abhishek_sharma wrote:N-liability rules for suppliers on cards
http://www.hindustantimes.com/N-liabili ... 58282.aspx
This can also be expressed as "surrender of sovereignty" Good going.The government is, however, of the view that the rules stating the international obligations should prevail over the domestic law in case of a dispute.
Lets wait for the actual rules..But this only confirms the views of many that even the "non satan" suppliers (read France, Russia) will have huge issues with the provisions of the liability law...abhishek_sharma wrote:N-liability rules for suppliers on cards
http://www.hindustantimes.com/N-liabili ... 58282.aspx
Well time for all of them to learn that the world has changed, but will the govt sell our intrests down the Ganga once again?abhishek_sharma wrote:As far as I know, all countries do have problems with the liability law. In this case, all are satan onlee. (No sarcasm here)
Sir-ji, The "some sort of FMCT" has always been a "universal and verifiable" sort. What do you have against that? It was formulated by RG and has been the posture of every GOI since then, including LohPurush etc. What exactly is your issue with this?Mort Walker wrote:Somnathji,
Go back through the pronouncements by the MMS govt from 2005 to present and there is commitment to some sort of FMCT.
Sir-ji, do you have a reference for enhanced radiation weapons being developed by India? I assume you mean cobalt blanket type devices. Where has this development been stated?Mort Walker wrote:Once the triad delivery platforms are in place, and variable yield enhanced radiation weapons are field configurable, the doctrine will change again.
That is precisely the point..All this rubbish about "selling" interests down the drain misses the fundamental point that suppliers are not expecting anything out of India that they dont out of France or China...Those who are crying blue murder should also think on what sort of supplier liability covers Kudunkulum 1/2 or the earlier CANDU reactors (close to nothing is teh answer)..abhishek_sharma wrote:As far as I know, all countries do have problems with the liability law. In this case, all are satan onlee. (No sarcasm here)
Mortji, why MMS..Go back to any poicy statement...We WILL sign up to a verifiable, non discrminatory FMCT...Also a similar NPT! or CTBT! The problem with treaties like FMCT is that they can only come into force by consensus..Unlike NPT, which has a set of carrots and sticks for memebers and non-members, neither CTBT nor FMCT has any great carrot/stick feature...therefore, even one country can veto the entry into force of the entire treaty...If its therefore well known that a particular country is going to oppose it, it makes tactical sense for most others to simply ascent! In any case, please referencce a draft of the FMCT which is specifically discriminatory towards India..Mort Walker wrote:Go back through the pronouncements by the MMS govt from 2005 to present and there is commitment to some sort of FMCT
VAriable yield enhanced radiation - neutron bombs! We apparetnly had the capability in 1998 (Santhanam), and confirmed in 2010 (Kakkodkar)..The draft doctrine was formalised in 2001-02...How come the policy makers didnt consider it then? Given that we had the "capability"? It has got nothin to do with our economy..Our potential adversaries are both nuclear armed..So unless we can be 100% sure that a decapitating precipitating nuke strike will take out every single nuke they have, the usage of nukes as oversized daisy cutters is not an option...It lies at the very basis of MAD...Even the US cannot achieve that vis a vis Noko - power differentials with Pak and China are far inferior in our case..Mort Walker wrote:Once the triad delivery platforms are in place, and variable yield enhanced radiation weapons are field configurable, the doctrine will change again
Julian Ryall in Tokyo 3:54PM GMT 04 Feb 2011
Shintaro Ishihara, 78, a former actor and author who has been governor of Tokyo since 1999 and has frequently provoked anger among Japan's neighbours, made his latest demand after a diplomatic row sparked by the arrest of a Chinese fishing vessel captain operating in Japanese waters.
"If Japan had had nuclear (weapons), there would not have been any (Chinese encroachment) on the Senkakus," he said. "And North Korea would not have abducted our citizens."
Mr Ishihara is chairman of a group of prefectural governors who have been demanding progress on the issue of Japanese nationals seized by North Korean agents in the 1970s and '80s.
In early 2009, he criticised the outgoing administration of President George W. Bush for not doing enough to support Japan's demand for their release.
Washington has "not displayed great interest in the matter," he said.
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"North Korea is a country with nuclear weapons, but when the United States had issues with Libya, they bombed Tripoli," he said. "Some children died and that was a tragedy – but Libya changed.
"A more serious approach is needed with regard to North Korea."
Mr Ishihara attracted international attention in 1989 after jointly authoring "The Japan That Can Say No" with the then-Sony chairman, Akio Morita. The bestselling book called on Japan to be more assertive in dealings with the United States.
He has also repeatedly stated that the Rape of Nanjing was fiction created by the communists in China, while in 2001 he stated in a magazine interview that "old women who have lost their ability to reproduce are useless and are committing a sin."
More recently, he attracted criticism in December for describing lesbians and gay men as "deficient."
In the context of the post, I believe somnath-ji may have meant the above comment in a satirical sense.somnath wrote: If we do not want to abide by international suplier liability, we are free to stick to our own 540MW (or 220MW) designs!
Sir-ji, honest question. What did Dr. Bhabha consider to be India's need for electric power in say 2015? I suspect that he had grossly underestimated the need. Hence, the need for imported power plants, even within the confines of the 3-stage program. It is quite simple really -- think about it.Sanatanan wrote: the 3-stage programme crafted by Dr Bhabha, did not require imported npps to be subsequently set up in the massive scale as being touted now as "additionality".
I didnt mean it saracastically at all Sanatananji..In all seriousnes, for 35 years, we lived with our 220MW reactors, warts and all..If nuke liability is such a big deal, we can still live with it!Sanatanan wrote: In the context of the post, I believe somnath-ji may have meant the above comment in a satirical sense.
it seems to me that in the deal, as also in the case of NSG clearance so "graciously" accorded to India, India has had to concede its right to "discover" the price of npps to be setup by the foreign countries, through a global tendering process (the well-recognised raja-margam) and instead, has had to agree to a "negotiated" price settlement mechanism.
Here we are talking about imported npps. (For indigenous npps, since the only "supplier" of the npp as a whole is NPCIL, a tendering process for setting up an npp at a given site would not apply.)somnath wrote:
Didnt understand your allusion to "negotiated" price settlement mechanism as opposed to global tendering - can you elaborate?
Thats a question of technology, isnt it? Areva is bringing in a different level/type of tech as (say) the Russians in Kudunkulum...Hence we are trying to absorb as much of the "best tech" as possible?Sanatanan wrote:In the case of a "negotiated" tender, technical and price discussion(s) take place only between GOI (in this case appropriate officials from NPCIL and perhaps GOI too) and the (single) npp Vendor to whom the site has been "allocated". Based on these negotiations, GOI, would take a decision to finalise the contract with the pre-chosen npp vendor
Don't know much about EWR tamper but by far the most used isotope (Co-60) has a half life of about 5 years . that's why even after 20-30 years, event like oneMort Walker wrote:Most Co isotopes for commercial use have short half life. ERW tamper involves a different design.
Amber G. wrote:Don't know much about EWR tamper but by far the most used isotope (Co-60) has a half life of about 5 years . that's why even after 20-30 years, event like oneMort Walker wrote:Most Co isotopes for commercial use have short half life. ERW tamper involves a different design.
discussed in detail here:
Co-60 in Delhi Scrap Iron shop
was so deadly.
Among radio isotopes of Cobalt, Co-60 is by far the one used in most commercial or medical use...among the short lived isotopes, only one which has significant use out side physics lab may be Co-57 (for medical tests such as Schilling etc).. it's half life is about 9 months...(there may be some other isotopes used for tracing etc but Co-60 is the main radio isotope when one talks about commercial/medical use)
*****
Also: Most of the injuries inflicted by an ERW come from the intense radiation, (vs heat and blast) ... intense burst being of high-energy neutrons..
BTW The term "enhanced radiation" refers only to the burst of neutron radiation released at the moment of detonation (not to any enhancement of residual radiation in fallout)
..People inside, say a heavy tank will die because the steel will become highly radioactive( for say a few hours) to kill every one inside .. tank armor is not very effective a shield.
In any case I would think ERW would need considerable amounts of tritium (half-life of about 12 years) which is also difficult to store for extended period of time.
India will open up its civilian nuclear installations to visiting American scientists and experts for the first time when representatives of the US Department of Energy’s main research centre, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), arrive here later this week. A US Embassy spokesman here said the scientists would be on a 10-day visit and would spend time at the Department of Atomic Energy and its two nuclear energy laboratories, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Ltd., and the National Thermal Power Corporation. They would also meet a number of industry representatives. While in Mumbai, the INL would present a charter to the newly-established India Section of the American Nuclear Society.As part of the Indo-US nuclear deal, India had finalised a plan for the separation of its civilian and military nuclear programmes. The plan was aimed at reconciling the scientific, financial and military objectives with the transparency the international community is demanding as a condition for the resumption of nuclear commerce.
A US Embassy statement here quoted John Grossenbacher, head of INL, saying “all advanced nuclear energy nations benefit by understanding each other's nuclear enterprises and collaborating where appropriate.” After representing the Energy Department during the negotiations of the 123 Agreement on civil nuclear energy cooperation, the INL had hosted the first India-US working group meeting and arranged for US technical support of the working group’s second meeting in January 2010 in Mumbai.Meanwhile, the US has asked India to further bring down its tariffs and insisted on improvements in the laws on intellectual property rights. Visiting US Commerce Secretary Gary Locke said while many tariffs have come down, others remain. Locke is leading a high-end technology trade mission from the US to promote the export of technologies in sectors such as civil nuclear energy, aviation and defence to the largest economy in south Asia.‘India has come along farther, faster than anyone would have expected,and there are good reasons to believe these trends can continue,' said Locke who is the first secretary to lead a business development mission here since 1997.
India has quietly opened up its civilian nuclear installation for the American scientists and experts arriving here later this week on a 10- day visit.
Two nuclear energy laboratories of the Department of Atomic Energy are on their itinerary, according to an US embassy spokesman here.
In a statement, the spokesman described the visiting team as representatives of the US Department of Energy's research centre Idaho National Laboratory( INL).
This will be for the first time when the Americans will be allowed into any nuclear installation in India.
The statement is silent on the laboratories and installations they will be visiting.
The team will be in Mumbai for a major part of the visit. It will also present a charter to the newly established India Section of the American Nuclear Society there.
The INL representatives will be visiting the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd, and the National Thermal Power Corporation, and interact with a number of industry representatives, the embassy statement said.
The Indian officials said there was nothing wrong in entertaining the Americans in the civilian nuclear establishments as such visits are part of the India- US civilian nuclear deal that provides for transparency the international community demands for India to resume the nuclear commerce.
Quoting INL head John Grossenbacher, the embassy statement said: " All advanced nuclear energy nations benefit by understanding each other's nuclear enterprises and collaborating where appropriate." After representing the Energy Department during the negotiations of the 123 Agreement on civil nuclear energy cooperation, INL had hosted the first India- US working group meeting and arranged for US technical support of the working group's second meeting in January 2010 in Mumbai.
Meanwhile, United States here on Monday asked India to further bring down its tariffs and insisted on improvements in the laws on intellectual property rights.
Visiting US commerce secretary Gary Locke said while many tariffs have come down, others remain that are hitting trade and investment.
Locke is leading a highend technology trade mission from the US to promote the export of technologies in sectors such as civil nuclear energy, aviation and defence to the largest economy in south Asia.
'' India has come along farther, faster than anyone would have expected, and there are good reasons to believe these trends can continue,'' said Locke who is the first secretary to lead a business development mission here since 1997. This is the first of several US commerce department missions being planned for 2011.
Locke, who earlier held talks with his Indian counterpart Commerce Minister Anand Sharma, said he had asked the Indian government to remove trade barriers and allow US firms further market access.
Addressing the summit organised by the Confederation of Indian Industry, Locke said if hindrances on investing in India were resolved the country would see a lot more American firms coming in, thus creating more jobs. He reminded that over last two weeks, the U. S. Commerce Department has removed the last remaining nine Indian defence and aerospace companies from the so- called " entity list."
THE federal Labor government has secretly canvassed the possibility of uranium sales to India while publicly asserting that it cannot allow such exports as long as Delhi maintains a nuclear arsenal outside the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.The Resources, Energy and Tourism Minister, Martin Ferguson, has told the US embassy in Canberra that ''a deal to supply India with nuclear fuel could be reached in three to five years''.Mr Ferguson also said that the former prime minister and serving Foreign Affairs Minister, Kevin Rudd, had been ''careful … to leave the door open'' for uranium sales to India.: Story continues below Yesterday Mr Ferguson told Parliament that at a meeting last month with the Indian Minister for External Affairs, S. M. Krishna he had ''reaffirmed that the position of the Australian government is that we are not in a position to sell uranium to India''.
Asked by the Coalition foreign affairs spokeswoman, Julie Bishop, whether he had discussed with a foreign government the possibility of a deal to sell uranium to India within the next few years, Mr Ferguson did not respond directly and instead reaffirmed the government's support for the US civil nuclear co-operation agreement with India.
However, a ''sensitive'' US embassy cable passed to WikiLeaks reveals that in November 2009, the US ambassador, Jeffrey Bleich, reported to Washington that Mr Ferguson had said an arrangement to sell uranium to India could be concluded within a few years.His remarks were made in a meeting with Mr Bleich and the US deputy chief of mission, Dan Clune, on November 27, 2009. The Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism deputy secretary, Drew Clarke, also attended.In a subsequent cable to Washington, Mr Bleich reported that Mr Ferguson had expressed the view that the expansion in uranium mining in Australia reflected ''a shift in willingness to consider nuclear energy''.According to Mr Bleich, Mr Ferguson said he ''personally supported the US-India nuclear agreement'' negotiated by the former Bush administration.
I want to start with an overview of the history of India's nuclear weapons programme.
If you go back to Jawaharlal Nehru's writings in the 1940s, he recognised that it may be used (as a weapon) and then India also must have it. But at the same time he was a man of peace he wanted international peace.
So essentially he was for development of technology. But he did not overlook the fact that it had a strategic dimension.
It comes out very clearly that at one point in time in 1954-55, (the father of India's nuclear programme) Homi Bhabha after presiding over the Geneva conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, came back with great enthusiasm and proposed to Nehru that India should amend the Constitution and say that it would never go nuclear.
Nehru wrote back to Bhabha that he should look after physics and leave the international relations to Nehru. We will think about these things when we reach that stage. So at one point of time it was Bhabha who was a peacenik, but as they saw the two major powers accumulating more and more weapons and developing newer weapons and China going nuclear,
I presume that Bhabha got converted to the view that India should also go nuclear.
The selection of the Canadian CANDU reactor (external link), which would produce plutonium and deputation of Homi Sethna (who headed the Atomic Energy Commission during India's first nuclear explosion in 1974) (external link) all show that at least in Bhabha's mind, the strategic programme was very much there.
George Perkovich (external link) says Nehru all the time had it in mind, but those who think of Nehru as essentially a man of peace would dispute it, but it is difficult to say unless the personal papers of Nehru are made available.
The interview with strategic guru K Subrahmanyam continues:
On the other hand in 1964 a few months before he died, while inaugurating the reprocessing plant he (Nehru) also said 'Come what may, we shall not make these evil things.'
Once the Chinese conducted the test, Bhabha was determined that India should go for it. (Then defence minister V K) Krishna Menon opposed Bhabha.
Once Lal Bahadur Shastri took over as prime minister, he was not familiar with all these things. The first time Bhabha came to Delhi to meet him I was told he was made to wait three days to get an appointment. He was used to indulgent treatment by Nehru and so he was a little put off.
Then Shastri appealed to the UK for a nuclear umbrella against the Chinese threat. In the early 1960s there was a discussion in the US whether India should be helped to become a nuclear power to neutralise China.
This was even before 1962 as they realised that China was close to building the bomb. It was supported by (then US Secretary of State) Dean Rusk in the State Department, but was opposed by the Pentagon and then US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara (external link).
In 1964 Bhabha was able to persuade Shastri to sanction the SNEP (Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project). In early 1965 there was an AICC (All India Congress Committee) session in Durgapur and there was pressure from some Congress members led by K C Pant, who was then a young MP, who said that India should go nuclear.
Shastri did not want to commit himself, so finally he said 'Not now.'
He did not rule it out. To some extent it helped Bhabha in getting the SNEP project sanctioned and it was under SNEP that Raja Ramanna, R Chidambaram, P K Iyengar were brought into Trombay. Then Bhabha died in an accident in 1966 and then Vikram Sarabhai took over.
The interview with strategic guru K Subrahmanyam continues:
Sarabhai, coming from a Gandhian background, was opposed to it. He argued that we did not have enough plutonium at that time and even by 1967 if we had enough for one test then what would you do afterwards. Thus, he alienated the Trombay people.
The result was they boycotted Sarabhai and did not share any information with him.
But Sarabhai was a gentleman and a very astute man and over a period of time he changed his mind. Not many people know about it, but he told me the last time we met in August 1971 while having dinner at the Ashoka Hotel, five months before he died.
Then the Trombay people made Purnima, the fast pulsed reactor, using plutonium from CANDU.
In 1967, Indira Gandhi sent Sarabhai and L K Jha on a worldwide mission seeking a nuclear security guarantee for India. They went to Russia, France, the US and the UK. They wanted a joint guarantee. They did not get it.
In 1965 when the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty resolution was moved we were one of the sponsors. We propounded the balancing principle -- no more proliferation, but weapon powers should negotiate to give up their weapons.
When the matter came up in Geneva in 1967 our delegate V C Trivedi found that something else was going on. They wanted to prevent everybody else from going nuclear, but did not want to have any limits on what they were doing. He made powerful arguments against this NPT and they are still quoted today.
To some extent the P-5 found that India was a thorn in their flesh in Geneva.
In 1968 when the matter came up regarding whether we should accede to the NPT (it was not debated much in the Cabinet) Mrs Gandhi and her close advisors like G Parthasarathy, P N Haksar were all against it.
At that time I was the director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis and conducted a crusade against the NPT and said India should go nuclear.
At that time there were a group of parliamentarians called the Young Turks who were leftist Congressmen like Krishan Kant who were for India going nuclear. Because of that we became good friends and I used to give Krishan Kant questions to ask in Parliament.
Sarabhai knew that Krishan Kant was asking 'my' questions. So in 1971 during dinner he told me, "Subbu you can call off your bloodhound (Krishan Kant), I am going to Mururoa Atoll to witness a French nuclear test."
The Gandhian of 1967 had changed enough to go and witness the tests. So I said, "Vikram, do I draw conclusions from this?" He said, "You do what you like."
However, till he died there was no reconciliation between him and the Trombay group. Sarabhai will be remembered as the founder of our space programme.
Then according to the version given to me by Ramanna in October 1972 during the convocation of IIT-Bombay, Mrs Gandhi summoned Sethna and Ramanna and gave the go ahead for testing.
Then they started designing the test. Preliminary work had already gone on, but Sarabhai had suspended it. But the Purnima reactor had give them some ideas about the behaviour of neutrons and plutonium etc.
Between 1972 and 1974 they worked on it. Ramanna has recorded that even in 1974 people like P N Dhar and Haksar got cold feet and it was Mrs Gandhi who told them to go ahead.
Why were they hesitant? Was it because of possible sanctions from the US etc?
Yes. At that time the US had become friendly to China and treated us as an ally of the Soviet Union so they came down on us very severely.
We already had a treaty with the Soviet Union!
Yes, and also they could not forgive us for creating Bangladesh, a new country on the map which nobody had done after 1945!
The sanctions started. We did not know that Pakistan had started its programme and was collecting money among the Islamic States.
When the Janata Party government came in (in 1977), Morarji Desai did not like that we had conducted a nuclear explosion and did not like Ramanna (since he had led the test).
He (Desai) even denied that there was any nuclear test. He continued to hold that tonnes of explosives were buried and exploded!
Is it because he thought Mrs Gandhi did it merely to overawe the domestic Opposition and not for any strategic reasons?
Yes. At that time the US was trying to persuade us to adopt full-scope safeguards -- that is everything should come under safeguards.
V Shankar, who was Morarji Desai's secretary, was in favour of it. So he told the Americans that we will examine it. The Americans were confident that India would accept it. Sethna was opposed to full-scope safeguards.
Morarji had said in Parliament that the Americans are proposing it and there is nothing wrong in examining it. Actually I discovered through Sethna that the proposal was originated by Shankar and not the Americans.
So I got a copy of the note from the Americans to Sethna which called it 'Mr Shankar's proposal.'
I got a photocopy of it and brought it to the notice of Cabinet Secretary Nirmal Mukherjee that Morarji Desai could be cited for contempt of Parliament since he had told Parliament that it was an American proposal whereas it was actually Shankar's proposal. So the Cabinet secretary took it to Morarji.
Was Shankar's proposal meant for the Cabinet?
No. It was for the Indians to discuss with the Americans. Thus it was buried. Then Morarji went and made a speech in the UN General Assembly saying we will not conduct any more explosions.
After he had read out that portion of his speech in the Cabinet, a message was sent through then President Neelam Sanjiva Reddy to drop it from his speech.
In spite of that Morarji said it in the UN and he faced a lot of opposition when he came back. He tried to wriggle out, saying I said an explosion and not test etc.
At that time Ramanna was also taken out of the BARC (the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay) and put in as scientific advisor to the defence ministry. Of course, that did a lot of good to the defence ministry. But the Trombay team had been dismantled. Then in 1979 I produced a report saying Pakistan is going nuclear.
How did you reach that conclusion?
We got intelligence information. We knew about A Q Khan coming back and starting uranium enrichment. I told the Cabinet secretary to take it to the five-member Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs. He did it and there was a discussion.
I was not present, but Nirmal Mukherjee told me that the decision to resume the (nuclear) programme was taken, but it was not unanimous. Three (Cabinet ministers) had voted for it and two had opposed it. He asked me to guess who were the two that had opposed the programme.
I said one was Morarji and that was correct, but I could not figure out who was the second. It was Atal Bihari Vajpayee!
H M Patel, Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram were for going ahead with our nuclear programme.
Then the Morarji government fell and Charan Singh came (in as prime minister).
Sethna said he could manage the whole programme himself. In fact he was trying to fill the BARC director's post so that Ramanna would not be able to get back, but that was prevented.
When Mrs Gandhi came back she posted Ramanna back to the BARC. The programme was restarted by 1983. We were again ready.
Was it for weapon testing?
Yes, for weapons. The shafts were sunk in Pokhran, but at the last moment the Americans found out through satellites and put pressure on us.
Mrs Gandhi told them to stop it at the last minute. In fact it was those shafts of 1983 that were used for the tests in 1998!
In 1984 we got involved in the 'Six nation five continents' initiative.
With Rajiv Gandhi.
It started with Indira Gandhi and after her assassination it continued with Rajiv Gandhi. Essentially we ourselves were advocating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
But it also involved some graduated disarmament along with a ban on testing.
Yes. We were in the forefront of it. When Rajiv took over (as prime minister), he had a very intensive discussion with a group of us including me. He was at that time very much opposed to our going nuclear and he was very much in tune with the six nation initiative.
Why was he opposed to it? Was it for economic reasons, sanctions etc?
No. He was new to politics and I think he was temperamentally a man of peaceful intent. He genuinely believed that if we can avoid it then we should avoid it.
For one year I had arguments with him and at one point in time I told him that "PM sir, if you won't take this decision, one day your defence expenditure will go through the roof."
So he asked the others present about it. Some agreed and others did not. Admiral R H Tahiliani was also present representing the Chiefs of Staff. He said "We will give you a very serious quantified answer to this." The PM said OK.
The committee consisted of (A P J) Abdul Kalam, R Chidambaram, General K Sunderji, Admiral K K Nayyar and Air Marshal Green. That group produced a report and for the first time it said a minimum credible deterrent of about 100 warheads can be developed in about seven years and it will cost about Rs 7,000 crore.
Only one copy of the report was prepared and delivered to Rajiv personally by Sunderji. We don't know what happened to it afterwards.
By that time were there no reports of the Pakistani nuclear programme?
Yes they were there, but I was not in government so I did not know about them. Thus he (Rajiv Gandhi) essentially stopped it (the nuclear weapons programme).
For some reason his relations with Raja Ramanna also deteriorated and he did not accept Ramanna's recommendation of making P K Iyengar his successor. He selected M R Srinivasan who had nothing to do with the weapons programme.
So at that stage it was obvious that Rajiv was not interested in pursuing the weapons programme. He went to the US, he had a successful meeting with President Ronald Reagan and there was an agreement on science and technology. I do not think he was given any promise regarding civilian nuclear reactors.
He was hoping for reactors from Russia and at that time Koodunkulam was under discussion.
However, I am told that research went on and Rajiv did not stop it and then in 1988 he came out with his disarmament plan and put it before the UN and then to his horror he discovered that no one took any notice of it.
He came back a disillusioned man and on the day of the air force demo at Tilpat outside Delhi, he said 'Let us go ahead.'
Thus in March 1989 or so he sanctioned the weapons programme.
There is also a rumour about Operation Brasstacks and some message delivered by Pakistan during that exercise that they have the bomb etc.
I will come to that. Even though the weapons programme was sanctioned only in 1989 the missile programme was sanctioned in 1984-1985. In fact Indira Gandhi had sanctioned it and Kalam had been brought in specially from the space programme.
In 1987 when Operation Brasstacks took place, A Q Khan gave an interview to Kuldip Nayyar and said, 'You people be careful, we have got the bomb.'
During the Kargil committee hearing, S K Singh, who was the high commissioner in Pakistan in the 1980s, told me that in January 1987, he was summoned by the minister of state of defence in Pakistan, who told him that if India takes any action, then 'We are in a position to inflict unacceptable damage', which is code to say we have the nuclear weapon.
Rajiv knew all that, but he still tried very hard (not to sanction the nuclear programme). Finally in 1989 the same man sanctioned the weapons programme. By 1990 we had not assembled many weapons, but the Americans came to us and said that Pakistan is threatening to use nuclear weapons against India.
This was in May 1990, but in February 1990 General Yakub Khan came to India when Kashmir was on the boil and he told I K Gujral, 'if you people use too much of force in Kashmir, there will be fire from the sky and rivers of blood will flow.'
I K Gujral took him to (then prime minister) V P Singh and he repeated the same thing. He would not look people in the eye, but recite it as if he has been instructed to recite it.
It was interpreted by India as a nuclear threat. In May 1990, the US sent a mission led by Robert Gates, the present US defence secretary, to Pakistan and they told the Pakistanis 'Be careful, do not try any adventure', then they came to India.
Here they did not say anything, but to the rest of the world they said, 'We defused a nuclear crisis between India and Pakistan.'
Two American scientists have claimed that on May 26, 1990 the Chinese actually conducted a nuclear test for Pakistan. So they had come to dissuade Pakistan from doing it. Instead they put out the story about India-Pakistan. So Pakistan actually had a tested nuclear weapon by 1990, and not in 1998.
That test was done in Lop Nor?
Yes, in Lop Nor. P V Narasimha Rao continued the programme. During the NPT review conference in 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely and unconditionally.
PV knew that we would be left out so he wanted to conduct a test. Preparations were all made, but again the Americans discovered it and they put pressure to stop it. That is a fact.
How did they find out?
Through satellites. So PV could not conduct the test. When Vajpayee took over PV sent him a note saying, 'I could not do it, you do it.' Vajpayee acknowledged it after PV died. In 1998 we were able to hide it.
There is a claim that we conducted a thermo-nuclear test in 1998 as well.
That is what (then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission) R Chidambaram says. The problem is the 1998 tests were done in shafts that were sunk in 1983. They were capable of taking only 60, 70 kilotons.
It is also in Rajasthan which may be sparsely populated compared to the rest of India, but it is still populated. So there is no way you can conduct a megaton test. Chidambaram says he did at 45 kilotons, but there are lots of people who question it.
Watch out for Part II of the interview with strategic guru K Subrahmanyam soon.
I had the privilege of listening to a lecture by Pitamaha (the first and only time, although I followed his articles in the print media) when he very forcefully argued in favour of India not signing the NPT. This was sweet nectar to my ears and mind since I too subscribed to the same view. I concluded (in retrospect, perhaps wrongly) that in advocating that India should not sign the NPT, Mr Subrahmanyam too, among other reasons he may have had, followed a thought process similar to mine -- that is, India needs to be self sufficient in high-technologies and for gaining that independence, it should avoid the embrace of the developed countries offered in one way or the other. (NPT == P-5 saying, "if you agree not to develop WMDs, and put whatever developments in nuclear technology you carry out in your country to intrusive and snooping inspections by us, then, we will give - read, sell - you every thing").jagga wrote: Part 1 -overview of the history of India's nuclear weapons programme.
Conversation with strategic guru K Subrahmanyam in July 2008
I had discussed this with another BR memeberSanatanan wrote:
By the way, as details unfold, I see that the ISROs S-band deal also germinated more or less at the same time as the nuclear deal. Some aspects of the nuclear deal, seem to be going now in the same direction as the S-band deal. Wonder whether there is/are any common cause(es) between them.
Just my thoughts.
Sanatnanji, this again brings forth an assumption that the nuke deal was about civilian nuclear power..Somehow parts of the govt ended up positioning it as such, but the reality is that the deal was about a fundamental shift in the world's treatment of India's programme...And India sitting on the nuke high table as a full member to frame the rules...Sanatanan wrote:To me, in view of the answers given by the Government over a period of many years, to questions in the Parliament, his statement as above, is not correct. (http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... &start=240 posted by me on 12 Jun 2008 06:26 pm)
By the way, as details unfold, I see that the ISROs S-band deal also germinated more or less at the same time as the nuclear deal. Some aspects of the nuclear deal, seem to be going now in the same direction as the S-band deal. Wonder whether there is/are any common cause(es) between them.
Ramana, if you do get a copy, kindly remember to send it to me.ramana wrote:Richard Mackenzie,"Nuclear Standoff on the sub-continent", Air Force Magazine, 1993, Vol. 76, No. 3
A copy or pdf would be helpful and most appreciated.
In March 1993 following articles were published"Apache Attack October 1991
By Richard Mackenzie
The helicopters would open the war. They had to take out Iraq's early warning net, and they had to get it all. Suzann Chapman http://www.airforce-magazine.com/_catal ... ticle.aspx …
60KB - Suzann Chapman - 9/4/2008
A Conversation With Chuck Horner June 1991
By Richard Mackenzie
… when he spoke with Richard Mackenzie at USCENTAF headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in March.
71KB - Suzann Chapman - 9/5/2008"
airforce-magazine.com > Magazine Archive > March 1993
Vol. 76, No. 3 March 1993
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Editorial: Battle of the Ban
By John T. Correll
Lifting the ban on gays would knock the armed forces for a very big loop for a very long time.
Valor: Super Ace
By John L. Frisbee
It was nearly two years after Pearl Harbor before Charles H. MacDonald got into combat. He quickly made up for lost time.
Santanam made a comment (not even an original one) on a specific issue and (surprise surprise!) in a specific larger context...Sundry people derived that to mean lots of different things (nuke deal is bad, India's deterrence is "phataka" etc etc)...shyamd wrote:K Santy came out and said P-II was not successful
shyamd wrote:Ramana, Can I clarify something - Is Arun_s guru convinced about N Deal now?
K Santy came out and said P-II was not successful and people viewed that as K Santy being against the N Deal. I believe his position has changed lately, to being satisfied with the current deterrent.
I think that its something a lot of people are thinking about.
Wasn't Arun guru's answer to this - India is not short of uranium - which the govt duely confirmed after signing of the N Deal.- This allows supply of fuel needed and more power reactors as suppliers can comply.
Fine with this and in fact confirms my suspicion that this is a way to bailout the US economy and perhaps some others.-However National agreements have review clauses in case India decides to exercise her supreme national interests.
- Hyde Act/India-US IAEA agreement etc. want return of equipment supplied etc which is ridiculous as it would be contaminated and use has hard tie wih their own rad waste etc. Also has Presidential signing statements to allow some leeway. Obama re-affirmed Bush's signing statements as powers of President.
Ji, the official position MUST be the opposite because it is a question of confidence, in fact when all Santhanam's supporters came out, it infact jeopardised our deterrence. The whole point of it is to show the world we have the maal and it works, when someone questions it, it actually affects confidence.At variance to his conclusion, the official position is the exact opposite.
This has support from many quarters that deterrence is not in question (admitted that is not the question). KS garu, Arun Prakash etc.
This can not be an absolute statement. It has to do with which horizon one is looking at. One can say "Saudi is not short of oil". But, will that be true after 100 years? The plan for uranium use in India had a 60 year horizon, IIRC.shyamd wrote: Ramana wrote:Wasn't Arun guru's answer to this - India is not short of uranium - which the govt duely confirmed after signing of the N Deal.- This allows supply of fuel needed and more power reactors as suppliers can comply.
Boss, you have to be kidding. US economy has something like a $14 trillion deficit. How can some measly $20-30 billion from India do any bailing out? Even if it is $50-100 billion over a decade, it is not even 1% of US deficit. Let us put an end to this talk of "bailout". These are small amounts for US economy.shyamd wrote: Ramana wrote:Fine with this and in fact confirms my suspicion that this is a way to bailout the US economy and perhaps some others.-However National agreements have review clauses in case India decides to exercise her supreme national interests.
- Hyde Act/India-US IAEA agreement etc. want return of equipment supplied etc which is ridiculous as it would be contaminated and use has hard tie wih their own rad waste etc. Also has Presidential signing statements to allow some leeway. Obama re-affirmed Bush's signing statements as powers of President.
Can you please post more either your view on K Santanam's views on this matter or better yet, public articles on the matter by K Santanam, so that others can make up their mind on what does the highlighted portion of your post mean? Thanks.shyamd wrote:Ramana, Can I clarify something - Is Arun_s guru convinced about N Deal now?
K Santy came out and said P-II was not successful and people viewed that as K Santy being against the N Deal. I believe his position has changed lately, to being satisfied with the current deterrent.
I think that its something a lot of people are thinking about.
?? the Nuclear Liability Law kicks in when there is damage due to an accident...If India tests, are we going to engineer an accident as well?ramana wrote:- India put in the Liability law which says suppliers are liable for a large number of years. This inhibits the some power reactor suppliers who would have demanded the return of equipment in case of exercising the supreme national interests
The law is making everyone reluctant, even the russians! And if we really dont want any foreign tech, then no one's forcing us to buy! There is no need to set up a smokescreen of a law!ramana wrote:No the law makes them reluctant to invest in first place. And stop making up scenarios and muddy the water.