Yeah right, which is why Palestine authority is begging Israel to give some territory. I am glad that Israel built the wall/fence, very difficult to make them give away that territory.nachiket wrote:cheenum wrote: One Paki Anal-ist claims that in 1971, Pakis wanted to fight on but Indians wanted a CEASEFIRE (surrender in Paki speak)... we have heard similar drivel after Kargil too. what gives?!?
Pakis were following their Arap biradhers onlee. Don't you know? In 1967, the Araps wanted to fight on, but Israel wanted a ceasefire. So the Araps surrendered vast tracts of land to the Israelis.
Siachen News & Discussion
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
cheenum
search around in BRF
The political pressure from unkil and others was to stop the war.
also our economy could not have sustained it
search around in BRF
The political pressure from unkil and others was to stop the war.
also our economy could not have sustained it
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Cheenum
I hope you didn't spill your coffee.
If it makes you feel any better, the bigger strategic blunders of that time had already been made in 1947-48. Haji pir was a 'small' goal, if you will.
In this case, for most part, the commanders on the ground had the better understanding of the realities.
Lesson 1: Mistakes happen. Point is, the need to note 'lessons learnt'.
Hence, relevant to Siachen (and also similar to Kargil)
The gains were kept in J&K, in 1971 (and LOC was born) outside it were returned. India did think, it had solved Kashmir at the Simla Agreement and Z A Bhutto's verbal promises and handshakes were proof AS LONG AS they were kept secret. Only thing is, ZAB got hanged and add 1+ to the times Pakistan did not keep it's word. In fact, used the time to build the bomb.
Lesson 2: wrt TSP:
Any agreement with Ayub is valid till the next ZAB comes along. Any agreement with ZAB (Mr 1000 year war) is valid till the next Zia comes along. Any agreement with Zia is valid till the next BB (Ms 1000 year war) comes along. Any agreement with BB is valid till next badmash comes along. Any agreement with badmash is valid till the next Musharraf comes along. Any agreement with Musharraf is valid till the next Kiyani comes along. Any agreement with Kiyani is valid till the next Paji comes along.
(Maybe TSP President, COAS, DGMO and ISI DG etc, be made to wear shock collars with the remote in A K Antony or PC's hands so that they can buzz them, if needed)
Lesson 3:
Hence, no more SECRET, unsaid, half-said, wink-wink understandings with TSP that are hidden from public view.
Whatever must happen, must be in the daylight with the whole world as witness (including Pakistanis).
More and more, I lean to the view that 'Policy' should be sooo clear and structured that is makes individual brilliance, biases, preferences and flaws irrelevant to the outcome.
I hope you didn't spill your coffee.
If it makes you feel any better, the bigger strategic blunders of that time had already been made in 1947-48. Haji pir was a 'small' goal, if you will.
In this case, for most part, the commanders on the ground had the better understanding of the realities.
Lesson 1: Mistakes happen. Point is, the need to note 'lessons learnt'.
Hence, relevant to Siachen (and also similar to Kargil)
The gains were kept in J&K, in 1971 (and LOC was born) outside it were returned. India did think, it had solved Kashmir at the Simla Agreement and Z A Bhutto's verbal promises and handshakes were proof AS LONG AS they were kept secret. Only thing is, ZAB got hanged and add 1+ to the times Pakistan did not keep it's word. In fact, used the time to build the bomb.
Lesson 2: wrt TSP:
Any agreement with Ayub is valid till the next ZAB comes along. Any agreement with ZAB (Mr 1000 year war) is valid till the next Zia comes along. Any agreement with Zia is valid till the next BB (Ms 1000 year war) comes along. Any agreement with BB is valid till next badmash comes along. Any agreement with badmash is valid till the next Musharraf comes along. Any agreement with Musharraf is valid till the next Kiyani comes along. Any agreement with Kiyani is valid till the next Paji comes along.
(Maybe TSP President, COAS, DGMO and ISI DG etc, be made to wear shock collars with the remote in A K Antony or PC's hands so that they can buzz them, if needed)
Lesson 3:
Hence, no more SECRET, unsaid, half-said, wink-wink understandings with TSP that are hidden from public view.
Whatever must happen, must be in the daylight with the whole world as witness (including Pakistanis).
More and more, I lean to the view that 'Policy' should be sooo clear and structured that is makes individual brilliance, biases, preferences and flaws irrelevant to the outcome.
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
I was seething after reading parts of "fangs of ice", thanks for the explanation Manu.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Gerard wrote:Next time, present the Pakistanis with a bill for the chai.The Pakistan side presented a non-paper on Siachen.
OT
Saar, you may have to give a deferred repayment schedule in that case as I wouldnt think they will settle the bill until the next IMF daan comes through.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
In 1965, Haji Pir was "traded" for territory in other sectors, primarily in Chamb-Jaurian where we lost ground to the Pakis - the latter was considered strategically more important...ManuT wrote:
So it was like that till 65, when it was recaptured then returned by Tashkent agreement.
I am sure in returning it LBS was unaware of it's history, not blaming him, just unawareness. Hopefully situation is slightly different today.
A person in his position should not have the authority to give away land, much less to his personal preferences, without total internal agreement and long internal consultations.
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Makes sense... what about the territories which India captured in the Punjab sector, what was it bargained for?somnath wrote:In 1965, Haji Pir was "traded" for territory in other sectors, primarily in Chamb-Jaurian where we lost ground to the Pakis - the latter was considered strategically more important...
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Somnath I did not see any thing to the effect saying, Pakistan is giving some territory to India. What India got was an assurance not to Interfere in India's Internal affairs which Pakis promptly junked saying "Interfering in Kashmir is not internal affairs of India"... a great opportunity lost.cheenum wrote:Makes sense... what about the territories which India captured in the Punjab sector, what was it bargained for?somnath wrote:In 1965, Haji Pir was "traded" for territory in other sectors, primarily in Chamb-Jaurian where we lost ground to the Pakis - the latter was considered strategically more important...
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
It wasn't an acre-by-acre land swap deal..Simply a grand bargain of basically repositioning troops back to their pre-war lines..The big tactical gain for India was Haji Pir (wasnt much tactical benefit out of the gains in Punjab, from what I have read), while for Pak it was the Chamb Jaurian...cheenum wrote:Somnath I did not see any thing to the effect saying, Pakistan is giving some territory to India
Tashkent agreement simply reiterated the usual stuff on Kahmir - both parties will sit and talk..And there were talks after that, many rounds, came to nothing...
To be honest, in 1965 there werent as many cards with us on the table to "settle" anything...There were in 1971, and seemingly the Simla agreement did something, but obviouly didnt go the whole hog..
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I went through the whole text, also ready about what couple of people who were there wrote about it. Soviets wanted some agreement done, also the ceasefire was not holding, Ayub was under loads of pressure from Bhutto and others. All this resulted in a compromise. I think Shastri was also under tremendous political pressure back home from Indira. Many things agreed were not committed to paper as it was supposed to ironed out at lower levels as separate agreements. Lot of things changes after Shastri's death with accusations and counter-accusation.. and the rest is history.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
From Across The border Link
KARACHI: The Indian army, and not just the civilian government, has played a role in the ongoing deadlock with Pakistan over the Siachen dispute, according to American and Indian assessments contained in confidential US diplomatic cables.
“On Siachen, Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) T. C. A. Raghavan” — who has also served as the Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Pakistan — “reported that the Indian army has drawn a line with its political leadership. It has told the government of India that withdrawal was tantamount to ceding the area to Pakistan due to the difficulty of retaking it should Pakistan occupy it,” wrote the New Delhi embassy in September 2008.
While talks held on Siachen this week between the two countries’ defence secretaries may have been inconclusive for a variety of reasons, cables reveal that the Indian army has historically had a role to play.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is described as having to fight intense domestic pressure, and not just from political hardliners. “Were any deal to crystallise, PM Singh would need buy-in from the army and the BJP to avoid handing himself a political firestorm,” noted a 2006 cable in anticipation of talks on Siachen scheduled for May that year.
In a section titled “First Obstacle: Managing the Military”, the cable described how “Army Chief J. J. Singh appears on the front page of the Indian Express seemingly fortnightly to tell readers the army cannot support a withdrawal from Siachen”.
Although the report acknowledged that “Given India’s high degree of civilian control over the armed forces, it is improbable that Gen Singh could repeatedly make such statements without Ministry of Defence civilians giving at least tacit approval”, it concluded that “Whether or not this is the case, a Siachen deal is improbable while his — and the army’s — opposition continues to circulate publicly. …
“The Army says the Siachen presence costs 3,000 crore rupees per year ($670m), which is a small sum when compared to the entire Indian defence budget.”
The cable also noted that Gen Singh’s position on the issue “is reflected in the Foreign Ministry as well”: India would not make a deal on demilitarisation without Pakistan signing a map laying out Indian and Pakistani troop positions before withdrawal. The primary purpose of this would be to justify action if Pakistan reneged on the withdrawal agreement.
Any deal, the cable implied, could only come after a go-ahead from the army: “The most telling signpost indicating the GOI is preparing the country for [a deal] would be Gen Singh publicly adopting a neutral (or supportive) position on a Siachen deal to signal in advance that the Army is on board, and that the GOI no longer needs to point to Army concerns to explain why a deal is not possible.”This pressure is seen as holding back Prime Minister Singh, who is described as being in favour of a deal — former National Security Adviser M. K. Narayan tells American officials in May 2005 that “the PM had instructed all his subordinates that ‘we need to accept Musharraf’s bona fides, even on Siachen’ … With this guidance in mind, the Ministry of Defence has been instructed ‘to take as flexible a position as possible’”.
A comment written in November 2006 sums up the American view of the matter. “India has repeatedly come ‘very close’ to an agreement on the Siachen issue in 1989, and again (less so) in 1993.
“Each time the prime minister of the day was forced to back out by India’s defence establishment, the Congress Party hardline, and opposition leaders. The Indian army is resistant to giving up this territory under any condition for a variety of reasons — strategic advantage over China, internal army corruption, distrust of Pakistan, and a desire to keep hold of advantageous territory that thousands of Indian soldiers have died protecting.”
Noting that then Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri had recently claimed he expected an agreement on Siachen, the New Delhi embassy added that his statements “go against longstanding conventional wisdom in India that an agreement on Siachen is unlikely anytime soon because the Indian Army and the hardline in the Congress Party would not be able to trust Pakistan enough to withdraw, regardless of how much Pakistan is willing to concede”.
America’s own opinion of Siachen is that “this remote region lacks military strategic relevance”. Despite this, cables over the years dating as far back as 2004 describe the issue as an “intractable” one unlikely to be resolved.
According to at least one Pakistani government official, Prime Minister Singh had admitted to this pressure in talks with Gen Musharraf.
In an October 2006 meeting at the Islamabad embassy, then MFA Director General (India) Jalil Jilani “said that he had absolutely no hope of a Siachen solution in the near term, even though Islamabad and New Delhi have already sketched the outlines of a deal.
“Jilani pointed to strong opposition to a Siachen resolution amongst the Indian military and defence establishment as the barrier to a resolution, a hurdle that PM Manmohan Singh had raised in his Havana meeting with President Musharraf in mid-September. Singh had told Musharraf that his military advisers are apprehensive that Pakistan would re-occupy the heights — including Indian posts — were the sides to withdraw
KARACHI: The Indian army, and not just the civilian government, has played a role in the ongoing deadlock with Pakistan over the Siachen dispute, according to American and Indian assessments contained in confidential US diplomatic cables.
“On Siachen, Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) T. C. A. Raghavan” — who has also served as the Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Pakistan — “reported that the Indian army has drawn a line with its political leadership. It has told the government of India that withdrawal was tantamount to ceding the area to Pakistan due to the difficulty of retaking it should Pakistan occupy it,” wrote the New Delhi embassy in September 2008.
While talks held on Siachen this week between the two countries’ defence secretaries may have been inconclusive for a variety of reasons, cables reveal that the Indian army has historically had a role to play.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is described as having to fight intense domestic pressure, and not just from political hardliners. “Were any deal to crystallise, PM Singh would need buy-in from the army and the BJP to avoid handing himself a political firestorm,” noted a 2006 cable in anticipation of talks on Siachen scheduled for May that year.
In a section titled “First Obstacle: Managing the Military”, the cable described how “Army Chief J. J. Singh appears on the front page of the Indian Express seemingly fortnightly to tell readers the army cannot support a withdrawal from Siachen”.
Although the report acknowledged that “Given India’s high degree of civilian control over the armed forces, it is improbable that Gen Singh could repeatedly make such statements without Ministry of Defence civilians giving at least tacit approval”, it concluded that “Whether or not this is the case, a Siachen deal is improbable while his — and the army’s — opposition continues to circulate publicly. …
“The Army says the Siachen presence costs 3,000 crore rupees per year ($670m), which is a small sum when compared to the entire Indian defence budget.”
The cable also noted that Gen Singh’s position on the issue “is reflected in the Foreign Ministry as well”: India would not make a deal on demilitarisation without Pakistan signing a map laying out Indian and Pakistani troop positions before withdrawal. The primary purpose of this would be to justify action if Pakistan reneged on the withdrawal agreement.
Any deal, the cable implied, could only come after a go-ahead from the army: “The most telling signpost indicating the GOI is preparing the country for [a deal] would be Gen Singh publicly adopting a neutral (or supportive) position on a Siachen deal to signal in advance that the Army is on board, and that the GOI no longer needs to point to Army concerns to explain why a deal is not possible.”This pressure is seen as holding back Prime Minister Singh, who is described as being in favour of a deal — former National Security Adviser M. K. Narayan tells American officials in May 2005 that “the PM had instructed all his subordinates that ‘we need to accept Musharraf’s bona fides, even on Siachen’ … With this guidance in mind, the Ministry of Defence has been instructed ‘to take as flexible a position as possible’”.
A comment written in November 2006 sums up the American view of the matter. “India has repeatedly come ‘very close’ to an agreement on the Siachen issue in 1989, and again (less so) in 1993.
“Each time the prime minister of the day was forced to back out by India’s defence establishment, the Congress Party hardline, and opposition leaders. The Indian army is resistant to giving up this territory under any condition for a variety of reasons — strategic advantage over China, internal army corruption, distrust of Pakistan, and a desire to keep hold of advantageous territory that thousands of Indian soldiers have died protecting.”
Noting that then Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri had recently claimed he expected an agreement on Siachen, the New Delhi embassy added that his statements “go against longstanding conventional wisdom in India that an agreement on Siachen is unlikely anytime soon because the Indian Army and the hardline in the Congress Party would not be able to trust Pakistan enough to withdraw, regardless of how much Pakistan is willing to concede”.
America’s own opinion of Siachen is that “this remote region lacks military strategic relevance”. Despite this, cables over the years dating as far back as 2004 describe the issue as an “intractable” one unlikely to be resolved.
According to at least one Pakistani government official, Prime Minister Singh had admitted to this pressure in talks with Gen Musharraf.
In an October 2006 meeting at the Islamabad embassy, then MFA Director General (India) Jalil Jilani “said that he had absolutely no hope of a Siachen solution in the near term, even though Islamabad and New Delhi have already sketched the outlines of a deal.
“Jilani pointed to strong opposition to a Siachen resolution amongst the Indian military and defence establishment as the barrier to a resolution, a hurdle that PM Manmohan Singh had raised in his Havana meeting with President Musharraf in mid-September. Singh had told Musharraf that his military advisers are apprehensive that Pakistan would re-occupy the heights — including Indian posts — were the sides to withdraw
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
i smell a rat with this cable from Dawn... Chindu has not reported such a cable. i don't remember seeing anything of this much detail. Also quoting MMS like a bosom buddy appears fishy, if true shows MMS in very very poor light.
Timing of Dawn also makes me suspicious
Timing of Dawn also makes me suspicious
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
^^ Internal army corruption being a reason for Siachen not being given?
Usual Paki article..
Usual Paki article..
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
I would have like to see the expression on Mushy's face when MMS told him that India's military advisers are apprehensive that Pakistan would re-occupy the heights - including Indian posts - were India to withdraw.
I am sure the babus present in that meeting would have had a good laugh later on at the constipated red faced look on mushy's face.
Defense procurement is corruption laded in every country in the world, and India is no exception.
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
After the latest Samosa-Chai session MMS would have called Obama and told him, I did the needful now you do the needful
In April, MMS did a Chai-Biskoth for Gilani and OBL double tap happened shortly...
now who get lucky - wait and watch?!
In April, MMS did a Chai-Biskoth for Gilani and OBL double tap happened shortly...
now who get lucky - wait and watch?!
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
GOI should stop wasting time/doing time pass negotiations about anything with the bloody PU&IS. Our standard line should be for them to vacate all of Kashmir. Too bad, it was not taken back in previous wars before both went nooclear.
I think we should increase our close to border deployments as we would be able to afford keeping troops closer to border but Pakis would not be for long given the state of their economy.
Wonder if anyone studied the economic impact of Op Parakram on both sides ? Should have done a good deal of damage to puki economy without firing a single bullet.
I think we should increase our close to border deployments as we would be able to afford keeping troops closer to border but Pakis would not be for long given the state of their economy.
Wonder if anyone studied the economic impact of Op Parakram on both sides ? Should have done a good deal of damage to puki economy without firing a single bullet.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
jai wrote:Wonder if anyone studied the economic impact of Op Parakram on both sides ? Should have done a good deal of damage to puki economy without firing a single bullet.
from wikiThe Indian cost for the buildup was 6,500 crore (US$1.44 billion), while the Pakistani cost was $1.4 billion (almost exactly the same)
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
I think within our economic means we should massively build up our military technologies and our armed forces and force the pukis to try to match. Let's see if the pukis collapse economically and as a nation-state from trying to match us, similar to what the U.S. did in the 80's to the Soviet Union. All of the puki efforts at all these different negotiations is to keep us from pulling away too far where they wouldn't be able to keep up. This is their real reason for always wanting talks on everything not peaceful coexistance.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
^^^Luxtor ji, that is eminently doable...all desh has to do is raise the defence budget by 100 basis point to something like 3.5% and let uss see the fun and games.....India raising another Strike Corps in plains or may be converting XII Corps in the desert into Strike Corps will send the pindiwalas into hysteria and sh*t-stan further down the drain. All doable with ease....Damn! just order those 1500+arty guns and see the fun.
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
I don't think Op Parakram was benign, Pakis reported a good number of casualties during that period in that sector in their martyrs page. anyone has the excel handy?jai wrote:Wonder if anyone studied the economic impact of Op Parakram on both sides ? Should have done a good deal of damage to puki economy without firing a single bullet.
regarding cost. the $1.4B Desh spent is a drop in the ocean compared to the $$$ Pukes Spent...
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Except, of course, a couple of minor cards like the Pakistanis running low on war stocks and the Chinese not making any efforts to open up the promised second front. The whole Pakistani operation was based on two premises: Limited War, and Mao's Promised Intervention. And both were running false. Yes, I know that IB and DMI had been grossly pessimistic in their estimates of war-stocks, but front-line units were already observing/reporting decreasing fire and mobility of enemy forces. The Chinese embassy was issuing demarches, but not a single new regiment was being moved into Tibet. Zhou En-Lai was advising Ayub Khan to dissolve the Pakistani Army and take to a People's War...somnath wrote:To be honest, in 1965 there werent as many cards with us on the table to "settle" anything...
Either the Pakistanis are the modern Shishupalas with an n-number of guarenteed pardons from India, no matter what the provocations; or Indians are the modern Prithvi Raj Chauhans who will keep letting go of their enemy until Darwin Law kicks in. In either case, the 1965 War cannot be seen in isolation but as part of a continuum.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
In the specific case of Siachen, both sides have good reason to keep the talks going. From the glacier itself, neither can do much to the other in a strategic sense; they would have to breach the LoC, work around and isolate the glacier in a manner akin to what Musharraf planned in OP Badr and OP Kargil (Indians would, of course, go the other way -- in a way Musharraf showed India how to really secure Siachen as a "Peace Glacier" in the future).Luxtor wrote:All of the puki efforts at all these different negotiations is to keep us from pulling away too far where they wouldn't be able to keep up. This is their real reason for always wanting talks on everything not peaceful coexistance.
In almost all other cases, yes, the Pakistani negotiators see discussions as a time-buying and strategic deception exercises, designed to facilitate other actions that can actually retard India's progress: terrorism, insurgencies, economic warfare through patronage of criminal gangs, etc.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Relatively speaking it (the 6,500 crore (US$1.44 billion) spend) hurt them more than it hurt us.jimmy_moh wrote:jai wrote:Wonder if anyone studied the economic impact of Op Parakram on both sides ? Should have done a good deal of damage to puki economy without firing a single bullet.from wikiThe Indian cost for the buildup was 6,500 crore (US$1.44 billion), while the Pakistani cost was $1.4 billion (almost exactly the same)
Was well worth the money, IMHO.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Hmm...ABV's smarts or circumstantial .....the jury would be out on this one long for sure....
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
I wonder why cashmere is the only place considered to be nuke flash point. I would say extend this pakilogic to Lebanon (Israel-Iran), Tibet (PRC-India), Poland (US-Russia), Seoul (NK-SK) etc.,
Paki's discomfort to do this shows their intentions.India would not make a deal on demilitarisation without Pakistan signing a map laying out Indian and Pakistani troop positions before withdrawal. The primary purpose of this would be to justify action if Pakistan reneged on the withdrawal agreement.
Do you see how a completely unrelated sh*t thrown into the mix, so it gets accepted along with other meaningful reasons? This is exactly what JA did in his interview with Pakis.“Each time the prime minister of the day was forced to back out by India’s defence establishment, the Congress Party hardline, and opposition leaders. The Indian army is resistant to giving up this territory under any condition for a variety of reasons — strategic advantage over China, internal army corruption, distrust of Pakistan, and a desire to keep hold of advantageous territory that thousands of Indian soldiers have died protecting.”
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
If the Big Idea was to plausibly cop-out of playing the beaters in the Great Taliban Hunt of 2001-02, it was the price they calculated worth paying. $1.44B USD was a small price for avoiding a possible civil war for the Paks.chetak wrote:Relatively speaking it (the 6,500 crore (US$1.44 billion) spend) hurt them more than it hurt us. Was well worth the money, IMHO.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Somnath ji
I did mention sometime back that more territory retrurned than regained, and retrurned were fertile lands of Punjab. So a lot can be /has been detabed at some length in the past.
Anyways, my concern is more in its current and future dealings
That is the point.
I did mention sometime back that more territory retrurned than regained, and retrurned were fertile lands of Punjab. So a lot can be /has been detabed at some length in the past.
Anyways, my concern is more in its current and future dealings
ParGha wrote:... the 1965 War cannot be seen in isolation but as part of a continuum.
That is the point.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
That is obvious from the size of the economy.chetak wrote: Relatively speaking it (the 6,500 crore (US$1.44 billion) spend) hurt them more than it hurt us.
Was well worth the money, IMHO.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Real reason why the talks didn't move forward:
From Tribune
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110602/edit.htm
From Tribune
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110602/edit.htm
The Siachen question
Playing China card won’t help Pakistan
Whenever Pakistan is in a situation where its stand defies logic in its dealings with India, it chooses to play the China card. This has been noticed during the latest round of talks on the Siachen glacier demilitarisation issue. Knowing well that any reference to China will be disapproved by India, the Pakistan Defence Ministry representatives who held talks on Monday and Tuesday with their Indian counterparts in New Delhi pushed for China to be represented during the negotiations because Beijing controls the Shaksham valley in the Siachen area. Besides this, Pakistan wants India to withdraw its troops from the vantage points held after great sacrifices without the areas’ proper demarcation. How can India vacate the areas it had captured in Operation Meghdoot without any guarantee that they would not be surreptitiously occupied by Pakistan? Islamabad’s stand is that India’s occupation of those areas has altered the status quo that existed when the Simla Agreement was signed. But the truth is that there is no mention of these Siachen points in that accord.
India and Pakistan were faced with a similar situation during their talks on the Siachen issue before the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, which killed the composite dialogue process that was on between the two sides. Then also India insisted that the areas under its control must be demarcated before the withdrawal of its troops, but this was not acceptable to Pakistan. Islamabad’s refusal to accept the demarcation idea clearly shows that its intentions are not pious. The next round of talks, scheduled to be held in Islamabad, can be fruitful only if Pakistan substantially accommodates the Indian viewpoint.
The standoff after the talks that concluded on Tuesday was already in the air because of the confidence deficit between the two sides. An atmosphere conducive to any agreement between India and Pakistan is missing today. It is difficult to say when the situation will improve. In fact, the tension between India and Pakistan is likely to go up owing to Pakistan’s unwillingness to punish all those guilty of the Mumbai terrorist killings despite India having provided enough proof to nail them.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Will it become fruitful the moment Pak says it is ready to authenticate the AGPL ( forget if it will comply later)?The next round of talks, scheduled to be held in Islamabad, can be fruitful only if Pakistan substantially accommodates the Indian viewpoint.
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
just a newbie question.... i agreed after immense sacrifice we have taken the control of glacier.... but what is the strategic importance of this location..... , i mean by controlling siachin are we getting any edge over pakistan in any confllicts ..?
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Please read the information here and it will give you good insight:jimmy_moh wrote:just a newbie question.... i agreed after immense sacrifice we have taken the control of glacier.... but what is the strategic importance of this location..... , i mean by controlling siachin are we getting any edge over pakistan in any confllicts ..?
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORC ... acier.html
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Interesting point Jimmy and I hope someone can elaborate.jimmy_moh wrote:just a newbie question.... i agreed after immense sacrifice we have taken the control of glacier.... but what is the strategic importance of this location..... , i mean by controlling siachin are we getting any edge over pakistan in any confllicts ..?
What I have noticed is that Siachen irks the Pakis. So its not only about strategic importance but also has a Psych angle to it.
And I justify our talks for a couple of reasons. During the talks we get to know what they are thinking. More importantly, if they agree to our position, or the talks fail, both results are a victory for us.
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
Does IA have to spend 300 Crores a year or 3000 Crores a year? 3K Crores looks way too high but I saw both these numbers being bandied around by DDM.
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
during the talks if they agree with our position and even mark it in a map, and we then agree to make it a paradise of peace to Bury Arundati Roy alive, how is it a victory for us?rajanb wrote: During the talks we get to know what they are thinking. More importantly, if they agree to our position, or the talks fail, both results are a victory for us.
Even before our last soldier comes down, Pakis would have occupied it. Also Chinese too are interested in this Glacier. another tit-bit, there are huge Gold deposits detected in this region!!!
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
From what I remember it is around 3000 crores but it is peanuts compared to the strategic advantage we get also keeping in mind that if Pakistan or china were to take it, we would be in a bloody soup.cheenum wrote:Does IA have to spend 300 Crores a year or 3000 Crores a year? 3K Crores looks way too high but I saw both these numbers being bandied around by DDM.
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
I think 3K crore would have been in Initial days where we were coming upto speed, current estimates should be a lot less.
According to CNN-IBN as quoted from "www.siachenglacier.com" it was 5 Crores per day in 2007 and this includes everything from HAWS, Siachen Mountaineering schools, base camp etc. A more holistic cost. I would say worth it. it looks like our soldiers now have good Igloo houses and Snow mobiles as against tents of yester years. I still remember George Kaka's outrage after visiting Siachen
According to CNN-IBN as quoted from "www.siachenglacier.com" it was 5 Crores per day in 2007 and this includes everything from HAWS, Siachen Mountaineering schools, base camp etc. A more holistic cost. I would say worth it. it looks like our soldiers now have good Igloo houses and Snow mobiles as against tents of yester years. I still remember George Kaka's outrage after visiting Siachen
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
I just found this topic on BR Archives, "Celebrating 20 years of victory on the Saltoro Ridge", there are plenty of information for us to learn and brush up our knowledge on Siachen. http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... f=14&t=118
Re: Siachen News & Discussion
3 crores a day, roughly a little more than 1000 crores a year. Extremely affordable now that casuality rates for us are way down from what they used to be.Manishw wrote:From what I remember it is around 3000 crores but it is peanuts compared to the strategic advantage we get also keeping in mind that if Pakistan or china were to take it, we would be in a bloody soup.cheenum wrote:Does IA have to spend 300 Crores a year or 3000 Crores a year? 3K Crores looks way too high but I saw both these numbers being bandied around by DDM.
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Re: Siachen News & Discussion
An interesting thing i noticed. If you see the current round of Siachen talks, there is Baileys and Nuts and Samosas... the previous round in Delhi (Foreign Sec level talks) has Perrier, Crystal Goblets, fresh fruits platter, ityaadi. the works... speaks volume about the importance attached to this round of negotiations by Desh