Bharat Rakshak

The companies will cooperate in the construction of new power units at Kudankulam in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and for the construction of plants designed with Russian light-water VVER 1000 reactors at new sites in India, Larsen said in a statement.

According to a release, the Heavy Water Board, through its Research and Development activities, had developed a unique ammonia injection technology for control of particulate emissions in the flue gas emanating out of coal-fired boilers. Heavy Water Board had patented this technology. The BHEL, Ranipet, was already a leader in the field of pollution control. The electrostatic precipitators (ESPs) designed and developed by BHEL dots the map of power generating sets in India.

The technology developed by Heavy Water Board, when used in tandem with the ESPs, where the ammonia is injected up stream of the ESPs, had been proven to increase efficient working of precipitators. It was understood that by acquiring this technology developed indigenously, BHEL would be able to contribute more positively for pollution abatement.

The Left-supported Third Front will not scrap the India US nuclear deal if it takes power after the Lok Sabha elections but keep it "in cold storage" to save New Delhi from Washington's strategic designs, says Communist Party of India (CPI) leader AB Bardhan.

What makes the situation even more troubling is that there does not appear to be a clear consensus within the country’s political establishment on India’s weapon status. At any rate, the role of nuclear weapons in our military strategy is a deeply held secret, not available even to the strategic community. The last substantive pronouncement on the subject was the adoption of the nuclear doctrine in January 2003.

India has become the third nation to eliminate its known stockpile of chemical weapons, the organization that monitors adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention announced last week

"I wish to sincerely, warmly, and emphatically congratulate India on this laudable achievement, which is the result of a consistent and unwavering commitment shown by India since entry into force of the convention,"

Ms Ritu Khurana, Sci C, Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL), Chandigarh, for her commendable work in theoretical analysis and mathematical modelling of detonation and shock wave phenomena, which formed the basis for numerical simulation of multipoint initiated implosion system. She was instrumental in the design and development of hybrid spherical wave lens will achieve 35 per cent reduction in weight and 15 per cent reduction in size in the new system.

The KSU leaders drove to the Raj Bhavan after villagers from the proposed uranium mining areas in the state's West Khasi Hills district had urged Mooshahary to issue a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to the Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) to start the long-pending Kylleng-Pyndeng-Sohiong uranium project.

http://www.drdo.com/pub/nl/2009/may09.pdf

The revival of nuclear energy at the international level has led five universities in France to create a two-year master's of nuclear energy programme. They are currently on the lookout for fresh graduates of physics/ engineering/ chemistry, especially from India.

Mr. Karat said the CPI(M) had “some ideas” on reworking the India-U.S. nuclear deal and might not be keen on scrapping it.

A retaliatory strike capability to destroy eight to 10 major population and industrial centres would be adequate to meet the requirements of deterrence. For 10 counter value targets to be destroyed in the adversary country, a total of 40 nuclear warheads, at the scale of four 20 to 40 Kiloton warheads per target, would be adequate to cause unacceptable damage in a retaliatory nuclear strike if the probable error (CEP) of the Agni IRBM delivery systems is taken to be 1,000 metres and a destruction assurance level of 0.7 (about 70 percent) is considered acceptable.

If the efficiency or overall reliability of India's nuclear delivery system is taken to be between 0.5 and 0.6 (50 to 60 per cent), a reasonable assumption for a modern nuclear force, then 75 warheads must actually be launched for about 40 to 45 warheads to explode successfully over their targets as some missiles may fail to take off, some may veer off course, some may be intercepted and some warheads may either fail to explode or may explode in a sub-optimal manner. Hence, a minimum of 75 warheads and, of course, their delivery systems must survive the enemy's first strike on Indian targets and be available for retaliation.

Despite the best possible concealment and dispersion measures approximately 50 per cent of the nuclear warheads and delivery systems may be destroyed in a first strike by the adversary. It would, therefore, be reasonable to plan a warhead stocking level of at least twice the number of warheads that are actually required to be launched, that is, 150 warheads. The last aspect to be catered for is a prudent level of reserves for larger than anticipated damage to own nuclear forces in a first strike and for unforeseen eventualities. Escalation control and war termination strategies would also be dependent on the ability to launch counter-recovery strikes and some fresh strikes. One-third the required number of warheads should be adequate as reserves. Hence, the total requirement works out to 200 nuclear warheads for a minimum deterrence doctrine with a no first use strategy if 10 major population and industrial centres are to be attacked in a retaliatory strike to achieve a 70 to 80 per cent assurance level of destruction.

Has this been posted before? Apologies if it has..

Please read BRM's paper circa 1999

What Next? Way to a credible deterrent

India should have the capability to destroy 20 long range, 30 medium and 50 regional targets. These are based on ensuring enough destruction capability to deter any aggressive behavior from any quarters. If only modest numbers are available, it would mean a reverse kamikaze situation- a negligible, minuscule retaliatory strike on a challenger who has delivered excessive destruction to the Indian State in a first strike. As the Indian deterrent program is based on minimal testing and low yield devices (< 45kt) , it would require three times this numbers to assure destruction. These numbers could come down with further delivery vehicle tests to prove reliability and accuracy; again if credible stewardship program is established, new payload details are revealed and accepted by the challengers, the numbers could go down.

Figure 4: RV and nuclear warheads options on various Indian missiles

Add to this another hundred to ensure survival of first strike. This number could go down, if a global or bilateral no first use agreement is reached with the NWS states. Another would be if a mutual de-targeting agreement were signed with principal NWS. A NWS declaration about not expanding their doctrine to non-nuclear threats would not be of much use to India in this case as she does not intend to use such threats

Add to this about a hundred for pipeline process- weapons at lab, under replenishment, in logistic cycle, unavailable due to any reason etc. This number is not subject to any trimming or reduction.

India is not part of any global security arrangement and has to rely on itself. The numbers suggested reflect this. If it were to be accommodated in international forums and mutual threat reduction mechanisms, then participation in reduction regimes can be considered.

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Seven months after the deal’s realisation, there is no sign of its transformative power. Rather, doubts have arisen over the supposed “global strategic partnership” with America. The policy frame in which Washington is viewing India is not the larger Asian geopolitical landscape, but the southern Asian context. But even on regional matters of vital interest to India, the U.S. has sought to ignore New Delhi or pursue antithetical policy approaches. To the chagrin of Indian neocons — who ingenuously marketed the nuclear deal as a U.S. move to build India as a world power and counterweight to China — Washington has declared that its “most important bilateral relationship in the world” is with Beijing.


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It was thus no surprise that Mr. Bush left the White House with a solid China-friendly legacy. Today, there is talk even of a U.S.-China diarchy — a G-2 — ruling the world. The naïveté of Indian neocons was astonishing.

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Take another example. India got no tangible help from the Bush or Obama administration to bring the plotters of the Mumbai strikes to justice, despite providing extraordinary access to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to independently investigate those attacks and even allowing the CIA to serve as a conduit for intelligence exchange with Islamabad. Rather, Washington wants India now to rise above the Mumbai attacks and aid Mr. Obama’s “Afpak” strategy by giving Pakistan a tranquil eastern border through troop redeployments

The U.S. message to India is to forget Mumbai and silently suffer Pakistan’s war by terror — a message reinforced by Washington’s identification of terrorist safe havens only along Pakistan’s western border. Ms Clinton indeed suggested India endure more Mumbais stoically by telling Congress, “So, we do have a lot of work to do with the Indian government, to make sure that they continue to exercise the kind of restraint they showed after Mumbai, which was remarkable, especially given the fact that it was the political season.”

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On Pakistan — a pawn too valuable for any U.S. administration to stop using for regional objectives — American policy has displayed continuity for long. The fact that Mr. Obama, in his first 100 days, has helped put together $15.7 billion in international aid for Islamabad shows the U.S. resolve not to allow Pakistan to fail — a country where, he admits, “we have huge strategic interests.” But it was Mr. Bush who let Pakistan rake in a terrorist windfall, as he plied it with sophisticated weapons and more than $12.3 billion in funds, notwithstanding the escalating Pakistani-scripted terror attacks in India after 9/11.

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For years, the U.S. has played to India’s ego and to Pakistan’s craving for funds and weapons. Mr. Bush kept India happy with a grand partnership vision while he pandered to Pakistan’s needs. The very day Mr. Bush announced his decision to sell F-16s to Pakistan — a public slap for India — Washington patronisingly offered to “help India become a major world power in the 21st century.” This was lapped up by Indian neocons as a “tectonic shift” in U.S. policy. Similarly, Mr. Obama massaged India’s ego by declaring that Richard Holbrooke’s mission would stay restricted to the Afpak belt, only to quietly include Kashmir and India in his envoy’s agenda. Now, Centcom chief Gen. David Petraeus has undiplomatically blurted out the truth to Congress that Mr. Holbrooke’s “portfolio very much includes India,” and Mr. Holbrooke and he are in “constant touch” with Indian officials.

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Today, while India gropes for strategic benefits from the nuclear deal, the U.S. is set to reap non-proliferation and economic benefits once international inspections begin and contracts are signed. It is unfortunate that intense partisan rancour was kicked up in India over an oversold deal, which was pushed through with no public scrutiny, although it thrusts an uneconomical energy choice and carries long-term implications.

For some perspective, consider that India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 — a detonation of a non-weaponized device like North Korea’s — but did not test actual nuclear weapons until nearly a quarter century later, in 1998. Even today, more than a decade after those tests, India still lacks many of the components of a modern nuclear arsenal, including submarine-launched missiles, missiles with a range longer than about 3,500 miles, and missiles with multiple, independently targetable warheads (MIRVs). This, despite the fact that India has a huge number of talented engineers and physicists and has been applying a considerable portion of its national resources to nuclear technology for more than 50 years.

Oxide fuel will be replaced by metallic fuels to power the future reactors of the country.

He said four more FBR reactors will be built by 2020 and the financial sanctions of these are expected soon. ``Out of which two, with each 500 MW capacity, will be built adjacent to site at Kalpakkam, where PFBR is coming up,’’

The United States hosted the second meeting of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Energy Working Group at Idaho National Laboratory on April 28-30, 2009. This was the first meeting held by the Working Group since entry into force of the U.S.-India peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.

Discussions focused on deepening mutual understanding of each country’s nuclear energy development plans, including light water reactors, near term reactor deployment, licensing, management of nuclear waste, research and development programs as well as international best practices. The U.S. delivered presentations on safeguards and physical protection. The Working Group will continue its efforts by developing an action plan to focus collaborative work efforts. Its next meeting is scheduled near the end of 2009 in India.

Action is picking up in the Indian nuclear sector. With the opening of the new window of nuclear commerce with other countries, the first on the list of projects to come up in the country is at the Koodankulam site in Tamil Nadu. Two reactors are already being constructed with Russian assistance under an earlier inter-governmental pact, while another four units are being planned.

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The biggest apprehension voiced against imported nuclear reactor-based capacities planned in the country, in the wake of the Indo-US nuclear deal, has been on the pricing front. The fear, essentially, is that the project cost entailed in setting up these new, gargantuan imported reactors could push final retail electricity tariffs to levels that consumers will find difficult to pay, creating an Enron kind of a situation.

For the new ‘VVER 1000’ units being offered by the Russians, the upfront price tag being quoted is $2 billion for each reactor under discussion. Russia has, meanwhile, proposed a sweetener in the form of a 30 per cent discount.

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Koodankulam is important in the way imported Light Water Reactor-based nuclear capacities get added in the future, in probably the same way as the Tarapur project was to the nascent Indian nuclear industry. This is specifically because Koodankulam could well prove to be the benchmark for future projects being developed through foreign participation under inter-governmental pacts.

India is planning to set up a slew of nuclear power parks across the country, with the sites chosen so far being Jaitapur in Maharashtra, Pati Sonapur in Orissa, Haripur in West Bengal, Mithirvirdi in Gujarat, and Kowadi in Andhra Pradesh. Six to eight reactors, of 1,000-1,650 MW, are proposed to be installed at each nuclear park. Negotiations are on with four global suppliers — GE-Hitachi and Toshiba-Westinghouse of the US, Areva of France, besides Atomstroyexport.

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Koodankulam will prove to be a crucial benchmark in terms of pricing and project implementation experience for all of the drama set to unfold in Act Two of the India nuclear saga.