Katare wrote:
Tilak,
US-Israel agreement is about ‘safety’ only while 123 agreements are about trade and transfer of technologies. In Israel’s case no nuclear material, manufacturing processes/technologies or equipments will be traded/transferred. The agreement is for only safety related data between two specific institutions in Israel and USA. Israel has a similar agreement already in existence with IAEA and this new agreement is in full compliance with existing CTBT/NPT etc laws. If you read those laws you’ll find that all those laws provide exemptions where physical safety is involved. Russia and others have used those exemptions to help India for long.
Quote:
U.S. Deeply Regrets Russian Shipment of Uranium Fuel to IndiaU.S. Deeply Regrets Russian Shipment of Uranium Fuel to India
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
February 16, 2001 Statement by Philip T. Reeker, deputy spokesman
RUSSIAN SHIPMENT OF LOW ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL TO INDIA
We deeply regret that the Russian Federation has shipped nuclear fuel
to the Tarapur power reactors in India in violation of Russia's
nonproliferation commitments.
As a member of the 39 nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, Russia is
committed not to engage in nuclear cooperation with any country that
does not have comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on
all its nuclear facilities. Although
India's Tarapur
reactors are under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,
India does not have such safeguards on
all of its facilities and is
indeed pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
At a December 2000 meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the
overwhelming majority of the members expressed their strong concerns
about Russia's planned shipment of nuclear fuel to India,
which they
regarded as inconsistent with Russia's commitments. We join other nuclear
suppliers in calling on Russia to cancel this
supply arrangement and live up to its nonproliferation obligations.
Russia's disregard of its Nuclear Supplier Group commitments, together
with its sensitive nuclear assistance to Iran, raises serious
questions about Russia's support for the goal of preventing nuclear
proliferation.
Russia's provision of sensitive technologies to other countries will
be an important item on the U.S.-Russian agenda of the Bush
Administration.
Dimona(NNRC) is
not an IAEA safeguarded facility, so where does IAEA/"safety" come in ?
Quote:
The agreement in no case legitimizes Israel’s clandestine nuclear program while a 123 with India gives us a legitimate international standing with a defacto NWS status.
They are not comparable deals neither comparable countries.
Katareji
I don't agree with the word "legitimate", when India actually hasn't signed anything (NPT, CTBT, FMCT). So the term is inapplicable IMO. If it is "illegitimate" why do we have IAEA safeguarded facilities (neither have we withdrawn any such) ?. Deriving benefits by signing-up is a different issue all together, as the P-5 have put next to nothing under safeguards.
Let me put it this way, if indeed India were to sign up to this deal, it still is a "de-facto" nuclear state and will remain so, and no so-called "legitimacy" (in the true sense) will be accorded. So Indian's hollering about "achieving legitimacy" is for domestic consumption, the litmus test for it will be the upcoming GNEP.. And Bush is on record saying India will not be considered "legitimate".