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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 06:15 
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^^^+1..There is no alternative to a local police SWAT team for first line of defence in CT/HR situations..The problem with this NSG solution is 3 folds:

1. Manpower - its not just a case of "stretching thin"...Its also a case of maintaining the "elitism" of the unit...FBI HRT for example, AFAIK has operators in low 3 digit numbers. ..An "elite unit" of 2000 cannot maintain their cutting edge if their numbers are required to beefed up to 7000 in quick time..

2. Infrastructure - a "pradropped" force (metaphorically speaking) like NSG creating its own grounds up infrastructure in 6-7 different locations is enormously wasteful and difficult - e are seeing that in WB already...Using the local police infra to set up a local force is faster and more efficient..

3. Local knowledge - tsarkar obvioulsy knows more than many..But in India, where city plans, building plans, maps of various localities are notoriously diffiult to come by, having local boys would be the difference between learning on the job in a situation and knowing the "beat", literally speaking..In 26/11, plans of even the Taj were not available on tap...And Chabad House? I would be willing to bet a very large amount that half of mumbai hadnt even heard of a place like that before 26/11..A force whose members are from the city, have grown up there and live there permamnently will be more suitable than a deputationist force like the NSG..

My 2 pence idea - the central govt should sponsor a JNNURM-type programme for upgrading local police forces...So Centre pays 60-70% of the costs, the state govt pays the balance, and central disbursal is outcome-driven (rather than outlay-driven)...I think something is there, but only for insurgency-afected areas..

And it shouldnt be too difficult - states like Andhra, TN, Punjab, Delhi already have fairly well trained "special" forces - to create SWAT team out of them shouldnt be too difficult..


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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 06:28 
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^+1


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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 10:21 
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tsarkar wrote:
NSG brings training, experience & other hard skills, however soft skills like intel, understanding lay of land and liaising with local populace are always provided by local police and IB. If we built in training & hard skills into these local forces, we dont need NSG in the first place.

But you still dont get the big picture, do you?

Because of NSG operators training and experience, it should be the last line of defence and not first or only line as suggested by you. Mumbai Police ATS/Crime Branch is the first line, that doesn’t train. Force 1 is the next line that has an officer crunch. Stationing NSG in Mumbai & other cities makes it the first line/last line/only line of defence, and no other cards remaining.


The ATS and Crime Branch will always be the first line of defence. Its not being suggested that the NSG take over those duties.

Quote:
NSG is the trump card. In an ideal situation, it shouldn’t be dealt. Ideally Mumbai Police ATS/Crime Branch/Force 1 officers/constables who perform should move up NSG.

Pakistan picks up dregs off its streets and look at the cost we paid man-to-man. And even worse, we’re forced to divert precious resources and personnel defending the hinterland. This is the real Pakistani objective – diverting resources and attention. Every Army Officer deputed to NSG in Mumbai or Chennai is one less in Kashmir or Kutch. So during their next Kargil type adventure will face IA battalions with depleted officer strength.


That's where you have me wrong. I never thought the NSG's manpower expansion or setting up its hubs all over the country side was a good move. But since the infrastructure has been put in place and appears to be a permanent arrangement, one of the two forces will be redundant in time of a crisis. Instead of the NSG's SAG detachment or Force One, an SRG unit with perhaps a greater proportion of recruits sourced from the Maharashtra and Police Forces would be a better bet. And yes aliasing with local authorities is a must - something I'm betting the NSG isn't ignoring right now.


Last edited by Viv S on 24 Feb 2011 10:39, edited 1 time in total.

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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 10:39 
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somnath wrote:
^^^+1..There is no alternative to a local police SWAT team for first line of defence in CT/HR situations..The problem with this NSG solution is 3 folds:

1. Manpower - its not just a case of "stretching thin"...Its also a case of maintaining the "elitism" of the unit...FBI HRT for example, AFAIK has operators in low 3 digit numbers. ..An "elite unit" of 2000 cannot maintain their cutting edge if their numbers are required to beefed up to 7000 in quick time..


Ideally speaking, the NSG was never required to be raised. The army's special forces (or a JSOC-type organisation in the future) had the wherewithal to create a world-class CT force permanently on call for all contingencies. Something on the lines of the SAS's Counter Revolutionary Warfare wing. But seeing as the NSG already has already well established and already has extensive training infrastructure, and recruits from all state police forces, it needs to be the nodal agency for all CT training nationwide.


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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 11:51 
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Viv S wrote:
Ideally speaking, the NSG was never required to be raised. The army's special forces (or a JSOC-type organisation in the future) had the wherewithal to create a world-class CT force permanently on call for all contingencies. Something on the lines of the SAS's Counter Revolutionary Warfare wing. But seeing as the NSG already has already well established and already has extensive training infrastructure, and recruits from all state police forces, it needs to be the nodal agency for all CT training nationwide.


The NSG was specifically raised to not have the regular SF tackle such domestic contigencies. The impetus for NSG was Op Bluestar in 1984, where the use of army special forces escalated the situation in the eyes of the people. The fact that the military is used for domestic law & order situation has a big impact on general populace. Also training & tactics required for urban HR/CT ops are quite different from the regular SF doctrine. Thus the NSG, which comes under the MHA, is a very wise move. Having the NSG staffed by army chaps with SF background alongside paramil & police personnel was a very good move. However the plot was lost when the NSG was deployed for VVIP security. Once that happened, the primary objective of the NSG got diluted and its resources stretched to the limits on non-core tasks.

Of late though after 26/11, they have recused themselves from some of the inane tasks which are sufficiently handled by other forces. NSG was always meant to be a last line of defence force, but depending on situation they may be the first/main response agency viz hijacking, etc. The central govt had encouraged the states to depute personnel to NSG and then used them as a nucleus to form their own special police teams for tackling local incidents. Hardly any were proactive about this, except for AP & TN (These are the ones I know of, there may have been others too). Most states wanted the NSG to do the work of local police, who were rather lazy to get of their bums. Prime example is Karnataka, where the NSG was used for combing operations for Veerappan! The NSG, very rightly, walked of the operation since they are not geared for such ops and it's not part of their SOP resulting in underutilization of resources.

States such as AP & TN realised the advantages of having a crack police force to do some heavy lifting and raised their own commando force. The TNCF and Greyhounds have been nurtured well by NSG trained local officers and they regulary exercise with the NSG to keep themselves updated. The success of TNCF & Greyhounds also illustrates the points being belaboured by tsarkar, Austin, et al. that only a local force can tackle/contain the imminent threat due to terrorists/hostiles. No operation can be successful without local intelligence and backup as seen from the Veerappan operation by TNCF or the anti-Naxal ops by Greyhounds, all of which had immense intelligence gathering and preparation before the final climax.

Coming to Mumbai's woes, I had posted about the farce of F1 earlier - Click here

F1 cannot grow until it is made to apply for entire Maharashtra and given a place above the Mumbai police in terms of chain of command/heirarchy. Else it is going to be a still born which will die in due course. Also the proliferation of many units viz. ATS, Crime Branch, Special Branch, QRT and now F1 along with its turf battles has fubar'ed the situation. Anyone remember the Mumbai Police commandos raised a decade ago by MN Singh and trained by Col. MP Choudhury. The force was disbanded within 2-3 years.

TNCF and Greyhounds have a clear mandate and are free of any turf battles as well as political interferences to a maximum extent. In a sense these forces offer refuge to folks who want to go about policing without getting into the corruption. TN & AP police are as corrupt as the next state but realized that having a effective sword arm staffed with motivated people keeps the public at large happy about the law & order situation, which allows the regular force to go about their 'business' :-o Mumbai needs a similar detente to be arrived at before we can think of an effective local SWAT team. In other words, Mumbai is well and truly naked when (not if) the next terrorist attack takes place. :cry:


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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 12:06 
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Viv S wrote:
Something on the lines of the SAS's Counter Revolutionary Warfare wing.


Unlike popular perception, the SAS CRW wing's main role is not really CT in HRT context though it was originally raised for that function and continues to service the rotations of each team through it for CT/HRT duty. As an aside, it is quite funny that SAS admirers love to cling fondly to the memories of the Iranian embassy siege which happened over 2 decades ago and comparatively was not really an extraordinary operation by any means.


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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 12:14 
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Marut wrote:
The NSG was specifically raised to not have the regular SF tackle such domestic contigencies. The impetus for NSG was Op Bluestar in 1984, where the use of army special forces escalated the situation in the eyes of the people.

Actually that is incorrect. NSG was primarily formed because both SFF and 1 Para Cdo proved to have inadequate skills in CQB and hostage rescue during the operation.

Marut wrote:
Prime example is Karnataka, where the NSG was used for combing operations for Veerappan! The NSG, very rightly, walked of the operation since they are not geared for such ops and it's not part of their SOP resulting in underutilization of resources.

One of the books on Veerappan has some B&W pics of NSG commandos in mufti (well, lungi) during their hunt for Veerappan. The NSG contingent was commanded by Brig. Raj Sitapathy who immediately after that walk out also led the Akshardham operation where Hav. Suresh Yadav was KIA and later Surjan Singh Bhandari DOW.


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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 13:31 
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Raja Bose wrote:
Marut wrote:
The NSG was specifically raised to not have the regular SF tackle such domestic contigencies. The impetus for NSG was Op Bluestar in 1984, where the use of army special forces escalated the situation in the eyes of the people.

Actually that is incorrect. NSG was primarily formed because both SFF and 1 Para Cdo proved to have inadequate skills in CQB and hostage rescue during the operation.


I am well aware of the inability of SFF and Para Cdo in Bluestar. Regular SF is not trained for such CT/HR ops and the lacunae was sought to be filled with the raising of NSG. But as I said, the public 'saw' the military being deployed than a 'police' force. Perception makes a difference as no one recounts Op Black Thunder as a dark hour, although it was pretty intense as well. Bluestar stoked the flames of the Khalistani movement while Black Thunder broke its back and put it on the death bed.


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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 13:50 
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Marut wrote:
But as I said, the public 'saw' the military being deployed than a 'police' force. Perception makes a difference as no one recounts Op Black Thunder as a dark hour, although it was pretty intense as well. Bluestar stoked the flames of the Khalistani movement while Black Thunder broke its back and put it on the death bed

Not really Marut-ji..the difference between BS and BT was not the force that was executing the ops, but the nature of carrying out the ops itself...BS involved a military force with heavy artillery and tanks barging into the temple..BW was a more nuanced "light infantry" ops that simply involved surrounding the temple to wear the terrorists out...KPS Gill explains the latter quite well in his book..

BTW, BT, while being a successful ops, didnt really "break the back" of the militancy..That had to wait for the elections that put Beant Singh in charge.....And the border fencing to be completed...and of course the tacit agreement with Pak, which in turn was facilitated by the successful RAW (JIT-X) campaign within Pak..


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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 14:56 
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Somnath,

BS was military action with tanks and artillery as though it was a set piece battle, which it was not and using SF as sort of super infantry. BT, executed in two phases, was mainly police action with NSG leading phase 1 neutralizing the fighting core of Khalistanis holed up followed by Punjab police laying a siege around the temple and flushing out the remnants in phase 2.
BT did break the Khalistani movement as it effectively shut out any Bhindranwale redux making it a 'harrasment' movement with ISI support. Later on, Beant Singh and other developments delivered the coup de grace.


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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 17:45 
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Raja Bose wrote:
Marut wrote:
The NSG was specifically raised to not have the regular SF tackle such domestic contigencies. The impetus for NSG was Op Bluestar in 1984, where the use of army special forces escalated the situation in the eyes of the people.

Actually that is incorrect. NSG was primarily formed because both SFF and 1 Para Cdo proved to have inadequate skills in CQB and hostage rescue during the operation.

Marut is correct, the NSG was primarily founded to handle gendarmie-type responsibilities. A SFF wing or one of the Para battalions could be trained for whatever necessary skills, but the political leadership was intelligent enough to foresee the complications of using such forces. The NSG was raised along the lines of GIGN, partially from military and partially from national police forces.


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PostPosted: 24 Feb 2011 18:03 
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somnath wrote:
Not really Marut-ji..the difference between BS and BT was not the force that was executing the ops, but the nature of carrying out the ops itself...BS involved a military force with heavy artillery and tanks barging into the temple..BW was a more nuanced "light infantry" ops that simply involved surrounding the temple to wear the terrorists out...KPS Gill explains the latter quite well in his book..

BTW, BT, while being a successful ops, didnt really "break the back" of the militancy..That had to wait for the elections that put Beant Singh in charge.....And the border fencing to be completed...and of course the tacit agreement with Pak, which in turn was facilitated by the successful RAW (JIT-X) campaign within Pak..


Success has many fathers. You can continue to add EX Brasstacks, the Fall of Soviet Union, India's strategic realignment... whatever, and they all did contribute in various measures to breaking the insurgency's back. Marut distracts from his point with that bit of hyperbole, but the point holds.

The point was that a dedicated counter-terror organization was necessary to handle such a situation with nuance and for the political masters to contain the fall-out; NSG achieved that. The terrorists' hold on the Golden Temple was broken; there was no cascading effects onto the Army, or allegations of using foreign forces to quell domestic issues. I find the reason for NSG quite justified by this operation.


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PostPosted: 25 Feb 2011 00:00 
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ParGha, When I say CQB skills, I wasn't referring to just the 'mechanical' CQB skills. Actually there is an interview somewhere from one of the NSG founders where he mentions why NSG evolved a unique (at that time) training and mindset conditioning programme of their own rather than upgrading the programmes of existing Army SF/SFF.

The 1st western CT/HRT group NSG looked at was the GSG-9 not GIGN.


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PostPosted: 25 Feb 2011 01:06 
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Raja Bose wrote:
The 1st western CT/HRT group NSG looked at was the GSG-9 not GIGN.


I don't know about what they looked at first... but the NSG was raised part-military, part-national police forces like the GIGN; the GSG9 was purely West German border guards. Both arrangements are unique to political imperatives of the said countries. After WWII the West Germans had put in strict checks and balances on military use, so they had to resort to this legal hook to address the vulnerability exposed by the Munich attacks. India and France had no such concerns about drawing military personnel; also, unlike the Brits, they had large national police forces to draw men from.


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PostPosted: 28 Mar 2011 21:28 
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http://in.news.yahoo.com/wanted-let-mil ... 0-487.html


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PostPosted: 04 Apr 2011 21:09 
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WTF!

Afridi's cousin killed in J&K: BSF
Quote:
"Saquib, killed in Anantnag on Sunday following a tip-off, turned out to be a relative of Shahid Afridi :eek: ," BSF Inspector General Vijay Raman said.


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PostPosted: 04 Apr 2011 21:16 
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^^ Reported many, many times in multiple threads on BRF.... anyways, the article is from 2003.


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PostPosted: 05 Apr 2011 01:48 
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http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_hi ... an_1527765

Quote:
A top Hizbul Mujahideen militant was today killed in an encounter with security forces in Shopian in Kashmir Valley, officials said.

Mohammad Zahid alias Abu Zaid, a resident of Doda district in Jammu region, was killed after a brief exchange of firing with security forces at Tharina village in Keller area of Shopian.

They said Zahid opened indiscriminate firing on security personnel and was killed in retaliatory action.

One AK rifle and some ammunition have been seized from the slain militant.


Nowadays it seems every 2nd high profile terrorist related event is in Shopiann.


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PostPosted: 13 Apr 2011 23:48 
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http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/ ... ZB20110413

Quote:
...

Since 2002, the Kashmir militants' movement over the LoC has fallen significantly, partly because India has fenced the previously porous frontier but also because Pakistan has imposed tough restrictions on the movement of the fighters.

CONTROLLING THE LINE OF CONTROL

"There's been a huge impact. Previously, about 50 mujahideen (Islamist fighters) used to cross to occupied Kashmir a month, now hardly five are able to do so," said Abu Huzaifa Kashmiri, a member of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen militant group, who now runs a hotel in Muzaffarabad, capital of Pakistani Kashmir.

...


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PostPosted: 17 Apr 2011 06:52 
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Those who are interested in this thread may also want to watch a movie called Armadillo

its a documentary following Danish troops in Afghanisthan


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PostPosted: 11 May 2011 03:59 
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Image

'Kashmiri children look on at an Indian police official during clashes with demonstrators demanding the release of Pro-Independence leader Muhammed Yasin Malik, in Srinagar on April 29, 2011. Security forces in Indian Kashmir fired teargas and used batons on April 29 to disperse pro-freedom demonstrators protesting the arrest of a key separatist in the region\'s summer capital Srinagar.


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PostPosted: 18 May 2011 03:29 
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http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/792238/

Quote:
Five CRPF personnel were killed and three injured when a commander's escort vehicle was blown up in a landmine blast by Naxals in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh.

Commander of CRPF's 2nd battalion Arvind Rai escaped unhurt in the attack which occurred when he was travelling with the jawans from Kerlapal to Sukma in Dantewada district, 280 kms from here, Additional Director General of Police Ramniwas said.

The vehicle which was following Rai's jeep was blown up in the blast, killing the five jawans on the spot.

Additional forces have been rushed to the site and the injured have been admitted to Jagdalpur hospital, he said.

The officer said that the Supreme Court had directed withdrawal of jawans from schools in Naxal-hit areas and Rai had gone to Kerlapal in connection with the setting up of a new barrack.

He was returning from the visit when the Naxals carried out the attack.

Security forces have intensified combing operations in the area, he said.


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PostPosted: 18 May 2011 09:21 
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Quote:
'Kashmiri children look on at an Indian police official during clashes with demonstrators demanding the release of Pro-Independence leader Muhammed Yasin Malik, in Srinagar on April 29, 2011. Security forces in Indian Kashmir fired teargas and used batons on April 29 to disperse pro-freedom demonstrators protesting the arrest of a key separatist in the region\'s summer capital Srinagar.


Seeing a shotgun being used by Indian forces for the first time ever. They must be using it to fire teargas shells or something, but I guess they can be loaded with conventional ammunition too.


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PostPosted: 18 May 2011 09:33 
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atreya wrote:
Seeing a shotgun being used by Indian forces for the first time ever. They must be using it to fire teargas shells or something, but I guess they can be loaded with conventional ammunition too.


The shotgun doesn't have the calibre (usually about 40mm) to be used for tear gas cartridges.


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PostPosted: 19 May 2011 03:00 
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Can someone identify that shotgun? Make? Model? Type?


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PostPosted: 19 May 2011 03:07 
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Rakesh wrote:
Can someone identify that shotgun? Make? Model? Type?


http://ofbindia.nic.in/products/data/weapons/wsc/6.htm

Image


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PostPosted: 19 May 2011 03:11 
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Thanks Aditya. A powerful gun indeed.


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PostPosted: 19 May 2011 10:28 
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my analysis of the picture... Glad to see kit improvement for CRPF Jawans too.
See the cops Shoes, lower leg protection, even his uniform has improved. Also his BPJ (not the best ) but it is a far improvement from what used to be issued. His helmet is a disappointment, but looks like a hand me down. Probably the army blokes got issued new ones (ballistic / Kevlar helmets) and this was handed down to the para-military police.
Shotgun – we already discussed
Neck protection behind the helmet, visor for helmet… (very important during stone throwing incidents).

He also seems to be be doing something with a barbed wire, wonder what?


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PostPosted: 19 May 2011 23:54 
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Viv S wrote:
atreya wrote:
Seeing a shotgun being used by Indian forces for the first time ever. They must be using it to fire teargas shells or something, but I guess they can be loaded with conventional ammunition too.


The shotgun doesn't have the calibre (usually about 40mm) to be used for tear gas cartridges.


There are "small" calibre rounds available for riot control.
Some examples:
http://www.ammunitiontogo.com/index.php ... ialty-ammo


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PostPosted: 20 May 2011 02:47 
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From OFB page:

Quote:
Anti Riot role by use of Rubber Ball non-lethal ammunition


So its four round 12 Gage pump action shot gun.


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PostPosted: 20 May 2011 09:14 
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Quote:
F1 cannot grow until it is made to apply for entire Maharashtra and given a place above the Mumbai police in terms of chain of command/heirarchy. Else it is going to be a still born which will die in due course.


There are deep seated structural problems with Maharashtra. First, above everything else, most of the residents of capital, India's Urbs Prima have almost no stake in the rest of the state. The Tamilian/Mallu may speak fabulous Marathi and the Gujarati may know Acharya Atre by heart (no exaggeration, they do, a former Tamilian IGP's daughter used to read the Marathi news on Bombay Doordarshan), but their loyalties begin and end with Bombay. Forget Gadchiroli, they couldn't care less about even Nagpur. In the case of TN, the entire political class is a transplant in Chennai from the districts. What happens back home matters heckuva lot. In AP, Hyderabad, the capital is right in the middle, the heartland. If the administration is lax about homegrown terror, they will be consumed in the capital itself. Karnataka too is a lot like Maharashtra.
And to add, JJ is a person of great determination and takes a lot personally. When Veerappan began to taunt her thru scum like Nakkeran Gopal and assorted role playing characters on TV, he virtually signed his own death warrant. From there it was short work to wipe out the scum.


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PostPosted: 31 May 2011 03:12 
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http://news.in.msn.com/national/article ... id=5181366

Quote:
The harsh realities of counter-insurgency operations

Questions are often asked why several columns of soldiers could not eliminate two or three terrorists hiding in the jungles of Jammu and Kashmir, or why it takes so long to kill a lone terrorist.

That's largely because of the state's topography and terrain, particularly in the densely-forested mountainous areas, some as high as 10,000 feet above sea level.

One such instance is a month-long operation in the thick forests of the mountainous areas of Surankote in Poonch district at a height of 8,000 feet, an area that quite often experiences rain during the summer and snow during the winter.

A spokesman of the 16 Corps of the Indian Army on Friday gave an account of the month-long operation in the Surankote area, 210 km north of Jammu.

"Relentless operations by Romeo Force (a counter-insurgency wing of the army responsible for operations in Rajouri and Poonch districts) and Jammu and Kashmir Police in the past one month have caused a huge loss to (Pakistan-based terror group) Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)."

According to him, the operation started on April 28. "Based on specific intelligence regarding the presence of a group of five LeT militants in the forest areas of Surankote, troops of Romeo Force and police launched operations on April 28. Braving bad weather conditions in difficult and rugged forested mountainous areas, the troops continued their search operations and succeeded in maintaining pressure on the hiding militants."

"The group of militants was on the run and kept shifting places during the hours of darkness. Prolonged operations by the security forces resulted in the busting of militant hideouts and recovery of large quantities of rations, bedding and other logistic stores," the spokesman said.

Due to the vastness of the area, with thick forests and undergrowth, physical contact with the militants could not be established. "The security forces kept their cool and continued the combing and search operations without a break. Finding it difficult to escape from the cordon, in the beginning of May, the militants split into two groups and tried to cross a big stream in the upper reaches. While doing so, two militants got washed away," the spokesman said.

The remaining militants conveyed telephonic messages to this effect to their handlers and masters across the Line of Control that divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan. They identified the drowned militants as Abu Huzefa alias H2, Chief of LeT for Poonch, Rajouri and Jammu, and Abu Abdullah alias Saifullulah alias Usman Bhai.

"The search operations by the security forces continued to trace the bodies of dead militants as well as to locate the other three militants. On May 20, the body of one militant was recovered from the Suran river near Bafliaz in Surankote. The body was highly decomposed and identified as that of Abu Huzefa. The body of the second militant is yet to be recovered," the spokesman said.

The second group of three militants was on May 23 reported moving in the forested areas of Sauni. "This area is at quite a distance from where the original searches were launched to take on the militants. The troops zeroed in on the group on the night of May 23 at 8 p.m."

"The contact with these militants was established and a firefight commenced. In the encounter, one dreaded militant, Abu Umar Khan Jangwani, was killed and his accomplice injured. Taking cover of the dense forests and darkness, the other two militants managed to escape.

One AK-47 rifle, two rifle magazines, 60 live rounds, two hand grenades and various other items were recovered from the encounter site," the spokesman said.

"Thus, sustained operations and perseverance of the security forces and the police in the past one month have resulted in the deaths of three dreaded LeT militants operating in the Surankote area," the spokesman claimed.



Image


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PostPosted: 03 Jun 2011 12:22 
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3 Terrorists sent to Jannat.
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a ... 073250.ece


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PostPosted: 04 Jun 2011 01:41 
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just one gripe though, every time night falls the GI's can't fight due to lack of night vision / thermal imaging devices. It's high time that DRDO start deploying these devices be it second, third or next generation goggles and devices in miltant infested area or GOI just go and purchase these outright and not give an opportunity for these scumbags to escape or regroup!


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PostPosted: 04 Jun 2011 02:06 
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^^
Arre bhai, it has been repeated numerous times that there is no dearth of NVGs in forward areas. However, even with the best of NVGs, the vision is vastly inferior to daylight vision in both image clarity and distance. Add to that the adverse effects of rain, dust etc and no NVG will give you adequate vision.

So, to repeat again, there is no dearth of "quality" optics, NVGs or BPJs in "forward areas". If there is something in short supply, it is UBGL. But even that could have been remedied by now.


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PostPosted: 16 Jun 2011 15:56 
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State of militancy and history of CT operations in Sopore:

http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/732040/

Quote:
...Though the police and army have stepped up pressure on militants in Sopore, there are reports of militants entering the town almost every week. Security agencies have also failed to nab Abdullah Unny—one of Lashkar’s top-most commanders in Kashmir who operates from Sopore. Police say Unny has identified and trained new overground workers and made inroads into new areas. In the beginning of 2010, the Lashkar was back in the Sopore-Rafiabad belt in full strength besides being a driving force for Lashkar cadre elsewhere in the Valley. Unny, police say, has turned Sopore into the first stop for Lashkar militants who enter Kashmir.

With both the police and the militants keeping their ears close to the ground, a hide-and-seek game has begun in Sopore. “If you want to know what will be the temperature of militancy in Kashmir, check the rise of mercury in Sopore,’’ says a police officer. “The battle is already on in this town. Let’s see what happens,” he says.....


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PostPosted: 16 Jun 2011 18:30 
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Abdullah "Unny"?

Mallu?


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PostPosted: 28 Jun 2011 02:14 
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http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/web1/11june28/news.htm#1

Quote:
SRINAGAR, June 27: Two hardcore militants, including a self-styled divisional commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen outfit, were killed in a 12-hour long gun-battle in Pulwama district in which two Army personnel including an officer were also injured while as a Government employee was shot dead by the ultras in a forest area of Ganderbal district.

Giving details of the encounter, Superintendent of Police Awantipora, Mohammad Irshad said that Police Station Tral recovered inputs last evening that a group of militants has entered the village Koil-Shikargah.

A police party rushed to the spot and laid a cordon of three suspected houses. As the police party was laying a siege of the three suspected houses, it came under fire from one house belonging to Muhammad Yousuf Bhat, the SP said.

Subsequently, the house of Muhammad Yousuf was cordoned and militants were told to surrender, but they paid no heed to this and instead, opened indiscriminate firing on the police personnel. In the meantime, 42 RR and CRPF 280 Battalion joined the operation.

The operation was, however, suspended during night on account of darkness. The security forces maintained a tight vigil on the house and foiled repeated attempts by the militants to flee the besieged area under the cover of darkness.

The security forces re-launched an assault on the militants shortly after dawn and the 12 hour long gun-battle concluded with the killing of both the hiding militants at around 8.30 am. In the encounter, two Army personnel including an officer were also injured and they were rushed to hospital for treatment. Their condition was stated to be out of danger when reports last came in.

From the encounter site, security forces recovered two AK assault rifles, four magazines, 14 rounds, an Under Barrel Grenade Launcher with a grenade and two Chinese hand grenades.

The slain militants have been identified as Muzaffar Ahmad Malla, resident of Tral and Suhail Ahmad Khan, resident of Dadsara-Tral.

Muzaffar, who had received arms training in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir, was one of the most wanted militants in South Kashmir, was the divisional commander of HM for South Kashmir. He was nominated as divisional commander after the killing of Sajjad Ahmad alias Balle on April 5 this year.


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PostPosted: 28 Jun 2011 05:42 
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This proves time and again that the forces are ill equipped and not given night vision aids in fighting these scumbags, who use the cover of darkness to make their move. High time that someone file a PIL on behalf of the Jawans and ensure that proper equipments are issued to ALL units that battles insurgency.


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PostPosted: 28 Jun 2011 12:07 
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Craig Alpert wrote:
This proves time and again that the forces are ill equipped and not given night vision aids in fighting these scumbags, who use the cover of darkness to make their move. High time that someone file a PIL on behalf of the Jawans and ensure that proper equipments are issued to ALL units that battles insurgency.

RR for sure has adequate NVGs, better quality ones than what the regular Army units are issues on par SF. A night assault would have resulted in civilian casualties. Cordoning off the area and putting pressure on the militants by tighteing the noose would have made the militants desperate. Also an early morning attack would have caught the militants off guard / tired worn-out... JMT


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