Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

All threads that are locked or marked for deletion will be moved to this forum. The topics will be cleared from this archive on the 1st and 16th of each month.
Locked
Raja Ram
BRFite
Posts: 587
Joined: 30 Mar 1999 12:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Raja Ram »

thanks shiv that is the one.

As per that we have to build Empires of the mind instead of sitting and dreaming of empires in the mind in BRF.
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by shiv »

It is tempting to compare nations with living beings. A creature that does not have protection against external foes will soon get attacked and have pieces chewed off, if not eaten up completely.

India is gambling here. Nehru gambled on international goodwill and oversaw India's ass getting kicked. Like a thick callus that grows on your foot in reaction to an ill fitting shoe, India increased its defences in response to 1962 and that saw us though 1965.

India's post 1965 wakefulness saw us through 1971 - while India Gandhi's prescience put us among nuclear armed nations and in Antarctica.

India has normally fallen asleep at the wheel when it comes to defence preparedness. When your economy grows your footprint grows, When your footprint grows you are treading on other people's toes and those people will hit back. You cannot build an economy without armed strength. I think i was Friedman who observed wisely that:
The velvet glove cannot work without a steel fist inside it. MacDonald's could not grow without a McDonnell (Douglas) behind it
Rishi
Forum Moderator
Posts: 746
Joined: 29 Sep 2002 11:31
Location: Maximum City

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Rishi »

Delhi Jingos, time to get yourself invited to:
Measuring Nuclear Test Yield: Understanding Pokhran II
Speaker: Dr. S.K. Sikka, Scientific Secretary, Office of the Principal Scientific Advisor to Government of India
Date & Time: 14th September 2009 at 1100 hrs
Venue: IDSA, Main Auditorium
[BY INVITATION ONLY]
http://www.idsa.in/index.htm
amit
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4325
Joined: 30 Aug 2007 18:28
Location: The Restaurant at the End of the Universe

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by amit »

Raja Ram wrote:Worth a read. Certainly gives an insight to the centrality of economic progress and the role he wants for India.
Raja Ram,

IMO you raise a very important point. There are many here (please note I don't necessarily include you among them) who somehow think that centrality of economic progress and not military power in India's medium vision is some sort of soft dhimmi kind of attitude.

I know that it's fashionable to cite the so-called Japan model which apparently India wants to follow. This line of thinking somehow seems to indicate that Japan despite its obvious economic clout is in some sort strategic straitjacket which prevents it from playing a more assertive role in world affairs.

However, IMO this viewpoint does not take into account one important point. And that is Japan is what it is today by choice not by design.

I know that after World War II it was the intention of the US to keep Japan on leash but that leash theory went bust a long time ago during the Cold War years as the Japanese economy started to flourish and US needed powerful allies against the Soviet bloc.

A search on Google San will give plenty of links on the US feeling regarding the Japanese military posture. Almost all talk of US actually wanting the Japanese to take a more proactive role. As it is the Japanese Navy is probably more powerful than the Chinese Navy minus the nuclear subs of China.

However, I don't know how many people here have realized that there is a ground swell of opposition within Japan for a militaristic makeover of its outward face to the world. Remember the kind of opposition that there was to Japanese troops going to Iraq?

In a nutshell what I'm trying to say is Japan is what it is by choice. And India will be what it wants to be by choice. And for it to becoming an economic power without commensurate military power will not happen unless the majority of people want that. Given India's young and aggressive population, I very much doubt that will happen.

So the question again turns to the centrality of economic power vs miliatry might. The analogy may not be apt but look at the Chinese model for a change.

All the issues that China considers important and wants to resolve to its satisfaction, Taiwan, Arunachal, conflict on islands with Japan, Philippines, presence in the Indian Ocean, the final settlement of the Tibet problem etc are not recent problems - they have existed for decades. Yet from 1980 onwards China kept the issues alive but on a back-burner and concentrated on economic growth.

Now in 2009, with the US at its weakest and the Chinese economy poised to overtake Japan and become the second biggest economy in the world, it is beginning to flex its economic and military muscles.

Doesn't it strike one as odd that China chooses to move on Arunachal now in 2009 and not in say 1995-96 or 1999 or any such year.

I personally think the Chinese waited for sufficient time to build its eocnomic power and use the money generated to build its military. Now IMO it feels sufficient confident to assert itself. And this assertion is going to get more audacious as the years go by.

It all comes down to what I wrote in the previous thread. A great nation is identified by both military and economic power, but economic power needs to come first in order to sustain military power.

Maybe MMS it trying to follow the China model and not the much derided Japan model? I mean we could perhaps get megaton bombs and 10,000 km ICBMs if we put our mind to it but if our industries suffer from 10 hour loadshedding, half the population goes to bed hungry and foreign exchange crisis becomes a fact of daily life, how long will military power sustain the nation? Why did the Soviet Union with its Tsar bombs and fancy missiles lose the war to the US without firing a single pathaka?

Again look at China, suppose it tests an N-bomb now, do you think the US can do diddly squat about that? Every poster on BRF knows NoKo was a Chinese maal tested, so what could the US do? Is it because it's scared of Chinese missiles or N-bombs or is it scared of the the $2 trillion forex reserves of China?
amit
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4325
Joined: 30 Aug 2007 18:28
Location: The Restaurant at the End of the Universe

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by amit »

Bottom line, what I think MMS is and should do and is probably doing is keep all options open, by not signing the CTBT and other shitty treaties and at the same time keep the moratorium going for a few more years - someone here had once mentioned that the internal GoI target date is 2020. And then after achieving a level of economic clout bring out the recessed deterrent to the forefront. I also happen to think that there's a cross party consensus on this course of action.

I'll be the first to call him "traitor" if he deviates from this line.
Last edited by amit on 08 Sep 2009 18:07, edited 1 time in total.
Gagan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 11242
Joined: 16 Apr 2008 22:25

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Gagan »

wrt signing NPT and CTBT and tech denial.

A whole lot of nations have signed the above treaties. I dont' think their economies flew off the very next day and they all became developed nations within a few years.

The link of economic development with adherence to the abovementioned treaties is very weak. Not adhering to the above treaties is the given excuse to tech denial, which will not disappear even after the treaties are signed.
The tech denial will simply reappear in another form.

The only way the tech denial will reduce and be rendered redundant is when India develops some of the tech itself, the hard way, develops economically. When the developed nations see that it is advantageous to them to trade with India, and the release of more tech will be to their benefit, only then will tech denial reduce / end.
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by shiv »

From Wiki:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_India
Age Structure of India
0-14 years: 31.1% (male 190,075,426/female 172,799,553) (2009 est)
15-64 years: 63.6% (male 381,446,079/female 359,802,209) (2009 est)
65-over: 5.3% (male 29,364,920/female 32,591,030) (2009 est)
If you take the average BRFite as being older than 14 years then there are 360 million Indians younger than you are (Did you think you were young?)

All these Indians will have to have education and jobs over the next 10 to 15 years.

That means schools, colleges, teachers, businesses, factories, food, medical care, water and fuel for cooking.

That of course does not mean that defence must be neglected. What priority needs to be given for conducting another round of nuclear tests?
Gagan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 11242
Joined: 16 Apr 2008 22:25

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Gagan »

Isn't Dr. S.K. Sikka the man who designed the TN warhead? IIRC, PC was the project head, but Dr Sikka was the person who's brainchild this baby was.

Also, Dr. Sikka was last seen very worried for two days right after the 1998 tests, busy doing calculations about the yield. The test team knew almost immediately how much the yield was from the seismographs
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by NRao »

Rishi wrote:Delhi Jingos, time to get yourself invited to:
Measuring Nuclear Test Yield: Understanding Pokhran II
Speaker: Dr. S.K. Sikka, Scientific Secretary, Office of the Principal Scientific Advisor to Government of India
Date & Time: 14th September 2009 at 1100 hrs
Venue: IDSA, Main Auditorium
[BY INVITATION ONLY]
http://www.idsa.in/index.htm
They need either a webcast or a podcast.

A must, considering the controversy.
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by NRao »

Whatever Dr. Sikka states, I wonder if this is a build up to signing the CTBT (with some attached conditions granted)?

This talk is unprecedented I would think.
amit
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4325
Joined: 30 Aug 2007 18:28
Location: The Restaurant at the End of the Universe

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by amit »

Gagan wrote:Also, Dr. Sikka was last seen very worried for two days right after the 1998 tests, busy doing calculations about the yield. The test team knew almost immediately how much the yield was from the seismographs
Gagan,

Have you personally seen Dr Sikka, looking worried for two days right after the 1998 tests?

If not and if you are quoting anecdotal evidence, then I would request you to provide a reliable link which supports this contention.
amit
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4325
Joined: 30 Aug 2007 18:28
Location: The Restaurant at the End of the Universe

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by amit »

NRao wrote:Whatever Dr. Sikka states, I wonder if this is a build up to signing the CTBT (with some attached conditions granted)?

This talk is unprecedented I would think.
NRao,

Any particular reason you think that the first indication on the so-called signing of the CTBT would be given by scientist and not by a politician or babu policy maker (say Shyam Sharan, the point man in all matters nuclear)?

The speech could also be IMHO a reaction to KS' recent statement?
SwamyG
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16267
Joined: 11 Apr 2007 09:22

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by SwamyG »

shiv wrote: India
Pakistan
North Korea
Cuba

Now wasn't someone worrying that India was clubbed with these nations? Naturally. India is part of the group and is clubbed with them. Even when we belong to the religion we claim exemption and pretend to be secular.

India's behavior with regard to CTBT is the behavior of a bunch of frauds. Perhaps we should sign.
...or the behavior of a bunch of proxies?
Suneet
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 16
Joined: 07 Sep 2009 15:47

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Suneet »

Do we have brain crunch in DRDO ISRO???

I know a few people working with DRDO... they say they just warm benches....

I am unaware of real situation, but is it alarming and is there something we can do to help it?
jaladipc
BRFite
Posts: 456
Joined: 15 Jan 2009 20:51
Location: i CAN ADA

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by jaladipc »

Cant we just sign CTBT,NPT, vagaira vagaira now and then when time comes and needs a nuke testing ,cant we simply withdraw all these treaties?
Gerard
Forum Moderator
Posts: 8012
Joined: 15 Nov 1999 12:31

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Gerard »

Gagan wrote:wrt signing NPT and CTBT and tech denial.
A whole lot of nations have signed the above treaties. I dont' think their economies flew off the very next day and they all became developed nations within a few years..
Brazil signed NPT, CTBT, MTCR.

One Brazilian academic in 1998 advised India to do the same. India would gain the same benefits as Brazil etc.

What the Brazilians found is that the promised cooperation in the nuclear and space sectors did not occur. Their SLV is yet to fly. Their nuke sub project didn't receive any help.

Japan on the other hand was in a far more powerful position before signing. In exchange for NPT signature they got enrichment and reprocessing tech. They got solid fuel and cryogenic launch tech.

Comprehensive national power determines tech denial, not a signature on a treaty or joining a cartel. South Korea has found that space launch technology is still denied to them under MTCR.
Gerard
Forum Moderator
Posts: 8012
Joined: 15 Nov 1999 12:31

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Gerard »

jaladipc wrote:Cant we just sign CTBT,NPT, vagaira vagaira now and then when time comes and needs a nuke testing ,cant we simply withdraw all these treaties?
NPT ?

A Non Nuclear Weapon State signatory to the NPT cannot possess nuclear arms. Full scope safeguards are enforced and THE Additional Protocol means IAEA inspectors under any rock and behind every tree.

There would still be breakout capability but breakout requires several months. Building an actual arsenal would take a few years after that.

These are not luxuries that India can afford.

The (not THE) additional protocol that Kakodkar negotiated is unprecedented. It islanded off facilities where the IAEA may lurk and prevents them looking anywhere else in India. No NNWS signatory to the NPT has these rights. Only NWS do.

CTBT?

India has a voluntary moratorium. Why sign the CTBT?
Has the USA? Has North Korea? why the rush?

If an Indian signature is the only thing preventing the treaty entering into force, surely there should be a price for such a signature? Goodwill is not enough.

Perhaps a final test series to proof weapons and gather further data? Perhaps under the table sharing of data (like France received)?
svinayak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 14223
Joined: 09 Feb 1999 12:31

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by svinayak »

Gerard wrote:
One Brazilian academic in 1998 advised India to do the same. India would gain the same benefits as Brazil etc.

What the Brazilians found is that the promised cooperation in the nuclear and space sectors did not occur. Their SLV is yet to fly. Their nuke sub project didn't receive any help.

Japan on the other hand was in a far more powerful position before signing. In exchange for NPT signature they got enrichment and reprocessing tech. They got solid fuel and cryogenic launch tech.
India is central to the stability of Asia and will be helped by many countries. This is the key to India not needing to sign any agreement. No major nation will allow India inside the camp of other nation.
China being a belligerent nation and a authoritarian rule is helping India to get the help of countries which wants to curtail China.
If India is able to develop all major technologies then India will be in a better nation but no country like India exists which has threat from two nuclear armed nation.
Philip
BRF Oldie
Posts: 21538
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: India

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Philip »

Under MMS,signing the CTBT at a later opportune moment was probably one of the unmentioned secret "terms of endearment" with Bush and the N-deal! However,given his bungling at S-al-S,the controversy about P-2s TN test and the recent Chinese agressive incursions,if any GOI at this moment even lifts up a pen with the intention of signing the CTBT,a tsunami of opposition from across the country will defeat its purpose.

For one,Marshal Bush is not in the US saddle any longer.Like that great Mel Brooks classic,there's a new sherrif in town and sh*t,he ain't white,he's a N***er! He ain't a bum pal of good Dr. Singh and the "Injuns" either.He prefers to consort with the rent boys from the badlands of Pak! See how he resurrected that old whore,"Jaws", to give the "Beardies" from the badlands what they always want;more six-shooters,rifles and bullets to fire at the ornery Injuns! The Injuns have actually had the audacity,the temerity and the effrontery to want to eat at the white man's table and smoke the nuclear warpipe too!The big chief in the White House says that we Injuns should instead obey the paleface...sorry blackface,be on the reservation with our braves doing no wardance but the waltz,getting drunk on cheap firewater and our chiefs in their teepees entertaining their squaws with the papooses fast asleep! As for our medicine-men,they shouldn't be whipping up radioactive baccy for the N-warpipe,they should be smokin' hash instead and getting high on poppy powder,which the Beardies and their CIA agents control and distribute and are a-willing to freely give to our sonambulist chief and his braves.

With such a nasty dude in the (once) White House appeasing and-a-sleeping with the Beardies of the Badlands,and their pals in perfidy,the slit-eyed yellow faced monkeys of Chinnny-Chin-Chin about to leap over the icy Himalayan mountains into the great plains of Industan,the home of the Injuns,the majority of the Injuns will go on the warpath if the old chief and his Squaw-in-charge dare to smoke the peace-pipe alone,while the hostiles (who ain't the Injuns this time round),are a war-whooping and-a-circling with their bows and arrows the wagons and homesteads of Industan!
Rahul M
Forum Moderator
Posts: 17168
Joined: 17 Aug 2005 21:09
Location: Skies over BRFATA
Contact:

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Rahul M »

this thread is about strategic and geopolitical aspects now.
not being on technical topics any longer I'm moving this to strat.

if people have objections please let it be known.
Raja Ram
BRFite
Posts: 587
Joined: 30 Mar 1999 12:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Raja Ram »

National objectives drive and translate as National Interests, these hinge on National Strengths. National Security is a derivative of the above. These National Interests have many dimensions, and there should be a constant calibration that ensures that there is a balance across dimensions.

This is the essence of what I had prepared as a presentation for a different audience and also shared with BRFites who happened to participate in the BR chennai meet.

It is my submission that this balance has to be maintained. If there is a skew towards one dimension, it will prove costly. Therefore it is not a guns vs butter argument. There is no denial of the centrality of the need to achieve the key national goals and they happen to be economic.

But economic progress can only happen if that is backed by adequate security and capability. In fact it works as a mutual guarantee.

For the moment though, India may want to base its pure economic focus and its aspirations on certain geo political assumptions and acceptance of a particular position in the pecking order. That of a knowledgeable beggar mendicant perhaps?

Then we can sign anything. Will not make any difference. All is after all maya
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 59773
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by ramana »

RahulM, I suggest moving this to the GDF as there is neither strategy nor technical inputs. Its a kin to the Psy-ops/Psyche threads.
Sanatanan
BRFite
Posts: 487
Joined: 31 Dec 2006 09:29

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Sanatanan »

From the latest issue of Frontline, article by R. Ramachandran.

Pokhran row

The article is fairly long, with several diagrams. Quoting here only the last paragraph:
Since the present AEC Chairman Anil Kakodkar, who was also part of Pokhran-II team, has stated categorically that no more tests are needed, the current controversy, one hopes, will not drive the country’s polity towards more nuclear tests.
What faith!
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by shiv »

For a country that is trying to carve out its own identity in this world, what is to be gained by not signing the CTBT on the one hand and not testing on the other hand?

By not signing, and claiming that India is "retaining the option of testing" the question would be "What is India waiting for?" India must test within a reasonable period of time. CTBT was negotiated in 1996 - and India was a party to those negotiations. India tested in 1998 - which is certainly a "reasonable" period. But now - 11 years later, exactly what is India waiting for?

Of course some people in India are saying "We don't need to test any more". If India does not need to test any more, it surely means that we can sign.

But of course there are the opponents to this view. There are those who say "India must test". Why must India test?
1) Because India needs to send a strong signal to the world about the size of its nuclear capability
2) Because India needs more data to prove/improve its arsenal.

So what are the signals that are sent out by this demand?
1) India is not confident that its deterrent is deterring anyone
2) India's claim of having enough data is a lie and India's deterrent is ineffective

Let us assume that this is true. Then India must test.

What are the consequences of India testing now?

1) It proves beyond reasonable doubt that India was not confident of its deterrent and that India was bluffing all along about having an effective deterrent.
2) The act of testing will tempt many other powers to do a test too. Pakistan may test again, but most other powers will wait and watch because what happens after India tests again is crucial. If India is let of lightly and not made to pay heavy penalties, it means that CTBT is dead and that other countries can break out and test and that includes China.
3) Chances are that India will be put under heavy sanctions which India will have to deal with. These will be defence related as well s in non defence areas. Travel to to the US and other nations will be curbed. Business outsourcing to India will be discouraged. India may weather these sanctions but how much the world suffers by trying to sanction India will depend on how much clout India has. How much clout does India have? Does anyone know?

Even if India's deterrence is a bluff, is it better to stick to that bluff and sign? Or is it better to stall and not sign and hope for better times to test? Or would it be least costly to test and get our deterrence right, remove all bluf but face possibly crippling sanctions?

Supposing India's deterrence is not bluff and things are fine. Is it better to sign or stall? If we stall - what for?
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by shiv »

Rahul M wrote:this thread is about strategic and geopolitical aspects now.
not being on technical topics any longer I'm moving this to strat.
Please move it.
Arun_S
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2800
Joined: 14 Jun 2000 11:31
Location: KhyberDurra

Re: Pokhran II not fully successful - scientist (2)

Post by Arun_S »

As Narayanan spelled out the rules for this thread, to keep the discussion at a higher plane
narayanan wrote:this thread should be about The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Testing in 2009 and Beyond. Those who argue for tests should defend that as a priority that overrides the many obvious "cons" and other national and global priorities. And - to keep things sane - the allegation that the tests did not achieve, TECHNICALLY, WHAT THEY WERE INTENDED TO ACHIEVE IN MAY 1998 CE (bold letters just to be sure everyone understands that, not to yell at anyone) must not be repeated, nor any more urls posted that repeat that. (red lettering deliberately intended to warn).

It does no good to start a sane debate, and then have some (<highly revered postor> - am I PC or what?) come in and post a FRESH url saying the great news:
Thus all further news development related to technical aspects of POK-II ( I.e. What they intended to achive in May 1998 versus what was achieved) and urls should not be posted on this thread.

For news and discussion on technical aspects of Shakti / POK-II, I have opened a separate thread for that on the MIL forum. The forthcoming talk at IDSA by Dr. S.K. Sikka should be discussed there.
Sanku
BRF Oldie
Posts: 12526
Joined: 23 Aug 2007 15:57
Location: Naaahhhh

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Sanku »

shiv wrote:So what are the signals that are sent out by this demand?
1) India is not confident that its deterrent is deterring anyone
2) India's claim of having enough data is a lie and India's deterrent is ineffective


I absolutely do not see how, nations that have had working deterrence had tested, those having working deterrence are still not 100% confident (debates on RRW in US)

testing is a natural progression of a technical power, and yes we do not have as many tests as others and there fore not as much data so we must test.

This is nothing but quest for pure data and thus pure truth, in line with Satyamev Jayate, we are following the Upnishad onlee.
ShauryaT
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5350
Joined: 31 Oct 2005 06:06

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by ShauryaT »

csharma wrote:K Subrahmanyam responds to Gen Kapoor's statement of revisting NFU policy.

No second thoughts

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/no-se ... s/514258/0
When NFU was formulated ( I was the convenor of the National Security Board that drafted it) there were no assumptions on the size of the Pakistani arsenal. The doctrine stands by itself irrespective of the size of the potential enemy’s arsenal. There is a second component of the nuclear doctrine: the credible minimum deterrent. It is that component that may call for some adjustments if the potential enemy’s arsenal were to increase. Even that is not a necessity from the point of view of deterrence, but a question of influencing the perception of the adversary.
Interesting. Did the NFU doctrine factor the doctrine or likely postures of India's enemies, or even that was done irrespective of the enemy's doctrines?
Gerard
Forum Moderator
Posts: 8012
Joined: 15 Nov 1999 12:31

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Gerard »

Congressional Record, October 24, 2007, pp. S13357-S13358

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to bring the attention of the Senate to a provision of the fiscal year 08 Defense Authorization Act, now in conference. Section 3122 of the bill undermines the Senate’s position on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CTBT, without the benefit of neither the historical treaty consideration process nor a senous policy debate.

It has been 9 years since the CTBT was the subject of any deliberation by the Senate, which ultimately concluded that its ratification was not in the Nation’s interests. There were numerous objections that proved determinative then and remain true today. First, the U.S. deterrent cannot be maintained without testing. U.S. nuclear weapons have the highest average age of any in the world. Some, like the W-76 warhead, the backbone of the submarine-based component of our nuclear triad, date back to 1966, making them more than four times as old as the average American car.

Given the high average age, now at its highest point in the six decade history of nuclear weapons, they require substantial, ongoing modification if they are to be maintained as a viable deterrent. As the then-Director of Sandia National Laboratories, Dr. C. Paul Robinson, testified to the Senate, “To forego validation through testing is, in short, to live with uncertainty.” We cannot afford uncertainty when it comes to the reliability, safety, and credibility of our most important weaponry.

Some believe that the reliable replacement warhead, RRW, can be developed and introduced without underground testing. Even if that judgment proves correct, it will be many years before we no longer need to rely on the older designs in the current arsenal for deterrence. As the administration noted in a recent statement by Secretaries Bodman, Gates, and Rice, “delays on RRW also raise the prospect of having to return to underground nuclear testing to certify existing weapons.” But, underground testing would be an option permanently denied to the United States through ratification of CTBT as section 3122 endorses. This permanent loss of the testing option would be even more problematic if we need to continue to rely on these aging designs for decades more as we would if current plans, including those passed by the House and proposed in the Senate, that eliminate RRW funding are not rejected.

Further, the cuts proposed to RRW compound the impact of current plans to cut more than $500 million in funding for the nuclear weapons complex that supports, maintains, and refurbishes the weapons currently in the complex. These proposed cuts to RRW and the nuclear weapons complex have been rejected by individuals of great authority, including Secretaries Kissinger and Schultz, and Dr. Sidney Drell. The second reason the Senate rejected the treaty in 1999, and would do so again today, is that the treaty is not verifiable. Militarily significant covert nuclear testing can—and almost certainly will—be conducted at low yields or in other ways aimed at masking the force of an explosion.

Assistant Secretary Paula DeSutter of the State Department’s Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation recently made this point. She stated that the International Monitoring System set up to monitor compliance with CTBT is “aimed to detect detonations over 1 kiloton; smaller or concealed detonations are less likely to be identified. Evasion techniques can easily reduce the signature of a nuclear explosion by factors of 50 or 100.”

Third, CTBT’s unverifiability means a ban will not have uniform effects. Our inability under CTBT to monitor the state of foreign nuclear weapons programs effectively means that hostile or potentially hostile countries will be able to modernize their weapons even as the U.S. arsenal steadily degrades. As a result, the long-term effect of CTBT accession would translate into the inevitable, if gradual, unilateral disarmament of our Nation’s deterrent.

Fourth, CTBT would damage the struggle against proliferation. On the one hand, the inherent unverifiability of the CTBT can be expected to encourage rogue state regimes to believe they could pursue nuclear weapons programs with impunity. On the other, the attendant erosion of our deterrent would mean that allied countries—notably, Japan, Taiwan and perhaps South Korea—that currently rely on the U.S. deterrent “umbrella” would be more likely to develop their own nuclear weapons.

As Dr. James Schlesinger remarked in testimony before the Armed Services Committee in 1999, “the chief barrier to proliferation in these last 55 years since Hiroshima has been confidence in the protection offered by the American deterrent. It is the reason, quite simply, that nations like [South] Korea or Japan, or more complicated, in the case of Germany, have not sought nuclear weapons. Because of the NATO agreement, because of the Japan Treaty, because of our agreements with the Koreans, they have not felt the necessity of taking that final plunge. As confidence on their part in the U.S. deterrent wanes over a period of . . . years, what is the likelihood that those nations will refrain from seeking nuclear weapons? I think that it is very modest.”

Finally, the Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999 because it realized that the Stockpile Stewardship Program, SSP, is a “crap-shoot,” as Troy Wade, a retired Department of Energy nuclear scientist, referred to it in his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1999. It remains doubtful whether the SSP, supported by CTBT advocates as a substitute for nuclear testing, can adequately meet the maintenance and refurbishment needs of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As a result, it will become ever more likely that dangerous anomalies in our weapons will pass unnoticed.

Despite these abiding concerns and the Senate vote in 1999, the 2008 Defense authorization bill would put the Senate on record in support of CTBT’s ratification without hearings or debate. How can new Senators—37 since 1999--be expected to have reached such a conclusion? Preordaining the ratification of a treaty, as is done in section 3122 of this bill, does a disservice to the Senate’s history of thoughtful consideration of treaties proposed for ratification, especially when the treaties were on issues with the gravity of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

I would be remiss if I didn’t reference the comments of Secretary of State Rice in a recent letter. She stated that the administration does not support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and “does not intend to seek Senate advice and consent to its ratification.” I also call the attention of the Senate to the Statement of Administration Policy on this bill which states strong opposition to section 3122 due to its dangerous implications for the reliability of our nuclear deterrent.

Mr. President, I note that these are not simply the concerns of this Senator. The letter I will ask to have printed in the Congressional Record makes clear that 40 of my fellow Senators share many of these concerns about the CTBT and the unprecedented approach taken by this bill. My colleagues recognize as I do that since the reasons for the rejection of this treaty in 1999 have not changed, neither should the Senate’s position.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the letter to which I just referred printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, October 23, 2007.
Hon. Carl Levin,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Levin: One of the Senate’s most important national security debates of the last decade was whether to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In the end, following a rigorous and thorough debate, 51 Senators voted to reject the CTBT, 17 more than necessary to assure its defeat.

The principal reasons the Senate rejected the CTBT were its lack of verifiability, adverse effect on the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile, and potential to increase nuclear proliferation.

We are not aware of any congressional hearings on this treaty since its rejection in 1999. The total absence of discussion in the more than eight years since its rejection belies the assertion in section 3122 of S. 1547 that the CTBT now should be ratified. Moreover, the 37 Senators who have joined the Senate since this treaty was rejected deserve to have the benefit of a careful and measured review of this treaty. There is no basis on which they can conclude that CTBT should be ratified.

The Constitution of the United States invests an extraordinary responsibility in the Senate to provide measured and thoughtful review of treaties when submitted by the President for our consideration. The Senate has not had the opportunity for such review since 1999. In a recent letter, Secretary of State Rice stated that the Administration does not support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and “does not intend to seek Senate advice and consent to its ratification.” The Statement of Administration Policy on S. 1547 likewise states strong opposition to section 3122 due to its dangerous implications for the reliability of our nuclear deterrent.

Under all of these circumstances, we believe it denigrates the serious role of the U.S. Senate to claim in section 3122 to express the “sense of the Congress” that the CTBT should be ratified.

Sincerely,

Jon Kyl, John McCain, Johnny Isakson, James Inhofe, Mike Crapo, Wayne Allard, Jeff Sessions, Michael B. Enzi, Sam Brownback, C.S. Bond, Larry E. Craig, Bob Corker, Saxby Chambliss, John Thune, Trent Lott, John Cornyn, Jim DeMint, Jim Bunning, David Vitter, John Ensign, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Ted Stevens, Pete V. Domenici, Olympia Snowe, Mitch McConnell, Elizabeth Dole, John Barrasso, Richard C. Shelby, Thad Cochran, Chuck Grassley, Norm Coleman, Richard Burr, John E. Sununu, Judd Gregg, Orin Hatch, Lamar Alexander, Pat Roberts.
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by NRao »

Sanku wrote:
shiv wrote:So what are the signals that are sent out by this demand?
1) India is not confident that its deterrent is deterring anyone
2) India's claim of having enough data is a lie and India's deterrent is ineffective


I absolutely do not see how, nations that have had working deterrence had tested, those having working deterrence are still not 100% confident (debates on RRW in US)

testing is a natural progression of a technical power, and yes we do not have as many tests as others and there fore not as much data so we must test.

This is nothing but quest for pure data and thus pure truth, in line with Satyamev Jayate, we are following the Upnishad onlee.

May I add missiles to the "working deterrence"? Chicom recently lost a (3rd?) stage that worked without a flaw!!!
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by shiv »

ShauryaT wrote:
csharma wrote:K Subrahmanyam responds to Gen Kapoor's statement of revisting NFU policy.

No second thoughts

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/no-se ... s/514258/0
Interesting. Did the NFU doctrine factor the doctrine or likely postures of India's enemies, or even that was done irrespective of the enemy's doctrines?
The crux of deterrence is the survivability of the retaliatory force and the aggressor’s calculation as to whether the casualties and damage likely to be inflicted by the survived retaliatory force on his population and cities can be justified by the strategic gain the unleashing of the nuclear attack will secure for the aggressor.

NFU retaliation by definition seems to be attacks on population centers.
enqyoob
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2658
Joined: 06 Jul 2008 20:25

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by enqyoob »

In which case, per the Shiv Doctrine laid out a while back, the optimal approach is a good number of small warheads spread out around the peripheries of cities with one or two in the middle. Which can be done with a shotgun delivery system (fairly random targeting).

In which case the deterrent is already well established, with even Scud-class missiles, with multiple warheads.
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by shiv »

Let me ask a provocative question and of course, the intention is to provoke debate.

What is India signs the CTBT soon? What does India lose? In what way does India's security get worse than it has been for the last 11 years?

The point that I am repeating here is that if India needs to test, it must test. If India is going to delay testing indefinitely the purported benefits of testing are also being delayed indefinitely.

What are the exact differences in status between the two following situations:

1) India not testing because it has signed CTBT
2) India not testing because it is just dithering and waiting for some propitious time.
Raja Ram
BRFite
Posts: 587
Joined: 30 Mar 1999 12:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Raja Ram »

Yes, What is India waiting for? As per the official Indian position, the world should be rid of nuclear weapons and this will happen soon. Again as per the various statements of Indian intent, the following are India's expectations

1. The world is now facing a serious inflection point and will move to a multi polar world. India expects that the powers that be will allow for the peaceful rise of India and China. India for its part is not interested in being multi-dimensional power but wants to be an economic power and a knowledge super power. India believes that other aspects are not critical or only a derivative and nuclear weapons should and will be eliminated.

2. The challenges of the world, including getting rid of nuclear power and climate change control have to be addressed by a multi-lateral rules based arrangement where nations act in concert to face these challenges. India expects to be an active participant and not be an obstructive irritant.

3. India does not want to be a threat to anyone. Its nuclear doctrine is not directed against anyone but is intended to only protect India with minimum credible deterrence. This minimum credible thingy is to be determined by us and us alone and does not depend on adversary's capabilities. Therefore it is immaterial to Indian strategic calculations whether the nation's current nuclear arsenal, capabilities and doctrine deter potential adversaries.

4. India believes that it shares a common destiny with other countries in the region including Pakistan and China. So much so, that it is prepared to change domestic policies and share its resources for the larger benefit of the teeming masses here.

5. By adopting the centrality of economic development as the only guarantee of security, India will keep its defence spending to the lowest minimum possible. By adopting the shared destiny approach, there will be a stakeholder interest developed in the region in the economic progress of India and therefore more resources can be provided for faster economic growth.

Please note the above are all official positions of India as stated by the leaders of the government in various fora.

In light of the above, we can safely conclude the following:

1. There is no need for further tests - as the Nuclear Doctrine of India stands independent of others and our current level of deterrence, whatever it is, good enough for India. Potential adversary's opinion does not matter. In the medium term, India in concert with other nations will eliminate nuclear weapons world wide.

2. There is no need for delivery system beyond a certain level, as once again, India is not a threat to anyone, and it does not matter if others are to India. India will act in concert with other nations and build a rules based system to resolve all global matters. India's current delivery capabilities are primarily to demonstrate capability and by sharing our destiny with our neighbours, these delivery systems are not needed at all.

3. Since the above positions and conclusions are shared by all parties, we are as shivji has put it, aspiring to be a yogi beggar. Other countries will respect our knowledge of all things esoteric and our restraint and universality of approach. And they will willingly increase the share of the crumbs that India will receive. So much that India can effectively eliminate poverty, educate all, build shiny cities and produce bollywood movies with it.

Since we have already proven capability and have a deterrence that is judged by us to be adequate as it does not depend on anything and is not meant to deter anyone, we are ready to seize the opportunities that come our way to establish our credentials as the knowledge super power a.k.a. enlightened yogi beggar.

We should therefore sign CTBT and if crumbs come our way, must sign FMCT and if more crumbs come our way sign NPT. By that time all nuclear weapons in the world will also disappear.

And because of all the crumbs coming our way and our increasing clout that comes from being a knowledge super power, all our citizens will be educated, have jobs, have money, have health etc. We will also share our destiny and prosperity with all our brethren beggars in the region. We will also be unattached to the vagaries of power politics as we will give importance to the demands of other worldly powers like the US and China.

So gentle rakshaks, there is no real need to work ourselves to any frenzy on matters such as fizzle ya sizzle or whether to sign this treaty or that. Our leaders and thinkers have already worked out that the ephemeral and impermanent nature of such things and are seized with the noble task of becoming a knowledge super power. That is real power. The rest is all maya.
ShauryaT
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5350
Joined: 31 Oct 2005 06:06

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by ShauryaT »

shiv wrote:
NFU retaliation by definition seems to be attacks on population centers.
?? The point being? If you attack us by one or 100, it does not matter, we will annihilate you? What would an opponent seek to do?
ShauryaT
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5350
Joined: 31 Oct 2005 06:06

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by ShauryaT »

Raja Ram ji. For a second, I thought was reading poetry. Excellent articulation.
Raja Ram
BRFite
Posts: 587
Joined: 30 Mar 1999 12:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by Raja Ram »

shiv wrote:Let me ask a provocative question and of course, the intention is to provoke debate.

What is India signs the CTBT soon? What does India lose? In what way does India's security get worse than it has been for the last 11 years?

The point that I am repeating here is that if India needs to test, it must test. If India is going to delay testing indefinitely the purported benefits of testing are also being delayed indefinitely.

What are the exact differences in status between the two following situations:

1) India not testing because it has signed CTBT
2) India not testing because it is just dithering and waiting for some propitious time.
Shiv,
I guess the same difference on why India did not sign NPT and adhering to its intent all this years and dithering on testing . It could have signed the NPT and continued dithering and protesting and ultimately testing. It would have been spared of costs that came with the decision. We could have got crumbs earlier. Stupid Indian leaders of yore, what were they thinking?

We should not commit the same mistake, we should sign CTBT and continue to dither on testing.

Here is a data point. NPT was signed by North Korea and then they withdrew and tested. What happened to them? They got talks and more talks and promises of crumbs in return and now new offers of bribe money. If North Korea can do it why can't India.

Oh I see now, it has to consider examples like Libya and Iraq. They got bombs and invasion. Iran is trying it now, what will they get? So India knows that as a fellow beggar nation they cannot be sure of what will happen that is why they did not sign but behaved as far as possible as a good yogi beggar.
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by shiv »

ShauryaT wrote:
shiv wrote:
NFU retaliation by definition seems to be attacks on population centers.
?? The point being? If you attack us by one or 100, it does not matter, we will annihilate you? What would an opponent seek to do?

No in fact the article does not say "we will annihilate you". The very next sentence has the answer

If someone attacks us with nukes he has to consider whether the price he pays in destruction of cities and population is worth the gain by attacking us. So..
Very rarely, if at all, can the answer to that question be in the affirmative. In such circumstances deterrence will prevail.
This means that if any country decides that she is willing to lose an unspecified large number of cities along with an enormous number of civilian casualties, deterrence will not work.
brihaspati
BRF Oldie
Posts: 12410
Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by brihaspati »

Time to call the bluff. TSPA only moves if it is sure that it will not get a hiding. They are one of the greatest cowards as soldiers as proved in BD in '71. Their most daring offensives appear to be carried out on womens' bodies. So India can actually prepare openly its citizens for the possibility of a nuke attack by TSP+PRC. There are public mobilization and safety procedures to be drilled. And openly state that TSP+PRC can try out a nuke adventure - India does not mind losing cities and people on either side. Not only on Indian side abut also on TSP+PRC side.

By the way, what happens to the neutron brahmastra?
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34982
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Pokhran II , CTBT and beyond

Post by shiv »

Raja Ram wrote:
I guess the same difference on why India did not sign NPT and adhering to its intent all this years and dithering on testing . It could have signed the NPT and continued dithering and protesting and ultimately testing. It would have been spared of costs that came with the decision. We could have got crumbs earlier. Stupid Indian leaders of yore, what were they thinking?

We should not commit the same mistake, we should sign CTBT and continue to dither on testing.

Here is a data point. NPT was signed by North Korea and then they withdrew and tested. What happened to them? They got talks and more talks and promises of crumbs in return and now new offers of bribe money. If North Korea can do it why can't India.

Oh I see now, it has to consider examples like Libya and Iraq. They got bombs and invasion. Iran is trying it now, what will they get? So India knows that as a fellow beggar nation they cannot be sure of what will happen that is why they did not sign but behaved as far as possible as a good yogi beggar.
Raja Ram - as usual I am typing without even having read, let alone having familiarized myself with the detailed texts of the NPT and CTBT. But let me hide behind my usual disclaimer of what my "general reading and timepass" tell me.

The NPT was clearly discriminatory against India because it gives special status to the P5 and nobody else.

The CTBT appears non discriminatory, but it is clearly discriminatory in favor of those nations who have already acquired the data and skills for sub-threshold testing (un detectable by the CTBT defined monitoring system).

If India feels she belongs in the latter group - she can join.

India can never belong in the P5 as defined by NPT

What is at stake is India's confidence in maintaining and developing its nuclear arsenal without setting of CTBT monitoring alarms. This is the same problem that the US and China face but the degree of difficulty for each is unknown.
Locked