budget numbers. This might go up to supposedly $5B on completion of all the lasers by 2010. The rest is supposed to be from the black budget, but those are numbers pulled from thin air. For all one knows, money from the black budget could have been diverted to many other black programs which are completely off the radar screen.



That is also the sense I get. New research into civilian fusion duplicating much of what ITER will be doing as well as ofcourse new warhead designs to keep the knowledge base current for working designers is really what the NIF is being built for. As far as pit remanufacuturing for the existing arsenal goes, there was an article sometime ago about discussions about a budget for a new facility as it was deemed that the existing capacity for pit remanufacture was deemed inadequate. But the budget for that was "peanuts" in US terms.

With all of their test data and simulations and laser facilities, the US Dept. of Energy still selected a primary for the 100kt RRW-1 that had been actually tested underground years before.

They are using a thicker, heavier radiation case (a proven design) for the RRW-1. There will be no repeat of the W76 fiasco.

And some argue that the RRW-1 and its siblings will have to be proof tested before the US military will field them.

Certainly physical and chemical tests will tell metallurgists the conditions of the primary pit.
They are also conducting subcritical tests.

LIF is meant for design of secondaries....

Becuase, there are some very sane people at the top, who may not think, they ever need a large stock pile.

OK, Serioulsly, I do hope that some of our PHWR's have been operating in low burn mode, since POK II. How many of them, I do not know but speculation is that, it has resulted in doubling of our fissile material on an annual basis, from what it was previously. Estimates range from 30-50 KG of WGP, per year.

There are some reports to indicate that in the view of DAE, the most optimal way (in costs and safety risks) for the small arsenal, that the establishment seeks, is best served through research reactors. This will enable the PHWR's to produce electricity, at optimal cost. Further, it will produce the RGP needed to fuel the FBR program and thus, not have to bring it under safeguards.

If, India indeed is using/planning to use the 8 reactors, say a quarter in low burn mode, over their remaining life, then it will indeed result in 12,000+ KG of WGP, enough for a 2000+ arsenal. However, 2 of these PHWR's have come on steam only in 2005 and the other two this year (do not know, if they are up). There are two issues, with the scenario. 1. FMCT will not allow them to keep on producing the WGP, for the reactors life time and 2. No Indian analyst has expressed a need for such an arsenal of fissile material.

It seems, the only realistic way to reach a higher, weapon arsenal, is to burn the 8 PHWR in low burn mode + FBR (making about 150 KG WGP PA) + Dhruva and maybe add Dhruva II to replace Cirrus, till about 2015 - my deadline for the FMCT to kick in. Hence, my take on the race with FMCT. Apart from this, there seems to be only one other option, that is to use RGP, for weapons, as done by the US, in a test and maybe one of the Chotus too? But, that has its own issues, in terms of reliability.

Again, feel free to enlighten. Also, a repeat question for you. How many years till the PFBR reaches, a state of equilibrium. Thanks.

http://tinyurl.com/2y3xxr

India's economic performance not dependent on nuke deal: FM

WASHINGTON: India's economic performance did not hinge on the Indo-US nuclear deal going forward, but it was in its "self-interest" to raise the share of atomic power, Union Finance Minister P Chidambaram said.

"I don't think it (the deal) has a direct impact on India's economic performance. We will have access to nuclear fuel, fuel for our nuclear reactors. Restrictions on some dual use items will be removed. So in that sense there are spin-offs to the Indo-US nuclear agreement," he told reporters.

aah haaa~~~~... so there is an acceptance of your side, think positive man!, else you guys wouldn't be running the show and it would be all split by now.

Chidambaram accepting the "cons", is pretty much enough to ask the congress now what? stop joking and get serious with left side else, Tri eye of Sanku's will open fire.

wake up dude.. go make the preparations! hit the calcutta streets.

From the Majlis-e-Monterey....

Japan's new premier faces India dilemma
By Masako Toki