Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

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NRao
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

You kidding NRao? What about the 230m?
I JUST checked - page 36 of THIS thread, where I responded to your (later edited) post. I clearly mention: 52 vs. 67. I am trying to verify the calc in Sunder's article, I am getting slight deviations, so I was taking a harder look - when I went back to verify the figure in the RR article and spent a ton of time - only to realize that THAT particular number is missing (this time I printed the article).

230 meters remains in the article.

Strange. I would have thought they would be more protective of the 230 that the 67. 67 I can guess from graphs, since the dispute has been about geo, 230 I cannot even dream of. Note that Sunder assumed 200 based on the accepted >200 figure. So, all those numbers in his article change.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Raj Malhotra »

shiv wrote:
Raj Malhotra wrote:
6. My take is that 230m shaft in “pink granite hard rock” could take a 500kt-1MT TN explosion.
Malhotraji have you read this?

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... crater.pdf
yes
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Raj Malhotra »

As more information has become available, I will again update and reproduce my post:-

I think Santhanam left 3 clues in his paper. The first was that fission bomb was 25kt which lot of people are coming around to and has been confirmed by Arun_S from Sanathanam.

The second clue was about the designed yield of TN which I am trying to unravel and third clue I have discussed below. My conclusion of design yield is 500kt to 1MT (1MT=1000kt). Also discussed below but first the third clue.

The third issue/clue is what is the dispute between BARC & DRDO. We are reading that dispute as dispute about yield. I don’t think that is the dispute. It would be idiotic to assume that Santhanam was not told about the “design yield”. Note-GoI & BARC are saying that he was not aware of “design” (not yield). The dispute (my guess) is about fusion Burn. That is why Santhanam says that BARC & DRDO agreed on S2 in which the actual yield was 25kt but reported as 10-15kt. And (my guess) is the reason he says that they disagreed was that DRDO (probably) said that (almost) nil fusion burn took place in S1 and the test is not adequate for weaponization and BARC said that (some) fusion burn did take place and hence test was adequate for generating data for FBF and TN. I think that is why BARC is saying that DRDO-Santhanam has no data (from instrumentation) and they have kept/held drilled – radioisotope data close to their heart. Santhanam is saying that he has adequate data from his own instrumentation and hence (almost nil) fusion burn took place.
I rely upon the following to support my point:-
Gerard wrote:India nuclear tests 'successful'
Mr Chidambaram said proliferation sensitive information such as the composition of materials used or their quantities had not been revealed so it was "speculative" on the part of others to calculate the yield.

"No one outside the design team has the data to calculate this fission-fusion yield break-up or any other significant parameter related to fusion burn," the two men said in a statement.

ramana wrote:From Pioneer, 24 Sept., 2009
FLASH | Thursday, September 24, 2009 | Email | Print |


Can build nuke deterrence upto 200 kilotons: Kakodkar

PTI | Mumbai




Explaining how the two-stage device needed a thorough understanding of advanced seismology and radiochemistry, Chidambaram said "our results were so accurate that we disclosed the yield on the same day of the explosion which no other country has done as science has evolved in the last two decades."


"We do not understand how without the knowledge of the design and therefore, without knowledge of the fusion-fission break-up and the quantity of thermonuclear material in the device and its isotopic composition, he has tried to calculate the efficiency of the fusion burn," he said.

Hence my conclusion, till refuted. BARC tested a 500kt to 1MT TN as S1 which failed and produced only 25kt. The 6th test was pulled as it was 100-350kt and would have produced only 5-10kt on fizzle which would have been difficult to disguise. India does not have FBF Or TN. BARC thinks that it can design FBF or TN on this data and Santhanam says NO!!!!!!!!!
This theory was only supported by speculation till Again today I was watching CNBC and a Gentleman Gopal (something) titled as Nuclear expert) said (as per my hearing during channel surfing) that we need 825kt yield to match Santhanam’s statement (he was rubbishing Santhanam with assistance of Karan Thapar but proving my point)
I also quote:-
Sanjay wrote:I will throw a wild card out especially in light of General Malik's comments regarding "megatonne weapons".

SP's Military Yearbook of 1992-93 indicated that India had prepared designs of nuclear weapons of between 20KT and 1MT...

Make of that what you will.

I would add another thing - despite how they may act, no part of the Indian scientific, military or political establishment is fundamentally stupid. Somewhere - sometimes very deep down - there is a hard core of pragmatism.
I am reproducing my last post again, to encourage somebody to give some answers. I will be glad to be proved wrong.
ramana wrote:
So if an expected crater radius of 72m and DOB of 230 m is for what yield?
K Santhanam gives the crater radius for the S-2 in his op-eds.

This is the multi-million dollar question, which i think will reveal the difference between three yields of S-1 "design yield" vs "claimed yield =43kt" vs "actual yield =20kt". I think that Sanathanam has already given info that part of yield of Fission bomb was used to save H&D of TN. Now the only reason he & PKI could be so sure of failure is that "design yield was way higher". So what was the yield that could be contained in 230m depth shaft in hard rock pink granite with 72m subsistence crater (my guess would be anything between 200kt-1mt). One way would be to feed data into Sikka article to get 70m subsistence crater instead of retarc (from 43kt)

So Guys waiting for the answer to Ramana's question!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (I don’t have mathematical capability to do 3D simulations and somebody will have to help)

The resident experts STILL are ignoring my queries therefore I will try to connect some dots in my own limited way:-

1. PKI said that if 10% fusion fuel burned then it would lead to 20kt fusion yield. It meant that PKI was talking about 200kt fusion yield which means something like 500kt to 1MT yield of the TN. My assumption is that TN nuke design started during PKI time and he knew that the TN was supposed to yield 500kt to 1MT and hence was not even satisfied with “then” reported 50kt yield.

2. Santhanam talked about 350kt to 1MT yield TNs, why ??.

3. SBM has referred to weight of 400kg for S1, it is too much for chotu 43kt TN, as I said before that even in 1960s the TN of this yield weight around 50kg.

4. Arun_S talks about boosted primary, boosted spark plug and tertiary, hence 50kt design yield is way toooooooo less for such a configuration.

5. Why would a team of scientists testing a TN for the first & perhaps the last time test a 43kt chotu TN? I think village thing is a red herring.

6. My take is that 230m shaft in “pink granite hard rock” could take a 500kt-1MT TN explosion

7. My (revised guess) is that S1 was meant to be 500kt-1MT device in which even the boosted primary fizzled leading to FBF yield of 17kt instead of 40-50kt and 2-4kt fusion yield instead of 200kt fusion yield with minor yields from spark plug and tertiary.

8. Ashely Tellis also said that primary failed to boost, this observation may have been based on intelligence reports.

9. My guess is that the 6th test was pulled as it was the lighter smaller, say 150kg-350kt yield TN whose fizzle would have given 4-5kt yield and would have been difficult to disguise as chotu TN.

10. Sanathanam has stated that FBF was 17kt but this NOT equivalent of stating that it burned properly.

Note:- Just read Arun _ S post:-
Arun_S wrote:
Raj Malhotra wrote:7. My (revised guess) is that S1 was meant to be 500kt-1MT device in which even the boosted primary fizzled leading to FBF yield of 17kt instead of 40-50kt and 2-4kt fusion yield instead of 200kt fusion yield with minor yields from spark plug and tertiary.
Boosted primary did not fizzle. Even Santahnam has stated that recently in press. It performed correctly per design (17 kT). (Sorry-I disagree till my core question is answered as what would produce 72m subsistence crater in pink granite at 230m depth)
9. My guess is that the 6th test was pulled as it was the lighter smaller, say 150kg-350kt yield TN whose fizzle would have given 4-5kt yield and would have been difficult to disguise as chotu TN.
Yes but for many reasons:
  • 1.) RC and Sikka knew immidiately teh TN failure mode was very basic to fusion design, and it would definitely fail on teh send TN article too.

    2.) Even if they wanted to take that shot to increase FBFB Primary Trigger reliabelity, there was no 20 kT pure fission Weaponized bum left on the 3rd day, to transfer Pure Fission yield to TN fusion. India would be exposed naked with nothing to mask failure. I think they did the right thing to pull out that shot. (What happened to dozens of weapons lying around with IAF, they could have lowered one in the shaft along with S6)

    3.) I also think fabrication of some critical parts in TN was extremely expensive and time consuming, why waste it, instead it will help time-wise to get to next series of test. (come on>>>>>>>>> expensive>>>>>>>> give me a break)
10. Sanathanam (through Arun_S?) has stated that FBF was 17kt
Wrong to attribute it to Santhanam.
(apology!!!!)
Last edited by Raj Malhotra on 25 Sep 2009 18:33, edited 3 times in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sanjay »

Some of this some of you know and I also apologize in advance for any repetition. I am putting some of my thoughts, research and views together in this.

In the mid-1980s the first weapons were assembled. Sundarji knew of them. By 1987-88 (Brasstacks time) there was the first move to mount weapons on aircraft. The Mig-23/-27 and Jaguar were all considered.

The weight of the device was limited by the ability of the platform's centre pylon to carry a certain mass and the ground clearance.

The weight of the nuclear weapon selected - arming mechanisms, casings, fins, fuze/ retardation configuration included - selected came in at about 450-550kg (perhaps less) but with minimal ground clearance - lack of coordination between DRDO/BARC and the IAF being responsible. Revisions were of course made.

Though by 1993-94 the Jaguar had been superceeded by the Mirage 2000, for years it was the primary option.

At all stages the IAF knew the following:

(a) The number of weapons
(b) Their yield
(c) Their weight.

Of the following questions, I asked each and every one of them to an IAF Air Marshal, now retired who answered in the affirmative. The IAF knew a great deal more than the Indian army about India's weaponization in the 1980s and into the 1990s.

At that time yields of 15kT were the ones spoken of, but realistically 25KT is very much possible. Note however, that all the discussions I had referred specifically to operational 15KT weapons. I don't think a quibble about 15-25KT is going to be a big deal.

George Perkovich, writing in India's Nuclear Bomb at page 242 describes a 1982-83 upgrade of the POK-1 device weighing 170-200kg and also mentions a FBF design being readied for testing at this time.

This 170-200kg design is very important as it dovetails in with a statement made by Karnad at page 82 of his book India's Nuclear Policy where he states:

"India also has the 300km Brahmos supersonic cruise missile (SCM), produced with Russian collaboration and can deliver a conventional warhead. A 20KT fission weapon is being specifically designed for it by BARC..."

This would tie-in with my consistent comments that 700-1000kg is excessive for a 20-25KT Indian fission warhead. Given that the Brahmos payload is 300kg, Perkovich may well be correct.

To add to the story, in 1996-98, prior to the tests but around the time of the Su-30MKI purchase, the MKI was selected in part because its centreline pylon was to be used at some point for a stand-off nuclear cruise missile.

Note where the air-launched Brahmos is ending up at present ?

Hammerblow IV was an IAF exercise in which a nuclear backdrop was factored in and the IAF demonstrated toss-bombing techniques: note that such techniques are not unique to nuclear strike and the MiG-23BNs involved were aiming at a heavily defended installation. The technique, however, it not an easy one to master so training pilots to do it does show an ability to delivery nuclear weapons in that way (the aim being to escape the blast).

During the period 1993 to 1999, the missile deterrent existed largely in potentia.

The Prithvi entered low-level production in 1993 with a rate as low as 10 per year but has now reached a total of between 180 and 200.

The Agni-TD was "operationalised" after a fashion with a few of them being around "just in case". None of these weapons were transfered to the armed forces.

The 1999 test of the Agni-2 was the first step towards a missile based deterrent. During the Kargil war, however, though 1-3 Agni-2 prototypes and perhaps 4 Prithvis were operationalised as a missile based deterrent in the event of a Pakistani strike. This was essentially a DRDO/BARC contingency force rather than a fully operational deterrent.

In the period 1998-99, however, Defense News reported that some 20 Agni missiles existed. I think that highly unlikely. The figure for Agni-2 was at best 3 and Agni-TD, 4.

I will not go into the story of the slow deployment and production of the Agni-1 and Agni-2.

Back to the central nuclear weapons story.

In 1996 when I started probing into weapons capability, BARC was very clear that it saw itself being able to produce fission or boosted-fission weapons if needed without the need for a dynamic test.

In 1996, despite Rao's moves in 1995, BARC was convinced that no Government would give a go-ahead for the dynamic testing of anything.

In 1998, what were tested - sub-kts aside (which were intended for simulations and probably to assess the use of reactor-grade plutonium) - were intended to - according to my sources:
(a) Validate the stockpiled weapons
(b) To develop a core design for a TN device while validating FBF technology which could be stretched to produce a variety of weapon designs without recourse to another test.

At all times, BARC wanted a series of 9 tests but realised that there were going to be political ramifications that would not allow another round of tests.

I have no real indication as to what S6 was so I will not speculate. Please note that the designations of S-1 etc are what we are using and have no official validation.

Regarding the weight of S-1, Raj, please see my reference to Test Simon of 1953 in Nevada to see an 11000lb TN 43kt test. The device was designed as a lead in to a much larger weapon - I think that would account for its weight. Similarly S1's 450kg should be considered in that light. The actual weapon designed to emerge may be lighter, heavier or something similar.

I am not going to debate yields. I agree with Iyengar's position that more tests are necessary and I am in absolute agreement with Srinivasan's analysis in respect of India's fission, boosted-fission and TN capability:
(per page 68 of Karnad's nuclear policy)

"According to Srinivasan, without more tests, the reliability of the 20kt fission weapon is "100%" of the tritium boosted design -"It will surely work... But the full performance of the booster part will be subject to less than 100% surety; [and] in the case of the full thermonuclear device the confidence level will perhaps be less.""

2002 was the watershed year for the military and nuclear weapons.

The Agni-1 had been tested, Agni-2 had entered LSP and the army - angling for control of these weapons - asked a direct question of BARC and DRDO regarding the status of the deterrent. Over a period of 48 hrs. Gen. Padmanabhan came to understand concerns over the TN weapon. He was told that BARC could not give a 100% yield assurance but that the TN capability was there.

This was also the period when DRDO and BARC began getting their own act together:

Quoting from Karnad's India's Nuclear Policy:

(at page 82) "Until 2002-2003 the high firewalls between the nuclear weapons design program and ASL prevented the optimization of nuclear missile design. Now there is very close cooperation. Thus, for example, S.K. Sikka, as head of the thermonuclear weapons project was asked to change the size parameters of a weapon for a certain Agni missile by a mere 5cm to exactly fit the missile configuration -because changing the missile size would require massive redesign and development work resulting in a delay of 3-4 years. After some quick calculations, Sikka readily agreed to chance the dimensions of the weapon in question. This level of cooperation is a great improvement on what existed when R. Chidambaram headed AEC."

At that point, there was a very conscious move not to rely on TN technology and to actively rely on the fission and boosted-fission technology available.

Scalability of these weapons is not easy, but it can be done and the devices so made would be more reliable than those on TN technology at this stage.

What is India's capability in this regard ? Fission technology - if one is willing to pay a weight and fissile material penalty - can be realistically scaled to 60-80KT in the Indian context with weapons immune from pre-detonation problems. Anything larger than that - problems can emerge (the 120kT French MR31 and the monstrous 500kT US Mk.18).

Would you want to test this again ? Sure. But the core fission technology has been mastered.

As far as FBF weapons are concerned, the largest one deployed gave a yield of 500kT.

Can India scale the FBF primary of S1 (assuming it was 17kT and worked properly) to 500KT ? No.

Can India scale such a weapon to 100-200kT ? Yes.

Would such a weapon be 100% reliable without testing ? No.

It would also be very bulky and weigh between 750-1000kg - you notice how this figure keeps recurring (Agni-2 payload etc) ?

See Srinivasan's comments which I posted earlier.

With FBF, something will work, but the efficacy of the boosting will at this stage be subject to less than 100% surety.

Can Indian scale its FBF to 60-80kT ? Yes - with probably a greater degree of reliablity and certainly enough to be acceptable.

With respect to the TN design - without going into the yields - the question comes down to this:

Whatever happened with S-1, can BARC weaponize a TN weapon that will work without further testing ?

The answer I keep getting is "probably".

Have they done it ? "Possibly".

I also note Chidambaram's words to the effect that BARC has been continuously working on things over the last 11 years. To assume things are static is dangerous. Indeed, Karnad at page 71 of India's Nuclear Policy states that:

"There are over 12 untested weapons designs, encompassing nuclear and thermonuclear gravity and glide bomb and warheads optimize for delivery by aircraft, land based cruise and ballistic missiles and ship and submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missiles on the shelf."

The most conservative of these designs could be viable with out dynamic testing - the most ambitious would be a gamble.

Regarding TN weaponization, I would say "weaponization" is a strangely undefined word.

Does it mean a fabricated device that is ready to be either tested or mated to a delivery system ?

Or does it mean a fabricated device that is ready to be handed over to the user with the designers giving an assurance of its viability ?

If it is the latter, I do not believe it has been done for any Indian TN device. The former, probably yes.

Where does this magic 200kT figure come from ?

It was intended that the S-1 device provide the basis for a weapon up to a "maximum-minimium" 200kT yield.

It was also intended that a contingency 150-200kT FBF be prepared in the event of the TN not working to specifications.

Does India have the capability to make a 200KT TN weapon ? Yes.

Has it made such a weapon ? Probably.

Is it 100% certain it will work to specifications ? No.

Is the SFC satisfied with that ? Not yet.

Is it deployed ? No.

Does India have the capability to make a 200kT FBF weapon ? Yes

Has it done so ? Probably

Is it 100% certain that it will work to specifications ? No.

Is the SFC satisfied ? More than with the TN

Is it deployed ? Probably not yet.

What we do know is that the Agnis are being deployed with payloads between 700 and 1000kg.

We also know that whatever is being said, the 20KT fission weapon - if it can fit on Brahmos - weighs under 300kg.

Therefore whatever is carried on the Agnis is over 20KT and weighs between 700 and 1000kg (say between 500kg and 750kg to cater for decoys etc.).

India's SFC has tailored its requirements and its planning around what is reliably available.

Such a capability is known and understood by the SFC and the GOI - hence Adm. Mehta's statement which is very conservative:

"We are a nation which maintains a credible deterrent...more than enough to deter anybody,'' said Admiral Mehta. And should someone do the unthinkable by launching a first-strike, then the "consequences will be more than what they can bear...As far as we are concerned, scientists ... tested[/b].''

Air Marshal Ajit Bhavnani's words to Karnad also speak of greater synergy between the political establishment and the SFC(page 99 of India's Nuclear Policy):

"It has been time consuming for the political bosses to understand what's a de-mate situation, what's a mated situation, why we should have a mated situation and when a de-mated situation...But once they were made to understand, we are now in a good situation."
Last edited by ramana on 25 Sep 2009 01:51, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: This post was made after express permission from ramana
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

Self deleted.
Last edited by NRao on 24 Sep 2009 22:37, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Raj Malhotra »

NRao wrote:
You kidding NRao? What about the 230m?
I JUST checked - page 36 of THIS thread, where I responded to your (later edited) post. I clearly mention: 52 vs. 67. I am trying to verify the calc in Sunder's article, I am getting slight deviations, so I was taking a harder look - when I went back to verify the figure in the RR article and spent a ton of time - only to realize that THAT particular number is missing (this time I printed the article).

230 meters remains in the article.

Strange. I would have thought they would be more protective of the 230 that the 67. 67 I can guess from graphs, since the dispute has been about geo, 230 I cannot even dream of. Note that Sunder assumed 200 based on the accepted >200 figure. So, all those numbers in his article change.
But would 67kt give 70m subsistence crater on surface, say using sikka article on type of sub surface geology
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »


But would 67kt give 70m subsistence crater on surface, say using sikka article on type of sub surface geology
No, ................. still 45 Kt. 67 is a constant used from a graph to compute the depth, crater, etc.

Sorry about that.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Kanson »

The device offically designated RDS-220, known to its designers as Big Ivan, and nicknamed in the west Tsar Bomba (and referred to as the Big Bomb by Sakharov in his Memoirs [Sakharov 1990]) was the largest nuclear weapon ever constructed or detonated. This three stage weapon was actually a 100 megaton bomb design, but the uranium fusion stage tamper of the tertiary (and possibly the secondary) stage(s) was replaced by one(s) made of lead. This reduced the yield by 50% by eliminating the fast fissioning of the uranium tamper by the fusion neutrons, and eliminated 97% of the fallout (1.5 megatons of fission, instead of about 51.5 Mt), yet still proved the full yield design. The result was the "cleanest" weapon ever tested with 97% of the energy coming from fusion reactions.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

Thanks Sanjay. Muh me ghee shakkar. You have done more than the BARC press conference today.

Can you answer one more question from a greedy person?

What is the feasibility of ~ 100kt FBF if reliability of 200kt FBF is probable?

Can you put all that as an op-ed and we can host it here on BRM. Will request N^3 's permission.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Masaru »

Good find Rao sir. OT, but this has been a nagging question for a while, which this Baki diplomat points out.
No-first-use has never been accepted as the basis for determining the deterrent postures of any of the Nuclear Weapon States. Indeed, India itself places no credibility in `no-first-use'. If it did, it should have accepted China's assurance of `no-first-use' and of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. This would have obviated the need for India's nuclear weapons acquisition and made unnecessary the operational deployment of nuclear weapons. Non-deployment, in turn, would make `no-first-use' declarations unnecessary.

Assuming that the Chinese would honor their doctrine and wouldn't use n-weapons against a non n-state, what exactly has been the gain in sudeepj space since POK-II ? On the surface
  • It gave Pakis equal-equal status, and gave cover for pursuing conflicts with greater confidence.
  • Limiting CMD to 20 kT devices, and forsaking the TN option deterrence w.r.t the Chinese is not improved.
  • The change of status from ambiguous to overt n-status gives the Chinese legitimacy (granted they care squat such stuff, but nevertheless) use their arsenal, thereby worsening the relative military balance.
In contrast the original ambiguous state, or the Israeli option or even the Japanese option seem attractive; in contrast to hard and brittle posture based on fizzles (with the assumption of a rescue by the world if things go too south). In fact if Tellis' formulation of 'force in being' posture still holds; IMHO it is nothing but euphemism for neither here nor there (don't want to take a stand on anything - maya) ad hoc policy formulation which is typical of babudom. Unfortunately this will not

India's emerging n-posture
The force-in-being implies that India's nuclear capa-bilities will be strategically active, but operationally dormant (!!), giving New Delhi the capability to execute retaliatory actions within a matter of hours to weeks (like in 26/11 which will be much ado about nothing). Such a capability will allow India to gain in security, status, and prestige, while simultaneously exhibiting restraint. India will acquire a nominal deterrence (another useless jargon like MCD) capability against Pakistan and China, while avoiding both the high costs of a ready arsenal and any weakening of its long tradition of strict civilian control over the military.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Raveen »

Sanjay, thank you...that one post...and now my hair have stopped graying...wow...seriously...amazing post...well worth the wait
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sridhar »

Point by point rebuttal by Kakodkar/Chidambaram...

http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=52813
A point by point response to the major doubts raised on the Pokhran – II tests as given by Dr. Chidambaram is given below.

Doubt -1

“If one goes by the numbers for the total nuclear yield put out by the Department of Atomic Energy, which I see no reason to dispute, the yield of the thermonuclear device detonated on May 11, 1998, was around 40 kilotons… In my opinion that ratio ( of fission energy to fusion energy) must have been around 1:1… Therefore, by my estimate, the fusion yield could not have been more than 20kt… This suggests that the fusion core burnt only partially, perhaps less than 10 per cent..” (P.K. Iyengar, August 2000, repeated recently )

Response- 1

The important point is that Dr. P.K. Iyengar does not dispute the yield of the thermonuclear test. We do not understand, however, how, without knowledge of the design and, therefore, without knowledge of the fusion-fission breakup ad the quantity of thermonuclear material in the device and its isotopic composition, he has tried to calculate the efficiency of fusion burn.

Doubt- 2

“The fission bomb yield from DRDO’s seismic instrumentation was 25 kiloton…” ( K Santhanam & Ashok Parthasarathi, The Hindu, 17 September, 2009)

Response – 2

The BARC estimate of the yield for the fission device is 15 kiloton ( not 25 kiloton) and for the thermonuclear device 45 kiloton. One of the methods used for the estimation of the device yield was close-in acceleration measurement, for which both DRDO and BARC had set up instrumentation. It soon became apparent that after discussion among the two groups of specialists that the DRDO data had anomalies and had to be rejected and that the BARC data, which had the expected waveforms, would be accepted.

Doubt -3

“..The fission bomb left a crater 25 metres in diameter. If the TN device had really worked with a yield of 50 kiloton, it should have left a crater almost 70 metres in diameter…” ( K. Santhanam & Ashok Parthasarathi, The Hindu, 17 September, 2009)

Response- 3

The surface feature produced at Ground Zero depends on the depth of burial and the rock medium around the shot point and the rock medium between the shot point and the ground. These were all different for the two device tests. The fission device was emplaced in rhyolite medium. The medium for the Pokhran-I test was shale and sandstone. The geology in the Pokhran region is inhomogenous. The propagation of the shock wave is affected by every nterface. 3 – D simulation calculations of the rock mechanical effects done by BARC scientists, after considering all these factors, accounted for the observed effects in the thermonuclear test.

Incidentally, dimensions in rock mechanics scale by the power ( 1/3.4) for underground nuclear explosions- for chemical explosions, they scale by the power ( 1/3) or as cube root; the difference comes from the latent heat absorbed in the former case for vaporizing and melting the rocks around the point of detonation.

Doubt- 4

“Dr. P.K. Iyengar…. Informed me that trace levels of these same ( radio) isotopes ( sodium-22 and manganese-54) were detected in Apsara, a pure fission reactor …..” ( K. Santhanam & Ashok Parthasarathi, The Hindu, 17 September, 2009)

Response – 4

The tail of the fission neutron spectrum extends to beyond the excitation energy of these reactions. But the fusion neutrons are of 14 MeV. That is why isotopes like Mn-54 and Na-22 are found in significant ( not trace) quantities in the rock samples from the thermonuclear device site rock samples. If one sees the gamma-ray spectrum of a typical rock sample of the thermonuclear test site, published in refereed journals by BARC scientists, sharp peaks for these radioisotopes are seen, not just bumps in the background! In the Mn-54/Ce-144 ratios from the samples of the two test sites, reproduced by R. Ramachandran in his Frontline article of 25th September, 2009, this ratio for the thermonuclear test samples is seen as a high multiple of the ratio for the fission test samples”
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sridhar »

Official Press Statement by Kakodkar/Chidambaram

http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=52814
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

In the Mn-54/Ce-144 ratios from the samples of the two test sites, reproduced by R. Ramachandran in his Frontline article of 25th September, 2009, this ratio for the thermonuclear test samples is seen as a high multiple of the ratio for the fission test samples”
So RR's article had official inputs. And means that scaled depth for pink granite is sensitive information and hence redacted.
We need to respect that.

NRao please edit your post.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

Masaru ji,

Perhaps we need a different thread for that. You can start one on that topic. Or better still check if there is one or similar one before you start.

Thx.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

Thanks.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

ramana wrote:
In the Mn-54/Ce-144 ratios from the samples of the two test sites, reproduced by R. Ramachandran in his Frontline article of 25th September, 2009, this ratio for the thermonuclear test samples is seen as a high multiple of the ratio for the fission test samples”
So RR's article had official inputs. And means that scaled depth for pink granite is sensitive information and hence redacted.
We need to respect that.

NRao please edit your post.
but, ............. they have not removed the depth from their article. The depth is the critical data point. Not what they removed.

I would be still interested in why Santhanam stated 72 meter as the expected crater radius.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by hnair »

narayanan wrote:If "contained" tests are possible with, say, 100m radius spherical blobs of soil+ rock, is it feasible to put such a thing on vibration isolating feet and hence do an off-ground test, totally defeating all seismic detectors? Of course, hiding this would be a challenge..
In that movie, Simba's daddy, James Earl Jones once said " The stars are watching us....". Creepy, subliminal message right there. Though we can always claim those flashes were from Amar Singh's progeny's wedding or some routine random terrorist attack....
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

NRao for that scaled depth, the corresponding scaled radius can be found from the chart. An expected ~72m radius crater would be caused by the 'notional' 150kt weapon. The phenomenonology (crater shape, radius etc) corresponds to a lower yield device which they state.

The only matter to be cleared is the cavity radius between POKI and S-I and adjusted for different strata (shale vs pink granite). And all this is BARC data.

From Press release:
The physical–mechanical processes associated with the propagation of the stress field set up in a geological medium by a sudden release of the explosive energy of a nuclear device – such as vaporisation, melting, crushing, fracture and motion of the rock – are dependent on the chemical composition of the rocks and their physical and mechanical properties such as density, porosity, water content, equation of state, strength, etc. Detailed computer simulation calculations were carried out for each of the five shafts of the May 1998 tests in order to ensure containment of radioactivity.
Did the cavity results by borehole and CORRTEX match expected ones?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sanjay »

Thanks - Ramana I will try to do that op-ed piece.

I am sending it around to get more feedback - every input or improvement or nugget of information is useful.

Just remember that I am also an outsider looking in, but I don't think I am overstating anything here.

WRT 100kT FBF - feasible. Very much so. Notice how Santhanam has not mentioned anything between 25 and 150KT ?

However, ideally, you would want a dynamic test. Short of that, you will get something that will perform at least as well as the fission stage !

Actually, BARC in 1996 - in an Asian Age article - implied exactly that. The fission part will work should the boosting fail - the implication being it was a useful design to them.

Fast forward to now - BARC has actually shown it knows how to develop a FBF device and it works.

I will also ask everyone to bear something in mind. More than DRDO, BARC operates under a heavy cloak of pressure and secrecy. They are not going to come out with any details unless they are squeezed from them.

One great thing about Santhanam's comments is that Wallace, Tellis et al were dead wrong about the yield.

I won't comment too much about Tellis lest my personal views get in the way (he referred to my work as "typically Indian"!) but Wallace seems to have deliberately ignored things to convey a view that even if every single thing Santhanam says is correct (and we now realise that things are more nuanced and complicated) Wallace got everything wrong.

Vera_K - in addition to your comment below: everything has to be weighed as a cost/benefit ratio.
Last edited by Sanjay on 24 Sep 2009 23:23, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by vera_k »

Sanjay, thanks for the detective work. It's clear that official circles are under no illusions as to the composition and capability of the deterrent. And the moratorium , IUCNA no-test clause and talk about CTBT are a way to increase interim benefits until the next series of tests becomes necessary.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

Yeah despite DDMitis, thanks to that reporter from Dainik Bhaskar who didnt mind Chatham House rule nicieties and published the remarks and let loose this maelstorm. We wouldnt get so much clarification.

As in all Natya Sastra plays following the Bharata Muni, alls for loka gnan.

So as the American revolutionary hero said "Keep the powder dry!" and dont sign any prohibition.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by vera_k »

Probably an important lesson in national psyche-

* When an American says "We can do it" it means - We will do it in the next few months if we haven't done it yesterday

* When an Indian says "We can do it" it means - We will do it sometime in the future, maybe in the next 25 years
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Kati »

Right after POK-II, there was a detailed discussion on the yield of TN device.
India Today carried an article raising some doubts about the claimed yield.
One important issue I mentioned at that time was that the calculation of
'yield' is done based on statistical models. I clearly indicated (to a question
raised by then BRF member Sunil Sainis) that such calculations are usually
done by inverse regression method. Further, the validity of model assumptions ('homoscedasticity', 'Gaussian probability distribution', etc.) of the regression
model being used is extremely important. If these assumptions are not
checked closely, then the resultant statistical inference (i.e., the estimated
'yield') would be very wild. I expect a nonlinear multivariate regression model
to explain 'yield' based by several 'explanatory variables' (rock formation,
depth of the shaft, etc.). PC's point by point rebuttal possibly clarifies some
of those issues.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sanjay »

I will throw a wild card out especially in light of General Malik's comments regarding "megatonne weapons".

SP's Military Yearbook of 1992-93 indicated that India had prepared designs of nuclear weapons of between 20KT and 1MT...

Make of that what you will.

I would add another thing - despite how they may act, no part of the Indian scientific, military or political establishment is fundamentally stupid. Somewhere - sometimes very deep down - there is a hard core of pragmatism.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Raveen »

Can someone please tell me what Gen Malik's comments were about MT weapons...I couldnt find it
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

Was away for a good 20 hrs, and lot of bytes has flown in the thread. In the limited time I will respond to very few things.

Sanjay is largely correct in this assessment. I will nit-pick on some where he is not correct/accurate or add my observations:
Sanjay wrote:Some of this some of you know and I also apologize in advance for any repetition. I am putting some of my thoughts, research and views together in this.

In the mid-1980s the first weapons were assembled. Sundarji knew of them. By 1987-88 (Brasstacks time) there was the first move to mount weapons on aircraft. The Mig-23/-27 and Jaguar were all considered.

The weight of the device was limited by the ability of the platform's centre pylon to carry a certain mass and the ground clearance.

The weight of the nuclear weapon selected - arming mechanisms, casings, fins, fuze/ retardation configuration included - selected came in at about 450-550kg (perhaps less) but with minimal ground clearance - lack of coordination between DRDO/BARC and the IAF being responsible. Revisions were of course made.

Though by 1993-94 the Jaguar had been superceeded by the Mirage 2000, for years it was the primary option.

At all stages the IAF knew the following:

(a) The number of weapons
(b) Their yield
(c) Their weight.

Of the following questions, I asked each and every one of them to an IAF Air Marshal, now retired who answered in the affirmative. The IAF knew a great deal more than the Indian army about India's weaponization in the 1980s and into the 1990s.

At that time yields of 15kT were the ones spoken of, but realistically 25KT is very much possible. Note however, that all the discussions I had referred specifically to operational 15KT weapons. I don't think a quibble about 15-25KT is going to be a big deal. {Arun_S: Correct. Although 20kT will be a more accurate representation}

George Perkovich, writing in India's Nuclear Bomb at page 242 describes a 1982-83 upgrade of the POK-1 device weighing 170-200kg and also mentions a FBF design being readied for testing at this time.
{Arun_S: Attributing S2 Pure Fission weapon to 170-200 estimate is in the right ballpark albeit very optimistic) }
This 170-200kg design is very important as it dovetails in with a statement made by Karnad at page 82 of his book India's Nuclear Policy where he states:

"India also has the 300km Brahmos supersonic cruise missile (SCM), produced with Russian collaboration and can deliver a conventional warhead. A 20KT fission weapon is being specifically designed for it by BARC..."{Arun_S: Look at the vial geometries in Brahmos. Putting 20 Kt Fission bomb on Brahmos is not possible. FBF is possible.}

This would tie-in with my consistent comments that 700-1000kg is excessive for a 20-25KT Indian fission warhead. Given that the Brahmos payload is 300kg, Perkovich may well be correct. {Arun_S: I will address the 700-1000 kg later. As for 300 kg Brahmos payload that is conventional payload that does not have form factor constrains. To map that to an equivalent mass of nuclear payload will be an obvious error.}

To add to the story, in 1996-98, prior to the tests but around the time of the Su-30MKI purchase, the MKI was selected in part because its centreline pylon was to be used at some point for a stand-off nuclear cruise missile.

Note where the air-launched Brahmos is ending up at present ?

Hammerblow IV was an IAF exercise in which a nuclear backdrop was factored in and the IAF demonstrated toss-bombing techniques: note that such techniques are not unique to nuclear strike and the MiG-23BNs involved were aiming at a heavily defended installation. The technique, however, it not an easy one to master so training pilots to do it does show an ability to delivery nuclear weapons in that way (the aim being to escape the blast).

During the period 1993 to 1999, the missile deterrent existed largely in potentia.

The Prithvi entered low-level production in 1993 with a rate as low as 10 per year but has now reached a total of between 180 and 200.

The Agni-TD was "operationalised" after a fashion with a few of them being around "just in case". None of these weapons were transfered to the armed forces.

The 1999 test of the Agni-2 was the first step towards a missile based deterrent. During the Kargil war, however, though 1-3 Agni-2 prototypes and perhaps 4 Prithvis were operationalised as a missile based deterrent in the event of a Pakistani strike. This was essentially a DRDO/BARC contingency force rather than a fully operational deterrent.

In the period 1998-99, however, Defense News reported that some 20 Agni missiles existed. I think that highly unlikely. The figure for Agni-2 was at best 3 and Agni-TD, 4.

I will not go into the story of the slow deployment and production of the Agni-1 and Agni-2.

Back to the central nuclear weapons story.

In 1996 when I started probing into weapons capability, BARC was very clear that it saw itself being able to produce fission or boosted-fission weapons if needed without the need for a dynamic test.

In 1996, despite Rao's moves in 1995, BARC was convinced that no Government would give a go-ahead for the dynamic testing of anything.

In 1998, what were tested - sub-kts aside (which were intended for simulations and probably to assess the use of reactor-grade plutonium) - were intended to - according to my sources:
(a) Validate the stockpiled weapons
(b) To develop a core design for a TN device while validating FBF technology which could be stretched to produce a variety of weapon designs without recourse to another test. {Arun_S: Wrong. Sub-kt test for validating FBF technology, care to explain how? Much less TN device. EoS is what one gets from these tests. S1 (TN) failed not for the lack of these tests.}

At all times, BARC wanted a series of 9 tests but realised that there were going to be political ramifications that would not allow another round of tests.

I have no real indication as to what S6 was so I will not speculate. Please note that the designations of S-1 etc are what we are using and have no official validation.

Regarding the weight of S-1, Raj, please see my reference to Test Simon of 1953 in Nevada to see an 11000lb TN 43kt test. The device was designed as a lead in to a much larger weapon - I think that would account for its weight. Similarly S1's 450kg should be considered in that light. The actual weapon designed to emerge may be lighter, heavier or something similar.

I am not going to debate yields. I agree with Iyengar's position that more tests are necessary and I am in absolute agreement with Srinivasan's analysis in respect of India's fission, boosted-fission and TN capability:
(per page 68 of Karnad's nuclear policy)

"According to Srinivasan, without more tests, the reliability of the 20kt fission weapon is "100%" of the tritium boosted design -"It will surely work... But the full performance of the booster part will be subject to less than 100% surety; [and] in the case of the full thermonuclear device the confidence level will perhaps be less.""

2002 was the watershed year for the military and nuclear weapons.

The Agni-1 had been tested, Agni-2 had entered LSP and the army - angling for control of these weapons - asked a direct question of BARC and DRDO regarding the status of the deterrent. Over a period of 48 hrs. Gen. Padmanabhan came to understand concerns over the TN weapon. He was told that BARC could not give a 100% yield assurance but that the TN capability was there. {Arun_S: Interesting to note "TN Capability is there", because TN design fix was IIRC not in place at that time. }

This was also the period when DRDO and BARC began getting their own act together:

Quoting from Karnad's India's Nuclear Policy:

(at page 82) "Until 2002-2003 the high firewalls between the nuclear weapons design program and ASL prevented the optimization of nuclear missile design. Now there is very close cooperation. Thus, for example, S.K. Sikka, as head of the thermonuclear weapons project was asked to change the size parameters of a weapon for a certain Agni missile by a mere 5cm to exactly fit the missile configuration -because changing the missile size would require massive redesign and development work resulting in a delay of 3-4 years. After some quick calculations, Sikka readily agreed to chance the dimensions of the weapon in question. This level of cooperation is a great improvement on what existed when R. Chidambaram headed AEC."

At that point, there was a very conscious move not to rely on TN technology and to actively rely on the fission and boosted-fission technology available. {Arun_S: Pure Fission is all they had and currently have for which there was/is 100% confidence. }

Scalability of these weapons is not easy, but it can be done and the devices so made would be more reliable than those on TN technology at this stage.

What is India's capability in this regard ? Fission technology - if one is willing to pay a weight and fissile material penalty - can be realistically scaled to 60-80KT in the Indian context with weapons immune from pre-detonation problems. Anything larger than that - problems can emerge (the 120kT French MR31 and the monstrous 500kT US Mk.18). {Arun_S: This is predicated on the assumption that FBF does not exist. }

Would you want to test this again ? Sure. But the core fission technology has been mastered.

As far as FBF weapons are concerned, the largest one deployed gave a yield of 500kT.

Can India scale the FBF primary of S1 (assuming it was 17kT and worked properly) to 500KT ? No.

Can India scale such a weapon to 100-200kT ? Yes.

Would such a weapon be 100% reliable without testing ? No. {Arun_S: that kills the argument to have such weapon. Particularly if India does not yet have 2 Axis Radiographs for hydro test system as Karnad mentioned in yesterday's article. It is appalling to note that Pakistan has it for over 5 years now. }

It would also be very bulky and weigh between 750-1000kg {Arun_S: correct. But given the reliability issue of this is same as a new FBF design that is designed from grounds up fro 150-200 kT yield but one that is a small fraction of this weight. Why would the horse eat dry hay when there is green grass around? }- you notice how this figure keeps recurring (Agni-2 payload etc) ?

See Srinivasan's comments which I posted earlier.

With FBF, something will work, but the efficacy of the boosting will at this stage be subject to less than 100% surety.

Can Indian scale its FBF to 60-80kT ? Yes - with probably a greater degree of reliablity and certainly enough to be acceptable. {Arun_S: If it is not deployed (which almost always means lack of reliability/confidence level necessary for acceptance or to be of significance), it does not add to deterrence.}

With respect to the TN design - without going into the yields - the question comes down to this:

Whatever happened with S-1, can BARC weaponize a TN weapon that will work without further testing ?

The answer I keep getting is "probably".

Have they done it ? "Possibly".

I also note Chidambaram's words to the effect that BARC has been continuously working on things over the last 11 years. To assume things are static is dangerous. Indeed, Karnad at page 71 of India's Nuclear Policy states that:

"There are over 12 untested weapons designs, encompassing nuclear and thermonuclear gravity and glide bomb and warheads optimize for delivery by aircraft, land based cruise and ballistic missiles and ship and submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missiles on the shelf."

The most conservative of these designs could be viable with out dynamic testing - the most ambitious would be a gamble. {Arun_S: If you talking of Fission and FBF variants, possible, OTOH for TN design there is no conservative design there, because the failure mode was very fundamental to core design. }

Regarding TN weaponization, I would say "weaponization" is a strangely undefined word.

Does it mean a fabricated device that is ready to be either tested or mated to a delivery system ?

Or does it mean a fabricated device that is ready to be handed over to the user with the designers giving an assurance of its viability ?

If it is the latter, I do not believe it has been done for any Indian TN device. The former, probably yes.

Where does this magic 200kT figure come from ?

It was intended that the S-1 device provide the basis for a weapon up to a "maximum-minimium" 200kT yield.

It was also intended that a contingency 150-200kT FBF be prepared in the event of the TN not working to specifications.

Does India have the capability to make a 200KT TN weapon ? Yes.

Has it made such a weapon ? Probably.

Is it 100% certain it will work to specifications ? No.

Is the SFC satisfied with that ? Not yet. {Arun_S: I may add SFC has some scathing view of the bum provider. }

Is it deployed ? No.

Does India have the capability to make a 200kT FBF weapon ? Yes {Arun_S: No. See my previous observation on FBF scaling to 150-200 kt}

Has it done so ? Probably

Is it 100% certain that it will work to specifications ? No.

Is the SFC satisfied ? More than with the TN

Is it deployed ? Probably not yet.

What we do know is that the Agnis are being deployed with payloads between 700 and 1000kg.

We also know that whatever is being said, the 20KT fission weapon - if it can fit on Brahmos - weighs under 300kg. {Arun_S: No way. }

Therefore whatever is carried on the Agnis is over 20KT and weighs between 700 and 1000kg (say between 500kg and 750kg to cater for decoys etc.). {Arun_S: Untested FBF whose fizzle yield would be ~20 kT. }

India's SFC has tailored its requirements and its planning around what is reliably available.

Such a capability is known and understood by the SFC and the GOI - hence Adm. Mehta's statement which is very conservative:

"We are a nation which maintains a credible deterrent...more than enough to deter anybody,'' said Admiral Mehta. And should someone do the unthinkable by launching a first-strike, then the "consequences will be more than what they can bear...As far as we are concerned, scientists ... tested[/b].''

Air Marshal Ajit Bhavnani's words to Karnad also speak of greater synergy between the political establishment and the SFC(page 99 of India's Nuclear Policy):

"It has been time consuming for the political bosses to understand what's a de-mate situation, what's a mated situation, why we should have a mated situation and when a de-mated situation...But once they were made to understand, we are now in a good situation."
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by V_Raman »

i am confusing on two contradicting statements made my Arun_S.

George Perkovich, writing in India's Nuclear Bomb at page 242 describes a 1982-83 upgrade of the POK-1 device weighing 170-200kg and also mentions a FBF design being readied for testing at this time.
{Arun_S: Attributing S2 Pure Fission weapon to 170-200 estimate is in the right ballpark albeit very optimistic) }


We also know that whatever is being said, the 20KT fission weapon - if it can fit on Brahmos - weighs under 300kg. {Arun_S: No way. }



first you agree to 170-200 estimate. but later you say that it cannot be less than 300kg.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

Its geometry also involved not just weight. It cant be shoe-horned into that geometry.

OTH a new 20kt design with that form factor can be designed and might not need cofirmatory tests as India has shown its mastery over fission. I think thats the inference.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sanjay »

Arun, I point out some concerns with some of your comments:

First of all, I am not questioning what adds to deterrence or what does not. I am looking at capability.

More particularly:

(1) Without much more info - to say that 20KT not possible on Brahmos is too general and not as yet a statement of fact.
Ramana's analysis is correct - note Karnad's quote - 20KT "being designed".

(2) I am aware of your FBF comments - both on the issue of whether they even exist or whether they can reach 150-200kt - and I disagree with your assessment.

(3) 100% confidence is nice but there are many TN weapons in service that have not been dyanmically tested and as such strictly speaking have less than 100% reliability levels.

(4) Having regard to your comments on my scalable fission designs - that is not predicated on FBF not being there. It is simply saying that fission designs can scaled to that level. Nothing more nothing less. FBF is a different issue.

As an aside, gratuitous comments of what you heard SFC thinks of the weapons makers are not germaine to this discussion.

As I said before, you are entitled to your views and interpretations and I appreciate the comments - and am prepared to accept your views on the sub-kt, I just disagree with you on some issues.
Last edited by Sanjay on 25 Sep 2009 00:37, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

Raj Malhotra wrote:7. My (revised guess) is that S1 was meant to be 500kt-1MT device in which even the boosted primary fizzled leading to FBF yield of 17kt instead of 40-50kt and 2-4kt fusion yield instead of 200kt fusion yield with minor yields from spark plug and tertiary.
Boosted primary did not fizzle. Even Santahnam has stated that recently in press. It performed correctly per design (17 kT).
9. My guess is that the 6th test was pulled as it was the lighter smaller, say 150kg-350kt yield TN whose fizzle would have given 4-5kt yield and would have been difficult to disguise as chotu TN.
Yes but for many reasons:
  • 1.) RC and Sikka knew immidiately teh TN failure mode was very basic to fusion design, and it would definitely fail on teh send TN article too.

    2.) Even if they wanted to take that shot to increase FBFB Primary Trigger reliabelity, there was no 20 kT pure fission Weaponized bum left on the 3rd day, to transfer Pure Fission yield to TN fusion. India would be exposed naked with nothing to mask failure. I think they did the right thing to pull out that shot.

    3.) I also think fabrication of some critical parts in TN was extremely expensive and time consuming, why waste it, instead it will help time-wise to get to next series of test.
10. Sanathanam (through Arun_S?) has stated that FBF was 17kt
Wrong to attribute it to Santhanam.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

Sanjay wrote:As an aside, gratuitous comments of what you heard SFC thinks of the weapons makers are not germaine to this discussion.
And your following statement was germane and not gratuitous !
Sanjay wrote:Incidentally, Santhanam was not universally respected within the armed forces. My first encounter with his name was in 1996 when serving and retired officers referred to him in quite scathing terms.

I don't believe such a view is justified - then or now - but neither is pouring scorn on RC and AK and Sikka.
While you ask me to use sources who are not anonymous and willing to go on record, yet:
Sanjay wrote:I am asking Shiv and Ramana an indulgence. I am going to answer almost every question - as far as I can - but at this stage I will not reveal sources. At some point all will be published. May I do so with the understanding that while I will try to explain how I know, there will be a limit ?
and
Sanjay wrote:Underground I wouldn't share sources yet - I will at some point. I am simply asking if it is OK if I were to answer the questions as far as possible without being pressed on sources.

I should note - my sources tend to be military rather than academic.
Showing mirror only.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

X-posted...
narayanan wrote:Gerard beat me 2 it, but here are the salient points. Isn't it time to start a fresh :(( :(( thread now that the "S1 Fizzle" thermal plume has sort of fizzled, unable to break through the GOI's solid concrete cover(up)?
N^3 the jury is not yet out on the matter. The issue of S-I test being successful is in abeyance. The question of the deterrent has been resolved on this forum. More due to Sanjay and his digging and augmented by the press conf.

Triumphalism within the community is not helpful for it might turn on itself.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

Sanjay wrote:One great thing about Santhanam's comments is that Wallace, Tellis et al were dead wrong about the yield.
Absolutely correct.
NPA can eat some "Chana" {horse-gram} made of iron ;)
I won't comment too much about Tellis lest my personal views get in the way (he referred to my work as "typically Indian"!) but Wallace seems to have deliberately ignored things to convey a view that even if every single thing Santhanam says is correct (and we now realise that things are more nuanced and complicated) Wallace got everything wrong.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sanjay »

Arun - I asked permission first. If there was an objection I would have removed it.

I specifically cited that comment about Santhanam to show how petty things could get. I also noted that I did not think it justified.

Ramana, since a moderator and webmaster takes umbrage to my not citing sources and since while I can do this I am not willing to do so on the forum, I humbly ask that my post and subsequent ones be removed so that I do not cause offense.

Appreciating your compliance. Thanks.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by John Snow »

Sometimes like me N guru also gets carried away in (de) light hearted ways :mrgreen:

Alls well that ends well. Its India that matters most.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Raveen »

Sanjay please don't remove your post...it was informative and most importantly seemed like the only logical explanation...also gives a good historic perspective to the issue for n00bs like me
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sanjay »

Raveen, I do not want to be accused of either hypocrisy or lying. As such, if a webmaster and moderator is offended - despite my specifically asking permission - I must ask that the post be deleted.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

Relax the post stays.

ramana
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sanjay »

Ramana, sorry. An accusation or insinuation of hypocrisy is very serious to me. That is why I took such pains to ask your consent first. I do not like producing unreferenced or self-referenced work. A senior BR webmaster has all but accused me of hypocrisy. As such, I will ask that the offending post be deleted - apologising for any offence caused.

Raveen, you and everyone else on BR has value to this forum. Your views matter. At times they might need some education in different areas - as do mine. We are neither "experts" nor "gurus", just people who've picked up things either through reading, study or experience.

Speaking for myself, please do not accept anything just because I said so. If it makes sense, great. If not, please ask questions.
Last edited by Sanjay on 25 Sep 2009 01:34, edited 2 times in total.
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