Books Folder - 2008 onwards!!!

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ramana
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

ramana wrote:Robert E. Sullivan, "Macaulay: The Tragedy of Power"
Publisher: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press | 2009 | ISBN: 0674036247 | 624 pages |

On the 150th anniversary of the death of the English historian and politician Thomas Babington Macaulay, Robert Sullivan offers a portrait of a Victorian life that probes the cost of power, the practice of empire, and the impact of ideas.
His Macaulay is a Janus-faced master of the universe: a prominent spokesman for abolishing slavery in the British Empire who cared little for the cause, a forceful advocate for reforming Whig politics but a Machiavellian realist, a soaring parliamentary orator who avoided debate, a self-declared Christian, yet a skeptic and a secularizer of English history and culture, and a stern public moralist who was in love with his two youngest sisters.
Perhaps best known in the West for his classic History of England, Macaulay left his most permanent mark on South Asia, where his penal code remains the law. His father ensured that ancient Greek and Latin literature shaped Macaulay’s mind, but he crippled his heir emotionally. Self-defense taught Macaulay that power, calculation, and duplicity rule politics and human relations. In Macaulay’s writings, Sullivan unearths a sinister vision of progress that prophesied twentieth-century genocide. That the reverent portrait fashioned by Macaulay’s distinguished extended family eclipsed his insistent rhetoric about race, subjugation, and civilizing slaughter testifies to the grip of moral obliviousness.
Devoting his huge talents to gaining power—above all for England and its empire—made Macaulay’s life a tragedy. Sullivan offers an unsurpassed study of an afflicted genius and a thoughtful meditation on the modern ethics of power.

Telegraph review of the same book!

THE MYSTERY OF THE MISSING PAGES


Macaulay: the tragedy of power By Robert E. Sullivan, Harvard, £29.95

Thomas Babington Macaulay, who lived in Calcutta between 1834 and 1838, left an indelible mark on the making of modern India. He drafted the Minute on Education, which introduced Western learning in English to the Indians, and authored the Indian Penal Code, which serves still as the bulwark of criminal jurisprudence in India. In Calcutta, he lived in a mansion on Chowringhee, which from 1845 became the home of the Bengal Club, the bastion of white exclusivity. Yet, Robert E. Sullivan’s new biography of Macaulay deals with the Indian career of his subject in the most disappointing manner. This is surprising since Macaulay’s India years saw him at the apogee of power and influence. It was here that his contribution was most enduring. It can be argued that if Macaulay had not come out to India, he would have been known as an orator, a masterful essayist and writer in the 19th century but he would have been a forgotten figure in the 20th century. It was the British Empire in India that secured for Macaulay his posthumous reputation.

The previous well-known study of the man was Macaulay: The Shaping of the Historian by John Clive, also published by Harvard in 1973. Clive devoted nearly 200 pages to Macaulay’s Indian achievement. In comparison, Sullivan gives a paltry 45 pages. Apart from the number of pages but also because of it, very few of the details of Macaulay’s life in Calcutta that are provided by Clive are available in Sullivan. Some of the details are important, as we shall see later in the review. This neglect is surprising as Sullivan is aware of the importance of India in Macaulay’s life. He writes, “Within living memory much of the English-reading world has demoted him [Macaulay] from an Eminent Victorian properly mentioned in the same breath with John Stuart Mill and George Eliot to a name known only to liberal-arts graduates of a certain age and to students of 19th century culture. Meanwhile his legacy flourishes in South Asia.’’ He cites with approval the inscription below his statue in Trinity College, Cambridge, which acclaims him for reforming the letters and laws of India.

Macaulay was not destined to come out to India. His father, Zachary, was a son of the manse. Zachary’s father and grandfather had both been Scottish Presbyterian ministers. Zachary himself was a member of the Clapham sect and had been a lifelong campaigner for the abolition of slavery. Zachary sent his prodigiously talented son, Thomas Babington, to a private boarding school; from there Macaulay moved to Trinity College, Cambridge. His career in Cambridge was distinguished and not distinguished. In the College Examination of Freshmen (May 1819), he was placed fourth in the first class, and in 1821, he won the coveted Craven Scholarship. In the Cambridge Union, he cut a figure as a popular orator. But as Sullivan notes, he refused to study anything but the Classics, in which he submerged himself. This had disastrous consequences. In the early 19th century, the only way to get an honours degree in Cambridge was through the mathematical tripos examination. Macaulay failed in mathematics — in the Cambridge jargon he “gulfed’’ — and was forced to take an ordinary degree. In 1823, he also failed to win a Trinity fellowship and won it in his second attempt the next year.

Zachary, a domineering father, had wanted a career in the Church for his son. When his son refused this, Zachary persuaded his son to pursue the legal profession, and Macaulay joined Lincoln’s Inn, from where he was called to the Bar in 1826. The call of silk did not capture Macaulay’s imagination. Politics beckoned him, and his driving ambition was to become a member of the House of Commons. In the early 19th century, this was not an easy ambition to fulfil for a young man with no independent resources and no aristocratic connections. Fortunately for Macaulay, his talents brought to him the patronage of Lord Landsdowne, from whose country seat in Bowood he was unanimously elected in 1830. Macaulay was launched but India was still far away.

His speeches in the House of Commons, especially the ones he made on the Reform Bill, made contemporaries refer to him as “the Burke of our age’’. He became the toast of the town and was invited out to dinner every night by members of the aristocracy. In June 1832, he was appointed one of the commissioners of the Board of Control for India. This body, since 1784, represented Parliament in the running of India while the Court of Directors represented the proprietors of the East India Company. By dint of hard work, Macaulay, in 1833, had become the secretary of the Board of Control with a salary of £1,500 per annum. India was opening up to Macaulay as a future. It had been laid down as policy that one of the members of the Supreme Council to govern India would be a person who was not a servant of the East India Company. By the middle of 1833, Macaulay was certain that the position would be offered to him and he was keen to accept it. The reasons were monetary. The post brought with it a salary of £10,000. On this salary he could return from India with a fortune even after living “in splendour’’ in Calcutta. This was important to Macaulay because he feared that without a solid income, his sisters would have to go out as governesses and milliners. Thus he sailed for India in February 1834 with his sister, Hannah, and with the complete works of Gibbon, Voltaire, Richardson, Horace and Homer to sustain him through the long voyage. The rest, as they say, is history.

Back in Britain, Macaulay was away from power but was influential. He was a champion of the Empire, of Progress and of Utility. He was also an advocate of genocide. He wrote, “it is in truth more merciful to extirpate a hundred thousand human beings at once, and to fill the void with a well-governed population, than to misgovern millions through a long succession of generations’’. Sullivan locates Macaulay’s “tragedy’’ in this double facedness: the champion of Progress who could advocate murder. But such contrary views are well known among paladins of empire, and the British Empire in India had no better high priest than Thomas Babington Macaulay.

Macaulay’s private life remains under a shadow as Sullivan reveals but does not explore. Sullivan mentions “Macaulay’s passion for his two youngest sisters’’ but refuses to explicate the nature of the passion. Was it sexual? He made his sister, Hannah, live with him in Calcutta even after her marriage to Charles Trevelyan. This is a detail that Sullivan only mentions in passing. It is significant that Macaulay censored his own journal by defacing material and after his death, Hannah and her son, George, not only defaced but occasionally also tore out offending pages. What were Macaulay’s demons? He relished power in India. But in his private life, what did he like and what did he hide? Mysterious and provocative questions hover over Sullivan’s life of Macaulay. But, unfortunately, Sullivan does not even gesture towards such questions.

RUDRANGSHU MUKHERJEE


Looks like our DIE are inspired by an inc*stous turd!!!!!
devesh
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by devesh »

the first half of the review reads like this: "Macaulay was given great opportunities to do great things only in India." it's almost like they're saying India should be *proud* of giving him that opportunity. like some kind of deranged chest thumping for something that ought to be condemned, but instead is upheld on a high pedestal.
ramana
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

No comments on Book Review thread please.

Thanks. ramana
abhishek_sharma
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by abhishek_sharma »

Circles of Hell: Michael Scammell

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archive ... tion=false

Voices from the Gulag
edited by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and translated from the Russian by Kenneth Lantz
Northwestern University Press, 414 pp., $29.95 (paper)

Gulag Voices: An Anthology
edited by Anne Applebaum
Yale University Press, 195 pp., $25.00

The Victims Return: Survivors of the Gulag After Stalin
by Stephen F. Cohen
Publishing Works, 216 pp., $22.95

Gulag Boss: A Soviet Memoir
by Fyodor Vasilevich Mochulsky, translated from the Russian and edited by Deborah Kaple
Oxford University Press, 229 pp., $29.95
What benighted bureaucrat, I wonder, sitting up all night in Moscow’s OGPU [1] headquarters, came up (around 1930) with the innocuous name Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps to describe his new department? And what harried official arranged the first letters of the Russian words Glavnoye upravleniye ispravitel’no-trydovykh lagerei to form the acronym Gulag? Little could either have suspected how far from home this sterile formulation would travel, or that it would come to stand beside the word “Holocaust” as the name of one of the two great aberrations of twentieth-century civilization.

It was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn who transformed that gray abbreviation into a symbol of twentieth-century barbarism, rhyming gulag with archipelago (a full rhyme in Russian: Arkhipelag Gulag) to endow it with the sinister ring that has reverberated around the world ever since. I had always thought this combination sprang fully formed from Solzhenitsyn’s imagination, but I recently learned that it was inspired by the boast of a sadistic boss called Degtyarev, who helped run Solovki, the first big Gulag camp situated on the Solovetsky Islands in the White Sea, not far south of the Arctic Circle.

Degtyarev’s specialty was selecting prisoners for execution and shooting them personally, for which he was nicknamed “camp surgeon.” He had a more boastful name for himself: “Commander of the Forces of the Solovetsky Archipelago.” When Solzhenitsyn heard this from the distinguished St. Petersburg philologist, Academician Dmitry Likhachev, a former prisoner in Solovki, he seized on it as the perfect metaphor for his subject and a memorable rhyme for his title. [2]

The word “gulag” acquired considerable resonance virtually overnight, but for many years after Solzheni- tsyn’s publication it referred exclusively to the labor camps, especially those established by Stalin after 1929. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary of 1993 spells it with a capital “g” and defines it in those terms. But by 2003, when Anne Applebaum wrote her own magisterial Gulag: A History, its meaning had expanded to cover the full range of criminal acts perpetrated by the Soviet regime. “The word ‘Gulag,’” wrote Applebaum,

has also come to signify not only the administration of the concentration camps but also the system of Soviet slave labor itself, in all its forms and varieties: labor camps, punishment camps, criminal and political camps, women’s camps, children’s camps, transit camps. Even more broadly, “Gulag” has come to mean the Soviet repressive system itself, the set of procedures that prisoners once called the “meat grinder”: the arrests, the interrogations, the transport in unheated cattle cars, the forced labor, the destruction of families, the years spent in exile, the early and unnecessary deaths. [3]

Since then “gulag” has lost its capital letter and entered the language as an independent noun, used in the plural sometimes, like “holocaust,” to signify other extreme forms of repression.

I was reminded of the progress this word has made by the arrival of four new books, all with the word “Gulag” in their title or subtitle, attesting to the combination of fascination and horror that the Gulag continues to exert on readers and offering further evidence of the crimes of that era. Two of them are selections from memoirs about the Gulag edited by its two foremost historians, Solzhenitsyn and Applebaum. A third, by the well-known Soviet specialist Stephen Cohen, is a brief memoir about Gulag survivors, while the fourth, also a memoir, comes from a most unexpected source, a former labor camp foreman who worked in the Gulag during World War II.

As is well known, Solzhenitsyn was inspired to write The Gulag Archipelago in part because of the large number of letters and memoirs he received after the unexpected publication in 1962 in the Soviet Union of his labor camp novella, A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. He drew on over two hundred of those accounts for the later work and interviewed as many of their authors as he could, which was when Likhachev told him about the archipelago image. Solzhenitsyn was unable to name most of his sources at the time for security reasons, and it was only after the fall of the Soviet regime that he was able to make amends and identify them. Later, in 2001, he published the testimony of seven of them in a volume called Pozhivshi v GULAGe (roughly, “Survivors of the Gulag”), which has now been translated into English and published as Voices from the Gulag.

Unfortunately Solzhenitsyn is barely present in this book, apart from being listed as editor, and there is no word about his reasons for selecting these seven voices, or explanation of the book’s shape or purpose. The translator, Kenneth Lantz, in an otherwise excellent introduction, does nothing to dispel the mystery, so the reader is left to guess at the editor’s intention. As it turns out, the memoir excerpts all follow a definable pattern, suggesting that Solzhenitsyn (or someone else) must have urged his authors to set down their experiences in a certain order. Each begins with a brief account of the author’s family history, profession, and normal life, followed by his sudden arrest, brutal interrogation, conviction (usually without a trial), consignment to the labor camps, and the devastating hardships and dangers of his peregrinations from camp to camp before final release and rehabilitation—though not necessarily permission to return home. Judging by the chapter numbers and brevity of some of the contributions, the originals must be much longer (and are presumably housed in the Memorial Library that Solzhenitsyn started in exile).

With the partial exception of the longest excerpt in the book, “My Life as a Gift” by V.V. Gorshkov, these stories are generally artless, and make less impact in this form than when they were subsumed into Solzhenitsyn’s larger narrative in The Gulag Archipelago. Yet their very rawness gives them an authenticity that is also persuasive. The innocence of their authors at the outset, and their anguished astonishment over each new horror they are forced to endure, compel faith in their veracity, while the almost ritual repetition of the tortures inflicted on each new victim sends a powerful message about the everyday ordinariness of arrest and incarceration in the Soviet Union. One prisoner is an auto mechanic, another an engineer, a third a circus performer, two are newly returned veterans from World War II, and two are still students when arrested.

All are thrust into solitary confinement or a crowded, filthy jail cell, undergo brutal interrogations as well as persecution by criminal prisoners, are sent on forced marches or transported by truck, train, or steamer to remote locations in the far north or in Siberia, and are compelled to toil on starvation rations at backbreaking labor in subzero temperatures. As weaker souls around them sicken and die, these prisoners cease being ordinary and become extraordinary, capable of unsuspected feats of courage and endurance, like men in battle, except that their sacrifices are meaningless and their ordeals the result of cruelty and cynicism.

Anne Applebaum’s Gulag Voices is similarly a byproduct of her larger history, containing excerpts from the memoirs she consulted in writing her book. Her selection does have a shape, being designed “to follow, roughly, the track of a prisoner’s experience, from arrest to release, and to illustrate various facets of camp life” (which in fact mimics the organization of her history). There are approximately double the number of voices represented in Solzhenitsyn’s collection, all having been published already, most of them in English translation. A major advantage of this arrangement is that, despite some unfortunate clashes of tone and terminology between the English and American translations, they are on the whole more professional and easier (in the lexical sense) to read.

The volume opens with a dry account by Dmitry Likhachev of his arrest in 1928 and closes with K. Petrus’s equally slight account of his release in the early 1950s, while Anatoly Marchenko’s description of life in a punishment cell (translated by myself) carries the story up to the mid-1960s. In between, Applebaum covers the same stages of the prisoner’s progress that are recounted in the Solzhenitsyn volume. She also restores the gender balance by including four narratives (one of them by a man) about the particular sufferings of women in the camps, ranging from the implacable pressures on young women to save themselves by prostitution or becoming a powerful boss’s mistress, to the horrors of mass rape and the ordeal of giving birth and watching one’s infant die of brutal neglect and malnutrition. Elena Glinka on the rapes and Hava Volovich on bearing and losing a child are as harrowing as anything I have read on the subject of the Gulag, and Isaak Filshtinsky’s compressed account of a young woman’s rise from fearful sex victim to hardened and cynical wife of a sadistic camp commandant is as richly allusive as a story by Chekhov.

The literary excellence of these and other excerpts (from Gustav Herling’s beautifully written memoir, A World Apart, Alexander Dolgun’s eloquent Alexander Dolgun’s Story, and such accomplished writers as Lev Kopelev and Lev Razgon) makes one regret Applebaum’s decision to omit the work of other powerful writers like Evgenia Ginzburg, Varlaam Shalamov, and Solzhenitsyn himself, on the grounds that their writings are “readily available.” A few of her selections strike me as relatively weak, and detract from the impact of the book as a whole. This is because Applebaum’s goals are primarily documentary rather than literary (though she obviously appreciates literary excellence as well); but as with Solzhenitsyn, I found that she puts much of the testimony of these authors to more effective use in her history than in her anthology. I would like to have seen a collection of the most powerful work possible on the Gulag with the more documentary material made available online.

Stephen Cohen’s short book, The Victims Return: Survivors of the Gulag After Stalin, addresses a subject that has received less attention than the lives of the prisoners in the labor camps, namely, what happened to the survivors when they returned to civil society. Not surprisingly, most of the ex-prisoners Cohen met on his visits to the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia were faring badly, and Cohen, who came to know several of them in his research for his book on Nikolai Bukharin, reports sympathetically on their broken marriages, broken careers, and broken lives. He is rather more interested, however, in a small group he calls “Khrushchev’s zeks,” one-time Communist officials who regained many of their former privileges when they returned to Moscow after the death of Stalin in 1953.

Khrushchev, he writes, “clearly trusted those recently exonerated ‘enemies of the people’ more than [he] did the Stalinist officials who still dominated the party and state apparatuses.” Not only did they persuade Khrushchev to order the immediate release of victims of the Gulag, Cohen writes, but they helped convince him to deliver his famous 1956 “Secret Speech” denouncing Stalin’s “personality” and “mass repressions.”

Cohen’s book is not so much about the victims’ everyday lives as it is about their little-known role in Soviet politics. His analysis of the changing motives behind Khrushchev’s ongoing anti-Stalinist campaign and the maneuvering of Party leaders before, during, and after the campaign is fascinating, and fills in many parts of the historical picture. So does his account of how the government’s attitudes toward former prisoners changed under Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin. Still, I’m not persuaded by Cohen’s thesis that leaders like Khrushchev—and more especially Gorbachev, whom Cohen counts as a personal friend—might, in other circumstances, have “saved” the Soviet Union from extinction.

The main problem with his book, in addition to its brevity, is the episodic, anecdotal character of the narrative, with new names and new ideas turning up in almost every paragraph. Some of the victims themselves fade into the background, and one comes away from it wishing that Cohen had chosen to write a more full-bodied memoir, with direct accounts of the leaders and prominent former prisoners he was able to meet. (One explanation for Cohen’s brevity is that he gave much of his material on returnees to Nanci Adler, who drew on it for The Gulag Survivor, her excellent book on this subject. [4])

The most original and surprising book here is Fyodor Mochulsky’s Gulag Boss, the first memoir, to my knowledge, ever published by someone from the other side of the watchtowers and the barbed wire. Although he served only six years in the Gulag, from 1940 to 1946, as a very young man, and was a civilian employee of the NKVD rather than an armed officer, Mochulsky is not an ordinary witness. A deeply loyal Party member both before and after his Gulag experiences, he became a career diplomat after World War II, worked at the United Nations and in the Chinese embassy of the Soviet Union for a long period, and later rose to be head of the China Section of the Central Committee before spending the last twenty years of his career (from 1967 to 1988) in the Intelligence Service of the KGB under Yuri Andropov. He remained a staunch supporter of the Soviet system to the end, while grudgingly acknowledging the excesses of Stalin and his supporters.

Mochulsky’s memoir is based on a diary he kept while working in the Gulag and portrays a familiar world of forced marches, barbed wire and watchtowers, freezing living conditions, starvation rations, backbreaking labor, and frequent deaths from malnutrition or a shot in the head. It is a world that is instantly recognizable from the accounts of former prisoners. Here are the colossal inefficiencies and callous neglect of the Soviet authorities, the privileged conditions and freakish excesses of the criminal prisoners, and again the horrifying plight of women, including more stories of rape and lesbianism, and of a beautiful young girl who makes several unsuccessful attempts to seduce Mochulsky (though he is sorely tempted), and turns out to have specialized in seducing, murdering, and robbing army officers before her incarceration at the tender age of seventeen.

What makes these stories astonishing, however, is the looking-glass world in which they take place. Mochulsky views this world through the eyes of a callow young man who totally believes his NKVD recruiter’s statement that “in capitalist countries…prisoners just rot in jail,” whereas in the Soviet Union

our laws are humane. The Soviet government sets itself the goal of giving each convicted person the opportunity to atone for his guilt to society by letting him do some honest labor for the common good.


This sounds cynically hollow to us now, but it made a deep impression on the patriotic young engineering graduate, and he continued to believe in it when the evidence of his eyes and ears sent a very different message. There is something intensely moving about his account of facing down a revolt by criminal prisoners in his care, of arranging to get proper living quarters built for prisoners exposed to subarctic temperatures, and of his sincerity and conscientiousness in carrying out his duties.

Mochulsky occasionally steps back and condemns the system’s excesses, but his memoir is written from the point of view of a true believer, presenting us with the conundrum of a good man serving an evil system. He also brings out some startling parallels between guards and prisoners, and their linkage. During a forty-five-day journey to the Pechorlag camp just south of the Arctic circle, he endures a series of crushing hardships only a little less harsh that those of some prisoners, and his first “home” in the Gulag is a primitive dugout that is barely habitable. This makes him all the more sensitive to the pitiable conditions of his charges (whom he risks punishment to help), while not in the least shaking his faith in the system. Indeed both guards and prisoners seem to accept their fate with stoic resignation.

What are we to make of all this? Black and white still define the differences between tyranny and democracy, but the complex gray area in the middle, where most people’s lives are lived, is harder to describe. All four of these books illustrate the gray areas as well as the horrors, and underline the colossal inefficiencies and uncertainties of the Soviet system. There was room in this system for altruism, generosity, nobility even, but the capricious arbitrariness of the regime left even more room for cruelty and corruption. Worst of all was the terrifying fear and insecurity felt viscerally at all levels of society. Whether an illiterate peasant, cultivated artist or scientist, high Party official, or general, you sensed an invisible trapdoor beneath your feet that might yawn open at any moment and drop you into an inferno from which there was usually no escape.[5]

This, it occurs to me, illustrates one crucial difference between the Gulag and the Holocaust. If you were a Jew in Poland under Nazi occupation, for example, or a Gypsy, you would be murdered for who you were, the corollary being that if you weren’t a Jew or a Gypsy you had much better chances of survival—unless killed in the war. [6] The situation was the obverse in the Soviet Union. No matter who you were, with the single exception of Stalin, you could be arbitrarily arrested, beaten, shot or starved to death, or condemned to a life of slavery, and no one could escape the risk.

Anne Applebaum’s Gulag: A History served as a strong and useful reminder of these issues, and its success highlighted the painful truth that the world has not yet measured the full meaning of the Gulag in the way it has the Holocaust. This is largely because Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union, has not itself come to terms with what the Gulag represented in the way the Germans have acknowledged the evils of the Holocaust and taken responsibility for it. Two admirably active voluntary organizations, Memorial and Vozvrashchenie (Return), have worked since 1988 to photograph the sites of former camps, record testimonies, collect information, publish studies and memoirs, and document what they can of the repressions carried out during the Soviet Union’s seventy-year existence.

Meanwhile, as the result of citizens’ initiatives, there are approximately three hundred small museums and a thousand statues and other tokens of remembrance scattered over the territory of the former Soviet Union, but they are almost invisible in daily life, and there are no such museums and few reminders in the larger cities, especially not in the capital. The promise of the Khrushchev government to allow a prominent memorial to be erected in Moscow (though not by the government itself) has never been realized. The closest officials have come is to allow the placing of the “Solovetsky Stone,” an unsculpted boulder from the main island of Solovki, on Lubyanka Square, in memory of the notorious Lubyanka Prison and the secret police headquarters that dominated the square in Soviet times. That stone was installed in 1990, before even Yeltsin came to power, and long before Putin appeared on the scene.

The present Russian government has sent conflicting signals about its attitude toward the Gulag. On the one hand there was Putin’s public courtship of Solzhenitsyn, followed by his recent decision to authorize a special edition of The Gulag Archipelago for use in Russia’s schools; on the other, a recently published teachers’ manual explains that Stalin acted rationally in his campaign of terror to ensure the country’s modernization, and Stalin was recently ranked third in a TV contest to find history’s greatest Russian.

Putin and Medvedev have allowed Memorial and Vozvrashchenie to continue some of their operations, but not without harassment from local and central authorities. As long ago as the mid-1990s, according to Memorial‘s website, permissions began to be withdrawn for the investigation of mass burial grounds, some of which remain under the control of the KGB’s successor organization, the FSB, while the compilation of Memorial’s “books of memory,” in which the names of former victims are recorded, has been frustrated by the refusal of the authorities to cooperate.[7]

The most recent instance of official harassment was a daylight raid by masked men on the St. Petersburg offices of Memorial in December 2008. Police confiscated twelve computer hard drives containing twenty years’ work documenting Gulag victims, along with research on the still secret graves of an estimated 2.7 million Leningraders, all of which were intended for an important new project designed to circumvent the obstacles to a physical museum, namely, a “Virtual Museum of the Gulag.” [8]

The Prosecutor’s Office claimed that it was investigating links between Memorial and an article in an obscure anti-Semitic newspaper that had been shut down a year before. On March 20, 2009, a court decided that the search and confiscation were carried out with “procedural violations,” and in May the hard drives were returned. The message sent by the authorities seemed clear enough: we are watching you and will do everything we can to hamper your activities. Thanks to the persistence of Memorial’s dedicated staff, however, the Virtual Museum went fully online in January 2010. [9]

The question of why the present Russian government is so adamantly opposed to a full reexamination of the evils of the Gulag is hard to answer, but Leona Toker, in her excellent Return from the Gulag Archipelago: Narratives of Gulag Survivors (2000), offers one explanation. Most of those who lived through and remember the era of the Gulag, she writes, are “more ready to condemn the identifiable agents of terror…than to recognize the radical flaws in their own past attitudes.” [10] Citing Shalamov, she suggests that “one of the reasons why Nuremberg trials were impossible in Russia is that in the Larger Zone few were innocent.” As a result, the “blanket accusation” of guilt has led to a “blanket amnesty.”[11] The “larger zone” she refers to was, of course, the Soviet Union, the smaller zone being the labor camp (or camps). Toker suggests that a way out of this dilemma would be for Russian society to admit “the traitors and the informers within the pale of the shared humanity as the unhappy exponents of impulses known to all and mastered by most,” and writes that the best labor camp narratives “show us ways of turning our awareness into sympathetic imagination.”

Alas, there seems little likelihood that the KGB’s successors will develop a “sympathetic imagination” or allow Gulag research and Gulag studies to develop and flourish at home. But there is no reason why the history and literature of the Gulag shouldn’t be studied more systematically and widely and commemorated in the West. The United States has its Holocaust Memorial Museum, and a website lists over sixty centers worldwide, including twenty-four in the US alone (in addition to Washington) and one in Russia. Why not a Gulag Museum here too, and a program of studies at a prominent university, say, Yale, which has published a huge amount of material relevant to this subject? [12] Anne Applebaum recently suggested that the West’s reluctance to tackle the subject of the Gulag thus far may be linked to residual guilt over embracing “a genocidal dictator…who committed crimes against humanity” as our ally during World War II. [13]

But surely it’s time to overcome such hesitations. There is already a large and growing literature on the subject by Westerners as well as natives of Russia, Central Europe, and other former Soviet republics. The superb histories of the Gulag by Solzhenitsyn and Applebaum, together with Toker’s discriminating volume on the literature of the Gulag, are more than enough to define a program, and if Peter Weir’s new film about the Gulag, The Way Back, starring Colin Farrell, is as good as early reports suggest, this may be a sign that the subject is at last about to enter the mainstream. [14]



1
Acronym for Ob'edinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie, Unified State Political Administration, a euphemism for the Soviet secret police. The OGPU was later merged into the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), which later became the Committee for State Security (KGB). ↩

2
Dmitry S. Likhachev, quoted in Chelovek-epokha: dve vstrechi s D.S. Likhachevym (A Man and His Times: Two Interviews with D.S. Likhachev) by Nikolai Kavin, Zvezda , No. 11 (2006), pp. 29–38. I am grateful to Alexis Klimoff for first drawing my attention to this statement, and to Likhachev's granddaughter, Vera Tolz, for tracing its source. According to Professor Tolz, the dissident writer Vladimir Gershuni, who assisted Solzhenitsyn with some of his research for The Gulag Archipelago , also claimed to have suggested the title to Solzhenitsyn. On the available evidence (admittedly scanty), I am inclined to believe it was Likhachev. ↩

3
Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History (Doubleday, 2003), pp. xxv–xxvi. ↩

4
Transaction, 2002. ↩

5
Adding to this complexity, as Mochulsky shows, was the possibility of equally dizzying rises from obscurity to power, and the frequent interchangeability of prisoners and guards. You could at various times in the history of the Gulag rise from prisoner to foreman and even armed commander, and Mochulsky met such men during his service. The most notable example of this phenomenon was Naftaly Frenkel, a prisoner in Solovki, who rose to become a guard and then one of the top commanders of the camp, where he invented the notorious "food-for-work" system, according to which prisoners were fed according to their output. He later held a senior rank in the Cheka (secret police), met Stalin and other leaders, and was appointed chief of construction on the White Sea–Baltic Canal. Both Solzhenitsyn and Applebaum write about him in their histories. ↩

6
See Applebaum, Gulag: A History , and David Bennett, " The Worst of the Madness " (Letter to the Editor), The New York Review , December 23, 2010, p. 101. See also Timothy Snyder's comment for some Soviet exceptions to this rule, The New York Review , December 23, 2010. ↩

7
See http://www.memo.ru/eng/index.htm , subsection "Memory of the Victims." ↩

8
See Catriona Bass and Tony Halpin, "Gulag Files Seized During Police Raid on Rights Group," The Times , London, December 13, 2008. ↩

9
See http://www.rightsinrussia.info/home/hro ... net-museum . There has been a Virtual Museum website since 2005, but it was highly incomplete until 2010. For the museum see gulagmuseum.org (in Russian). ↩

10
Return from the Archipelago: Narratives of Gulag Survivors (Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 245–246. ↩

11
Toker, Return from the Archipelago , p. 246. Nanci Adler similarly notes the burden of guilt and the problem of "official amnesia" in post-Gulag Russia, see The Gulag Survivor , pp. 1–3. ↩

12
An excellent example of what such studies might look like is provided by the annual journal Gulag Studies , published by the small firm of Charles Schlacks Jr., with contributions by Applebaum, Toker, and French and Russian authors. The journal is now edited by Professor Olga Cooke at Texas A&M University. The first issue contains an excellent "selected bibliography of historical works on the Gulag," by W.T. Bell and M. Elie, and in the following double issue (numbers 3–4) there is a Gulag historiography, also by W.T. Bell. ↩

13
See "Interview: Anne Applebaum Discusses Peter Weir's New Gulag Film, ‘The Way Back,' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 26, 2010. ↩

14
Of course, what we really need in this multimedia age is a Shoah for the Gulag, although it is probably now too late. ↩
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by abhishek_sharma »

MEDICINE:

On Cancer and People
Thoru Pederson
The Emperor of All Maladies A Biography of Cancer by Siddhartha Mukherjee Scribner, New York, 2010. 595 pp. $30, C$34.99. ISBN 9781439107959.

http://www.sciencemag.org/content/332/6028/423.1.full
Following the story of cancer from its first recorded appearance through to the ongoing efforts to conquer it presents a daunting challenge even for a specialist historian of medicine. In The Emperor of All Maladies, oncologist Siddhartha Mukherjee reveals that he is an engaging writer, commands a considerable breadth of knowledge of cancer in antiquity and through the ages, and, less surprisingly, can expound thoughtfully on where cancer detection and treatment stand today.

Mukherjee (a physician and researcher at Columbia University) clearly crafted his book for those readers usually referred to as “the educated lay audience”—folks who watch the Charlie Rose Show and read at least the New York Times if not the New York Review of Books. I can imagine such readers responding to the author's enjoyable style, turning pages not in a frenzy but steadily. Practicing physicians (whether oncologists or not), medical school teachers, biomedical researchers, fellows, residents, and students may even be more engaged. (For example, a young rheumatology professor who has always wanted to know more about the development of chemotherapy, a topic lying just outside her field, will be well rewarded.) In this respect the book reminded me of Iain Pears's novel An Instance of the Fingerpost (1), which has attracted legions of rapt ordinary readers along with aficionados of chemistry and physics as practiced in 17th-century Oxford. Of course, one wishes to satisfy as many diverse audiences as possible. The ideal for the scientist-author, achieved by Lewis Thomas, is to gain both broad success and the admiration of one's peers.

Image

First to describe a cancer. The 45th of Imhotep's teaching cases concerns “bulging tumors of the breast.” For therapy, he offered only “There is none.”
SOURCE: NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE/HTTP://IHM.NLM.NIH.GOV



The author describes his book as “not just a journey into the past of cancer, but also a personal journey of [his] coming-of-age as an oncologist.” He notes the earliest known recognition of the illness, a breast cancer included among 48 cases described by the Egyptian physician Imhotep around 2625 B.C.E. He offers a superb sketch of the scant record of cancer from antiquity before leaping over a long interval when not much happened and delving into the late 19th century. He recounts Paul Ehrlich's discovery of the principle of specific affinity and fruitless search for a discriminating anticancer drug as well as William Halsted's introduction of the radical mastectomy (before Halsted became a full-time cocaine addict). And he provides an informative account of the early- to mid-20th-century advent of chemotherapy pioneered by Gertrude Elion and George Hitchings at the Burroughs Wellcome Laboratory and by Sidney Farber at Harvard.

The author does not, however, offer a comprehensive history of cancer medicine. For example, I was surprised that the author discussed the advent of bone marrow transplantation so fleetingly. This became an impressively effective treatment for certain forms of leukemia, yet E. Donnall Thomas, whose efforts in starting it were in due course recognized by a Nobel Prize, is simply mentioned in two widely separated sentences. Readers will find that Mukherjee repeatedly spotlights the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute. That may stem from the book's autobiographical strand, as he trained there. Although the Farber is clearly among the top U.S. centers for cancer research and treatment, there are also important stories from other such centers. Some readers may feel, as I do, that these have been underplayed. Many of my colleagues who have read the book think it is too long, and I agree that a more concise account might have had greater impact. In addition, at places Mukherjee's account is marred by his attempt to weave together too many concurrent stories.

To be fair, I should stress that the book proves Mukherjee is a very fine writer. We can applaud the fact that an active, practicing oncologist far from the end of his career and from having excess time on his hands was willing to make the considerable effort such an informative account requires. Nonetheless, there are places, often in the closings of stories about the treatment of a patient, where the author's tendency to employ dark allusions goes too far. Repeatedly, one senses that “just when there was hope, the veil of darkness descended.” The overuse of such metaphors of Morpheus is distracting and unsettles the book. Whereas a few might have been fine, the recurrent tone is not. The author cannot equal Susan Sontag on disease as existentialism, and he should not have tried to do so.

On balance, many different audiences should find The Emperor of All Maladies a pleasurable read. Although the author, on this evidence, is not as gifted a writer or observer as Oliver Sacks, Atul Gawande, and their ilk, the book represents his first try. I hope that the future brings more of his writing, as medicine and science need talent of his promise.

References

↵ I. Pears, An Instance of the Fingerpost (Jonathan Cape, London, 1997).
Christopher Sidor
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Christopher Sidor »

Today I finished reading the book

The shadow of the Great Game: The untold story of India's Partition
By Narendra Singh Sarila.
ISBN=978-81-7223-874-2
HarperCollins Publishers India.

A wonderful piece of work. The author does draw some erroneous conclusions, but if we strip away the authors view point, we are left with some fantastic gems. There are two chapters exclusively devoted to Kashmir. Especially the part, about the acquisition of northern Kashmir, i.e. gilgit and balatistan, by pakistan.

A disclaimer is in order. I have always believed that Pakistan is a prop by some north Atlantic nations and certain Asian nations, who will utilize it for their own needs. Strategic and Economic. This is a belief that I have held before I have read this book. Further please do not assume that I hold a grudge against contemporary British or Britain.

Some notable points I am giving below
  • By the time partition came, India's status in the British commonwealth or British empire has reversed. From being the economic rational of the British common wealth it became the strategic rational. It was no longer the most lucrative market, for British industry. Rather it was a base from with the oil wells of western asia could be protected, the so called "Wells of Power". India was also a source of limitless fighting manpower whose quality was good.
  • Air power had made its presence felt in Britian, especially the Blitz. Air power was based on oil. Oil was in the Gulf. The Gulf was where the British interest lay post WWII and not India.
  • India was no longer the self-sustaining dynamo. Rather at the end of WWII, Keyenes informed the British Government that it was under a debt of 3 billion pounds and 2 billion pounds were being spent to maintain the empire.
  • The British were stunned by the Congress refusal to take part in WWII. Congress opposed the inclusion of India as the belligerent against the axis power. This made Congress as unreliable in eyes of British raj. Consequently they built up the Muslim league against the the congress.
  • The British saw the northwestern part of Pakistan and Kashmir as the cockpit of the future struggle against Soviet Union. i.e. a continuation of the so called great game. One consequence of the Nazi invasion of Soviet Union was the shifting of the Soviet Industrial might from the European part of Soviet Union to areas east of Urals, i.e. the Asiatic part of Soviet Union. The Urals has been considered in certain Northern Atlantic countries as the boundary between Europe and Asia. These areas were not vulnerable from Western Europe. But could be attacked from NWFP province of undivided India.
  • The predominant oil producing region of Soviet Union was the Caucasus. These areas were also not vulnerable from Europe, but again were vulnerable from NWFP of undivided India.
  • Congress was not prepared to take part in the so called great game or containment of Soviet Union. Nor would it allow India or Indian resources or Indian manpower to be used similarly. The Muslim league was willing on all these three points.
  • The Royal Indian army could not be counted upon to stay loyal. The fact that INA consisted of erstwhile Royal Indian Army officials made an impression. Also the fact that one Sikh, one Hindu and one Muslim generals were able to work in INA made the so called unity of Indian different communities/castes/religions a reality. There was a report by an American officials that the moral of Indian Army was low and it was basically a mercenary army.
  • The great Indian mutiny of 1946 seemed to reinforce the above mentioned point. It was compared again and again to 1857 as the worst point when British rule was the most vulnerable.
  • It appeared to British that the communal flare up was a perfect "antidote" to the anti-British feeling prevalent in India during 1945-47.


Now let me refute some of the incorrect observations of the author.
1) Congress erred in not taking a willing part against the Axis power.
The declaration claiming that India was at war against the axis power was done without any consultations with the Indians. It was a repeat of WWI when India took willing part against the so called aggressor nations. But post WWI the move only consolidated British rule in India. India did not get dominion status nor more self rule. Moreover we had no quarrel with any of the axis powers. It was certain north Atlantic nations and Soviets which had the quarrel with the axis powers.
The fact that we were basically fighting a war on behalf of somebody else is not pointed out by the author. Another fact that the author failed to point out was that Britain dragged India into its war. Finally we were perpetuating somebody else's power with our manpower/resources/location also is not mentioned.

2) Congress erred in launching the quit India movement in 1942.
Congress literally coincided the quit India movement with the peak of axis power.Please refer to the image given below, where black represents the axis power while yellow represents neutral countries.
Image
Courtesy Wikimedia. The Original Image at a higher resolution is given here. The Image is hosted by the courtesy of ImageHousing
The nazis had just reached the oil wells of Caucasus and were threating to over-run Stalingrad, thus cutting off southern Russia from the rest of the country. Apart from the impact of the fall of Stalingrad, which bore Stalin's name and not lenin or marx or some body else, would result, the nazi's came closet to winning the war in 1942. Congress choose the most significant time to launch the agitation.
We should have sat out the WWII, if it were in our hands. There was no different between Churchill and Hitler or between Nazi Germany and Imperial Britain. Both of them were at the end of the day fighting to keep their empires alive. Churchill succeeded while Hitler failed.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by jrjrao »

Image

US Institue of Peace

at Amazon.com

Folks, just a heads-up that this book, which was released last month, is quite a good read. Shiv and other resident Piskology gurus have been saying the same things over the years in this forum, but it is still nice to see it all written up by a DC heavyweight couple, and published by a leading think-tank.

I don't think the Pakis will like this book at all. It is unceasing in its dissection of the India-obsession of the Pakis, and how this makes the Pakis negotiate in the uniquely Paki way with the US.

Woodward's earlier book -- "Obama's Wars" -- had said this: "The term "liars" is frequently deployed by American officials to describe Pakistani negotiators...". This new book expands on this quite a bit.

At 197 pages, this is a slim book and makes for a fast read. It was easily worth the 10 bucks I paid for it at Amazon.com.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »


John W. O'Malley, "Four Cultures of the West"

Publisher: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press | ISBN 10: 0674021037 | 2006 | 272 pages |
The workings of Western intelligence in our day--whether in politics or the arts, in the humanities or the church--are as troubling as they are mysterious, leading to the questions: Where are we going? What in the world were we thinking? By exploring the history of four "cultures" so deeply embedded in Western history that we rarely see their instrumental role in politics, religion, education, and the arts, this timely book provides a broad framework for addressing these questions in a fresh way.

The cultures considered here originated in the ancient world, took on Christian forms, and manifest themselves today in more secular ways. These are, as John W. O'Malley identifies them: the prophetic culture that proclaims the need for radical change in the structures of society (represented by, for example, Jeremiah, Martin Luther, and Martin Luther King, Jr.); the academic culture that seeks instead to understand those structures (Aristotle, Aquinas, the modern university); the humanistic culture that addresses fundamental human issues and works for the common good of society (Cicero, Erasmus, and Eleanor Roosevelt); and the culture of art and performance that celebrates the mystery of the human condition (Phidias, Michelangelo, Balanchine).

By showing how these cultures, as modes of activity and discourse in which Western intelligence has manifested itself through the centuries and continues to do so, O'Malley produces an essay that especially through the history of Christianity brilliantly illuminates the larger history of the West.
Samudragupta
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Samudragupta »

Why Churchill Matters
What is the point of revisiting Winston Churchill's somewhat unsavory career as an imperial praetorian? How about just leaving him on his pedestal (whether he belongs there or not) and moving on to the pressing issues of today - finding a pretext to obliterate Iran; awaiting civil war in Iraq; preparing for the fallout, both radioactive and political, of a nuclear conflagration between India and Pakistan? A new biography by the promising young British historian Richard Toye offers compelling reasons why Churchill remains relevant to a world of international jihad.

Churchill was a late-Victorian imperialist who lived to govern Great Britain in the atomic age. Probably the two key elements to understanding Churchill are that he loved war and that he never swerved from his belief in the rightness of the Empire, even as he succumbed to its inevitable piecemeal disappearance. His decisions and writings and speeches, in and out of government for almost seven decades, resonate to this day in the war-torn third world.

Churchill was born to rule. He learned the arts of rule in the classrooms and playing fields of Harrow and Sandhurst. He served a memorable tour in India, which was a tame place in his young manhood, and then he moved on to various seething outposts of the Empire, both as a soldier and as a journalist. His superior officers encouraged him to wear these two hats because his dispatches invariably reflected well on the Army and its good works on behalf of the great unwashed. He domesticated these civilizing missions as "jolly little wars." They satisfied his youthful craving for adventure, but not his determination to make his mark, and soon he found his way into electoral politics where he spent the rest of his life.

The outbreak of World War I catapulted Churchill into the position of his dreams - first lord of the Admiralty. This put him in charge of the Royal Navy, which, owing to a quadrilateral whose corners were London, Halifax, Bermuda and Gibraltar, enabled Britain to dominate a very substantial chunk of the planet.

Churchill's perch at the Admiralty led him to the first major upset of his career: Gallipoli. Churchill was not esteemed by many for his military genius and Gallipoli was the proof of its absence - British troops were pulverized by Turkish artillery in a foiled amphibious landing. Churchill managed to evade culpability for the tragedy for a while, but eventually he had to leave the Admiralty under a cloud. He found work for a while at the Front, then he returned to government as minister of munitions.

In the wake of the Great War, the British acquired considerable territory from the defeated Ottoman Empire, including Mesopotamia. Having survived the disgrace of Gallipoli, Churchill rose through the ranks of the War Office in Lloyd George's Liberal government. In 1920, Churchill helped to make a fateful decision the consequences of which George W. Bush would have done well to ponder. Churchill had the help of T.E. Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia") and Gertrude Bell, archeologist, explorer, diplomat and, perhaps most importantly, MI6's reigning presence in the Middle East. They cobbled together lands populated by Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds to create an inherently unstable new state, Iraq. In fairness, Churchill and Lawrence were troubled by the wisdom of forcing together peoples who had been at each other's throats almost since the beginning of time, but they were overruled by their superiors. Nevertheless, it is Churchill who is most closely identified with the creation of Iraq; in the words of Miss Bell (as she was generally known by everyone except her many lovers), Churchill played "a crucial role in giving birth to the Middle East we live with today."

Churchill's immediate problem was holding his new creation together as the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds went at each other. He deplored expending British lives in "these thankless deserts." Instead, he advocated air power and "exploring work with gas bombs, especially mustard gas, which would inflict punishment on recalcitrant natives without inflicting grave injury upon them." Not only did George approve Churchill's proposal for chemical warfare but, as Toye writes, "Just as horrifying, if not more so, were the casualties inflicted by machine guns and bombing." Churchill lamented the practice of British soldiers to "fire willfully on women and children," but he did not use his power to stop the carnage. Were he alive today, he would probably call it "collateral damage."

Britain ruled Iraq with a puppet monarch and a garrison of troops to keep order until the end of World War II, after which the tragic nation eventually wound up under the thumb of Saddam Hussein. Churchill's own ideas for keeping the peace in Iraq suggests that he might have found a soul mate in Saddam, who also held Iraq together with crushing force until W. invaded the country and upset the balance of power - or, perhaps more correctly, the balance of terror. The British experience predicts that, with the departure of American troops, the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds will once again soon find their way to each other's throats.

Toye has little to say about the years for which Churchill's admirers would like us to remember him: the 1930s, when he was the most prominent British politician to appreciate the menace of Nazism and to oppose his own prime minister's policy of appeasement (Churchill had abandoned the Liberals in favor of the Conservatives), and his leadership of Britain during the war - a war that bled Britain of its blood and treasure to such a degree that it could no longer hold its Empire together against the torrents of nationalism, communism and religious fanaticism. But the British did not let go easily.

The Tories were swept out of office when the war ended and Churchill loudly led them in opposition while the Labour government of Clement Atlee disposed of Palestine and the jewel in Britain's imperial crown - India.

After having denounced Labour's plan for Indian independence as "Operation Scuttle," he eventually accepted the inevitable and, with uncharacteristic generosity of spirit, wrote to Atlee that the Conservatives would not oppose his plan, which entailed the partition of the Indian subcontinent into a Hindu South (India proper) and a Muslim North (the new state of Pakistan), in the hope that this would put an end to the fierce religious wars that marked the territory. Thanks to nuclear technology and, conceivably, espionage and the meddling of third powers, the Hindus and Muslims now possess the means to give greater import to their theological differences.

In the '20s, Churchill had a hand in governing Palestine - and did so with greater temperance than he displayed in Iraq. Still, as in Iraq and India, Britain was caught up in ancient religious and racial hatreds that it no longer had the strength to contain. Britain's departure in 1948, expedited by the Irgun and the Stern gang and such horrific acts of terror as the blowing up of the King David Hotel, did not pain Churchill so much as the loss of his beloved raj. Zionists have sought to claim Churchill as one of their own, but Toye deems the evidence "unconvincing." A more nuanced verdict might be that Churchill's ambivalence about Jews far outweighed the loathing and contempt he had for Arabs, whom he considered subhuman. It is, therefore, surprising that Churchill thought the Atlee government could have given the Arabs in Palestine "a better deal." For a man as complex and mercurial as Churchill, he was sometimes capable of remarkable prescience: the British exit from Palestine was promptly celebrated by Arabs and Jews in the 1948 War.

Progressives might like to believe that Atlee's nominally socialist government was embarked on a high-minded venture to end British imperialism. Such was not the case. The sacrifice of India and Palestine was not driven by exalted ideology, but by politico-military reality, which was generally unkind to Atlee's imperial designs.

In 1951 the recently elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh, nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which was bleeding Iran of the oil that Churchill had helped to seize back in the 1920s. Mossadegh, a secular nationalist and a firm believer in democracy, created a crisis for the Labour government by depriving it of oil that it required, among other reasons, to fuel the Royal Navy. Buying the oil from Iran at a fair price was not an option for Britain. The favored measure, engineering a coup to replace Mossadegh with a British figurehead, was not feasible because Mossadegh had expelled every British subject, including its MI6 officers who could have done the job. Atlee's government turned to the United States for help. It tried to persuade the Americans to carry out the coup on its behalf. President Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson adamantly refused. Both men supported non-communist, democratic nationalists like Mossadegh, a brilliant, Swiss-educated lawyer who had great plans to raise his country from poverty by capitalizing on its oil wealth. Unfortunately for Iran, the rules of the game changed in 1952 when Dwight Eisenhower was elected to replace Truman, and Churchill was returned to Downing Street. Eisenhower agreed to the British plea for a coup even before he was inaugurated and the deed was executed - with black propaganda, carefully orchestrated riots and demonstrations and a military overthrow of Mossadegh - by the CIA's chief-of-station, Kermit Roosevelt (grandson of Theodore, who shared Churchill's penchant for jolly little wars). With Iran's oil fields secure in friendly hands and the shah securely on his throne, Kermit Roosevelt paid his respects to Churchill, whose greeting was, "Young man, if I had been but a few years younger, I would have loved to have served under your command in this great venture."

The great venture would have its day of reckoning. In the late '70s, the forces of Islamic fundamentalism gained ever-greater momentum, driving a dying shah from the Peacock Throne and establishing a conservative theocracy. In 1979, crowds raging through the streets of Tehran stormed the United States Embassy and seized 52 hostages. The United States endured impotent humiliation until the hostages were finally released after 14 months of harsh captivity. Justice, even this primitive and arbitrary form of justice, was not fully served. The British escaped culpability for inspiring the coup against the enlightened, democratic government of Mossadegh, and conservative mullahs teach a captive nation to hate the United States to this very day.

Winston Churchill had always been a devout believer in hanging. When the Mau Mau Emergency exploded in Kenya in 1953, the government of white settlers responded by hanging blacks, no matter how tenuous their connection to Mau Mau, until their number exceeded 1,000. Toye presents no evidence that Churchill resisted either the executions or the confinement of tens of thousands of blacks in detention camps, or atrocities by the security forces that were worthy of Mau Mau itself. His principal concern seems to have been that the response to Mau Mau gave "a bad odor ... to Britain in the world." London had the authority to correct the bad odor, but the best Churchill could do was urge the settlers, in the vaguest possible way, to "negotiate" - and to assure them that they enjoyed his support. Churchill left office within two years, having accomplished nothing to resolve the Mau Mau Emergency. Toye over generously attributes this to Churchill's decrepitude and his preoccupation with cold war issues. Toye might have added Churchill's patronizing and racist view of blacks and false, nostalgic failure to grasp that Kenya had changed since his visit there in 1907. In the event, the fighting continued until 1957, but it was not until 1960 that the state of emergency was finally lifted, on Harold Macmillan's watch.

One of the most moving vignettes in "Churchill's Empire" (almost sufficient to make us feel pity for the old tyrant) describes an incident that a visitor described when he called upon Churchill not long before he left office. The prime minister was sitting in a chair, staring emptily into space. He began to talk about Anthony Eden's growing impatience as Churchill's long-time No. 2. "Those hungry eyes. Those hungry eyes," he said. "I really should resign. One cannot expect Anthony to live forever."

In fact, Churchill was beginning to have doubts whether Eden was the right person to succeed him, but in the end, he handed Downing Street over to his protégé. This proved to be one of the great mistakes of his long career, because within a year, Eden was charting a course that would lead him to his rendezvous with destiny at Suez. In the wake of that disaster for Britain's influence in the world, Eden was replaced by Macmillan, whose approach to Empire Toye describes as "unromantic." What little remained of Churchill's Empire by the time Macmillan was through with it was swept away by the Labour government of Harold Wilson. In retirement, Churchill told a cousin: "[It] has all been for nothing. The Empire I believed in has gone."

Churchill was surely correct that his Empire belonged to history. In a lifetime spent trying to extend its reach and then in fighting a rearguard action just to hang on to however much of it he could, Churchill left a great deal of damage in his wake. Toye tells the story with impeccable scholarship and elegant prose. Having laid out the facts with such objectivity, one is taken aback by some of his overly generous conclusions. The book can just as well be read as an indictment, but either way, it is likely to remain the definitive history of Winston Churchill's imperial career.
http://www.truth-out.org/why-churchill- ... 1304014308
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by abhishek_sharma »

ON CHINA: By Henry Kissinger, Illustrated. 586 pp. The Penguin Press. $36.

Review
Henry Kissinger was not only the first official American emissary to Communist China, he persisted in his brokerage with more than 50 trips over four decades, spanning the careers of seven leaders on each side. Diplomatically speaking, he owns the franchise; and with “On China,” as he approaches 88, he reflects on his remarkable run.

To the degree that Washington and Beijing now understand each other, it is in good measure because Kissinger has been assiduously translating for both sides, discerning meaning in everything from elliptical jokes to temper tantrums. At every juncture, he has been striving to find “strategic concepts” that could be made to prevail over a history of conflict, mutual grievance and fear. As President Nixon’s national security adviser, then secretary of state for Nixon and Gerald Ford, and since 1977 as a private interlocutor extraordinaire, Kissinger has been unwaveringly committed to surmounting what he considers the legitimate Chinese resentment of American interference in their internal affairs and Americans’ distaste for China’s brutal suppression of ethnic, religious and political dissent.

The surprise buried in his lumbering review of Sino-American relations is that the much ballyhooed Nixon-Kissinger journeys to China in 1971-72 turned out to have been the easy part. “That China and the United States would find a way to come together was inevitable given the necessities of the time,” he writes. “It would have happened sooner or later whatever the leadership in either country.” Both nations were exhausted from war (Vietnam, clashes on the Soviet border) and domestic strife (antiwar protests in Nixon’s case, the Cultural Revolution in Mao’s). Both were determined to resist Soviet advances and so could quickly agree to make common cause. The menace of Moscow took the leaders’ minds off confrontations in Vietnam and Taiwan and quelled their ritual denunciations, whether of international imperialism or Communism. They decided that the adversary of my adversary was my pal, and for more than a decade that was fruitfully that.

But that was a different time. China finally escaped from Mao Zedong’s mad doctrine of perpetual revolution and from the enfeebling nostrums of central planning; it became an industrial powerhouse. The Soviet Union and its empire collapsed. And the United States, feeling supreme, began promoting democracy with missionary zeal even as it grew dangerously addicted to foreign oil, goods and credit. The radical shift in the balance of power turned China and the United States into mutually dependent economic giants, but it left them without an overarching strategic design of partnership.

It is to demonstrate the need for such a design that Kissinger reviews the ups and downs of Sino-American relations, reaching even into ancient Chinese history to define national characteristics. (He finds it apt that the Chinese like to play “wei qi,” or “go,” a protracted game of encirclement while we play chess, looking for control of the center and total victory.) Kissinger draws heavily on much recent scholarship and on notes of his trips to Beijing to celebrate the pragmatism of Mao’s successors. He says they are content to remain within their restored historic frontiers, willing to await a peaceful reunion with Taiwan, and most determined to continue their remarkable economic growth and to eradicate China’s still widespread poverty. He is less confident about America’s capacity to sustain a steady foreign policy, noting that “the perpetual psychodrama of democratic transitions” is a constant invitation to other nations to “hedge their bets” on us.

As students of Kissinger well know, he has long considered democracy to be a burden on statecraft — both the clamor of democracy within the United States and our agitations for democracy in other lands.

He recalls yet again his agonies in office in the 1970s, when he thought that American demonstrations during the Vietnam War could have misled Mao into believing that a “genuine world revolution” was at hand. He argues that the “destruction” of Nixon in the Watergate crisis, the withdrawal of Congressional support for Vietnam, new curbs on presidential war powers and the “hemorrhaging” of intelligence secrets all combined to undermine the quasi alliance with China, making America appear ineffectual against the Soviets. He is glad that Jimmy Carter did not let his human rights concerns upset relations with China and that Ronald Reagan’s cheerful personality overcame the “almost incomprehensible contradictions” of his dealings with Beijing even as he promoted the idea of an independent Taiwan.

The severest test of the quasi alliance, of course, was the brutal suppression of democratic strivings in Tiananmen Square in 1989. That violent crackdown also tested Kissinger’s tolerance for the assertion of American values in foreign relations.

Looking back, he believes everything depends on circumstances: “There are instances of violations of human rights so egregious,” he writes, “that it is impossible to conceive of benefit in a continuing relationship; for example, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and the genocide in Rwanda. Since public pressure shades either into regime change or a kind of abdication, it is difficult to apply to countries with which a continuous relationship is important for American security. This is especially the case with China, so imbued with the memory of humiliating intervention by Western societies.”

And so Kissinger admires the way President George H. W. Bush, “with skill and elegance,” walked the “tightrope” of punishing China with sanctions after Tiananmen while simultaneously apologizing with private letters and special emissaries. President Bill Clinton tried applying pressure for a time, Kissinger notes, but was shown no gratitude when he wisely relented; the Chinese “did not view the removal of a unilateral threat as a concession, and they were extraordinarily touchy regarding any hint of intervention in their domestic affairs.” And President George W. Bush, despite his “freedom agenda,” earns Kissinger’s praise for overcoming “the historic ambivalence between America’s missionary and pragmatic approaches,” by means of “a sensible balance of strategic priorities.”

If America’s preference for democratic governance is made the main condition for progress on other issues with China, Kissinger concludes, “deadlock is inevitable.” Those who battle to spread American values deserve respect. “But foreign policy must define means as well as objectives, and if the means employed grow beyond the tolerance of the international framework or of a relationship considered essential for national security, a choice must be made.” That choice “cannot be fudged,” he insists, even as he attempts to protect his flanks with a fudge of his own: “The best outcome in the American debate would be to combine the two approaches: for the idealists to recognize that principles need to be implemented over time and hence must be occasionally adjusted to circumstance; and for the ‘realists’ to accept that values have their own reality and must be built into operational policies.”

Still, in the end, Kissinger votes for national security über alles. Scattered through his history are tributes to American values and commitments to human dignity, which may indeed sometimes drive our policies beyond calculations of the national interest. Exactly that happened, in fact, after “On China” went to press, when President Obama ventured into Libya. Kissinger was perhaps surprised when that humanitarian intervention and bid for regime change failed to evoke a Chinese veto at the United Nations. But in Asia now more than Europe, he argues, “sovereignty is considered paramount,” and any attempt “from the outside” to alter China’s domestic structure “is likely to involve vast unintended consequences.” Besides, as he used to insist while practicing realpolitik in Washington, the cause of peace is also a moral pursuit.

This central theme of Kissinger’s experience and counsel must be distilled from the sometimes ­meandering and largely familiar history he tells in “On China.” Only in its last pages does he discuss the essential question of future Sino-American relations: With no common enemy to bind them, what will keep the peace and promote collaboration and trust between the world’s major ­powers?

Kissinger addresses this question by looking to the past, a memorandum written by a senior official of the British Foreign Office, Eyre Crowe, in 1907. Crowe argued that it was in Germany’s interest to “build as powerful a navy as she can afford” and that this would itself lead to “objective” conflict with the British Empire, no matter what German diplomats said or did. There is today a “Crowe school of thought” in the United States, Kissinger observes, which sees China’s rise “as incompatible with America’s position in the Pacific” and therefore best met with pre-emptively hostile policies. He perceives growing anxieties in both societies and fears they are exacerbated by Americans who claim that democracy in China is a prerequisite for a trusting relationship. He warns that the implied next cold war would arrest progress in both nations and cause them to “analyze themselves into self-fulfilling prophecies” when in reality their main competition is more likely to be economic than military.

Indulging his habitual preference for diplomatic architecture, Kissinger insists that the common interests the two powers share should make possible a “co-evolution” to “a more comprehensive ­framework.” He envisions wise leaders creating a “Pacific community” comparable to the Atlantic community that America has achieved with Europe. All Asian nations would then participate in a system perceived as a joint endeavor rather than a contest of rival Chinese and American blocs. And leaders on both Pacific coasts would be obliged to “establish a tradition of consultation and mutual respect,” making a shared world order “an expression of parallel national aspirations.”

That was indeed the mission of the very first Kissinger journey to Beijing. And while he does not quite say so, he invests his hopes in a concert of nations represented, of course, by multiple Kissingers.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Rony »

brihaspati wrote:Abhishek_Sharma ji,
Airavat, Atri, Jambudvipa ji all will be able to give you better lists than me! Some of the books I would suggest are already there in Rony ji's list.

My personal track is to try and read up the sources if possible first. So for me, I would start with
(1) RigVeda, Satapatha Brahmana, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad
(2) The basic Puranas
(3) The basic samhita' and smritis - dharmasutras - especially Manu, Boudhayana, Apastambha, Gautama.
(4) Arthsastra
(5) Buddhist historical scholarship, Vanabhatta, Fahien and Hieuen Tsang
(6) Jaina histories of western India
(7) Rajatarangini, all the Persian chronicles about India - Chachnama/Biladuri, Utbi, Firishta, Lahori et al
(8) Foreign travellers of the late medieval
(9) History of Punjab/Gujarat/Karnataka/Bengal/ available in regional languages from comparable periods.

This is going nowhere! I will try to make a list but cannot do this before Friday. Are there specific questions or areas you are interested in exploring- then we can try to make a feasible list!


Brihaspati Garu,

Did you have some time to make the list of History books on India, particularly on Ancient Indian and Middle age Indian History ? Atri garu, Airavat garu , Jambudriva garu and any other person who are well versed in history can pool in as well. There are many people out there who want to read Indian history untainted by marxist and colonial interpretations but dont know what books to purchase.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Airavat »

Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan

Also http://www.archive.org has digitized historical records, which can be read online.
Last edited by Airavat on 18 May 2011 07:12, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, & Colonization By Walter D. Mignolo
Publisher: Unive.rsity of Michigan Press 1998 | 428 Pages | ISBN: 047210327X , 0472089315 |




The Darker Side of the Renaissance weaves together literature, semiotics, history, historiography, cartography, and cultural theory to examine the role of language in the colonization of the New World. Exploring the many connections among writing, social organization, and political control, including how alphabetic writing is linked with the exercise of power, Walter D. Mignolo claims that European forms of literacy were at the heart of New World colonization. It has long been acknowledged that Amerindians were at a disadvantage in facing European invaders because native cultures did not employ the same kind of texts (hence "knowledge") that the Europeans valued. Yet no one but Mignolo has so thoroughly examined either the process or the implications of conquest and destruction through language. The book continues to challenge commonplace understandings of New World history and to stimulate new colonial and postcolonial scholarship.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Christopher Sidor »

Today I finished reading a book
The Age of Airpower
Author = Martin van Creveld
First Edition
ISBN = 978-1-58648-981-6 (hardcover)

There is an excellent review of this book by New York Times. A detailed bio of the authour, Martin Van Creveld is available at Wikipedia.

But first a disclaimer. This book is written with an american audience in mind. Further it does seem that this book was written to refute the claim that air power on its own is sufficient to assure victory, something which Donald Rumsfeld and his so called "Revolution in Military Affairs" belief propounded to the hilt. This is reinforced by the earlier writings of the same author. So we have to keep this bias into mind before we sit down to read this book.

Air power came on its own in World War-II. Till then it was seen as a branch to the existing Army or Navy. It was the British and the Germans which actually separated the air wing from army and made it into a full fledged service on par with military and navy. But in the process while army lost its air wing, the navy was able to retains its air wing as independent of the air force. This has continued till date for all the modern armed forces.

The initial service chiefs of air force sought to bring under their control everything that flew. Including missiles. Both Strategic and Tactical. However due to constraints this could not be achieved. Rather control of strategic missiles, i.e. missiles carrying nuclear and thermonuclear warheads, was handed over to an entirely new force. In fact by the time of WW-II got over the american air chiefs were dominated by a group called as Bomber mafia. They held beliefs such as "The Bomber always get through." They held with disdain all the fighters due to their severe range and endurance limitations. It was not until the very late 1944s that a fighter, i.e. the American Mustang, capable of providing fighter escort to the bombers right until Berlin, was made available. Also due to the limited nature of air-defense systems like flak and anti-aircraft guns, the belief that "The Bomber would always get through," became a dogma.

It is worth noting that without the development of the bomber it would not have been possible for the nuclear age to dawn. Barring the bomber there was no delivery mechanism available for the first nuclear bomb. This has significant lessons as far as India is concerned. You see nuclear weapons on their own are useless. They need delivery vehicles. Either planes or missiles. This lesson we learnt in the late 1980s in our conflict with China on the Himalayas. We had the bomb, but we did not have the means to throw it across the Himalaya Mountain range. If we are able to deny Pakistan the delivery systems of nuclear weapons, i.e. its missiles and F-16s, we are essentially impairing Pakistan's ability to use its nuclear weapons.

It was not until the late 1950s when the first Intermediate Range Ballastic Missiles, i.e. IRBMs, began to make an appearance that a significant dent in the role of the bomber arose. Further the role of the bomber reduced significantly with the progress of the air defense systems. Add to this was the fact that the cost of keeping the SAC on constant standby and keeping a portion of bombers constantly in air was exorbitant. And in fact it remains till date exorbitant. No other country, baring US has maintained a fleet like SAC, constantly on standby.
Futher with the growth of SLBMs even the second strike capability of air force bombers was degraded. While Submarines could be remain hidden and launch their missiles at will, Bombers even with Air-to-Ground Missiles were unable to function in the role. For example the air launched cruise missiles that could be launched from bombers had ranges of some 1500 miles. Far less than the ranges of SLBMs. This is even if one omits the warhead carrying capacity of these missiles.
So it was Missiles which changed the dogma to "The Missiles always get through." Slowly and surely the bomber fleet was relegated to a back burner. The last development which happened was the stealthy B-2/B-1 and the normal B-52 bombers. Post 1980s no new bomber development program has been initiated by any country. Due to cost and the effectiveness the bombers are slated to go into history museums. It is noteworthy to trace out american bomber development program to understand its scope and true dimensions.

Each B-29, which dropped the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and nagasaki, cost some 6 lakh USD to make in WW-II. In 2009's equivalent prices the cost of B-29 bomber was computed to a value of 1.1 Crore USD. This is discounting the fact, that development of B-29 cost almost the same amount as the development of the first atomic bomb did. Further by the time Cold war came about B-29 were obsolete. B-29's could not reach most of their targets inside the Soviet Union.

So the Americans developed the B-36 bombers. Cost of each B-36 was USD 41 Lakhs. Then also the basic weakness of B-29s were not over come. A B-36 flying from US could only reach Germany. Add to this the fact that B-36 was not flying faster than B-29 which made it vulnerable to Mig-15's and to other surface-to-air missiles which the soviets had. To overcome the B-36 limitations, two new bomber programs were initiated B-47 and B-52.

Initially the B-47 could not carry the Thermonuclear weapons. When this issue was resolved another was not, namely the lack of inter-continental range of B-47.

It was not until B-52 appeared on the scene that the Americans had truly an inter-continental range bomber which could carry all the nuclear ordinances. By this time Soviets had built up exceptionally well interceptors and Surface to air missiles.

So work shifted to stealth bombers. The result was B-1 and B-2 bombers, so expensive to acquire and sustain that they became pariah to many pilots. Consider this, a B-2 required air-conditioned hangars to operate. It is estimated a B-2 requires 119 hours of maintenance per hour of flight. The B-2 could not operate alone. By the time they ended up being used against the serbs, they had to be escorted by electronic warfare aircrafts. This disproved one of the so called advantages of B-2, i.e. the ability to fly missions on its own. Further the B-2's operating out of US took 30 hours to drop some 12 tons of ordinance on the serb's. Another ominous development as far as stealth bombers were concerned came in the same war. The Serbs managed to shoot down a F-117 Stealth aircraft. This raised a question mark on the capability of stealth aircraft to go undetected.

The Story of the Bomber and air-defenses is the classical story of sword and the shield. In this case the shield, i.e. air-defenses, has rendered the sword ineffective. But this is not the only story in this book. There are some more, worth recounting.

For example in WW-II some B-29s landed in soviet controlled territories. While the crew were repatriated, the aircraft were not. Further the cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were to face the horror of nuclear bombing were spared the murderous bombing runs of USAAF, which burnt to ground tokyo and other cities. The reason was "so that the first
atom bombs could be tested on them and the precise results studied in detail." These two cities were going to serve as a lab rats for the first nuclear bomb run of human history.

Basically while no war, be it on land or sea, can be won without air supremacy, air power on its own does not assure one of victory. Nor can air-power substitute for boots on the ground. This is important as far as India is concerned. There are some advocates in US which are claiming that with the death of Osama Bin Laden, it is time to abandon Af-Pak. So called "Mission Complete" moment. To take care of terrorist operating out of this area, drones and air-strikes should be used. Or to paraphrase one of the proponents of this approach, "the sky over af-pak will be permanently darkened."
The problem with this scenario is that in a low-intensity conflict like terrorism air-power is ineffective. What is required is boots on the ground. No country or entity has surrendered to an air-power bombardment alone, neither Britian, nor Nazi-Germany, nor Nippon japan, nor Iraq and nor Taliban.
Hitler could not bring Britain to her knees by using bombers.
Ditto for Britain and US, who carried out murderous raids over Nazi Germany and Japan but failed to break them.
In fact even Japan did not surrender to the twin atomic bombings or to the indiscriminate bombing runs by USAAF. So intense and indiscriminate were the bombings that the american would have run out of targets in two months had the bombings continued. Rather what compeled the japanese to surrender was the loss of Manchuria to the soviets in a period of less than a month which made their position untenable. The loss of Manchuria meant the annihilation of the Kwantung Army. It also meant that the IJA fighting in China was cut off from Korea and its land link to Japan.
Iraq also showed that air-power alone was not able to either overthrow saddam or drive him away from kuwait. It took a land invasion to achieve all its objectives.
In case of Afghanistan, the country itself had very few targets which could be hit by air. And if northern alliance had not been there, then another force of similar nature would have to be created.
But if Americans are hell bent on handing over afghanistan to taliban or neo-taliban, then we need to seriously re-think our support to them in the af-pak theater. Maybe it time for India to activate alternative options as far as Afghanistan is concerned.


While this book is a must read for what can be achieved by air power and what are its severe limitations, it does have its drawbacks.
It does not fully explore the revolutionary nature of Unmanned aerial vehicles, UAV/Drones. These will truly be the next revolutionary in air power. If introduction of jet fighter was the last revolution in air power, then UAV and drones are the next wave.
They allow an air force to over come the weakest link in the air force chain of command. Humans. With pilot-less drones, we can dream of aerial tankers which can remain airborne for weeks. Or UAV-AWACs which can perennial provide us with a cover. We can truly have round the clock aerial patrols and stand off missions. We can imagine fighters which can undergo G forces which are unthinkable right now. This will open up new missions which till date were not possible. Imagine a series of armed drones keeping a watch over the Himalayas and able to be called into service at any slight hint of incursion of PLA or PLAAF. Or keeping tabs on all the non-Indian Navy underwater and surface assets in Indian ocean. The list goes on and on.
Further the growth of ABM has not been explored. Right now ABM does not have the ability to provide a 100% shield against BM. But it is improving. Even in our own neighborhood, India's development of ABM system has forced Pakistan to scale up its nuclear weapons and associated delivery vehicles. ABM forces ones opponent to pause and think. Even an imperfect ABM does that. Slowly and surely, just like the sword and the shield, the power is shifting towards ABM and away from BM. And just as SAMs and interceptor fighters slowly and steadily drove away the bombers from the air, ABM will slowly degrade the capability of BM. It will not happen over night, but in a gradual manner.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by abhishek_sharma »

Kissinger and China: JUNE 9, 2011
Jonathan D. Spence

On China: by Henry Kissinger, Penguin, 586 pp., $36.00
It is hard to fit Henry Kissinger’s latest book, On China, into any conventional frame or genre. Partly that is because the somewhat self-deprecatory title conceals what is, in fact, an ambitious goal: to make sense of China’s diplomacy and foreign policies across two and a half millennia, and to bring China’s past full circle in order to illuminate the present. In form, the book is highly idiosyncratic, for it is not exactly a memoir, or a monograph, or an autobiography; rather it is part reminiscence, part reflection, part history, and part intuitive exploration.

To borrow a current phrase, it is a “hybrid vehicle,” and a more accurate title, it seems to me, would have been something like Variations on a Theme in China. If we keep that in mind as a working subtitle, then we can see how the book follows six sequential themes: China’s early history, China’s inadequate attempts to modify the imperial system of the later dynasties, the formative years of Maoist consolidation, Kissinger’s own experiences while orchestrating President Nixon’s 1972 China visit, China’s later cycles of “opening up” and repression under Deng Xiaoping, and a surprise final section that ingeniously links pre–World War I British and German expansion to some of the current problems facing the United States and China today.

For Henry Kissinger, ancient China was a subtle place. That in turn led to its special resonance in the present: “In no other country,” he writes, “is it conceivable that a modern leader would initiate a major national undertaking by invoking strategic principles from a millennium-old event,” as Mao often did in discussing policy matters. And Mao “could confidently expect his colleagues to understand the significance of his allusions.” How could it not be so? For “Chinese language, culture, and political institutions were the hallmarks of civilization, such that even regional rivals and foreign conquerors adopted them to varying degrees as a sign of their own legitimacy.” “Strategic acumen” shaped China’s earliest international policies; and to support its central position it could call on a remarkable series of potential followers and aides.

A good example was the Chinese scholar known in the West as Confucius, who taught by citing examples to a small group of loyal and dedicated students. They reciprocated by drawing on their conversations for practical examples that could create a legacy on his behalf—forming a canon that Kissinger describes as “something akin to China’s Bible and its Constitution combined.” Whereas in the Western world “balance-of-power diplomacy was less a choice than an inevitability,” and “no religion retained sufficient authority to sustain universality,” for China foreign contacts did not form “on the basis of equality.”

Kissinger’s reflections about the Western and Chinese concepts of strategy lead him to posit a stark distinction, one in which “the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage,” while “the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces.” It is a good way for Kissinger to prepare the reader for a dualistic approach to two vast philosophical and military traditions, which he begins by summarizing the key differences between the Chinese players of the board game weiqi (the Japanese go) and those favoring the contrasting game of chess. While chess is about the clash of forces, about “decisive battle” and the goal of “total victory,” all of which depend on the full deployment of all the pieces of the board, weiqi is a game of relative gain, of long-range encirclement, which starts with an empty board and only ends when it “is filled by partially interlocking areas of strength.”

Teachers and practitioners of grand strategy have studied these contrasts between the two for many centuries. The principles of weiqi are echoed in the haunting text known as The Art of War, by a certain Master Sun, writing around the same time as Confucius. Kissinger quotes Sun at some length, drawing especially on his insights into the concepts of “indirect attack” and “psychological combat.” (“One could argue,” says Kissinger, “that the disregard of [Master Sun’s] precepts was importantly responsible for America’s frustration in its recent Asian wars.”) As the talented translator of classical Chinese John Minford renders one of the maxims by Master Sun quoted by Kissinger:

Ultimate excellence lies
Not in winning
Every battle
But in defeating the enemy
Without ever fighting.



Master Sun succinctly lists his favored tactics for success in order of their priorities and effectiveness: first on the list is an all-out attack on the enemy’s strategy, second comes an attack on his alliances, then comes an attack on his armies, followed by an attack on his cities. “Siege warfare,” says Master Sun, “is a last resort.”

How then did this subtle and complex China collapse as completely as it did, left to flounder, apparently helpless, in the vicious currents of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? In what I would call the second section of his variations, Kissinger gives a partial answer, one that focuses on the various cultural, economic, and political blows that hit China in numbing succession, from the arrival of Lord Macartney’s mission in 1793, seeking expanded trade and residence rights, to the opium wars, the internal rebellions, the Christian sectarians, down to the Boxers of 1900 and the collapse of the imperial regime itself. Somewhat undercutting his previous discussion, Kissinger suggests that “centuries of predominance had warped the Celestial Court’s sense of reality. Pretension of superiority only accentuated the inevitable humiliation.”

At the same time some of those weiqi pieces were still in play: “Chinese statesmen played their weak hand with considerable skill and forestalled what could have been an even worse catastrophe,” defying the basic rules of balance of power politics. Rapidly sketching some of the survival strategies of Chinese political realists in the nineteenth century, Kissinger argues that “the rearguard defense to maintain an independent Chinese government was a remarkable achievement.” In the later nineteenth century, he writes, the Chinese scored some real successes against Western aggression by using those tried and true methods of pitting enemy against enemy, with one central irony being that the fading government expected its most skillful officials to “gain time without a plan for using the time they gained.” He recognizes that resorting to appeasement of major powers like Russia and Japan made sense in a situation where “some degree of conciliation [was] the only prudent course,” given the fact that a rapidly weakening China was no longer in a position “to make its defeat costly beyond the tolerance of the stronger.”

The narrative becomes somewhat blurred here, owing to the remarkable confluence of events in China’s quest for a new order. Rebellions, military modernization, transformative education, assertive foreign powers demanding ever fresh “concessions”—all overlapped, compounded by the swift rise of Japan, which between 1894 and 1905 defeated the fleets and the land armies of both China and Russia. With the coming of the New Culture Movement in 1919, the activities of the Third International (the Comintern), and the 1921 founding of the Chinese Communist Party, Kissinger appears somewhat overwhelmed, and the reader might perhaps be wise to skip to what I see as the third of the main variations, where the chapter title “Mao’s Continuous Revolution” signals to the reader that Kissinger is approaching the areas of his analytical expertise as a China-watcher and professional diplomat.

In describing the early years of the Communist revolution in China, Kissinger tells us plainly where he stands emotionally. As he phrases it, “at the head of the new dynasty that, in 1949, poured out of the countryside to take over the cities stood a colossus: Mao Zedong.” He shifts the image but not the cosmic idea when he tells us that Mao lived “a lifetime of titanic struggle.” Despite these awesome attributes, Kissinger also admits that the main years of Mao’s power proved that it was “impossible to run a country by ideological exaltation.” The attempt to do so ended by making tens of millions of Chinese lives almost unbearable—one might be tempted to say “inconceivable,” while “millions died to implement the Chairman’s quest for egalitarian virtue” in the famine between 1958 and 1962.

Kissinger notes that the famine was “one of the worst” in human history and assesses the deaths at over 20 million (some scholars recently have estimated twice that number as probable1). As to the Cultural Revolution toll between 1966 and 1969, he gives no estimates, but accepts the current judgment that “the result was a spectacular human and institutional carnage,” one primed by “the assaults of teenage ideological shock troops.” Yet it was the Chinese people themselves who gave Mao’s impossible challenges a kind of foundation because of “his faith in [their] resilience, capabilities, and cohesion.” “And in truth,” says Kissinger, “it is impossible to think of another people who could have sustained the relentless turmoil that Mao imposed on his society.”

The remark is close to harsh in its moral judgment of the Chinese population as a whole. Why did the Chinese even try to “sustain” this “turmoil”? Was it out of fear? Or out of the same kind of unwavering faith in transformation that Mao had been preaching since the Teens of the twentieth century? By way of explanation, Kissinger repeats that “only a people as resilient and patient as the Chinese could emerge unified and dynamic after such a roller coaster ride through history.”

Thinking about Mao in power gives Kissinger the chance to circle back to some of the themes with which he opened his variations. “No previous Chinese ruler,” we are told,

"combined historical elements with the same mix of authority and ruthlessness and global sweep as Mao: ferocity in the face of challenge and skillful diplomacy when circumstances prevented his preference for drastic overpowering initiatives."

Mao’s flamboyant rhetoric certainly made plenty of noise in the four-year Chinese civil war (1945–1949) that followed the defeat of Japan, but it was not necessarily a match for Stalin’s canniness, as could be seen at the time of the preliminary sparring between Stalin and Mao at the very beginnings of the Korean War: the Russian response to North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, both approving an invasion of the south and refusing to provide assistance (“If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help”), “was authentically Stalin,” writes Kissinger: “haughty, long-range, manipulative, cautious, and crass.”

Indeed, as Kissinger’s absorbing chapter on the Korean War shows, Mao was by no means always successful when dealing with the master manipulator himself. “The trouble with policy planning,” Kissinger notes, in a passage that suggests both his lifetime of diplomacy and its attendant travails, “is that its analyses cannot foresee the mood of the moment when a decision has to be made.” Or, to put it another way, in Korea “a Chinese offensive was a preemptive strategy against dangers that had not yet materialized and based on judgments about ultimate American purposes toward China that were misapprehended.” The confrontations were compounded by the fact that not one “of the many documents published to date by all sides reveals any serious discussion of a diplomatic option by any of the parties.” Overall, Kissinger concludes, in his detailed coverage of the Korean War, Stalin was the biggest loser, and the PRC achieved “something more than a draw…. [The war] established the newly founded People’s Republic of China as a military power and center of Asian revolution,” and showed that China was “an adversary worthy of fear and respect.”

With the fourth of the variations, “The Road to Reconciliation,” On China makes a major shift in mood and content, becoming in part a first-person narrative, as Kissinger himself enters the story as President Nixon’s national security adviser during the bold and ultimately successful quest to arrange a meeting between Mao and Nixon in Beijing, with an accompanying account of diplomatic exploration of the science of the possible. Readers seeking to find chapters on the Vietnam War as detailed as those on the Korean War will be disappointed—Kissinger remains muted on many aspects of the Vietnam war as it was viewed in the United States, and links the war to his earlier patterns of historical thinking, claiming:


"When the US buildup in Vietnam began, Beijing interpreted it in wei qi terms: as another example of American bases surrounding China from Korea, to the Taiwan Strait and now to Indochina…. Hanoi’s leaders were familiar with Sun Tzu’s Art of War and employed its principles to significant effect against both France and the United States. Even before the end of the long Vietnam wars, first with the French seeking to reclaim their colony after World War II, and then with the United States from 1963 to 1975, both Beijing and Hanoi began to realize that the next contest would be between themselves for dominance in Indochina and Southeast Asia."

Although much of the Nixon visit to China has been covered by the principals themselves in their published memoirs, the bibliography and notes to On China give helpful leads to many other sources. They enable Kissinger to recall the work of his advance team—and then the President’s February 1972 visit to Mao—in a sustained narrative that neatly blends the personal with the national sides of the story. Kissinger obviously derived immense pleasure from negotiating this China trip and from all his other visits at the highest levels—fifty or more, according to his own calculation—that came afterward.

Even if Mao was a somewhat tarnished colossus by this time, there is also Zhou Enlai to continue the tale, and then later Jiang Zemin, Deng Xiaoping, and other ministerial-level Chinese officials. Cumulatively these transcribed minutes help us to see the gradual changes in policy when both sides were willing to risk rebuff. Reprising his first variation, Kissinger reflects on how, from 1972 onward, “what we encountered was a diplomatic style closer to traditional Chinese diplomacy than to the pedantic formulations to which we had become accustomed during our negotiations with other Communist states.” Here, to his obvious delight, “was a diplomacy well suited to China’s traditional security challenge,” preserving a “civilization surrounded by peoples who, if they combined, wielded potentially superior military capacity.” China, Kissinger observes, prevailed by “fostering a calibrated combination of rewards and punishments and majestic cultural performance. In this context, hospitality becomes an aspect of strategy.”

As an added plus, there was the chance to get to know Zhou Enlai, a consummate courtier, politician, and diplomat, who “dominated by exceptional intelligence and capacity to intuit the intangibles of the psychology of his opposite number.” In a nicely constructed summary of the two main Chinese leaders, Kissinger writes of their special attributes:

"Mao dominated any gathering; Zhou suffused it. Mao’s passion strove to overwhelm opposition; Zhou’s intellect would seek to persuade or outmaneuver it. Mao was sardonic; Zhou penetrating. Mao thought of himself as a philosopher; Zhou saw his role as an administrator or a negotiator. Mao was eager to accelerate history; Zhou was content to exploit its currents."

The subsequent leader-to-leader meetings in Beijing went well and it may very well be true, as Kissinger writes, that the Nixon trip was “one of the few occasions where a state visit brought about a seminal change in international affairs.”

How swiftly, nevertheless, things could change: the Watergate crisis and the resignation of President Nixon on August 8, 1974, led, in Kissinger’s words, “to a collapse of congressional support for an activist foreign policy in the subsequent congressional elections in November 1974.” This was accompanied by an “enfeebling [of] the American capacity to manage the geopolitical challenge,” which in this situation meant above all a policy by which the US would weaken the Soviet build-up on China’s borders.

Kissinger tells us that “the destruction of the President who had conceived the opening to China was incomprehensible in Beijing,” though one might question whether Mao and Zhou were genuinely so astonished. Watergate was surely no more harmful and unanticipated than the sudden destruction of Mao’s selected successor, the minister of defense and army marshal Lin Biao. Lin was accused of trying to kill Mao in a 1971 coup, and subsequently was himself killed when the plane in which he was trying to escape to the Soviet Union, along with several of his family members, crashed in Mongolia. Even after this long passage of time, Kissinger carefully refers to the drama as being “reportedly an abortive coup.”

Mao himself jocularly noted in an aside to Nixon that

"in our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad…. As for the Soviet Union, they finally went to dig out the corpses, but they didn’t say anything about it."

Each side could (and did) exaggerate the subtlety of the other. Mao felt no hindrance to “defying laws both human and divine” or—as Kissinger glosses Mao’s use of the familiar Chinese idiom—”trampling law underfoot without batting an eyelid.”

Equally hard to predict were the astonishing changes brought to China after Mao’s death in 1976, and the return to power of the thrice-purged Party veteran Deng Xiaoping, which provides the setting for the fifth variation. In his 1979 visit to the United States, which Kissinger labels “a kind of shadow play,” Deng made a dramatically favorable impression. Like the earlier Chinese strategists admired by Kissinger, Deng could pursue contrasting policies at once: thus in early 1979, for instance, while he was charming his hosts in the United States, he not only also ordered Chinese troops into Vietnam, to counter Soviet influence there, but also arrested and ordered harsh prison sentences for many of the Chinese artists and writers who had been participating in the short-lived flourishing of demands for more freedom of expression known as “Democracy Wall.”

It now seems inevitable—though it was not—that Deng’s ten years of close to absolute power after 1979 must have led inexorably to the immense demonstrations and subsequent massacres of 1989 in Tiananmen Square. We can note the caution of Kissinger’s language, as he writes that the events of spring 1989 were not due to a single cause, but that “it was the unprecedented confluence of disparate resentments that escalated into upheaval.” More simply put, “events escalated in a manner neither observers nor participants thought conceivable at the beginning of the month.”

Recent events in North Africa and the Middle East may help to underline Kissinger’s sardonic reflection that “the occupation of the main square of a country’s capital, even when completely peaceful, is also a tactic to demonstrate the impotence of the government, to weaken it, and to tempt it into rash acts, putting it at a disadvantage.” As to the “harsh suppression of the protest,” writes Kissinger, that was “all seen on television.” In fact, I believe it is still accepted by most analysts in the West that the television lights were turned out on the square, and much of the killing took place in darkness—hence the great disparity in reports of what happened where, and when, and of how many fatalities there really were. Such figures are needed if one is to separate random from deliberate use of lethal power.

So was Deng Xiaoping a tyrant or a reformer, or an intricate mixture of the two? Some of the most absorbing pages of Kissinger’s book deal with the uses of diplomacy shortly after the Tiananmen crackdown, and the differences in response that were in play. He discusses how President George H.W. Bush sent a personal letter to Deng on June 21, 1989, in which he spelled out the issues concerning sanctions and other steps as he saw them, while at the same time he referred to Deng as a “friend,” despite what had so recently occurred. In the same letter, Bush talked of the United States as a “young country,” especially when contrasted to the “history, culture and tradition” of China.

To reinforce some of the themes in the letter concerning the best methods for damage control in the circumstances, on July 1 the President sent Brent Scowcroft (his national security adviser), together with Lawrence Eagleburger (deputy secretary of state), in a military transport plane to meet with Deng and the Chinese premier, Li Peng. In the ensuing discussion seeking some balance between violent suppression and the threat to order, Kissinger observes, “the difficulty was that both sides were right.” The letter and the talks do seem, however, to have led to a reopened dialogue, and in November 1989 Kissinger was invited to Beijing in a private capacity to continue the Bush/Scowcroft overtures.

The most intriguing materials in Kissinger’s depiction of his own personal meetings with Deng Xiaoping concern the various alternatives for solving the impasse over the treatment of the celebrated Chinese astrophysicist and writer on democracy Fang Lizhi. Witty and acerbic, sharp and funny in debate, Fang, the ousted vice-president of the prestigious Chinese University of Science and Technology, had for several years been openly advocating free speech and assembly.2 During the crackdown (and manhunt) that followed Tiananmen he had been sheltered in the American embassy, and faced severe punishment if the Chinese authorities got hold of him. Kissinger reports that after he told Deng that “your best friends in America would be relieved if some way could be found to get him [Fang] out of the Embassy and let him leave the country,” Deng then personally unscrewed the microphones between his and Kissinger’s chairs, to ensure that confidentiality was maintained. Asked by Deng what solution he could see to the problem of Fang, Kissinger tells us that he told the Chinese leader:

"My suggestion would be that you expel him from China and we agree that as a government we will make no political use of him whatsoever. Perhaps we would encourage him to go to some country like Sweden where he would be far away from the US Congress and our press. An arrangement like this could make a deep impression on the American public…."

True to his training in politics during the Mao years, Deng “wanted more specific assurances” and asked Kissinger: “What would you think if we were to expel him after he has written a paper confessing to his crimes?” Kissinger doubted that Fang would agree to write such a confession, and told Deng:

"If he says that the American government forced him to confess, it will be worse for everyone than if he did not confess. The importance of releasing him is as a symbol of the self-confidence of China."

It was a delicate line to tread, and one that certainly suggested curbing some of Fang’s rights to freedom of expression, as long as it could be done tactfully.

In fact, while staying in the embassy, Fang wrote an essay, “The Chinese Amnesia,” published in these pages after his release, deploring the ways that “the Communists’ nefarious record of human rights violations” had been “largely overlooked by the rest of the world.”3 Fang and his wife were finally flown to the UK in an American military plane, and after a spell in Cambridge and Princeton he was subsequently appointed a professor of physics at the University of Arizona. Among other writings, in 1996 he published in these pages an essay (with Perry Link) commenting on the need for “freedom to criticize and dissent” in China,4 and he served for years as both a board member and cochair of the organization Human Rights in China; otherwise he seems to have concentrated mainly on his scholarly work.

The remaining chronological chapters of On China bring Kissinger’s own dealings with China close to the present, by looking at the later Deng reforms and the transition to the next generations of leaders, from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, with his reiterated calls for China’s “peaceful rise.” In this post-Deng period, after the negotiated agreements on the future of Hong Kong, Kissinger feels that China’s leaders

"no longer made any claim to represent a unique revolutionary truth available for export. Instead, they espoused the essentially defensive aim of working toward a world not overtly hostile to their system of governance or territorial integrity and buying time to develop their economy and work out their domestic problems at their own pace."

Kissinger calls this a “foreign policy arguably closer to Bismarck’s than Mao’s: incremental, defensive, and based on building dams against unfavorable historical tides.” One consequence was the Chinese determination “to prove their imperviousness to outside pressure.” As the former premier Li Peng put it in a talk with Secretary of State Warren Christopher in 1994, “China’s human rights policy was none of [the US’s] business.”

The direct reference to Bismarck’s policies lays a foundation for Kissinger’s sixth and last variation, designed to draw his arguments together, especially those on “balance of power” and the possibilities of meaningful diplomacy. To effect this transition, Kissinger has chosen a classic of pre–World War I diplomacy, known most commonly by its author’s name as the “Crowe Memorandum.” Eyre Crowe was a career official in the British Foreign Office, an omnicompetent tabulator of the European balance of power and the burgeoning arms race, a mine of information on the so-called Western section of the Foreign Office (which he supervised), a master of the statistical skills needed to assemble the relevant information in the vast Foreign Office files, and with a special knowledge of Germany—he was born to a German mother, lived in Germany until he was seventeen, and had married a German woman.

Crowe’s celebrated twenty-three-page memorandum, handed in to British Foreign Secretary Earl Grey on New Year’s Day of 1907, took a hard-eyed realist’s view of the march of European international politics, with special focus on the naval arms race in which England and the recently unified Germany appeared to be locked. Crowe’s conclusion was sharp and devastating. Whether Germany chose to spread its influence by the force and richness of its cultural inheritance, or chose to project its strength by constant pressures on the British Empire and its many colonial dependencies, it essentially had no choice in the matter of survival: “In either case Germany would clearly be wise to build as powerful a navy as she can afford.” England’s choice of options was also limited. Given Germany’s urgent race for expansion, England was faced with a similarly stark choice:

"England must expect that Germany will surely seek to diminish the power of any rivals, to enhance her own by extending her dominion, to hinder the co-operation of other States, and ultimately to break up and supplant the British Empire."

The Crowe Memorandum is a document projecting a kind of ruthless common sense rather than profound complexity. Perhaps for that reason, as Kissinger explains, there are senior military officers and policymakers in both China and the United States today who, more than a century after Crowe, wonder whether his formulations could be adapted to the present time so as to replace early-twentieth-century Germany and England with the choices facing China and the United States today. In its most direct form, this might point to a possible struggle between the two major powers in the Pacific, in a situation with room for only two major protagonists, only one of whom can win. The main riposte to this argument is to seek a richer pattern of alliances in the current century, and to diversify trade in resources, minerals, and cultural relics in a nonthreatening way that can promise wide-scale access to valued resources without major greed and disagreements.

Some of these answers can be found in the early texts with which Kissinger began his book; some can be seen in the patterns of political and commercial assertiveness that we are now witnessing in both China and the United States. But we need to remember one fact, small but relevant, that Kissinger does not pursue: namely, Crowe’s memorandum did not go unchallenged. The most important critique came from another senior career officer in the Foreign Office, Thomas Henry Sanderson (1841–1923), who on February 21, 1907, handed to Grey his own careful assessment and criticism of Crowe’s logic. After reading Sanderson’s countermemo, Grey exclaimed that “somewhat to my surprise he [Sanderson] has taken up the cudgels for Germany.”

What Sanderson wrote in his own notations to Crowe’s memorandum was that

"Germany is a helpful, though somewhat exacting friend, that she is a tight and tenacious bargainer, and a most disagreeable antagonist. She is oversensitive about being consulted on all questions on which she can claim a voice….Her motto has always been “Nothing for nothing in this world, and very little for sixpence.”"

With China substituted for Germany this is perhaps not a bad description of how things stand at the moment. As for Sanderson’s depiction of the old British Empire in 1907, that too was trenchantly written, and one can only hope that it does not apply to the United States today. “It has sometimes seemed to me,” wrote Sanderson,

"that to a foreigner reading our press the British Empire must appear in the light of some huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream."

Both of the memos, Sanderson’s and Crowe’s, were marked “secret.” But they could not both be right. Either Germany had to be stopped in her tracks or England had to lose her paramount global position. No clear decision had been taken when—seven and a half years later—World War I broke out in Europe.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Hiten »

if anybody is looking to read a book about India's foreign policy as viewed by an outsider - a Canadian diplomat Davide Malone Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy [Amazon]

Please read and review

an interview with him
http://www.dnaindia.com/blogs/post.php?postid=2749

could've done without the title and book cover cliches, though
svinayak
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by svinayak »

Image
No go
The Western politician who understands China best tries to explain it—but doesn’t quite succeed
May 19th 2011 | from the print edition


On China. By Henry Kissinger. Penguin Press; 586 pages; $36. Allen Lane; £30. Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk

CHINESE and American leaders have been sniping at each other in public again. This month Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, discussing political reform, told the Atlantic magazine that China’s leaders were “trying to stop history, which is a fool’s errand”. This may have been what provoked Wang Qishan, a Chinese deputy prime minister, to tell a television interviewer that Americans were “simple” (perhaps “innocent” conveys the Chinese word better), and have trouble understanding China, “because it is an ancient civilisation, and we are of the Oriental culture.”

Mr Wang will applaud Henry Kissinger’s latest work, a distillation of more than 40 years of involvement with China and its leaders, and an unabashedly Orientalist affirmation of the otherness of the country. The most riveting chapters deal with Mr Kissinger’s leading roles in the Nixon administration as it established links with Mao Zedong’s China. The well-known story bears retelling by a central protagonist who made his first, secret trip in July 1971, pleading illness to take a few days out of his official schedule while on a visit to Pakistan. President Richard Nixon’s own trip in 1972, which had been initiated by Mr Kissinger, was indeed a “week that changed the world”, as China and America ganged up to deter Soviet expansionism.

Foreign policy
Mr Kissinger’s encounters with the urbane, conciliatory prime minister, Zhou Enlai, and the elliptical, moody Mao—and indeed with every senior Chinese leader since—make gripping reading. Some of Mao’s allusively poetic dialogue, in particular, is beyond parody: “At the approach of the rain and the wind the swallows are busy.” The panoramic authority with which the Chinese leaders (and their interlocutor) dissect the world is breathtaking.

But Mr Kissinger is not telling all. He recounts how, in the years beforehand, more than 100 exploratory meetings in Warsaw had made no progress because of Taiwan, which America still recognised as “the Republic of China”. It is not clear when or why America abandoned its notion that China should commit itself to peaceful reunification as a precondition for a presidential visit. China has never renounced the threat of invasion.

Nor does Mr Kissinger explain the thinking behind the communiqué signed after Nixon’s first visit, in which America acknowledged “that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” Large numbers of people in Taiwan have never maintained any such thing. But for China’s leaders, and, it seems Mr Kissinger himself, public opinion anywhere outside the United States is not really a factor when the geopolitical stakes are so high.

Before Mr Kissinger himself enters the narrative, the reader is offered 200 pages of history of modern China and its foreign relations. Most of this is uncontentious and well told. But it is marred by three related flaws. The first is Mr Kissinger’s insight that Chinese strategists think like players of wei qi or Go, which means that, in the long term, they wish to avoid encirclement. Westerners are chess-players, tacticians aiming to get rid of their opponents’ pieces “in a series of head-on clashes”, he writes. “Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.”


This conceit has been used by other authors. It appears every few pages here like a nervous tic. Even before Mr Kissinger joins the game, the metaphor is pulled into service to analyse, among other things, Chinese policy in the Korean war, the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s (where, of course, “both sides were playing by wei qi rules”), the 1962 war with India (“wei qi in the Himalayas”). Later he describes events in Indochina as “a quadripartite game of wei qi”, just at the time when genocide was under way in Cambodia.

Second, the picture of Chinese foreign policy, as formulated by cool, calculating, master strategists playing wei qi, makes it appear more coherent, consistent and effective than it has been. China’s involvement in the Korean war, for example, led, in Mr Kissinger’s phrase, to “two years of war and 20 years of isolation”, hardly a goal for China—or a wei qi triumph.

Third, Mr Kissinger gives little weight to the fact that Mao, Zhou and the others were in fact communists. In power they soon replicated some of the forms of an imperial court, and China’s history always mattered more to them than “Das Kapital”. But one cannot ignore the influence of Mao’s adaptation of Marxist ideology on his foreign policy, let alone the importance to domestic politics of the Leninist structures imposed on the Chinese Communist Party in the 1920s, which still wears well.

In a rare admission of a blunder, Mr Kissinger recounts the only time he saw Zhou lose his serenity—at a banquet in Beijing in November 1973 when Mr Kissinger said that China had remained “essentially Confucian in its belief in a single, universal, generally applicable truth”. Communism, he suggested, had established Marxism as the content of that truth.

This was an extraordinary gaffe. Zhou was under indirect attack by Mao’s cronies through a campaign criticising Confucius. But his reaction also illustrates the prickliness of Chinese leaders when foreigners presume to pronounce on the eternal verities of Chinese culture.

If even the venerable Mr Kissinger can be caught out, what hope for American statesmen far less familiar with China? The problems that have beset relations since he left the stage are not surprising. His book describes the important role he played as an intermediary in trying to resolve the worst crisis—after the Beijing massacre of 1989. Shortly afterwards, the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the relationship of its “defining shared purpose”.

Since then, America’s relations with China have been marked by a startling increase in economic interdependence, but not by any onset of mutual trust. Mr Kissinger notes that in the post-1989 era, China’s foreign-policy posture has been “closer to Bismarck’s than Mao’s”. It has, you could say, taken up chess.

In his closing chapter Mr Kissinger finally turns to the big question: does China’s astonishingly rapid rise condemn it to inevitable conflict with America? He notes the similarities with the rise of Germany a century ago and the inevitable threat it posed to the British empire. America and China, too, could easily fall into a cycle of escalating tension that would be hard to break. Optimistically, Mr Kissinger insists that “were history confined to the mechanical repetition of the past, no transformation would ever have occurred.” But on how to avoid such repetition, he is disappointingly vague.
http://www.economist.com/node/18709581
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by SwamyG »

Breaking India This book has been mentioned by several people, including me, several times in BRF. If you know nothing about the book, please click on the link read that website and return here....I will wait.................................

.....Now that you know what the book is about, I will not getting into the actual content of the book. I will not provide a normal review - you can google and find better reveiws. I like to show you why you need to buy this book for reference. Please support the author and such initiative by buying this book. So what do I mean by that? For regular readers of BRF, IF and other yahoo groups there is nothing new from a big picture perspective. However, the authors provide tonnes of data and details that you can use it elsewhere. It is all neatly placed in one book for you. You don't have to go to Wiki or google books or check with BRF asthana gurus.

1. When you are talking to someone, say about the American government's role in supporting evangelisation of India; the other person commands you "Prove it!"; you then say "Wait a minute", and then pull this book from your backpack and show him or her all the references (if you have a bad memory like me). Else you can go on and on about what Clinton and Bush did; and what Obama continues to do - you will during the course of the discussion talk about USAID, USCIRF, IRFA, DFN etc. To beat the matter into the other guy's head you can quote FCRA numbers too. {this has been discussed in IF by some of us}

2. If you are talking or fighting with someone on the Internet that the British created/made the caste system rigid; invariably the other person will laugh at you and mock you for even suggesting that. So after reading this book, you can quote with authority what Risley did to morph jati-varna into race - you will also talk about how Risley used the ridiculous Nasal Index. You will also be able to trace his work back to Max Muller. Your opponent by now would have come to the conclusion that you know your stuff; and that is when you kick your discussion up a notch to finish the opponent by bringing in Monier Williams, Willam Jones, Stewart Chamberlain, Joseph Gobineau, Rudolph Grau, Adolphe Pictet, Ernest Renan, Karl Schlegel, Johann Herder etc etc. Your opponent accepts he was wrong at laughing at you or beats a hasty retreat; hopefully someone else was hearing or reading your points - it will change their minds for sure.

I think I must have made my point by now on why you should buy this book now or add it to your wish list.....if not you are a {fill in the blanks onlee}

I wish the authors had spent some more time in tweaking their language, at times it appears like reading a blog or discussion forum. I guess it is the style of Rajiv Malhotra that he imbibed by writing in Sulekha, Yahoo groups and elsewhere for almost a decade. Sometimes, one wishes the authors provided little more data when making a point. Then the book would have gone over thousand pages - it is already 600+ pages now. So at times, when they make conclusion it seems a stretch or almost like a CT. Such instances are rare though.

Also, they provide the information in variety of ways - apart from text, they arrange important content in neat and compact diagrams and charts.

If you have spare money, then buy extra copies donate to your library or gift it to someone you want to convince.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

Hyman P. Minsky, "Stabilizing an Unstable Economy"
McGraw-H ill | ISBN: 0071592997 | 2008 |
In his seminal work, Minsky presents his groundbreaking financial theory of investment, one that is startlingly relevant today. He explains why the American economy has experienced periods of debilitating inflation, rising unemployment, and marked slowdowns-and why the economy is now undergoing a credit crisis that he foresaw. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy covers:
* The natural inclination of complex, capitalist economies toward instability
* Booms and busts as unavoidable results of high-risk lending practices
* “Speculative finance” and its effect on investment and asset prices
* Government's role in bolstering consumption during times of high unemployment
* The need to increase Federal Reserve oversight of banks

Henry Kaufman, president, Henry Kaufman & Company, Inc., places Minsky's prescient ideas in the context of today's financial markets and institutions in a fascinating new preface. Two of Minsky's colleagues, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Ph.D. and president, The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, and L. Randall Wray, Ph.D. and a senior scholar at the Institute, also weigh in on Minsky's present relevance in today's economic scene in a new introduction.
A surge of interest in and respect for Hyman Minsky's ideas pervades Wall Street, as top economic thinkers and financial writers have started using the phrase “Minsky moment” to describe America's turbulent economy. There has never been a more appropriate time to read this classic of economic theory.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by svinayak »

The King Whisperers: Power Behind the Throne, from Rasputin to Rove
Kerwin Swint PhD (Author)



Publisher: Union Square Press; 1 edition (March 1, 2011)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 9781402772016
ISBN-13: 978-1402772016
ASIN: 1402772017

The book talks about Kautilya.
At its core The King Whisperers by Kerwin Swint is a study of the proverbial power behind the thrones of history.

Swint takes the reader on a journey through history delving into events spanning thousands of years, exploring individuals who, in varying ways, helped establish, guide, influence or control those who ruled.

At first blush one may be tempted to pass over such a work thinking it lacked focus, was too broad in its undertaking or, even that it was going to be too academic to be engaging to all but those in, well, academia. After all, Swint is an academic himself.

However, you would be wrong. On all counts.

The King Whisperers, just shy of 300 pages, is divided into 10 distinct categories based upon characteristics of each Whisperer. Each of the 10 sections profiles multiple individuals.

To address such a large number of individuals throughout history in such a short work is quite a promise to make. However, Swint delivers on this promise.

Swint populates each category with profiles of individual Whisperers and in doing so sets out some of the most remarkable tales I've read in sometime.

The starting point was logical - Niccolo di Bernardo Dei Machiavelli; however, as with all of the profiles, Swint does more than simply regurgitate history, rather he demystifies Machiavelli and allows the reader to understand that Machiavelli, while focused in his efforts, was not the most Machiavellian of those in history, either before of after him.

Throughout the book Swint moves from profile to profile allowing the reader to understand how certain individuals appeared, sometimes from no where, sometimes by self appointed divine right, sometimes through the military or traditional politics, to wield the power behind the throne. His use of categories as a vehicle to better understand the particular Whisperers' style and approach could not be better formulated.

For instance, one of his categories, Schemers, addresses individuals who literally clawed their way to the top. They lied, cheated, betrayed and rose to their respective seats of power in often less than ethical ways.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

Lesley Hazleton - After the Prophet: The Epic Story of the Shia-Sunni Split in Islam

Publisher: Doubleday (September 15, 2009) | Language: English | ISBN-10: 0385523939 | 256 pages |
Much American foreign policy has been shaped by the centuries-old disagreement between Islam's two main factions, and yet Americans in general, and our politicians in particular, often can't tell Sunnis from Shi'ites. With the publication of this outstanding book, we no longer have any excuse. Hazleton ties today's events to their ancient roots, resurrecting seventh century Arabia with reverence and vivid immediacy. Here are rich recreations of the lives of the Prophet Muhammad and his beloved wife Aisha; here are often overlooked details (why is green the color of Islam? why do some Muslim women veil?) filling in the contours of the narrative. The battle to name Muhammad's successor is gripping—but it is Hazleton's ability to link the past and present that distinguishes this book: the main issue is again what it was in the seventh century—who should lead Islam?—played out on an international level. Where Ali once struggled against Muawiya, Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia today vie with each other for influence. Anyone with an interest in the Middle East, U.S.-international relations or a profound story masterfully told will be well served by this exceptional book.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Rony »

Nagapattinam To Suvarnadwipa: Reflections On The Chola Naval Expeditions To Southeast Asia
The expansion of the Cholas from their base in the Kaveri Delta saw this growing power subdue the kingdoms of southern India, as well as occupy Sri Lanka and the Maldives, by the early eleventh century. It was also during this period that the Cholas initiated links with Song China. Concurrently, the Southeast Asian polity of Sriwijaya had, through its Sumatran and Malayan ports, come to occupy a key position in East-West maritime trade, requiring engagement with both Song China to the north and the Chola kingdom to its west. The apparently friendly relations pursued were, however, to be disrupted in 1025 by Chola naval expeditions against fourteen key port cities in Southeast Asia. This volume examines the background, course and effects of these expeditions, as well as the regional context of the events. It brings to light many aspects of this key period in Asian history. Unprecedented in the degree of detail assigned to the story of the Chola expeditions, this volume is also unique in that it includes translations of the contemporary Tamil and Sanskrit inscriptions relating to Southeast Asia and of the Song dynasty Chinese texts relating to the Chola Kingdom.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

Peter H. Wilson, "Europe's Tragedy: A History of the Thirty Years War"
Allen Lane | 2009 | ISBN: 0713995920 | 1024 pages |
From the Defenestration of Prague in 1618 until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, brutal warfare swept across Europe. In his monumental study of the causes and the consequences of the Thirty Years War, Wilson, a professor of history at the University of Hull in England, challenges traditional interpretations of the war as primarily religious. He explores instead the political, social, economic as well as religious forces behind the conflict—for example, an Ottoman incursion left the Hapsburg Empire considerably weakened and overshadowed by the Spanish empire. Wilson then provides a meticulous account of the war, introducing some of its great personalities: the crafty General Wallenstein; the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus, who preserved his state through canny political treaties and military operations; and Hapsburg archdukes Rudolf and Matthias, the brothers whose quarrels marked the future of Bohemia, Austria and Hungary. By the war's end, ravaged as all the states were by violence, disease and destruction, Europe was more stable, but with sovereign states rather than empires, and with a secular order. Wilson's scholarship and attention to both the details and the larger picture make his the definitive history of the Thirty Years War.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

Henry Corbin, "Alone with the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi"
Princeton University Press | 1998 | ISBN: 0691058342 | 454 pages

"Henry Corbin's works are the best guide to the visionary tradition.... Corbin, like Scholem and Jonas, is remembered as a scholar of genius. He was uniquely equipped not only to recover Iranian Sufism for the West, but also to defend the principal Western traditions of esoteric spirituality."--From the introduction by Harold Bloom

Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240) was one of the great mystics of all time. Through the richness of his personal experience and the constructive power of his intellect, he made a unique contribution to Shi'ite Sufism. In this book, which features a powerful new preface by Harold Bloom, Henry Corbin brings us to the very core of this movement with a penetrating analysis of Ibn 'Arabi's life and doctrines.

Corbin begins with a kind of spiritual topography of the twelfth century, emphasizing the differences between exoteric and esoteric forms of Islam. He also relates Islamic mysticism to mystical thought in the West. The remainder of the book is devoted to two complementary essays: on "Sympathy and Theosophy" and "Creative Imagination and Creative Prayer." A section of notes and appendices includes original translations of numerous Su fi treatises.

Harold Bloom's preface links Sufi mysticism with Shakespeare's visionary dramas and high tragedies, such as The Tempest and Hamlet. These works, he writes, intermix the empirical world with a transcendent element. Bloom shows us that this Shakespearean cosmos is analogous to Corbin's "Imaginal Realm" of the Sufis, the place of soul or souls.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by svinayak »

Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy
Stephen M. Walt (Author)
320 pages Publisher: W. W. Norton; First Edition edition (September 19, 2005)
In lamenting the feckless Bush Administration policies that have put the U.S. in a deep hole in terms of its international standing and alliances, Walt observes that the U.S. is "a remarkably immature Great Power," and that "Americans remain remarkably ignorant of the world" (p. 245). In contrast to the spate of immature, ignorant books currently flooding the market, calling for a global War on Islam, among other amazing hare-brained ideas, TAMING AMERICAN POWER is a refreshing voice of sanity.

It is the merit of Stephen Walt's, to have been gathered a lot of little pieces in a framework that would capture the situation like this: 1) Why other states fear the US primacy? 2) What strategies can states pursue in response to US primacy? 3) What can the US do about #2?
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by abhishek_sharma »

The ‘Dramatic Picture’ of Richard Feynman: Freeman Dyson

Quantum Man: Richard Feynman’s Life in Science
by Lawrence M. Krauss
Norton, 350 pp., $24.95

Feynman
by Jim Ottaviani, with art by Leland Myrick and coloring by Hilary Sycamore
First Second, 266 pp., $29.99
Image
Richard Feynman, circa 1985 (Credit: Shelley Gazin/Corbis)

In the last hundred years, since radio and television created the modern worldwide mass-market entertainment industry, there have been two scientific superstars, Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawking. Lesser lights such as Carl Sagan and Neil Tyson and Richard Dawkins have a big public following, but they are not in the same class as Einstein and Hawking. Sagan, Tyson, and Dawkins have fans who understand their message and are excited by their science. Einstein and Hawking have fans who understand almost nothing about science and are excited by their personalities.

On the whole, the public shows good taste in its choice of idols. Einstein and Hawking earned their status as superstars, not only by their scientific discoveries but by their outstanding human qualities. Both of them fit easily into the role of icon, responding to public adoration with modesty and good humor and with provocative statements calculated to command attention. Both of them devoted their lives to an uncompromising struggle to penetrate the deepest mysteries of nature, and both still had time left over to care about the practical worries of ordinary people. The public rightly judged them to be genuine heroes, friends of humanity as well as scientific wizards.

Two new books now raise the question of whether Richard Feynman is rising to the status of superstar. The two books are very different in style and in substance. Lawrence Krauss’s book, Quantum Man, is a narrative of Feynman’s life as a scientist, skipping lightly over the personal adventures that have been emphasized in earlier biographies. Krauss succeeds in explaining in nontechnical language the essential core of Feynman’s thinking. Unlike any previous biographer, he takes the reader inside Feynman’s head and reconstructs the picture of nature as Feynman saw it. This is a new kind of scientific history, and Krauss is well qualified to write it, being an expert physicist and a gifted writer of scientific books for the general public. Quantum Man shows us the side of Feynman’s personality that was least visible to most of his admirers, the silent and persistent calculator working intensely through long days and nights to figure out how nature works.

The other book, by writer Jim Ottaviani and artist Leland Myrick, is very different. It is a comic-book biography of Feynman, containing 266 pages of pictures of Feynman and his legendary adventures. In every picture, bubbles of text record Feynman’s comments, mostly taken from stories that he and others had told and published in earlier books. We see Feynman first as an inquisitive five-year-old, learning from his father to question authority and admit ignorance. He asks his father at the playground, “Why does [the ball] keep moving?” His father says, “The reason the ball keeps rolling is because it has ‘inertia.’ That’s what scientists call the reason…, but it’s just a name. Nobody really knows what it means.” His father was a traveling salesman without scientific training, but he understood the difference between giving a thing a name and knowing how it works. He ignited in his son a lifelong passion to know how things work.

After the scenes with his father, the pictures show Feynman changing gradually through the roles of ebullient young professor and carnival drum-player, doting parent and loving husband, revered teacher and educational reformer, until he ends his life as a wrinkled sage in a losing battle with cancer. It comes as a shock to see myself portrayed in these pages, as a lucky young student taking a four-day ride with Feynman in his car from Cleveland to Albuquerque, sharing with him some unusual lodgings and entertained by an unending stream of his memorable conversation.

One of the incidents in Feynman’s life that displayed his human qualities sharply was his reaction to the news in 1965 that he had won a Nobel Prize. When the telephone call came from Stockholm, he made remarks that appeared arrogant and ungrateful. He said he would probably refuse the prize, since he hated formal ceremonies and particularly hated the pompous rituals associated with kings and queens. His father had told him when he was a kid, “What are kings anyway? Just guys in fancy clothes.” He would rather refuse the prize than be forced to dress up and shake hands with the King of Sweden.

But after a few days, he changed his mind and accepted the prize. As soon as he arrived in Sweden, he made friends with the Swedish students who came to welcome him. At the banquet when he officially accepted the prize, he gave an impromptu speech, apologizing for his earlier rudeness and thanking the Swedish people with a moving personal account of the blessings that the prize had brought to him.

Feynman had looked forward to meeting Sin-Itiro Tomonaga, the Japanese physicist who shared the Nobel Prize with him. Tomonaga had independently made some of the same discoveries as Feynman, five years earlier, in the total isolation of wartime Japan. He shared with Feynman not only ideas about physics but also experiences of personal tragedy. In the spring of 1945, Feynman was nursing his beloved first wife, Arline, through the last weeks of her life until he watched her die from tuberculosis. In the same spring, Tomonaga was helping a group of his students to survive in the ashes of Tokyo, after a firestorm devastated the city and killed an even greater number of people than the nuclear bomb would kill in Hiroshima four months later. Feynman and Tomonaga shared three outstanding qualities: emotional toughness, intellectual integrity, and a robust sense of humor.

To Feynman’s dismay, Tomonaga failed to appear in Stockholm. The Ottaviani-Myrick book has Tomonaga explaining what happened:

"Although I sent a letter saying that I would be “pleased to attend,” I loathed the thought of going, thinking that the cold would be severe, as the ceremony was to be held in December, and that the inevitable formalities would be tiresome. After I was named a Nobel Prize awardee, many people came to visit, bringing liquor. I had barrels of it. One day, my father’s younger brother, who loved whiskey, happened to stop by and we both began drinking gleefully. We drank a little too much, and then, seizing the opportunity that my wife had gone out shopping, I entered the bathroom to take a bath. There I slipped and fell down, breaking six of my ribs… It was a piece of good luck in that unhappy incident."

After Tomonaga recovered from his injuries, he was invited to England to receive another high honor requiring a formal meeting with royalty. This time he did not slip in the bathtub. He duly appeared at Buckingham Palace to shake hands with the English Queen. The Queen did not know that he had failed to travel to Stockholm. She innocently asked him whether he had enjoyed his meeting with the King of Sweden. Tomonaga was totally flummoxed. He could not bring himself to confess to the Queen that he had got drunk and broken his ribs. He said that he had enjoyed his conversation with the King very much. He remarked afterward that for the rest of his life he would be carrying a double burden of guilt, first for getting drunk, and second for telling a lie to the Queen of England.

Twenty years later, when Feynman was mortally ill with cancer, he served on the NASA commission investigating the Challenger disaster of 1986. He undertook this job reluctantly, knowing that it would use up most of the time and strength that he had left. He undertook it because he felt an obligation to find the root causes of the disaster and to speak plainly to the public about his findings. He went to Washington and found what he had expected at the heart of the tragedy: a bureaucratic hierarchy with two groups of people, the engineers and the managers, who lived in separate worlds and did not communicate with each other. The engineers lived in the world of technical facts; the managers lived in the world of political dogmas.

He asked members of both groups to tell him their estimates of the risk of disastrous failure in each Space Shuttle mission. The engineers estimated the risk to be of the order of one disaster in a hundred missions. The managers estimated the risk to be of the order of one disaster in a hundred thousand missions. The difference, a factor of a thousand between the two estimates, was never reconciled and never openly discussed. The managers were in charge of the operations and made the decisions to fly or not to fly, based on their own estimates of the risk. But the technical facts that Feynman uncovered proved that the managers were wrong and the engineers were right.

Feynman had two opportunities to educate the public about the causes of the disaster. The first opportunity concerned the technical facts. An open meeting of the commission was held with newspaper and television reporters present. Feynman was prepared with a glass of ice water and a sample of a rubber O-ring seal from a shuttle solid-fuel booster rocket. He dipped the piece of rubber into the ice water, pulled it out, and demonstrated the fact that the cold rubber was stiff. The cold rubber would not function as a gas-tight seal to keep the hot rocket exhaust away from the structure. Since the Challenger launch had occurred on January 28 in unusually cold weather, Feynman’s little demonstration pointed to the stiffening of the O-ring seal as a probable technical cause of the disaster.

The second opportunity to educate the public concerned the culture of NASA. Feynman wrote an account of the cultural situation as he saw it, with the fatal division of the NASA administration into two noncommunicating cultures, engineers and managers. The political dogma of the managers, declaring risks to be a thousand times smaller than the technical facts would indicate, was the cultural cause of the disaster. The political dogma arose from a long history of public statements by political leaders that the Shuttle was safe and reliable. Feynman ended his account with the famous declaration: “For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.”

Feynman fought hard to have his statement of conclusions incorporated in the official report of the commission. The chairman of the commission, William Rogers, was a professional politician with long experience in government. Rogers wished the public to believe that the Challenger disaster was a highly unlikely accident for which NASA was not to blame. He fought hard to exclude Feynman’s statement from the report. In the end a compromise was reached. Feynman’s statement was not included in the report but was added as an appendix at the end, with a note saying that it was Feynman’s personal statement and not agreed to by the commission. This compromise worked to Feynman’s advantage. As he remarked at the time, the appendix standing at the end got much more public attention than it would have if it had been part of the official report.

Feynman’s dramatic exposure of NASA incompetence and his O-ring demonstrations made him a hero to the general public. The event was the beginning of his rise to the status of superstar. Before his service on the Challenger commission, he was widely admired by knowledgeable people as a scientist and a colorful character. Afterward, he was admired by a much wider public, as a crusader for honesty and plain speaking in government. Anyone fighting secrecy and corruption in any part of the government could look to Feynman as a leader.

Image
Richard Feynman giving a lecture on quantum electromagnetics in 1983, from Jim Ottaviani and Leland Myrick’s Feynman



In the final scene of the comic book, Feynman is walking on a mountain trail with his friend Danny Hillis. Hillis says, “I’m sad because you’re going to die.” Feynman replies, “Yeah, that bugs me sometimes too. But not as much as you think. See, when you get as old as I am, you start to realize that you’ve told most of the good stuff you know to other people anyway. Hey! I bet I can show you a better way home.” And Hillis is left alone on the mountain. These images capture with remarkable sensitivity the essence of Feynman’s character. The comic-book picture somehow comes to life and speaks with the voice of the real Feynman.

Twenty years ago, when I was traveling on commuter trains in the suburbs of Tokyo, I was astonished to see that a large fraction of the Japanese commuters were reading books, and that a large fraction of the books were comic books. The genre of serious comic-book literature was highly developed in Japan long before it appeared in the West. The Ottaviani-Myrick book is the best example of this genre that I have yet seen with text in English. Some Western readers commonly use the Japanese word manga to mean serious comic-book literature. According to one of my Japanese friends, this usage is wrong. The word manga means “idle picture” and is used in Japan to describe collections of trivial comic-book stories. The correct word for serious comic-book literature is gekiga, meaning “dramatic picture.” The Feynman picture-book is a fine example of gekiga for Western readers.

The title of Krauss’s book, Quantum Man, is well chosen. The central theme of Feynman’s work as a scientist was to explore a new way of thinking and working with quantum mechanics. The book succeeds in explaining without any mathematical jargon how Feynman thought and worked. This is possible because Feynman visualized the world with pictures rather than with equations. Other physicists in the past and present describe the laws of nature with equations and then solve the equations to find out what happens. Feynman skipped the equations and wrote down the solutions directly, using his pictures as a guide. Skipping the equations was his greatest contribution to science. By skipping the equations, he created the language that a majority of modern physicists speak. Incidentally, he created a language that ordinary people without mathematical training can understand. To use the language to do quantitative calculations requires training, but untrained people can use it to describe qualitatively how nature behaves.

Feynman’s picture of the world starts from the idea that the world has two layers, a classical layer and a quantum layer. Classical means that things are ordinary. Quantum means that things are weird. We live in the classical layer. All the things that we can see and touch and measure, such as bricks and people and energies, are classical. We see them with classical devices such as eyes and cameras, and we measure them with classical instruments such as thermometers and clocks. The pictures that Feynman invented to describe the world are classical pictures of objects moving in the classical layer. Each picture represents a possible history of the classical layer. But the real world of atoms and particles is not classical. Atoms and particles appear in Feynman’s pictures as classical objects, but they actually obey quite different laws. They obey the quantum laws that Feynman showed us how to describe by using his pictures. The world of atoms belongs to the quantum layer, which we cannot touch directly.

The primary difference between the classical layer and the quantum layer is that the classical layer deals with facts and the quantum layer deals with probabilities. In situations where classical laws are valid, we can predict the future by observing the past. In situations where quantum laws are valid, we can observe the past but we cannot predict the future. In the quantum layer, events are unpredictable. The Feynman pictures only allow us to calculate the probabilities that various alternative futures may happen.

The quantum layer is related to the classical layer in two ways. First, the state of the quantum layer is what is called “a sum-over-histories,” that is, a combination of every possible history of the classical layer leading up to that state. Each possible classical history is given a quantum amplitude. The quantum amplitude, otherwise known as a wave function, is a number defining the contribution of that classical history to that quantum state. Second, the quantum amplitude is obtained from the picture of that classical history by following a simple set of rules. The rules are pictorial, translating the picture directly into a number. The difficult part of the calculation is to add up the sum-over-histories correctly. The great achievement of Feynman was to show that this sum-over-histories view of the quantum world reproduces all the known results of quantum theory, and allows an exact description of quantum processes in situations where earlier versions of quantum theory had broken down.

Feynman was radical in his disrespect for authority, but conservative in his science. When he was young he had hoped to start a revolution in science, but nature said no. Nature told him that the existing jungle of scientific ideas, with the classical world and the quantum world described by very different laws, was basically correct. He tried to find new laws of nature, but the result of his efforts was in the end to consolidate the existing laws in a new structure. He hoped to find discrepancies that would prove the old theories wrong, but nature stubbornly persisted in proving them right. However disrespectful he might be to famous old scientists, he was never disrespectful to nature.

Toward the end of Feynman’s life, his conservative view of quantum science became unfashionable. The fashionable theorists reject his dualistic picture of nature, with the classical world and the quantum world existing side by side. They believe that only the quantum world is real, and the classical world must be explained as some kind of illusion arising out of quantum processes. They disagree about the way in which quantum laws should be interpreted. Their basic problem is to explain how a world of quantum probabilities can generate the illusions of classical certainty that we experience in our daily lives. Their various interpretations of quantum theory lead to competing philosophical speculations about the role of the observer in the description of nature.

Feynman had no patience for such speculations. He said that nature tells us that both the quantum world and the classical world exist and are real. We do not understand precisely how they fit together. According to Feynman, the road to understanding is not to argue about philosophy but to continue exploring the facts of nature. In recent years, a new generation of experimenters has been advancing along Feynman’s road with great success, moving into the new worlds of quantum computing and quantum cryptography.

Krauss shows us a portrait of a scientist who was unusually unselfish. His disdain for honors and rewards was genuine. After he was elected to membership of the United States National Academy of Sciences, he resigned his membership because the members of the academy spent too much of their time debating who was worthy of admission in the next academy election. He considered the academy to be more concerned with self-glorification than with public service. He hated all hierarchies, and wanted no badge of superior academic status to come between him and his younger friends. He considered science to be a collective enterprise in which educating the young was as important as making personal discoveries. He put as much effort into his teaching as into his thinking.

He never showed the slightest resentment when I published some of his ideas before he did. He told me that he avoided disputes about priority in science by following a simple rule: “Always give the ******** more credit than they deserve.” I have followed this rule myself. I find it remarkably effective for avoiding quarrels and making friends. A generous sharing of credit is the quickest way to build a healthy scientific community. In the end, Feynman’s greatest contribution to science was not any particular discovery. His contribution was the creation of a new way of thinking that enabled a great multitude of students and collea gues, including me, to make their own discoveries.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

Richard M. Eaton, "The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760 (Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies)"
Publisher: University of California Press | 1996 | ISBN: 0520205073 | 388 pages |
In all of the South Asian subcontinent, Bengal was the region most receptive to the Islamic faith. This area today is home to the world's second- largest Muslim ethnic population. How and why did such a large Muslim population emerge there? And how does such a religious conversion take place? Richard Eaton uses archaeological evidence, monuments, narrative histories, poetry, and Mughal administrative documents to trace the long historical encounter between Islamic and Indic civilizations. Moving from the year 1204, when Persianized Turks from North India annexed the former Hindu states of the lower Ganges delta, to 1760, when the British East India Company rose to political dominance there, Eaton explores these moving frontiers, focusing especially on agrarian growth and religious change.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

A very important book for Indians


The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company: 1660-1760 By K. N. Chaudhuri
Publisher: C U P 2006 | 652 Pages | ISBN: 0521031591 , 0521217164 |

The main contribution of the work is to offer a comprehensive history of the English East India Company during the century 1660-1760. It also examines the commercial economy of the Asian countries in which the Company traded and its political relations with Asian princes. Finally, it is a study of business and economic decision-making under pre-modern conditions. The book is based on an extensive analysis of the quantitative and qualitative material available in the Company's archives. The data-processing of the quantitative evidence and its subsequent statistical analysis was carried out on a computer, and the book contains comprehensive tables on the volume and value of the Company's trade, prices of commercial goods, and on monetary and financial history. The extensive scope of the book and its consideration not only of the Company but of the economies in which it operated make it essential reading for all concerned with the economic history of the period, both of Europe and Asia. The techniques used in analysing the original data and their theoretical framework make it of methodological interest to economic historians.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Prem »

http://www.boston.com/ae/books/articles ... artitions/
Images, language make an impact
Even in the context of the worldwide violence and carnage of the 1940s, the genocides engendered by the India-Pakistan partition stand out as particularly brutal.
As India approached independence with its Muslims and Hindus steadfastly refusing to co-govern, partition seemed inevitable. But the process, engineered by the British as part of its colonial exit strategy, was a perfect storm of incompetence, negligence, and indifference.
They disregarded that millions of Muslims and Hindus lived in communities closely braided together. They ignored the Sikhs’ existence. And they rushed the job, declaring the partition official on Aug. 15, 1947, with little warning and still lacking definitive boundaries. Indian Muslims awoke that day in a Hindu country that wanted them gone; while across the ambiguous border, Hindus and Sikhs had suddenly become aliens in hostile Pakistan.Within three months, between 10 million and 12 million people on both sides of the border had fled in terror. In transit, they were open targets for violence, abduction, rape, and murder. Entire trainloads of people were butchered. Men on all sides annihilated their own families to prevent them from being captured. In some villages, parents threw their children into a bonfire. Men, to “protect’’ their wives, beheaded them. In all, half a million people died.This is the bloody, violent netherworld explored by Amit Majmudar in his debut novel, “Partitions.’’ The book chronicles the journey of four characters, all seeking refuge amid the chaos.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

Ronald Asmus, "A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West"
The brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 seemed to many like an unexpected shot out of the blue that was gone as quickly as it came. Former Assistant Deputy Secretary of State Ronald Asmus contends that it was a conflict that was prepared and planned for some time by Moscow, part of a broader strategy to send a message to the United States: that Russia is going to flex its muscle in the twenty-first century. A Little War that Shook the World is a fascinating look at the breakdown of relations between Russia and the West, the decay and decline of the Western Alliance itself, and the fate of Eastern Europe in a time of economic crisis.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Rony »

Absolute Monarchs : A History of the Papacy
John Julius Norwich makes a point of saying in the introduction to his history of the popes that he is “no scholar” and that he is “an agnostic Protestant.” The first point means that while he will be scrupulous with his copious research, he feels no obligation to unearth new revelations or concoct revisionist theories. The second means that he has “no ax to grind.” In short, his only agenda is to tell us the story.

And he has plenty of story to tell. “Absolute Monarchs” sprawls across Europe and the Levant, over two millenniums, and with an impossibly immense cast: 265 popes (plus various usurpers and anti­popes), feral hordes of Vandals, Huns and Visigoths, expansionist emperors, Byzantine intriguers, Borgias and Medicis, heretic zealots, conspiring clerics, bestial inquisitors and more. Norwich man­ages to organize this crowded stage and produce a rollicking narrative. He keeps things moving at nearly beach-read pace by being selective about where he lingers and by adopting the tone of an enthusiastic tour guide, expert but less than reverent.

A scholar or devout Roman Catholic would probably not have had so much fun, for example, with the tale of Pope Joan, the mid-ninth-century Englishwoman who, according to lore, disguised herself as a man, became pope and was caught out only when she gave birth. Although Norwich regards this as “one of the hoariest canards in papal history,” he cannot resist giving her a chapter of her own. It is a guilty pleasure, especially his deadpan pursuit of the story that the church, determined not to be fooled again, required subsequent papal candidates to sit on a chaise percée (pierced chair) and be groped from below by a junior cleric, who would shout to the multitude, “He has testicles!” Norwich tracks down just such a piece of furniture in the Vatican Museum, dutifully reports that it may have been an obstetric chair intended to symbolize Mother Church, but adds, “It cannot be gainsaid, on the other hand, that it is admirably designed for a diaconal grope; and it is only with considerable reluctance that one turns the idea aside.”

If you were raised Catholic, you may find it disconcerting to see an institution you were taught to think of as the repository of the faith so thoroughly deconsecrated. Norwich says little about theology and treats doctrinal disputes as matters of diplomacy. As he points out, this is in keeping with many of the popes themselves, “a surprising number of whom seem to have been far more interested in their own temporal power than in their spiritual well-­being.” For most of their two millenniums, the popes were rulers of a large sectarian state, managers of a civil service, military strategists, occasionally battlefield generals, sometimes patrons of the arts and humanities, and, importantly, diplomats. They were indeed monarchs. (But not, it should be said, “absolute monarchs.” Whichever editor persuaded Norwich to change his British title, “The Popes: A History,” may have done the book a marketing favor but at the cost of accuracy: the popes’ power was invariably shared with or subordinated to emperors and kings of various stripes. In more recent times, the popes have had no civil power outside the 110 acres of Vatican City, no military at all, and even their moral authority has been flouted by legions of the faithful.)

Norwich, whose works of popular history include books on Venice and Byzantium, admires the popes who were effective statesmen and stewards, including Leo I, who protected Rome from the Huns; Benedict XIV, who kept the peace and instituted financial and liturgical reforms, allowing Rome to become the religious and cultural capital of Catholic Europe; and Leo XIII, who steered the Church into the industrial age. The popes who achieved greatness, however, were outnumbered by the corrupt, the inept, the venal, the lecherous, the ruthless, the mediocre and those who didn’t last long enough to make a mark.

Sinners, as any dramatist or newsman can tell you, are more entertaining than saints, and Norwich has much to work with. If you paid attention in high school, you know something of the Borgia popes, who are covered in a chapter succinctly called “The Monsters.” But they were not the first, the last or even the most colorful of the sacred scoundrels. The bishops who recently blamed the scourge of pedo­phile priests on the libertine culture of the 1960s should consult Norwich for evidence that clerical abuses are not a historical aberration.

Of the minor 15th-century Pope Paul II, to pick one from the ranks of the debauched, Norwich writes: “The pope’s sexual proclivities aroused a good deal of speculation. He seems to have had two weaknesses — for good-­looking young men and for melons — though the contemporary rumor that he enjoyed watching the former being tortured while he gorged himself on the latter is surely unlikely.”

Sexual misconduct figures prominently in the history of the papacy (another chapter is entitled “Nicholas I and the *****”) but is hardly the only blot on the institution. Clement VII, the disastrous second Medici pope, oversaw “the worst sack of Rome since the barbarian invasions, the establishment in Germany of Protestantism as a separate religion and the definitive breakaway of the English church over Henry VIII’s divorce.” Paul IV “opened the most savage campaign in papal history against the Jews,” forcing them into ghettos and destroying synagogues. Gregory XIII spent the papacy into penury. Urban VIII imprisoned Galileo and banned all his works.

Most of the popes, being human, were complicated; the rogues had redeeming features, the capable leaders had defects. Innocent III was the greatest of the medieval popes, a man of galvanizing self-­confidence who consolidated the Papal States. But he also initiated the Fourth Crusade, which led to the wild sacking of Constantinople, “the most unspeakable of the many outrages in the whole hideous history of the Crusades.” Sixtus IV sold indulgences and church offices “on a scale previously unparalleled,” made an 8-year-old boy the archbishop of Lisbon and began the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition. But he also commissioned the Sistine Chapel.

Even the Borgia pope Alexander VI, who by the time he bribed his way into office had fathered eight children by at least three women, is credited with keeping the imperiled papacy alive by capable administration and astute diplomacy, “however questionable his means of doing so.”


By the time we reach the 20th century, about 420 pages in, our expectations are not high. We get a disheartening chapter on Pius XI and Pius XII, whose fear of Communism (along with the church’s long streak of anti-Semitism) made them compliant enablers of Mussolini, Hitler and Franco. Pius XI, in Norwich’s view, redeemed himself by his belated but unflinching hostility to the Fascists and Nazis. But his indictment of Pius XII — who resisted every entreaty to speak out against mass murder, even as the trucks were transporting the Jews of Rome to Auschwitz — is compact, evenhanded and devastating. “It is painful to have to record,” Norwich concludes, “that, on the orders of his successor, the process of his canonization has already begun. Suffice it to say here that the current fashion for canonizing all popes on principle will, if continued, make a mockery of sainthood.”

Norwich devotes exactly one chapter to the popes of my lifetime — from the avuncular modernizer John XXIII, whom he plainly loves, to the austere Benedict, off to a “shaky start.” He credits the popular Polish pope, John Paul II — another candidate for sainthood — for his global diplomacy but faults his retrograde views on matters of sex and gender. Norwich’s conclusion may remind readers that he introduced himself as a Protestant agnostic, because whatever his views on God, his views on the papacy are clearly pro-­reformation.
“It is now well over half a century since progressive Catholics have longed to see their church bring itself into the modern age,” he writes. “With the accession of every succeeding pontiff they have raised their hopes that some progress might be made on the leading issues of the day — on homosexuality, on contraception, on the ordination of women priests. And each time they have been disappointed.”
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Sriman »

Stranger to history, A son's journey through Islamic Lands - Aatish Taseer
323 pages
Picador India
http://www.flipkart.com/books/033051115 ... 4tw3f91o8k

A bit of background on the author and the book: Aatish is Tavleen Singh and Salman Taseer's son. Tavleen brought him up in India alone as Salman was already married and refused to look after the child. Aatish grew up despising his father but still has an urge to get to know his father when he grows up. He establishes a tenuous relationship with his father and meets him. After Salman criticizes an article Aatish wrote on British Pakistanis and accuses him of maligning Islam, Aatish starts wondering about the affinity a so called whiskey swilling liberal like his father has for Islam. The book is a result of his journey across Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and finally Pakistan to understand the reasons for Islamic angst. The book is a part travelogue, part research and part Aatish's own personal battles.

Aatish is very perceptive, clued up about geopolitics and doesn't mind calling spade a spade. He is treated very well in all the countries he travels in, yet it does not cloud his judgement on the bigotry in his host societies. The fact that he hails from two elite families in India and Pakistan opens a lot of doors for him (especially in Pakistan) and in a way it provides an unguarded glimpse (afterall he is Salman Taseer's son and not a foreigner) into the lives of the elite in Pakistan you'd struggle to find in other books. He talks about the casual racism/bigotry among the elite, entrenched hatred against Hindus within Pakistani society, effect of Zia's islamization etc. There is plenty of new insights that even seasoned BRFites would appreciate.

I think the most important aspect of this book is that Aatish comes to conclusions that are uncomfortable for the WKK crowd (widespread visceral India hatred amongst the elite for one) and coming from someone seen (sad but true) as having liberal credentials in India (elite,anglophile, married to an englishwoman) hopefully these views will receive more attention. Recommended read.
Last edited by Sriman on 09 Jul 2011 20:07, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Sriman »

To Live Or To Perish Forever - Nicholas Schmidle
271 pages
Random House India
http://www.flipkart.com/books/818400092 ... aw23f2e1nc

Nick Schmidle spent two years in Pakistan (2006-2008) on a fellowship from Institute of Current World Affairs. During his stay he met some very interesting characters; Abdul Rashid Ghazi (the man who ran Lal Masjid and was later killed in the raid on the mosque. He met him through Khalid Khawaja), Akbar Bugti's grandson, Sipah-E-Sahaba militants in Karachi, Maulana Diesel, Maulana Fazlullah etc. Predictably enough, his stay ended when he was deported. He spent time in most of the places you'd consider important to understand Pakistan (except perhaps south Punjab) - Karachi, with a feudal lord in rural Sindh, Balochistan (Gwadar and Quetta), NWFP and FATA. He lived in Islamabad, close to Lal Masjid and witnessed the raid on the masjid. Funnily enough he was hosted by one Shireen Mazari ( :mrgreen: ) but he doesn't have a very flattering opinion of her*:
Meanwhile, Mazari detected a CIA plot behind every bomb, riot and sneeze in Pakistan.

"What's wrong with the media blackout?" She said with an irritated air when i suggested that the government was creating a credibility problem for itself. "There ought to be a limit to freedom of speech. Why is this terrorist being given so much airtime in foreign newspapers?" she asked,referring to Ghazi. Mazari admitted that she hadn't actually read the foreign coverage, but she confidently criticized it nonetheless.
..
Mazari wondered why the army didn't bomb the mosque.

"Don't you think there would be massive number of casualties?" I asked. "Plus i know that militants have an impressive arsenal of weapons they haven't used." I told her about Ghazi's grenade launcher. "The army might be surprised by what they encounter," I said.

Mazari wrote a weekly column in the News, an English-language daily newspaper. Two days after our conversation, i read her column: "Interestingly, a number of foreign journalists and analysts, especially American, were in frequent contact with Abdul Rashid Ghazi and had been allowed to view the military hardware he surrounded himself with. As one of the analysts put it: Ghazi was liked by the American journalists because he was familiar with the western idiom!Given this level of superficiality, one wonders whether his action against the Chinese endeared him further."

A drive-by shooting in Peshawar a few days earlier had killed three Chinese workers. At the end of her column, Mazari suggested a possible jihadi-and -CIA-agents-posing-as-journalists nexus, part of a plot to ruin Pakistan's relationship with China. My mind reeled. This was clearly a woman who could not be trusted. And she was my host.
The book is full of anecdotes like these. Overall, i found that Nick Schmidle's views/observations confirm views held on BRF but there are lot of nuances we would do well to understand. Recommended read.

* Mods, please edit the snippet if you think it's a spoiler.
Last edited by Sriman on 09 Jul 2011 20:18, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by svinayak »

Prem wrote:http://www.boston.com/ae/books/articles ... artitions/
Images, language make an impact
Even in the context of the worldwide violence and carnage of the 1940s, the genocides engendered by the India-Pakistan partition stand out as particularly brutal.
As India approached independence with its Muslims and Hindus steadfastly refusing to co-govern, partition seemed inevitable. But the process, engineered by the British as part of its colonial exit strategy, was a perfect storm of incompetence, negligence, and indifference.
They disregarded that millions of Muslims and Hindus lived in communities closely braided together. They ignored the Sikhs’ existence. And they rushed the job, declaring the partition official on Aug. 15, 1947, with little warning and still lacking definitive boundaries. Indian Muslims awoke that day in a Hindu country that wanted them gone; while across the ambiguous border, Hindus and Sikhs had suddenly become aliens in hostile Pakistan.Within three months, between 10 million and 12 million people on both sides of the border had fled in terror. In transit, they were open targets for violence, abduction, rape, and murder. Entire trainloads of people were butchered. Men on all sides annihilated their own families to prevent them from being captured. In some villages, parents threw their children into a bonfire. Men, to “protect’’ their wives, beheaded them. In all, half a million people died.This is the bloody, violent netherworld explored by Amit Majmudar in his debut novel, “Partitions.’’ The book chronicles the journey of four characters, all seeking refuge amid the chaos.
There is some problem with this narration.
There is nothing called co governance. When did ML really fight against the British for the independence. It was the British and ML against the Congress.
Indian Muslims awoke that day in a Hindu country and they continued to live today. Where are the Hindus in the Pakistan today.
Sikhs and Hindus were together to save the Indians from Muslim attack.
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by krishna_j »

Climate Wars: The Fight for Survival as the World Overheats

pub by Viva books Rs 695/- Pp 320 Gwynne Dyer April 2011

* Scenario I:The Year 2045
* Chapter I:The Geopolitics of Climate Change
* Scenario 2:Russia, 2019
* Chapter 2:An Inevitable Crisis
* Scenario 3:United States, 2029
* Chapter 3:Feedbacks: How Much, How Fast?
* Scenario 4:Northern India, 2036
* Chapter 4:We Can Fix This....
* Scenario 5:A Happy Tale
* Chapter 5:… But Probably Not in Time
* Scenario 6:United States and United Kingdom, 2055
* Chapter 6:Real World Politics
* Scenario 7:China, 2042
* Chapter 7:Emergency Measures
* Scenario 8:Wipeout
* Chapter 8:Childhood’s End.

http://www.flipkart.com/books/185168742 ... d0x3fabgab

This is a futuristic book looking at global warming that will not be a benign phenomenon . Rather an increase of only a few degrees can potentially cause massive changes in the earth's climate.

Conflict over water, food, land, fuel due to the impact of our changing climate. Dyer has asked influential people all over the world what they think will happen as the world warms up, and there are 8 scary scenarios as the result.

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan, triggered by conflict over water resources and the starvation resulting from the collapse of the Indus river system. A militarized 'fortress America' keeping back hordes of starving Mexicans with a fence topped with automatically controlled machine guns. War in the newly melted Arctic ocean over the scraps of remaining hydrocarbons are some of the scenarios covered etc

Of particular interest is the chapter on the conflict over water resources - with India potentially tapping the flow of water from Kashmir into Pak - resulting in nuclear strikes all over India and though there is a counter strike , the author contends that India is so preoccupied and crippled that the Pak military is able to roll across and take over Kashmir and control all the water resources going into India .

Too simplistic in execution but frightening in conceptualization - worth a read esp as there is an Indian edition released by Viva.

It should be compulsory reading for all young people and us oldies, so that they know what kind of world we are creating for future generations
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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by ramana »

abhishek_sharma wrote:The Quranic Concept of War: JOSEPH C. MYERS

Parameters, Winter 2006-2007
The Quranic Concept of War, by Brigadier General S. K. Malik of the Pakistani Army provides readers with unequalled insight. Originally published in Pakistan in 1979, most available copies are found in India, or in small non-descript Muslim bookstores.

One major point to ponder, when thinking about The Quranic Concept of War, is the title itself. The Quran is presumed to be the revealed word of God as spoken through his chosen prophet, Mohammed. According to Malik, the Quran places warfighting doctrine and its theory in a much different category than western thinkers are accustomed to, because it is not a theory of war derived by man, but of God. This is God’s warfighting principles and commandments revealed.
Malik’s attempts to distill God’s doctrine for war through the examples of the Prophet. By contrast, the closest that Clausewitz comes to divine presentation is in his discussion of the trinity: the people, the state, and the military. In the Islamic context, the discussion of war is at the level of revealed truth and example, well above theory—God has no need to theorize. Malik notes, “As a complete Code of Life, the Holy Quran gives us a philosophy of war as well. . . . This divine philosophy is an integral part of the total Quranic ideology.”

...

For purposes of this review, the term “doctrine” refers to both religious and broad strategic approaches, not methods and procedures. Malik’s work is a treatise with historical, political, legalistic, and moralistic ramifications on Islamic warfare. It seemingly is without parallel in the western sense of warfare since the “Quran is a source of eternal guidance for mankind.” ...

Malik’s arguments are clearly parochial, often more editorial than scholarly, and his tone is decidedly confident and occasionally supremacist. The reach and influence of the author’s work is not clear although one might believe that given the idealism of his treatise, his approaches to warfare, and the role and ends of “terror” his text may resonate with extremist and radicals prone to use terroristic violence to accomplish their ends. For that reason alone, the book is worth studying. ...

General Zia states that all Muslims play a role in jihad, a mainstream concept of the Quran, that jihad in terms of warfare is a collective responsibility of the Muslim ummah, and is not restricted to soldiers. ...

In the preface Ambassador Brohi details what might be startling to many readers. He states that Malik has made “a valuable contribution to Islamic jurisprudence” or Islamic law, and an “analytic restatement of the Quranic wisdom on the subject of war and peace.” ...

Brohi then defines jihad, “The most glorious word in the Vocabulary of Islam is Jehad, a word which is untranslatable in English but, broadly speaking, means ‘striving’, ‘struggling’, ‘trying’ to advance the Divine causes or purposes.” He introduces a somewhat cryptic concept when he explains man’s role in a “Quranic setting” as energetically combating forces of evil or what may be called, “counter-initiatory” forces which are at war with the harmony and the purpose of life on earth. For the true Muslin the harmony and purpose in life are only possible through man’s ultimate
submission to God’s will, that all will come to know, recognize, and profess Mohammed as the Prophet of God. Man must recognize the last days and acknowledge tawhid, the oneness of God. ...

Brohi places jihad in the context of communal if not imperial obligation; both controversial formulations:

"When a believer sees that someone is trying to obstruct another believer from traveling the road that leads to God, spirit of Jehad requires that such a man who is imposing obstacles should be prevented from doing so and the obstacles placed by him should also be removed, so that mankind may be freely able to negotiate its own path that leads to Heaven.” To do otherwise, “by not striving to clear or straighten the path we [Muslims] become passive spectators of the counter-initiatory forces imposing a blockade in the way of those who mean to keep their faith with God."

This viewpoint appears to reflect the classic, collective duty within jihad doctrine, to defend the Islamic community from threats—the concept of defensive jihad. Brohi is saying much more than that; however, he is attempting to delineate the
duty—the proactive duty—to clear the path for Islam. It is necessary not only to defend the individual believer if he is being hindered in his faith, but also to remove the obstacles of those counter-initiatory forces hindering his Islamic development. This begs the question of what is actually meant by the initiatory forces. The answer is clear to
Brohi; the force of initiative is Islam and its Muslim members. “It is the duty of a believer to carry forward the Message of God and to bring it to notice of his fellow-men in handsome ways. But if someone attempts to obstruct him from doing so he is entitled as a matter of defense, to retaliate.”

This formulation would appear to turn the concept of defense on its head. To the extent that a Muslim may proclaim Islam and proselytize, or Islam, as a faith, seeks to extend its invitation and reach—initiate its advance—but is unable to do so, then that represents an overt threat justifying—a defensive jihad. According to Brohi, this does not result in the “ordinary wars which mankind has been fighting for the sake of either revenge or for securing . . . more land or more booty . . . [this] striving must be [is] for the sake of God. Wars in the theory of Islam are . . . to advance God’s purposes on earth, and invariably they are defensive in character.” In other words, everywhere the message of God and Islam is or can be hindered from expansion, resisted or opposed by some “obstruction” (a term not clearly defined) Islam is intrinsically entitled to defend its manifest destiny.

While his logic is controversial, Brohi is not unique in his extrapolation. His theory in fact reflects the argument of Rashid Rida, a conservative disciple of the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh. ...


No Nation is Sovereign

The exegesis of the term jihad is often debated. Some apologists make clear that nowhere in the Quran does the term “Holy War” exist; that is true, but it is also irrelevant. War in Islam is either just or unjust and that justness depends on the ends of war. Brohi, and later Malik, make clear that the ends of war in Islam or jihad are to fulfill God’s divine purpose. Not only should that be a holy purpose, it must be a just war in order to be “Holy War.”

The next dualism Brohi presents is that of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, the house of submission and the house of war. He describes the latter, as “perpetuating defiance of the Lord.” While explaining that conditions for war in Islam are limited (a constrained set of circumstances) he notes that “in Islam war is waged to establish supremacy of the Lord only when every other argument has failed to convince those who reject His will and work against the very purpose of the creation of
mankind.” Brohi quotes the Quranic manuscript Surah, al-Tawba:

"Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya
with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued."


Acknowledging western critics who believe that Islam is in a state of perpetual struggle with the non-Islamic world, Brohi counters in a clearly dismissive tone by explaining that man is the slave to God, and defying God is treason under Islamic law. Those who defy God should be removed from humanity like a cancerous growth. Islam requires believers “to invite non-believers to the fold of Islam” by using “persuasion” and “beautiful methods.” He continues, “the first duty” of a Muslim is dawa, a proclamation to conversion by “handsome ways.” It is only after refusing dawa and the invitation to Islam that “believers have no option but in self-defense to wage a war against those threatening aggression.”

Obviously, much turns on how threats and aggression are characterized. It is difficult to understand, however, based on the structure of his argument, that Brohi views non-believers and their states as requiring conversion over time by peaceful
means; and when that fails, by force. He is echoing the doctrine of Abd al-Salam Faraj, author of Al-Farida al-Ghaibah, better known as The Neglected Duty, a work that is widely read throughout the Muslim world.

Finally, Brohi examines the concept of the ummah and the international system. “The idea of Ummah of Mohammad, the Prophet of Islam, is incapable of being realized within the framework of territorial states.” This is a consistent view that
underpins many works on the concept of the Islamic state.

For Muslims, the ummah is a transcendent religious and cultural society united and reflecting the unity (tawhid) of Islam; ...

With respect to the “law of war and peace in Islam” Brohi writes it “is as old as the Quran itself. . . . ” In his analysis of the law of nations and their international dealings, he emphasizes that in “Islamic international law this conduct [war and
peace] is, strictly speaking, regulated between Muslims and non-Muslims, there being, from Islamic perspective, no other nation. . . . ”
In other words, war is between Muslims and non-Muslims and not in actuality between states. It is transnational. He adds, “In Islam, of course, no nation is sovereign since Allah alone is the only sovereign in Whom all authority vests.”

Here Brohi is echoing what Islamic scholars such as Majid Khadduri have described as the “dualism of the universal religion and universal state that is Islam.”

The Divine Philosophy on War

...

Challenging Clausewitz’s notion that “policy” provides the context and boundary of war; Malik says it is the reverse, “‘war’ forced policy to define and determine its own parameters” and since that discussion focuses on parochial issues such as national interests, and the vagaries of state to state relations it is a lesser perspective. In the divine context of the Quran war orients on the spread of “justice and faith in Allah altogether and everywhere.” According to the author war is to be fought aggressively, slaughter is not the worst evil. In the course of war every opportunity for peace should be pursued and reciprocated. That is every remonstrance of peace by the enemies of Islam, but only as prescribed by the Quran’s “clear-cut philosophy and methodology” for preserving peace. ...

It also established the precedent that Muslims may conclude treaties with non-believers, but only for a temporary period. ...


The author’s point is that peace between states has only secular, not divine ends; and peace in an Islamic context is achieved only for the promotion of Islam. As the Prophet gained control of Mecca he decreed that non-believers could assemble or watch over the Sacred Mosque. He later consolidated power over Arabia and many who had not yet accepted Islam, “including Christians and Jew, [they] were given the option to choose between war and submission.” These non-believers were required to pay a poll-tax or jizya and accept the status of dhimmitude [servitude to Islam] in order to continue practicing their faith. According to Malik the taxes were merely symbolic and insignificant. In summarizing this relationship the author states, “the object of war is to obtain conditions of peace, justice, and faith. To do so it is essential to destroy the forces of oppression and persecution.”

...
The Nature of War

Malik, like Brohi, acknowledges critics who say that Islam has been “spread by the sword,” but he responds that Islam is spread through restraint in war and in “the use of force [that] have no parallel.”...

Strike Terror into their Hearts

Malik uses examples to demonstrate that Allah will strike “terror into the hearts of Unbelievers.” At this point he begins to develop his most controversial and conjectural Quranic theory related to warfare—the role of terror. Readers need to understand that the author is thinking and writing in strategic terms, not in the vernacular of battles or engagements. Malik continues, “when God wishes to impose His will on his enemies, He chooses to do so by casting terror into their hearts.

He cites another verse, “against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including
steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts) of the enemies of Allah . . . .” Malik’s strategic synthesis is specific: “the Quranic military strategy thus enjoins us to prepare ourselves for war to the utmost in order to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies, known or hidden, while guarding ourselves from being terror-stricken by the enemy.”Terror is an effect; the end-state. ...

“Respect” therefore is achieved psychologically by, as Brohi suggested earlier, “beautiful” and “handsome ways” or by the strategic application of terror. When examining the theme of the preparatory stage of war, Malik talks of
the “war of preparation being waged . . . in peace,” meaning that peacetime preparatory activities are in fact part of any war and “vastly more important than the active war.” This statement should not be taken lightly, it essentially means that Islam is in a perpetual state of war while peace can only be defined as the absence of active war.
Malik argues that peace-time training efforts should be oriented on the active war(s) to come, in order to develop the Quranic and divine “Will” in the mujahid. When armies and soldiers find limited physical resources they should continue and emphasize the development of the “spiritual resources” as these are complimentary factors
and create synergy for future military action.

Malik’s most controversial dictum is summarized in the following manner: in war, “the point where the means and the end meet” is in terror. He formulates terror as an objective principal of war; once terror is achieved the enemy reaches his culminating point. “Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose . . . .” Malik’s divine principal of Islamic warfare may be restated as “strike terror; never feel terror.” The ultimate objective of this form of warfare “revolves around the human heart, [the enemies] soul, spirit, and Faith.”


Terror “can be instilled only if the opponent’s Faith is destroyed . . . . It is essential in the ultimate analysis, to dislocate [the enemies] Faith.” Those who are firm in their religious conviction are immune to terror, “a weak Faith offers inroads to terror.” Therefore, as part of preparations for jihad, actions will be oriented on weakening the non-Islamic’s “Faith,” while strengthening the Islamic’s. What that weakening or “dislocation” entails in practice remains
ambiguous. Malik concludes, “Psychological dislocation is temporary; spiritual dislocation is permanent.” The soul of man can only be touched by terror. ...

Evaluation of The Quranic Concept of War

While the extent and reach of Malik’s thesis cannot be confirmed in the Islamic world neither can it be discounted. Though controversial, his citations are accurately drawn from Islamic sources and consistent with classical Islamic jurisprudence.. ...

Policy planners and strategists striving to understand the nature of the “Long War” should consider Malik’s writings in that light. Malik makes clear that the Quran provides the doctrine, guidance, and examples for the conduct of Quranic or Islamic warfare. “It gives a strategy of war that penetrates deep down to destroy the opponents’ faith and render his physical and mental faculties totally ineffective.” ...


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Re: Book Review Folder - 2008/2009/2010/2011

Post by Prem »

The Beautiful and the Damned: A Portrait of the New India
http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdail ... ndia-.html
Esther once worked as a waitress at Hotel Shangri-La, serving breakfast, high tea and happy hour drinks at the Horizon Club on the nineteenth floor. Some of her guests were businessmen passing through Delhi, while others maintained small but expensive office suites along the corridors twisting away from the club lounge. In the evening, these men sat in the lounge sipping Black Label Scotch with lots of ice, appreciative of the quiet, smiling demeanor with which Esther brought them their food and drinks, leaving them to talk to one another or on their BlackBerrys while outside the sheer glass windows the sun went down softly over the Parliament building and the palatial bungalows of industrialists and politicians. One of the men who sat in the club lounge was an arms dealer. I met him before I met Esther, although the reason I went to see the arms dealer was because I was looking for Esther.

All through the past few years in India, sometimes in Delhi and sometimes in other cities, I had noticed the women who worked as waitresses in cafes and restaurants and as sales assistants in retail stores. They were usually in their 20s, soft-spoken and fluent in English. In the shape of their eyes, their cheekbones and their light skin, I could read their origins in northeastern India. They were polite but slightly reticent until I spoke to them and told them that I too had grown up in the northeast. Then they seemed to open up, and often there were extra touches of attention as they served me. I flattered myself that they liked me. After all, I knew where they were from, I was generous with my tips and I thought I understood something of their loneliness in the loneliness I had felt when I began to leave my small-town origins behind and started my drift through cities. But in most ways, I wasn’t like them. I had grown up in Shillong, the most cosmopolitan of urban centers in the northeast, while the women were from Nagaland or Manipur, the first generation from these states to abandon their poor, violence-ridden homes for the globalized metropolises of the mainland. Their journey was longer and harder than mine had ever been, and although there were tens of thousands of them in Delhi alone, they were in some sense utterly isolated, always visible in the malls and restaurants but always opaque to their wealthy customers.
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