Bharat Rakshak

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So can someone shed some light on how that problem be solved? Actually from my gut feel i see this to be a 'very small' issue. Has this issue been blown out of proportion? or is it really this big? Can't a country that spends $1.23 billion on buying tanks spend a few more bucks to buy rail carriages?

And if push comes to shove, Cant we have a standard Arjun issue rail carriage that can be used to replace all other tank carriages?

The existing BWTA wagons have pay load capacity of 60+ tons ; the Arjun weighs 58.5 tons. The only issue is that the width of the tank is more than that of the flat and so, the tracks protrude on both sides. A six inch wooden sleepers when placed on the floor of the wagons before loading the Arjun MBT ensures that the tank tracks move over adjacent platforms without fouling with them. With this arrangement Arjun MBT’s were moved as class ‘A’ ODC on Chennai-Delhi, Delhi-Suratgarh, Delhi-Jaiselmer, Chennai-Balasore and Balasore-Delhi lines, on several occasions

In addition, Ministry of Railways, RDSO, Lucknow were approached in 1992 to conduct a feasibility study for rail transportation of MBT Arjun. The study was based on a two pronged approach i.e. design of a new wagon and modification of existing BWTA wagon. The feasibility report was submitted along with all-India broad gauge railway maps showing sectors where the loaded wagon could move as class ‘A’ ODC and the empty wagon could be run as non-ODC. In consonance, the Army HQ, Q Move (Rail) approved both proposals. The RITES / Texmaco team has delivered prototypes of the new wagon for field trials in 2006, it has been proposed that the case for modification to existing BWTA wagons be foreclosed because the population of the new rail wagons can comfortably match the production schedule of the Arjun MBT.

JSF engine too big for regular transport at sea

Regular wear and tear, as well as mishaps such as an engine sucking a foreign object off a carrier deck, make the availability of replacement aircraft engines critical. High-tempo combat operations only increase the need. Carriers typically pack spares, but heavy demand can drain those stores, requiring at-sea replenishment.

However, the F-35C’s Pratt & Whitney F135 engine, contained in its Engine Shipping System, is too large for the cargo door on a standard carrier onboard delivery plane and for the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, the program office acknowledged in a response to a follow-on query from Navy Times. The engine can be broken down into five component parts, but just its power module and packaging alone won’t fit into the COD or the V-22.

The JSF Program Office says the V-22 Osprey, like the MH-53E helicopter, can externally carry the F135 engine module, the heaviest of the five components, at least 288 miles “in good weather.”

One outside analyst, Jan van Tol of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, wondered how the Osprey, in hover mode, could safely lower the module to the flight deck or pick up an out-of-service engine in higher sea states, given the heavy downdraft the aircraft’s 38-foot rotors generate when the engine nacelles are in the vertical position. When so positioned, with the aircraft hovering over the flight deck, the rotor wash can also affect sailors standing nearby – particularly those attaching the load sling, van Tol said. The GAO reported in 2009 that during shipboard exercises, the V-22’s downwash was so severe that in one instance, a sailor was directed to hold in place the sailor serving as the landing guide.

Heat could also be a problem. Depending on the amount of heat generated, sailors involved in sling operations could possibly be forced to wear heat-resistant suits, van Tol said.

Moreover, the Navy has no fleet V-22s and has no plans to acquire them.

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The 9,400-pound engine module and transport container also cannot not be transferred from a supply ship to a carrier during underway replenishments — when two ships are sailing side-by-side and connected by supply lines — because, Kennedy said, “It’s too heavy for the unrep station.”

In one of the books, either Into the Storm or Every Man a Tiger, Tom Clancy stresses the importance of logistics during the GW I. It was then I realised the importance of logistics in warfare.

K

Sources said better road management, better offloading, better rail links, equipment and man management, have reduced the mobilisation time. Every strike corps has been working at reducing its own mobilisation period.

Sources said timings may differ for armoured units and artillery units and also what matters is the place and terrain from where they move, like the Dehradun-based 14 Division is a hilly terrain and the Patiala-based 1 Division is farthest when compared to the deserts, where ‘Vijayee Bhava’ was carried out.

Movement is carried out in four phases which are command elements, reconnaissance, main body and balance.

Command elements comprising the formation commanders earlier used to take eight hours which was now been brought down to two hrs.

Reconnaissance comprising two officers, the second in command of the Brigade and the mobile operations, used to take 12 hours which has been brought down to six hours.

The main body of the formation comprises all the three units in the Brigade and their administration and logistics, which used to take 18 hours earlier, has now been brought down to 12 hours.

The remaining of the troops were given 30 hours, as opposed to their 36 hours.

The mission was successful, with all the units of the 60 Brigade meeting at the destined point in 45 hours, and another couple of hours for a final check. The distance covered was around 450 kilometers, and approximately 3500 personnel moved on road, on transportation that was either hired or were army trucks.

A Division has three Brigades in it, and for a complete Division to mobilise, another 10 hours could be added to this, said asource, but for a fighting unit formation, Vijayee Bhava has proved that the target of 48 hours can be achieved.

Support elements, like engineers, logistics, doctors, medical care, artillery, and other administrative items also move along, all of which take time to fall in place. ‘Vijayee Bhava’ also tested the advanced version of the indigenous Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), with a glass cockpit.

Why do you think the Golden Quadrilaterral project ofr highway linking was launched under a retired brigadier?

Abstract: The article focuses on the significance of a military-wide distribution process owner (DPO) in conducting logistical operations in peace and war. DPO presents a new paradigm for the logistics community. It ties strategic and operational logistics for its effective distribution. It indicates that logisticians must focused on tactical warfare. It is suggested that command's unity must be established so that DPO can bring strategic, operational and tactical logistics back into alignment.

Gentlemen, that report of X hours of mobilization was for an Brigade level force. One cannot mobilize and move an entire Corps to battle area in 48hours - for a simple reason that Corps, and that too something like 2 Strike Corps, is a huge-huge entity. What we may be targeting it to position some strike elements from these formation in double-quick time on border/their jump-off points.

Rohit, "Suman Sharma"'s narrative not-withstanding, it is not clear what formations participated. As usual she launched into a long winding narrative on the formation and hours.

She talks about Dehradun based 14 Div (she left out the RAPIDs part) and the ISt Armoured Division, thats it? after stating this, she launched into some hours-Minutes maths.

What about the rest of the II Corps.what about (Corps level) Artillery or Engineering or mechanized formations. It would be great if you can draw an ORBAT for "Ex Vijayee Bhava"?.

The IAF has also clarified that the bidders need to have the support of the Ilyushin Design Bureau which is the Russian OEM in this case.

The stop-and-start supply of spares, the irregular maintenance and unreasonable price hikes have been a stumbling block for India. Besides the current Ilyushin aircraft maintenance issue, the IAF has been looking for countries other than Russia for special tools and spares and global tenders have been floated for parts and tools related to MiG fighters, AN-32 transport aircraft, Mi-17 helicopters and OSA-AK surface-to-air missile systems.

Even the Indian Army sidelined Russia recently by issuing a Request for Information (RFI) for the acquisition of active protection and counter-measure systems for its T-90S main-battle tanks (MBT) bought from Russia.

In the long term there is a need to integrate the logistic resources of the three Services and utilise the existing national infrastructure more profitably to economise on overall effort. An efficient logistic structure contributes greatly towards meeting the requirements of the field force. This is particularly relevant in the context of the Indian Army which is deployed over a vast geographical spread in varied terrain and climatic conditions. With advancements in C4I2SR capabilities, along with automation providing total asset visibility of the logistic support system, it will be possible to introduce a major transformation to cater to user requirements.
Indian Army Doctrine

Military Logistics India 2012 will address key issues facing the Indian defence logistics community as well as the role of maintenance, repair and overhaul on operational capability in general and equipment availability and important topics covering engineering support in deployed operations.
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Problems

Difficulty Identifying Initial Relief Requirements. ...

Properly Sourcing Relief Supplies ...

Disconnects Between DOD Approval Process and Reality...

Lack of Logistics Planning and Coordination Enablers. ...

Difficulty Coordinating and Deconflicting Airlift. ...

Limitations in Airfield Offload and Throughput Capacity. ...

Properly Sustaining the Flow of Logistics ...



Need for Unclassified Information-sharing and Collaboration Tools ...

Need for More Humanitarian Assistance Exercises ...

Solutions

1. develop pre-crisis integrated logistics planning with the interagency

2. gain visibility of all relief supplies within the affected theater

3. define desired humanitarian assistance/disaster relief processes and outcomes

4. develop an interagency framework for collaboration in advance of HA/DR situations

5. practice and refine humanitarian assistance/disaster relief response frequently through exercises and other pre-crisis events and forums.

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The importance of logistics in military campaigns

Napoleon's failure: For the want of a winter horseshoe