Bharat Rakshak

WOW vsunder I would have benefited in my younger days!

No you are spot on and the problem spans across the board in DRDO, IAS, IFS, officer level recruitements in the forces, even the officer levels in police and other internal security apparatus, intelligence, etc. Essentially, anyone with any ounce of an head in them, is not willing to join the government anymore.

There is only one way out and this is for the government to get out of this business of business, and large parts of the military complex, should be treated as a business (maybe not the nuclear apparatus though), so that a small government can focus on essential things only. Slightly OT but this is a serious issue.

The change happenning is slow and were it not for this slowness, half of the BRF crowd would be typing in IST time, as opposed to GMT, EST, PST, etc. This post is OT for this thread but is a serious issue for discussion.

Ramana, if you take LakshmiC's ratios as he said:



Regarding S1:
Assume the aim was 200 kt.
Assume that spark plug went off
Assume that tamper was non fissile
Assume that fusion did not work at all and was a complete fizzle.

Then Primary only gives 30 kt
Spark plug gives 15 kt
Total 45 kt

That is missile deliverable and as long as forces have not been lied to and told that it is 200 kt and not 30 kt - India should be able to at least field a missile deliverable 30 kt boosted fission warhead.

Some of the assumptions we have had to make here are as mind boggling as the scaling bit was pointed out to be. But the only facts we have are what was released and said by very very few people, RC said one thing, PKI said another and a few others said other things. Assuming we do not give too much credence to what gets said on this forum as primary information that we can rely on as totally accurate.

I am not disputing the idea that we need to test and prove a 200 kt missile deliverable warhead. But when the first test (in 1998) did not work and we know (as per forum research) that designs cannot be scaled linearly, a second working test will hardly be "credible"

And when we do a second test, we are suddenly changing the status of the 1998 tests from "successful and credible" to failure and "need to test more"

So after a new (future) test that achieves this - what is to prevent credibility from going down further when people say "The Indians declared 1998 a success and they suddenly said it was a failure in 2009 and tested again. It is likely that their declaration of 2009 test as a success is also a bluff like the 1998 bluff"

That's why you don't say anything failed. You just say that you are conducting proof tests or production validation tests or simulation data gathering tests (or all of the above).
Ideally you don't even release details of the number of tests or their yields.

Indian scientists have had to design their bombs under constraints not imposed on other powers. France and China refused to sign the PTBT because of the difficulty of estimating yield with underground tests. While India tested a PNE underground in 1974, France tested aboveground in that same year. China did an atmospheric test as late as 1980.

Other powers have been able to calibrate their test sites by exploding designs both above ground (where fireball radius and cloud sampling give very accurate estimations of yield) and underground (where the site specific empirical constants used in seismic methods are determined and post shot drilling can be correlated with the known airburst yield).

They have been able to test weaponised designs using actual bombs and missiles.

They have been able to carry out a series of development tests (primary, +secondary, one point safety etc) for their designs over a period of several months to 2 years (for their newer weapons).

By contrast, a Pohkran-III may entail a short series of tests where as much as possible is tested at once. Perhaps actual production warheads being utilized to validate designs after the fact. Perhaps just two or three tests to check reproducibility/consistency of yield.

Shiv, that does not compute logically. Please explain logically why would 1998 be a failure if we test in 2008.

Just see Gerard's post above for a few reasons why I think your point is stretching it.

Gerard: Your post reminded me of two stories. Both concern the famous G.I.Taylor of the Rayleigh-Taylor instability. In 1945 Taylor was shown a sequence of pictures of the explosion at Alamogorodo and from these pictures he accurately calculated the yield and told the Press, using some elementary dimension analysis. He was hauled off by special branch in Britain who thought security was breached. Then he explained how he computed the precise yield of the device from the sizes of the cloud.
G.I.Taylor

The second story concerns Satish Dhawan. Once G.I.Taylor was visiting Caltech. Hans Liepmann, Dhawan's thesis advisor showed Taylor, Dhawan's thesis. For some reason a drop of ink from Taylor's pen fell on Dhawan's thesis. Liepmann had Taylor circle the ink blob and autograph it and sent it to Dhawan.

Shiv: Ask Roddam Narasimha this second story. He knows it well.

And blame the military for "end user validation tests", where the "rigid, tradition bound, military" types were unwilling to accept the scientists calculations and demanded actual proof before deployment of mated, operational weapons on board submarines and on dispersed, mobile TELs.

And blame DRDO for this lack of trust by the military, they "having a track record of broken promises". Throw in the "the Arjun tank and the LCA", both "under powered" "too heavy" etc etc.

ramana: OK, shell game was a silly suggestion, sorry. But if u mean what I understand by "false flag" then I will happily agree that this is exactly what is dangerous about the demand to test. It is "false flag", just a new way of doing what was sought to be done with the Wallace type papers. What will be "validated" will be the NPAs' model of what India is. The damage will be all to India, and will be permanent.

Now the "freedom to test" is, as you say, the real issue in the 123. But there is a huge contradiction in the "we need to test" school's position.

(a) on the one hand, they say, "screw the West, East, whatever, we must test to validate our deterrent, we can brush off the sanction etc. Been there, done that."

(b) OTOH, they say that what Hyde says, binds our hands for all time, since displeasing the POTUS at some future time would be a red line that we cannot afford to cross.

If (b) were not the case, then we just ratify the 123 and move on. When we need to test, we test. Why is this unacceptable to the "Need to Test Now" (N2TN) school?

So I find this line of reasoning glaringly untenable. So I question the motives behind it.

The N2TN then claim that we should trash this 123, and hold out for a sweeter deal where the freedom to test is explicit (what else would be acceptable?) This means that the COTUS, WHOTUS and POTUS must agree to a Bill where they say, "India needs to test nukes live, and we are going to agree because India is the richest country in the world, we need their business".

I am asked to believe that if the NDA comes to power next year, this will be a pretty certain thing.

I say If the present 123 is shot down because of the N2TN reasoning, that puts the lid on any India-centric 123 for the foreseeable future.

So I say, "Look for alternatives to live testing, and take it as a hard constraint that there will be NO live testing". Then one is forced to look at other things.

BTW, I don't agree that either hypersonic / cruise delivery systems or hypersonic interceptors are vaporware. OTOH, reliance on vertical-liftoff rocket / ballistic delivery systems or Mach 2 airplanes, is very very dangerous. India already has the Brahmos in production, and Akash variants in production. So the airbreathing cruise part is already in hand. The hypersonic part is not that far off.

N^3,

My concern regarding the deal is about fissile material cutoff being forced on us. there is some condition requiring our cooperation on the FMCT. As long as we can produce as much fissile material (and tritium) as we wish even if the rest of the world signs FMCT and what not, I have no problem with the deal.

What prevents a scenario where the deal creates private and other lobbies that pressure the govt not to oppose the FMCT ? After all, even when there was a good deal for tarapur, the US wentback on its commitments. IF 20000MW of electricity depends on imported uranium, there is a chance for "no uranium if you do not sign FMCT pressure". This is the biggest worry.

Not testing means the focus should be on mass production of boosted fission weapons and their delivery systems.

Is it really an either-or question even today?

Would someone like to pick holes in the non-NSG Uranium + 700 MW indigenous PHWRs option (to get us to the 50,000 MW first stage needs proclaimed by MR Srinivasan -- even setting aside for a moment questions on why this particular need suddenly surfaced a few months ago)?

For reference - let me cross post what Gerard has said



The suggestion is that India, which declared a unilateral but nevertheless forced moratorium on testing in 1998, should now say:

a) We are going to test
b) We are not going to test because of reason X
c) We are going to test for reason Y

Assuming that nobody else tests and rescues us like Pakistan did in 1998 what is the signal that India is sending out?

Let me post my view on that as my answer to your question.

1) Nobody in the world is under any constraint to believe or accept India's excuses for testing again no matter what language or lack of announcement that the tests are conducted with.

2) When every nuclear country in the world has abstained from testing and when non nuclear states have already signed away their rights to test, a test by India can only mean that either

a) They (India) are unsure of their deterrent (IOW 1998 was not a success)
or
b) They (India) are arming and acting belligerent when everyone else is "not testing and trying desperately to disarm".and discourage nukes This is an obvious lie but India is the only country calling it a lie. Nobody else has the need or guts to do that - so India is isolated already.

In both cases it is to the advantage of every P5 nation, Pakistan, NPA and anyone else who cares to ensure that India is thwarted from developing its nukes ever or is punished by all possible means for testing more nukes when it could have shut up and sat quietly for a while.

If Indian nukes are really not working as we believe on here - so much the better for all these anti-Indian entities. if India is really only "conducting proof tests or production validation tests or simulation data gathering tests (or all of the above)" then everything must be done to ensure that India is punished.

That means, as I have stated earlier, harsh military sanctions with some spillover onto civilian applications. It also means continued wink and nod regarding the proliferation and supply of arms to anyone who is opposed to us.

That also means as i have stated earlier that we are undermining conventional military strength in order to chase the windmill of the 200 kiloton that we want, rather than the 20 (or 30 or 43) kiloton that we already have.

We already have people loudly proclaiming in public that the TN test was a fizzle. It is getting more and more difficult to test again and say without batting an eyelid that we are sure of our deterrence.

How necessary or urgent is it for us to do this? Don't you think it is better for us to say that we will test whenever we want and wait for an opportune moment to test at some currently unpredictable date. What is the current urgency to test if we actually have a working deterrent?

Your response to my post is exactly the same as ShauryaT's response.

I don't know and am willing to listen.

Well, I am saying that:

1. India can, perfectly legally under international law, source Uranium from non-NSG countries (such as Namibia, Niger, Uzbekistan, which are 3 of the top 5 current producers of Uranium, or for that matter the 140 plus other countries that are not members of the 45-nation NSG cartel) as long as such Uranium is supplied to safeguarded nuclear facilities with safeguards similar to those applied to Tarapur-1&2, Kudankulam, and the first two units of Rawatbhata.

2. It is only the 45-nation NSG cartel which decided, in 1992 (IIRC), to require "full-scope safeguards" on all facilities as a condition of nuclear trade. A condition that India obviously has no desire to meet; hence the need for an NSG waiver, which the US is brokering (and charging very high brokerage fees for, if I may add)!

3. DAE and NPCIL have already announced that all future PHWRs will be 700 MW capacity (having demonstrated their ability to commission the two 540 MW Tarapur units (Tarapur-3&4) under budget and in less time than initially projected).

4. Therefore, the "non-NSG Uranium + indigenous 700 MW PHWRs" option can supply our nuclear power needs until the 3-stage thorium program kicks in.

Why do we have to sign any deal (thereby voluntarily signing up to all kinds of multilateral - such as IAEA - legal rigmarole open to interpretation by a UNSC which will never have our best interests in mind) if all we want is Uranium to power our first stage program (whether it needs to be 10,000 MW or 50,000 MW - as MR Srinivasan recently stated out of the blue)?

And if we do not have to sign this deal to meet our energy needs, it is not an either-or situation.

Because, the gap India did open for itself with POK II, will not be open too long. NPT has already been extended indefinitely. A change of political fortunes in the US, will close the CTBT loop. The chances that FMCT will come into force within 5 more years is high. India does pay a cost to defy the world order, even if technically it has not violated any agreements. If India seeks to be on par in CAPABILITIES with other leading powers then it does not have the luxury of sailing against the wind for too long . India will pay a higher cumulative strategic price for doing this later than earlier. The chances to be as an equal in future shitty bitty treaties will be higher, if our capabilties are clear and the will to deploy them are clear to one and all.

In many ways, India needs this deal, however, it has to be on better terms. Terms that will not be offered, until certain things are done.

Shaurya, you are admitting India is NOT equal to others now. You want India to prove that statement (that India is less than equal) by testing soon and you are saying that the testing will be to equalize our status with others.

This means that India is exactly where the world powers want it to be - i.e less capable and that 1998 was at least a partial bluff. It did not make us equal.

If India is less than P5 today after defying them in 1998, on what basis are you making the assumption that we will somehow match them in capability by another single test?

At what point in time do you anticipate that India will be accepted as equal And exactly what benefits do you feel will accrue from india testing repeatedly to reassure itself that "We are now equal to P5"

Is this desire to test stemming from a feeling of inferiority and incapability among Indians who feel that way.

Or does it stem from a feeling that others are not accepting us as equal and we should test to force them to accept us as equal? The assumption here is that if we test - they will somehow accept us as equals.

I don't understand the part where India can get all the fuel needed, just by importing it from Nigeria etc. If this is true, what stops Nigeria from selling to TSP and Al Zuwahiri? Or KSA?

Assuming that there is some very good reason why you can't just import from such places, the NSG still controls the technologies, so India should either invest massively in R&D and manufacturing infrastructure for these purposes (and wait 15 years for any results), or sign up and get on board. The latter option is more cost-effective, and cuts the time delay, once foreign exchange is not such a choking problem as it used to be.

As for fears of the FMCT, I read the deal as Unkil saying, "Yes, v will sign off on this, and v know that u will then b able to direct much more of your own fuel to weapons building, but then u should COOPERATE in getting to a FMCT at some point". The logic here is that today India has to say to FMCT because it would freeze India into a very bad situation. But once enough fuel is available to generate a lot of enriched Yoo and Pu, then why not get on board the FMCT? Point is that now we get to define "ENOUGH" without being under siege.

Without such an "INTENT", the NSG cannot save their H&D in agreeing to sell to India. They have all adopted some such "fissile material cutoff" simply because they have more than enough already siphoned off into the Classified world. Like a Mantri going on hunger strike.

Without a short-term infusion of Yoo, India has no real hope of breaking through to eventually get to the happy state of "3rd stage thorium-based" etc. as discussed exhaustively here.
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As I c it, here's the situation:
1. Jingostan was 500% pushing for the Deal with Unkil until, say, circa May 2004.
2. Then Jingostan was still 400% pushing for it, citing poor progress / personality skills of Pee Em and chamchas.
3. GOI amazingly broke through to a deal.
4. Jingostan micro-analyzed the deal, and pushed 425% for getting COTUS approval, fighting off the NPA propagandoos.
5. But when COTUS passed a law (of course with all sorts of COTUS silliness attached) it was like a tug of war where the other side suddenly starts pushing instead of pulling: the prospect of an actual deal before the next election, became real. Situation deteriorated.
6. Jingostan joined Commiestan in OPPOSING the deal and demanding honesty from GOI (hah!)
7. Again, against all odds, the GOI showed some sense and spine in negotiating the 123.
8. PeeAref debated the 123 ad nauseum. Jingostan was essentially getting to the situation of a treed cat. Fortunately, Commiestan was up another tree, and seemed to guard access to the NSG.
9. The GOI circumvented that too, and seems to have been doing quite well in negotiating with the NSG.
10. Jingostan is like a watered flower as far as prospects for 2009 go. So now there is a severe time problem. If the NSG negotiations were dragged out enough, there is a good chance that Jingostan can once again swing around to become 600% behind the deal. BUT... if the NSG talks break through and a deal is signed, and COTUS rushes to endorse.. then there is a huuuuuuge problem.
11. Suddenly the Itch To Test (I2T) becomes unbearable.
12. In the process, Jingostan seems perfectly willing to come out with "True Confessions". I predict that if there is no relief (i.e., no breakdown in talks with NSG) we will hear stories along the lines of "I Ate My Baby!" That the POK-II tests were actually just a Holi preparation, all entirely conventional bums, but there was an earthquake because Jayalalithaaa visited Rajasthan, so GOI decided to declare that there had been new clear tests.

You see why I view this whole "N2TN" as a blatant politically-motivated sell-out of India? It violates Fundamental Principles #1 and #2 deeply. No insults intended against anyone, unless someone is insulted by revelation of the clear evidence of their own deeply-held beliefs, which in this case cloud objectivity. Sure there are technical reasons to test. But technical reasons are always subject to consideration of alternatives where the whole problem can be avoided. When we suggest those, we are told that the solutions there are not ready yet, so we should not consider them. Until testing is banned in those areas???

Correction: From the news, I note that Shri Advani DID NOT join the "N2TN" crowd- what he said was that he is not opposed to the 123 deal, but wants India to retain the option of testing. But the 123 agreement actually does NOT ban testing by India, it just says that if India goes down that path, then the US will also consider what it should do.

So Shri Acharya needs to correct his understanding of what Shri Advani means.

enqyoob,

I think BJP wants to renegotiate the deal to dilute the anti test language and provisions. US doesn't have to say that they welcome the tests. But they could have chosen varying degrees of discretion and reticence. Hyde is rather indiscrete and rather loud. It didn't have to be that way. To say that there was no other way for the USA is to buy into their line hook line and sinker.

After an Indian test US is of course free to do whatever is not explicitly prohibited by the treaty. But why was such a show made to spell out exactly what US must do. That wasn't "necessary" from Indian viewpoint. And if it was meant to appease the NPA's, then that is not India's problem. And that evidently leaves room for renegotiation.

What do you think US is getting out of this deal? and why the urgency on their part if all the great benefits are meant to accrue to India? I need to see this side of the equation compute to a satisfactory degree too. So all supporters of the deal in its present form, please, voice your understanding of this aspect. I had mentioned earlier that capping India's TN capability might be a sufficient prize for USA.

Based on the elpquence of enqyoob saar and his stellar logic, I am 400% convinced that we have mastered the fission, but Fusion of Indians is way far off.

we had literally lynched DRDO for all it did but were quick to acknowledge the achivements when they publicly demonstrated the product, upon which we took turns to castigate army / IAF procurement and requirements, but some how DAE is beyond ceasers wife.

Initially I was one of the cheer leaders to pooh pooh the wallance and co wallahs, now when our ex chiefs of DAE suggest we need to walk one more step, everybody is very very worked up.

as Gerad had said all others have tested in atmos tower shots, air dropped with parachute, and even missile dropped, of atleast 40 odd tests.

We have completed say 8 tests (or 7) we have enough data for DOOs to develop codes, thats great.
As project manager I have done that many times asking my team to start coding looking at the data I will get the requirement later.

The fundamental question we need to address is what is our Vision of our role in world affairs?
what is our geo political goals in the vicinity of our neighborhood, world at large.
Do we want an economic super power model like Japan S. Korea etc,
or do we want to be global player like PRC both economic and military power?

what is the path towards being global power with out compramising our national identity and aspirations?

do we have buy from all nation parties and a protocol to continue in that path?

Till we have atleast some idea about the above questions it is useless to talk about strategic elbow room or role play.

Jai BARC, Jai DAE.
Jai Hind
oops forgot
Jai Chidambara Rahasyam

In my post I did not mention LKA. Sorry you are mistaken

Thanks Acharaya, my apologies for the mistake. I concatenated the post above ramana's which cited Advani's "No deal if no POKIII" with your "question of whether testing is needed should never be asked again". Goes to show MY bias, as Hamilton Burger would have said. I guess you were referrring to ramana's post in between that said the testing need was cited by technical experts.

So I note that LKA has not called for more tests.

Satyarthi: I cannot answer your question to my satisfaction either (what does US get out of this?) I can give all the Party Line answers, but they don't satisfy someone like me who has learned Conspiracy Theory from the Master Guru (Acharya) himself. According to Scott McLellan, the Dubyan Administration has not exactly been honest on a lot of things so one has to wonder.

One thing is that I don't pay much heed to the Hyde Act. In fact, why should the Hyde Act "control" US-India relations any more than the Karat Act or the Advani Act? Only the 123 agreement operates, and I am not unhappy with the wording there. I also don't believe that LKA or anyone else can induce a better-worded agreement and get it past COTUS.

People cite China's example - and ask if we don't want to be like China. Strong, Tough, not scared of anyone...

May I point out HOW they got there? Korean War: 900,000 Chinese soldiers dead. Fought the entire United Nations to a standstill.

Vietnam War: How many hundreds of thousands of Chinese died? Forced the USA, Australia and other poodles to run away, hanging from helicopter landing skids, leaving their flunkies behind to be "re-educated".

War against India: Whipped the behinds of the lound-eyed indoos. Beautifully timed the war with a 1-2 punch, feinting in the West, and invading in the East, causing collapse. Conveyed the fear that they could have gone straight to Delhi, though the truth was that they were one bombing raid away from total destruction. Withdrew smartly as the air attacks were about to commence.

War against the Soviet Union on the Siberia-Mongolia border (Ussuri River). Some say thousands died. Some say tactical nukes were used.

Funded and propped up North Korean regime to be like a mad dog, biting the US occasionally, barking loud more frequently.

"Wrong Way Wong Wei" incident.

Do you want to see India go down this road? Pay the price of achieving the fear-based "respect" that China enjoys? 900,000 dead in war? War with most of the superpowers? Not a friend on any border (except the Paki terrorists across the Karakoram Pass)?
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Some items from long before:

Ananth: Number of nuclear-tipped artillery shells / tactical nukes is from sources that cannot be cited (experts on arms reduction). The point they made is that tactical nukes / artillery shells are NEVER COUNTED IN ANY OF THE WARHEAD REDUCTION NUMBERS.

Also told me that the present obstacle to reducing nuclear warheads to zero is the Russia-China standoff. Russia sees no hope of preventing a Chinese takeover of Siberia unless nuclear weapons are used - no hope of matching China with manpower or conventional weapons in that region. So Russian deterrence to Chinese takeover of Siberia is based on nuclear weapons. Large numbers of tactical nukes because they have fought at least one "limited war" there already, so it is established that they can exchange a few thousand weapons and still be outwardly fine and dandy. China of course returns the compliment with a set of shor-range and intermediate-range missiles, and Russia does likewise, so that stops any effort to reduce the number of warheads. No one else is willing to reduce below these numbers.

That's where the very large number of tactical weapons comes from. If US also reduces way below China in artillery shells, then an exchange of pleasantries, say in North Korea or Taiwan could leave the US fleet and divisions in vapor state, without US being able to retaliate since ICBM retaliation would trigger Armageddon. Another demonstration that having Agnis is no help when little "Astras" are what are needed.

Now u c why "START" is not called "NWRT"

Even MMS has not called for more tests.



What have I deserved to be mentioned twice in the same post by the great guru N3 who is the inventor of the great conspiracy called 12 step of dictatorship.

From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology By Graham Spinardi

The users perspective:

Rear Admiral: Raja Menon

[quote]What levels of technology is India at now? To ask these questions is to create great unease in Indian official circles, because the answers might require a set of decision that would create enormous unpleasantness internally and externally. For this reason many analysts with good sense are quiet. They hope they will not be a victim of “shoot the messengerâ€

Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance by Donald MacKenzie

See ramana? An entire new clear detergent can be (and WAS) based on fizzle bums. Much cheaper to design the detergent from Step 1 with concrete in lieu of Pu.
India's can be far superior to USA's: 99% made of concrete. Note that Saddam built his entire SCUD inventory with concrete blocks. More damage was done to the target area due to the Patriot anti-SCUDS than from the SCUD warheads. Its only a matter of time before Pakistan invents the Fedayeen Anti-KufrBum Mijjile with Pu tip, to explode above Islamabad any time a launch is detected. Or suspected. Or hallucinated.

N^3,



We could only say yes to FMCT once we have separated enough enriched yoo and Pu. Enough should mean enough for a large arsenal of big boosted fission weapons using 8kg Pu each as well as a "uncounted" arsenal of tactical nukes. After all, given the rising conventional imbalance against China, this is our only hope, isnt it ? Signing FMCT after just having enough fuel to do this keeps us in the same bad situation that signing FMCT now does.

Do we get to define "ENOUGH" wthout siege. What about an Obama administration close to the NPA crowd ? It is very likely to use the deal (if it goes through) as a pressure point to push us into the FMCT asap. The deal for Tarapur was a "perfect" deal, but the US reneged on that in 1974 and we had to go through a lot of trouble. What prevents the "international community " from suddenly taking a "no uranium if you do not sign FMCT asap" after the deal goes though and we have 20000MW dependent on imported yoo ? By then there is likely to be a reliance lobby in this business also working to armtwist our govt into the FMCT.

There should be 4 fast breeder reactors of 500MWe operating in the military sector for a good 20 years...

ramdas, in your scenario, what is the REAL pressure point? It is the internal LOBBY. In other words, you are saying that India should not sign an agreement with the outside world because India is afraid of what the Indian voters (or their elected representatives) will do against the Indian interest. Sorry, but the evidence to-date does not support this, and at any rate, isn't there a contradiction in saying: "We are going to be a SuperPower, but we are afraid of the LOBBY inside our country"?

If a future POTUS tries to impose conditions that we don't agree to, then it is a standoff. By the same token, don't you think the US and NSG are concerned that
a) Hindu Nationalist Extremists will take over the govt. from the present kind and gentle Vatican-approved regime, and grab all the imported Yoo, kick out the inspectors, close all facilities to inspection, and steal all the sophisticated instruments for use in weapon-building
or
b) The Marxists will take over, nationalize all the GE/Westinghouse/whatever nuke power plants, ban transfer of money outside India, and sell the instruments to China
or
c) Islamists will take over and turn all the plants and the imported Yoo into dirty-bomb manufacturing???

Bottom line: R U really arguing that Indian babucracy cannot properly interpret the term "India will cooperate in progressing towards an FMCT", and may do things with unseemly SPEED?

So this FMCT thing is a non-starter as a reason to oppose the deal.
Explicit "permission" to conduct nuclear tests, ain't gonna happen. None of the P-5 ever got "permission" from anyone. You don't get "permission" to become a superpower.

Returning to the question of "What does the US get out of this?" The answer is that until the India question is resolved, the US' grand plans to contain nyookulear proliferation are going nowhere. NPT can be "extended" but it is getting more and more irrelevant. The bigger question is how to make $$$$$$ off nukes.

If India remains cut off from foreign fuel, and oil prices keep rising, India will
a) be forced to wake up and invest on War Phooting in renewable energy.
b) use the $$$ saved by not investing in FullScope Safeguards etc. to advance nuke R&D.

Once this is done, the main clout is gone - nuke plants are after that needed only for weapons and R&D. India willl say after that to any of these ittybitties. I will be VERY happy to see this happen - cut the dependence on imported fuel of ALL sorts.

OTOH, if India is brought "on board" then India can be a "centralized fuel processing facility" (meaning glowing garbage dump too). This, for reasons explained earlier, is central to the plans to sell reactors/plants to MANY nations under the "return the fuel in enclosed mailing envelope for reprocessing" deal. Then India gets a cut of this business, but the fuel and technology suppliers and reactor suppliers make out like bandits, since the price of Yoo is rising much faster than price of oil. India makes out like a bandit as well because of reasons explained by kgoan on one of his rare appearances. Result is that most of the $$$ that could have gone into Renewable Energy investment now gets poured into this license-raj scam, and keeps India on the hook as part of the Noo Whirled Odour led by Caliph Obama or Air Marshal McCain. So, satyarthi, rest assured, there is a GOOD Giga$$$$ scam behind this.

Getting India to cap, roll back, eliminate etc. would be good, no doubt, since then India will also have to subscribe to the Friendly Neighborhood Protection Scheme (FNPS) with the New Clear Umbrella, like Japan, Thailand etc. I would say India is racing towards Thailand status right now, so this will happen with all the Lobbies being very happy about it. But then again, it's just getting too costly to maintain US military around the world. FNPS used to be OK as long as MAD was in effect against the Soviet Union anyway. But with that gone, FNPS is just too dangerous, since it means US cities getting nuked just because some Indians got fried by some Chinese. No deal. Getting a FRIENDLY India to be a Rent-a-Cop in Asia would be so much more efficient, so the US does NOT benefit any more from Cap-Rollback-Eliminate being applied to India. The NPAs are making the same old noises, just to keep Indians worried.

Question was whether the UQ and France would buy into this, since with India joining the P-6, they slide ever deeper into irrelevance. But the NSG talks seem to be going well, and UQ and France are also betting that it's better to join the bandwagon and hope for the good $$$ than to resist. Besides, UQ and France use Metric units, so they have an advantage over the US in selling stuff to the Indian Public Sector.

Why is Unkil now encouraging Agni? Answer: THAAD and Space-based BMD.

Excellent references.

I have myself stated time and again that the behavior of a troll (among other things) is to ask for someone to say or define something and then proceed to knock it down without the troll himself being able to come up with a detailed alternative plan. I don't wish to do that so I'll say something in my own defence before passing comments:

1) I am not a nuclear war expert
2) I can recognise a dead body when I see one and have some idea of how many dead in a disaster make people react
3) I have already stated how I think low yield weapons should be used

Gurmeet Kanwal:
I entirely agree with what he has written

Dr. G Balachandran:
While I agree with the points he makes about the amount of fissile material we have and the accuracy of long range missiles.

But if we are looking at punishing an enemy we must also consider in any nuclear doctrine the idea that large civilian populations need to be terrorized. Cities are no longer compact conglomerations - that is the US model of a city. Cities of the developing world are huge megacities caused by the coalescing of multiple towns and villages into a massive urban mass spread over a huge area.

Even a 1 megaton hit is not enough for such a city.

The best way to really finish off these cities is to hit with small nukes that kill by the thousand and make people flee, and create chaos by bombing surrounding urban concentrations to force people from there to flee too. It is not the death of a million that counts. It is the fact of having 3 million people fleeing something simultaneously on the roads clogging up all effort and paralysing the entire area. I am suggesting that half a dozen small nukes could do this if used judiciously on a megacity.

Bharat Karnad:
He states that Thermonuclear weapons bring with them greater responsibility and therefore need stricter control, unlike lower yield weapons that may be used more easily.

But that is precisely the point. If the idea is to terrorize an enemy what better way to terrorize him than to have small nukes under not so strict control? Especially if they can be applied to cause terror the way I have described?

It is the US model to have huge nukes under very strict control

It is the Pakistan/Al Qaeda model to have small nukes under less strict control

In the context of strategic deterrent capabilities certainly not, and is no secret. India as a nation-state has certain national aspirations. Among these, is a desire to be a great and powerful nation and have a seat at the table as, an equal. Were it not for this desire, we would not be having this debate. There is a gap between these desires, our capabilites and actions.

Other powers do not want competition, from anyone. So, the question of "where world powers want India to be?" is moot. The claim post POK II was, India is a Nuclear Weapons State. There was no talk of a claim to any status. Our capabilities are for us to have and not someone else to grant.

I have never claimed a single test, will do the magic. I am asserting that the technology trajectory of yield to weights, lower CEP, MIRV capability over ICBM/IRBM ranges from land and sea are inescapable.

When we are "on par" in capabiities and demonstrate a will to field them, with the appropriate deterrent strategy. My concern is to be on par with capabilties, for now. I am not worried about equality of status, but on par capabilites.

I have not called for "repeated" testing. I have called for "enough" tests to field the weapons, our users and some analysts feel they need, that have been accepted without doubt. The question is, what does it take to take the doubts away?

No, it is a desire to be as mad as the rest of the world, so that, the mad fellows do not gang up and kill the only sane one. But seriously, the person, who seems to have studies this is Admiral Raja Menon, who does advocate a warhead in the range of 250-400 KT and numbers in the 500+ ranges. So, no it is not inferiority among Indians but the lack of strategic thinking in our government that concerns me and the users the most.

I prefer using the word "on par" with capabilities, in this context. The fact of the matter is, this world does understand the value of demostrated power. This deal would not have been on the table, were it not for POK II. As for, others accepting us or not, testing to demonstrate our power and capabilities is one important but not the only thing, we need to do.

I think, in most NWS countries, the arsenal seems to be moving away from MT range weapons to KT levels. But, the total payload in the missile is still at the MT level range with the MIRV's in place. So, when all the warheads in the missile are targeted over a single city, the low CEP rates of modern missiles and the MIRV warheads ranging from 100-500KT, each pack a devastating blow in packs of 4, 6, 8 and the US one can go upto 12. One way or the other, the mega city is toast. The MIRV''s are simply more efficient.

shiv: Dr. Balachandran's main point seems to be that there's only so much fissile stuff to go around (at present) and so India should develop fusion weapons which give much more bang per kg of fizz. Very good practical calculation, but not good enough to force a decision to do more testing.

By the way, experts, is a 20KT yield hydrogen bum halal by laws of physics? or is it like, fission bums sold in 10KT increments, but 200kT minimum order on fusion-boosted?

Ideal, if you can pack at least 50 or 100 of them in a missile.

One way or the other, the users seem to prefer MT capacity in the missile.

Shauryaji, ramana disses this, which pulverizes my confidence, but...

The big change in the new clear detergent business that I project is that these big MT delivery systems (regardless of # of MIRVs in them) are on their way out. They are much easier to defend against than small independent cruise type missiles. So they are huge liabilities.

If it was your job to design a missile defense system for an area the size of, say, southeastern India, how would you go about it? The present advertised approach is (a) sabotage at the launch pad, (b) boost-phase intercept, (c) mid-course intercept using ship-launched rocket missiles with kinetic kill warheads, (d) Theater high-altitude defense using kinetic kill or large explosions using ground-launched fast-burn rocket missiles, (e) terminal area intercept using Patriot type fast-burn ground-launched rockets and (f) "put ur head between ur knees and kiss your ass goodbye".

There are several things terribly wrong with this, so I don't think this is the actual plan at all. The main thing is that a rocket that has to reach Space or the edge of space, has to be fairly large, and has a Mass Ratio (ratio of starting mass to eventual payload mass) on the order of 10 to 20.

Once you detect an enemy launch, you have a set number of minutes before the intercept opportunity. You need a few minutes from ignition to reach even 100K meters. Figure it out: assume a 5G acceleration all the way from the ground (PRETTY challenging on a big rocket) to 100,000 meters. It takes over 1 minute.

Now let's see if 5Gs is feasible. To have 5G at liftoff (or after the rocket is blasted out of the tube, which is tough on such a large missile), the thrust of the rocket must be 6 times the weight of the rocket (Newton's 2nd law).

Only about 3% of the weight of a total rocket with Mass Ratio 10, can be the rocket engine. Let's say the engine has a thrust-to-weight ratio of 100 (upper limit for rocket engines of some size), so the thrust of this engine must be 300% of the rocket weight, so the max acceleration is 2G. So even 5G continuous is very unlikely.

So - 30 seconds for identifying a launch, 2minutes to launch decision, 1 minute for countdown, 1 minute or more to reach 100,000 meters even straight up - MINIMUM time is several minutes. If you don't have to go cross-range at all. Even with this, the vehicle is not going to have much maneuvering capability when it gets up to 100,000 meters.

How many such large missiles can you have ready for launch, and under the trajectory of the attacking missile? You need one per kinetic-kill intercept point. The advantage is on the side of the attacker. If they trick you into launching on a false warning, you've shot off your defenses, and are open to the real attack that comes, say, 2 minutes after the first one. You can only wring your hands and go to Stages (e) and (f) of the Defense Plan

With a little bit of thought, one can come up with a much better way of defending. Say you have 5 B747-size airplanes on alert, filled with fuel and communications, with 2 hypersonic interceptors under each wing. When tensions get really high, you have at least one up in the air at any time, cruising at, say, 40,000 feet, going Mach 0.8 in a wide circle.

When launch detection occurs, the other 4 747s roll for takeoff and climb (this is to deal with a second wave of attackers). The patrolling one turns towards the predicted re-entry point. As the missile(s) approach, the orbiting 747 launches its 4 interceptors (unmanned is fine) at 10 second intervals, with their rocket-boosted ramjet engines, to climb to 100,000 meters (difference is they are starting at Mach 0.8 and 13000 meters at t=0, and are much smaller than the ground-launched thing). Each has, say, 4 rocket+ramjet missiles with multiple kinetic-kill warheads, and they are starting with the advantage of height and speed, to coast towards the re-entry vehicles. Your interceptors are spread over a wide area.

If it is false alarm or a feint before the real launch, you lose nothing but fuel - the interceptors glide to a landing and get re-fitted and fueled for the next 747. Meanwhile your next 3 747s are well on their way, on full alert.

In this scenario, the advantage is VERY much on the defender's side. Which is why I say that ICBMs and MT-carrying missiles are on their way to extinction. Once you figure the chances, the attacker is effectively deterred, because there is a high chance that not a single warhead will get through. Of course, once you launch, you have laid yourself open to genocidal retaliation. Score: Attacker: 0. Defender/Retaliator: 100 million. Game over.

Any country that races flat out to build the large MIRV-carrying things, is making the same mistake as getting elephants to fight cavalry. This is why Unkil is happy that India is making ever larger Agnis etc. instead of putting the money where it should be going.

Sorry for the long post, but this reasoning is not getting through to the N2TN crowd. We DON'T need 200kT weapons. We need small ones, with hypersonic delivery systems. Plus hypersonic interceptors and missiles launched from them.

My personal belief (as per my current understanding) is that expressions like "toast" are assumptions based on a nuke's explosive potential and the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Even MIRV's have to be specifically targeted toc ause maximum terror and suffering. That means a bunch of MIRV's landing is of no us - but they should be specifically targeted at hitting towns and urban collections radiating outwards on escape routes from the centers of megacities.

It is no use hitting countryside randomly with a shower of MIRVs - each must hit a town or a city from which relief efforts can be coordinated for a single targeted city.

Even a single 10 kiloton bum in the center of Bangalore will cause hundreds of thousands of those who survive to lose their livelihood, their water supply and power and those with support and family in surrounding towns will seek to escape. Those people will need to have misery poured on them by targeting nukes on the surrounding towns along highways so that they meet people trying to escape TO Bangalore.

If we are talking nuclear war there is no sense in lobbing a nuke and assuming the worst. Misery must be planned for and executed with full knowledge of how much bum you have under your control.

The larger your bums, the lesser you need for missile accuracy, that's all - but not by a large margin though. If you use one single megaton blast to make a 10 km radius area into "toast", you will need 6 more to make a 20 to 30 km radius (2800 sq km) into toast. As enqyoob pointed out - this is a waste of resources. Making toast of such a large area render that area useless and non livable but surrounding areas go on. The surrounding areas must be made to suffer by specifically targeting towns and urban areas 30 to 50 km away from a central bomb. One can cripple a much larger area by light frying than by making burnt toast. Targeting towns along main highways within 50 km of the center of a bombed megacity will cause misery over 7500 sq km.

JM miserable T

I was doing general reading across internet where the articles seem to say that even for deep penetrator nukes the sweet spot is less than 10kt and the issue is whether the nuke can dig in well before working/exploding

N^3,

I should have phrased it better. Once we have a 40000+MW power program dependent on imported yoo, lobby or no lobby it creates a wonderful handle for "FMCT now or no yoo, no 40000 MW" kind of pressure. This is something the nuclear deal's supporters have not addressed. Given our situation my feeling is that the civilian program should be moved forward to the maximum extent that does not negatively affect the military program It should not be allowed to develop a dynamic of its own that gives others a handle to affect the military program negatively.

Regarding cruise missiles, the soviets were developing a hypersonic meteorit missile of ~4000km range. This was a big cruise missile weighing ~10 tons. So, an intercontinental cruise missile that is hypersonic might be quite large itself. Wont maneuvering RV's on a ballistic missile be much better ?with decoys chaff and other means of penetrating ABM defences ?

Speaking of technical experts, every open source reference I see has a thermonuclear bomb tamper (or is it pusher) made of U 238. It would seem like e need plenty of spent Uranium fuel for that. I don't suppose that is in short supply?

What happens to a thermonuclear bomb in which you do not use u-238 as tamper. Is that neutron bum?

description of the W80 cruise missile warhead from wikipedia

Long time ago when I was reading this book (select pages also available on Google books:
[url=http://books.google.com/books?id=nkmQl_NrcgMC&dq=from+polaris+to+trident+the+development+of+us+fleet+ballistic+missile+technology+by+graham+spinardi&pg=PP1&ots=mrW-_jMV3U&sig=kbuhuvJYmehZV5ccJG5cb3K9re8&hl=en&prev=http://www.google.com/search%3Fq%3DFrom%2BPolaris%2Bto%2BTrident:%2BThe%2BDevelopment%2Bof%2BUS%2BFleet%2BBallistic%2BMissile%2BTechnology%2BBy%2BGraham%2BSpinardi%2B%26ie%3Dutf-8%26oe%3Dutf-8%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26client%3Dfirefox-a&sa=X&oi=print&ct=title&cad=one-book-with-thumbnail#PPA23,M1]From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile ...
By Graham Spinardi[/url]

Somewhere in the beginning few chapters you will find reference on how the weight of the TN weapon was significantly reduced by use of tertiary stage that used enriched fissile material (Oralloy) for 3rd stage. This was the (simple) breakthrough that allowed the sub launched missile to achieve the range. while the 500kT comfortably met the minimum yield reqmt of 300kT.

High enriched 3rd stage has since become the std mantra for all countries that deployed TN weapons.

I just opened my book and found that on page 54.