Bharat Rakshak

With regards to 2 & 3, what is needed is long range. Now we can either develop pretty long range AAM and there are reports that we have shown interest in the K-172 AAM from Russia and are probably funding its development. This is indeed a good news, clearly showing that our planners know what we are going to face in future and working on the problem at hand.

However, I have a few doubts about the efficacy of such a system. Firstly, the missile needs to have a long range of 200-400 Kms. Any less would mean that our fighters would be entering the protective zone around the AWACS and refuelers, which means well we fight out a expensive ballet in the sky. Also, invariably due to the distances involved, the missile would take 10-20 mins and also would be comparatively large in size, hence the enemy fighters might try to take pot shots at the missile itself and destroy it. Also the missile would prone to jamming and other counter measures.

I think the best weapon for roles 2 & 3, would be a directed energy weapon. A high energy laser or EM pulse. Its time we pour huge money into it and develop these two. Both these systems have very high range thus giving good standoff ranges. These systems would definitely be game changers and would require considerable research to fructify.

In the first issue of Vayu 2001, (the latest is the second issue), Air Cdre Jasjit Singh has a great article on Air Dominance. I am an admirer of Jasjit Singh's grasp of history and his overall vision that sees both the forest and the trees and takes them all into account when he writes. Using his knowledge of aviation history he makes some points that are totally new to the line of thinking that we tend to see.

Jasjit Singh (I will call him JS) points out that ideas of Air Dominance were born in WW I but failed to make much headway because of technological constraints. Air Power was new and great potential as seen in winning wars from the air, but the idea remained only "potential"

World War II did nothing to further the concept of Air Dominance, but ideas of "Air Superiority" - i.e. localised dominance of Air Power were born. The idea was that battles were, ultimately going to be wone by land froces alone and that Air Power was required only to gain a local "favorable air situation" to allow the land forces to do their job. The idea that Air Power itself could be used to win a war (which he referes to later) went no further in WW II despite the hype about the Battle of Britain which was more hype than reality and not even local Air Superiority, leave alone Air Dominance.

Even these ideas took a back seat after WW II because it was assumed that all wars would be nuclear - so the time and effort (and money) to be put into gaining dominance in the air would be worthless. This, followed by teh experiences of the Korean and Vietnam wars led "staff colleges" to teach the concept of merely getting a localised "favorable air situation" which is "Air Superiority" expressed in different words to allow the ground forces to do their job. The scope and utility of air power in this idea of air war taught to generations of aviation seniors in staff colleges was very limited. For example the "air superiority" that India achieved in India-Pakistan were was restricted to about 30 km over the battle zone. And similar situations were true in Korea and Vietnam. Armies too started looking at their air forces as tools that would achieve local air superiority and then restrcit themselves to helping the ground forces win the war.

What was ignored by most air forces of the world was that the USA (and Israel) deliberately and consciously developed the concept of "Air Dominance" in which entire wars could be fought and won using Air Power. Air Dominance consists of two aspects. The first aspect is total air to air dominance that enables complete destruction/making ineffective an adversary's Air Force. The second aspect is Air-Ground dominance where a new class of sensors and precision weapons decimate the enemy ground forces. The US's stated objectives have been "to prevent their ground forces from being attacked by the enemy ground forces" and "to remain one generation ahead of everyone else".

China has recently declared, at least on paper the intention to try and create an Air Force capable of Air Dominance.

There is is lesson for all this for India. i am ot sure what air power doctrines are followed in india- although JS does say that the old concepts of local air superiority" have been taught at "staff colleges". This thinking will have to give way to new concepts of air dominance. Simultaneously with this the Indian Army too will have to get in on the picture to understand that air dominance has an air to ground component that takes the role of the air force beyond one of local air superiority and close iar support to ground forces. maybe that article needs scanning an uploading. Where is Nayak when you need him?

Since we are hearing so much of how US is getting better at jamming, controlling ground radars. Is it possible to use IRST instead of Radar. Like the IRST used on fighters, if we make the same system on ground but much much bigger in size, being a passive system won't they be jamming proof plus safe from anti radiation missiles?

Is there a reason why this has not been tried yet?

^^
Range limitations.

I am happy and proud of this refreshing candidness. Satya (truth) and an ability to look at it straight in the face is the first step towards self improvement.

But wouldn't the bigger size increase the range? Let's say an IRST on a Jet is 15 x 15 inches size and one used on ground is made 20 x 10 feet size.

Also like wiki says:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infra-red_search_and_track


I hope this isn't too irritating and stupid, but just trying to understand.

I have been reading some very interesting books about soldiers and warfare. I alluded to one of them in the post linked below
viewtopic.php?p=1106919#p1106919

For those interested, the Amazon links to those books are below
Acts of War: Behavior of Men in Battle
Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command

Marshall (SLA Marshall mentioned in the post linked above above) makes some interesting points about what happens in the mind of the soldier right up there in front - in the line of fire. What keeps him going and what scares him and makes him run. It is impossible for me to summarize both books here except to say that such studies seem to be guiding the development and effectiveness of Western armies - esp USA. This, it would seem to me is the future of the fighting man. Let me explain.

We have some threads about ancient battles and other threads about history. We hear of 50,000 man armies and even 300,000 man armies. In retrospect it seems to me that what Marshall says about soldiers hold true for all ages. He does quote liberally from the past as well - from general and leaders who have been in the thick of battle. It seems to me that battles in those bygone days must have been as inefficient as Marshal found them to be in WW2. Only one in 5 men firing/fighting. Poor communication leading to loss of initiative or even panic retreat for no reason. The same men fighting effectively time and time again. Leadership failures. Communication failures.

The overall message that comes through is that in a large number of battles where a number of men went to the frontline - the actual battle could have been won, or defeat avoided by just half or less than half the men provided the right actions and training were imparted.

Battles are won and lost on the basis of men firing and communicating with each other, both verbally and via technology. Communication has to be lateral - is with the flanks as well as in depth - ie towards the interior - away from the front line. And appropriate training has to be given for every man to fire his weapon, as well as leaders (officers) who urge their men to do so. Another important point is that hile overall morale may be the confidence that the soldier has in his country and his people - when it comes to the crunch - when the man has to charge into a hail of bullets it is not patriotism that keeps a man going but discipline+loyalty to his mates. Not just discipline alone. The man will kill to save his mates. Not his country or his political system. He will run abreast of his mates, his "paltan" because when faced with the terror of death the most precious thing available, what the man values most is those mates. I quote from Marshall's book:



But on the other hand in battle a man may lose track of his mates and no one may know the tactical situation leading to either needlessly cowering alone under cover or ineffective or disastrous action.

Clearly there appears to be a possibility of introducing technology to change this situation. First and foremost is communication. Since communication, man to man, platoon to platoon, frontline to back has been shown to be decisive in so may battles - there is a need for equipping every single soldier with communication devices.

Marshall makes the point that verbal communication - just plain shouting is important. But he does point out that in the noise of battle, orders and communications may be misheard or misinterpreted. He make two interesting example of how bad communication led to a panic retreat. In one instance two platoons were abreast of each other and they were asked to move back a few yards and take cover behind a hedgerow. One platoon got the order and the other did not hear it. The one that got the order started moving back under fire. The other platoon thought that an order had come for retreat and they ran like hell to the back and out of the frontline.

In another instance a group of men who were actually in a situation where they were dominating the enemy dropped everything and ran when they saw one of their officers running back. It turned out that the man had been hit on an artery and he was just running back to the medic for some first aid.

So the electronic revolution must be utilized to put every man in touch with others - with a personal set of headphones and a mike. Moving map displays must be available to leaders in battle and seamless communication with UAVs, AWACS and helos. These are force mulitpliers. Gone are the days of sending in 1000 men in a mad charge where only 200 actually fight and many are uselessly killed or injured. Sending in 200 well armed, well equipped, well trained and well supported men will do the job just as well and possibly with fewer casualties. It is that advantage that makes war politically acceptable and that is where we need to get to deal with future challenges.

Cross posting some thoughts from the other forum

As I see it - conquests of territory in the past rode on the back of advancements in weapons and warfighting methods. Sea power was an early deveiopment. In relatively recent times the horse and mounted, mobile forces began consistently defeating infantry. The next step ahead was the gun - and the coming of firearms overrode everything else. Colonialism and the conquest of Africa came with the firearm. More recently air power made it possible to gain victory, but on the ground the firearm still rules. Holding territory needs needs men on the ground and firearms. Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Waziristan and even Somalia all reached a stalemate because the firearm technology is no different whether it is a US GI, Viet Cong, Taliban or Somali yahoo. Somalians can be defeated in the air and perhaps even at sea. On land all forces are equals because the firearm has now reached everyone in the world after WW2.

This means that the Somali cannot be defeated in his land as long as he has a supply of firearms, and supplies of firearms are easy to get. If we must defeat the Somalis militarily in Somalia the cheapest method would be to copy the US and use robots - a.k.a UCAVs to do pinpoint targeting of individuals and other targets and "wear down" a rebel population. This could go on side by side with peace efforts and negotiations as the US is doing in AfPak

Paki Forums reporting- PN is getting 6 Qing Class Submarines equipped with Stirling AIP and CJ-10K missiles..A very potent platform in hands of enemy...

Thought this might be a good topic cross posted from the newbie thread to resurrect this thread

Shiv sir, the idea put forward by Raghuraj is great. However I have a few questions. Wouldn't we be requiring some kind of sensor suite either IR based or Radar based in the "BAT's" so that we can hit the targets with out guns. Which means the system would have everything that is needed by an AAM for guidance and instead of hit to kill would use guns to shoot down.

How about we remove the gun and only have Long range IR based AAMs like R-27T or R-27ET. Thus we would not need any sensors on the mother craft. AWACS provide the initial target location, the mother craft launches the missiles in the general direction of the target and let the missiles do what ever is needed. The mother craft continues to get target location information from AWACS and if needed provides mid-course guidance.

Slightly modifying the design proposed by Raghuraj. Why not modify the IJT design for the job. It has a service ceiling of 9000m, range 1000km, endurance of 3 Hrs and hardpoints for 1000kg load. Remove the cockpit. That should make the design much sleeker. Use the space provided for more fuel. Put longer wings, thus providing with better loiter time. Hang 4-6 R-27T / R27ET. Or modify the HAL Kiran / Deepak for doing the same thing. Thus what we are going at is the missileer concept of USN.

People would say that the mother aircraft would be vulnerable once the missiles are launched. Well the idea is swarm. These would not be roaming around in pack of 2-6, but in a swarm of 20-40. Its like the honey bees defending their hive. Quite a few would die protecting the hive, but they would ensure the hive survives. Also the hives production of new defender is such that lost numbers are filled up easily. We can do away with the jet and explore using a micro-light. remove the pilot from the microlight and hang 2 missiles.

In continuation with my above post, Shiv sir & Raghuraj, why cannot the same concept be ground based. What I mean is that a air based craft carrying missile is anyway visible on enemy radar, thus they can see the concentration of the swarm and plan to evade it. To prevent that we may need to put the swarm in high alert on ground and launch them once we detect enemy fighters.

However a ground based system is naturally much more difficult to detect, more so in this case where the system itself is not containing any radar emitter, just a receiver of target coordinates from AWACS or other long range detection system. So lets say we design canister containing 4-8 land based IIR SAM ( ASTRA with a IIR head , maybe the one being used in NAG, and booster. Astra as such weighs 160 odd kgs, with booster maybe it would be around 250 kg, range would lesser around 40-60 km.). The canister would use target information from Awacs / Long range sensors and launch the missile. It might provide mid-course guidance based on inputs from AWACS / long range sensors. Mount these canister on trucks and deploy them around as many as you want. In fact we can heli deploy the 1-2 tons canister into remote locations using Dhruv/Mi-17. The system would have battery for operation for operation. The system would be in standby mode till it gets target information. This would conserve power. If required we can provide solar based power chargers.

This system would have great cost advantage vis-a-vis SAM and its associated Radar, control etc systems. Thus what we are doing is we are removing the dedicated guidance & acquisition radars from the SAM system and replacing it with AWACS / long range Radar or sensor. Thus we are distributing the cost of the Long range detection system over a large number of canisters.

Some would say that if we place a few canister in a valley we might have difficulty in having radio contact with them. Well what I say is lets use satellite. The Long range sensor using satellite broadcasts the incoming enemy fighter/missile location along with other target information. It is received by all deployed canisters, just like all TV's in good old days would receive DD transmission. The canister knows its own location, It determines if it is in a position to engage, if so fire the missiles and send a broadcast via satellite on its present number of missiles remaining. This is picked by the unit responsible for its upkeep to do the needful. Thus, once let's say 10 incomining enemy fighters/ missiles are detected and 5 canisters in a sector decide they can engage it, they fire their missiles. So we might have 20-40 missiles going for the kill.

Hey all ideas are good and are very welcome

My Premise for BAT was to break the basic assumption of SWARM attack by Fishbeds, as they are thought to be spendables for a higher value strategis achievement, I tried to brought down our cost for a counter measure.

It will prevent use of such Tactics and eliminate the problem of ACs number GAP with padosi, and fight will be taken to Quality GAP where we rule and where we must rule. I thought of not adding fancy stuff in BAT as it is only a "Do & Die Offense Blocker" and it will have stealth structure (hidden guns) will not have radar so will evade anti radiation missiles, will have radiation homing so com on Fishbeds light your torches (Radars) BATs will measure you up.

part one of the 3.

Indian Military Doctrine for 7 Dimensional Wars of 21st Century : Part -1

He is Ex DRDO.

Indian Military Doctrine for 7 Dimensional Wars of 21st Century : Part – 2

Tomorrow part 3. it has very comprehensive solutions.

Indian Military Doctrine for 7 Dimensional Wars of 21st Century : Part – 3

Final part.

Kinda DUMB question but not sure how to articulate the same...in the event of a war with China, will they use the insurgent organizations in the NE part of India as part of the offensive tactics? Like Pakistan uses "freedom fighters"? And will we be able to efficiently tackle both the conventional and asymmetrical war at the same time with resources presently available on the borders?

Wasn't there a NCW / related thread?

Network Centric Warfare – A Revolution in Search of Indian Doctrine

One more. I think this is a good example for our Nuke command and control.

A National Command and Control Network for India in view of Pakistan and China

Network Centric Warfare – Architectural Options

Need for Customized Response Open Swarms (CROSs) and Customized Response Open Request-Based (CROR).

Network centric warfare is a much talked about framework but do we have sufficient combat experience to say that it will work for situations it has never been tried out? The issues are primarily around the capability of the "centre" in optimizing decisions over billions of parameters in real time, with many elements not quantifiable or framable in a quantitative/preference ordering [so that automated solutions are possible].

Humans in actual conflict situations seem to have intuitive/anticipatory faculties that machines do not show.

The Iraq war was fought on a virtually flat floodplain where scenario building, and intel gathering or real time monitoring is easier. Targets are not really dispersed and not highly mobile. But note that the same strategy failed in AFG. No high value assets of the enemy concentrated at constrained locations. Dispersed and terrain adapted mobility of the enemy.

Network based warfare will have to score early on. Once it gets entangled in continually adapting and elusive enemy it is no longer effective. I don't know how this will pan out. It is being studied, all I can say now, as yet its more enthusiasm from the gamer generation. The interim simulations are of mixed success. Maybe people will find better solutions out of the network models.

I agree with this, but the way it might pan out for India may be different from the way it was used by the US and coalition forces in Iraq.

I have recently finished devouring the second of three books about the infantryman in combat (mostly psychology) and a common problem seems to be total confusion and inability to see the enemy at all and ignorance of where one's own forces are in the middle of hot combat. That is when they depend entirely on training and intuition, and sometimes blind panic. If the infrastructure can be put in place, then the situational awareness of the man on the ground can undergo a major change - so he knows exactly where his mates and other forces are and also the situation of any known enemy forces.

A small smartphone sized device that maps out where one's own people are relative to oneself and secure, reliable communication would be useful IMO. If that image could be slaved to a pair of goggles or a gunsight..hmm

From what I understand Militaries use the phrase " Fog of war " to depict this situation.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fog_of_war

shiv ji,
with small highly trained special ops forces trained specifically for the system - possible. I was wondering at larger formations - where the network will actually be called out to deal with wider battlefields. Some kind of dynamic local subnetwork might become necessary. Thats what the simulations seem to indicate. But again simulations are all on idealized conditions.

The Indian Defence Intellectual fabric need to understand "gamer generation" as this generation will destroy their platform centric forces. what happened to mighty Saddam Hussein in 1991 is just the start.

Read "war and anti-war" by alvin and heidi tofflers and "In Athena's camp" a rand corp book ( download the rand one free here http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR880.html )

What are your views on why the gamer gen failed in AFG and is failing in Pak?

I fail to understand why you say that they failed?

What were the objectives for the US/UK on ground in AFG? Primarily and officially to destroy the Talebs as a military force capable of seizing state power again and this has not happened. Negotiations are now being sought with the Talebs. Neither is AQ gone and dead. Most of the territory west of Indus is out of control from both the sarkaris of AFPAK as well as the "west".

Talebs have not been destroyed and they are coming back to power.

Its the general over all objective, involving military, social, diplomatic ... inputs. As I understand from your initial question, it was more to do with NC Warfare - which failed, which is the topic.

I differ on the POV that they are coming back to the power.

Added later....

They are fighting Networks - and one cant fight networks with hierarchies - US/Allies Need to understand and create a "spiral swarm" doctrine to defeat networks http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT374.html

Added even later

You should understand that Irregular Warfare is actually NCW. so if we understand the network architecture - we need to weaken the architecture, engulf the network or what I call create Spiral swarms using CROSS or CROR Architectures

Even the spiral swarm doctrine is a theoretical projection that does not take into account terrain and socio-economic aspects into a comprehensive model. As for "networks", the Talib model is not strictly speaking a network in the sense you are referring to.

I had once discussed irregular warfare without using technicalities. Almost every model coming out of the western military-intellectual exercises regarding irregular warfare suffers one common weakness - they do not study or incorporate the specificities of "control" that is exercised within irregular warfare : the role of ideology, philosophy of action and goal, and its impact on the structure of signals exchanged between various components of a movement engaged in IW.

It is not really about hierarchical or swarm as counter. Either of those will work if there is sufficient fracture within the IW implementing side to break up the ideologically founded mutually acknowledging reinforcements that is the key to IW. If such a fracture cannot be opened up or utilized - neither hierarchy nor swarm will work. The only option then left is territorial encirclement and drying out or liquidation.

chackojoseph garu,
can you illustrate how the spiral swarm doctrine would have applied in AFG against the Taleban? The elements of situational awareness, supply and repair, overall central intent versus local reality, coordination across a very broken terrain (radar/signalling etc)? Is the swarm technique not much more in favour of the Talebs to be adapted? [which they have partially done with a much lower technical support].

IMHO, the 'failure' has not been due to battle tactics but the larger strategy. I think to defeat an irregular mobile enemy(guerrilla warfare), one needs to hit their lair of the top leadership(including the funders, trainers, and arms source). The top leadership is PA and their lair is pindi. US/UK have not hit this lair. Instead, fighting in the periphery with the foot soldiers(cannon fodder) has been the main reason of the 'failure'.

The foot soldiers can be churned out by the Taliban continually. So, winning such periphery battles will not do much good for US. Gaining the control of land is also futile. It is expensively(in terms of man, machine and money). US being the foreign power, Taliban can play the patriotism card(or our religion is in danger card) to gain more sympathisers.

To quickly end the war, US needs to go after the top layer(PA) in pindi. Without doing that, US is beating around the bush.

This raises the question: What is the real aim/goal of US in Astan?

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technol ... ck=main_sr
Russian-Made Tech Vs. America's Stealth Warplanes







Read it all..

The Indian Army is still a lumbering elephant. A lot needs to be done to make it an agile Cheetah. This will take a lot of will not only on the part of the GOI but by the Army itself as a first step. The IA really needs a complete overhaul. The cold start doctrine is a step in the right direction but a lot still needs to be done.From all accounts most of the special forces of the IA are anything but that. Poorly equipped with a vauge doctrine.

Being from Uttrakhand, I am always apprehensive about the chinese. Just a 5-10 hour drive is the border.

Mines is what I am interested in but linked by wires so arranged like a net that any tampering with one will get an adjacent one to blow up.

I am sure some body must have worked in this kind of booby traping. I mean someone from outside the forum. If somebody has some link of the sort, please do post here.

Two Chinese Su 27s were spotted on Indian radar - that was in the news. In 10 years we will find J-20s or J-31s.

How do we figure out their radar signatures? Heat signatures? What needs to be included in our future AEW hardware to detect frontal stealth, which both J-20 and J 31 appear to have even if they are less stealthy in other aspects.

Trying again

What means and technology has India developed/acquired to track stealthy aircraft?

Over the Himalayas, there are no cellphone towers for help in tracking. Perhaps IR?

^^^^What about the AESA radars on Phalcon and Indian AEW&CS ???

Bi-Static and Multi-Static radars are one answer.

Think of it this way, if you have more than one radar illuminating a piece of real estate in the sky, any incoming fighter will have to expose its larger RCS cross-sections to one or more of the illuminating systems. If they are all networked, then the information is shared and the location passed on to the aircraft/target under threat. Alternatively, the information is given to inteceptors that will track and eliminate the targets.



Another way is to increase the power of the radar systems, but this is limited to platform choice for the airborne radars. For example, it might be possible to increase the power on the Phalcon (unlikely but possible) while that is not the case on the CABS AEW. Ground based radars don't really have power limitation problem but instead have are vulnerable and restricted on line of sight.

-Vivek