Puarji: The issues with the CPMFs and hence, internal security management is a little different...
The CPMFs are, as you know, not a monolith...the BSF is , on the whole doing ok..please remember, in the 90's and in this decade, they were the ones who brought urban terrorism under control in Kashmir, especially Srinagar city...there may have been failings, but all said and done, they did a good enough job to control Srinagar, Anantnag and Baramula cities..had they not been there, the IA would have had to put in atleast two more divs in the valley.
Yes, I know, although IA was withdrawn from the towns only much later in the game. Even then, the officer responsible for much of BSF's success in J&K, first as IG BSF, J&K Sector, and later as DG BSF, was an EX Army Officer, EN Rammohan. His early experiences in the Army certainly stood him in good stead in his role with the BSF.
The ITBP, as you mentioned is again alright..
I dont know enough about the SSB to complain, but given its AoR, I am not too sanguine..
I have no complaint about the CPMF's per se. They are brave chaps, doing their best. But they are being horribly underutilised, and when used, not being used properly.
The real problem, amongst the CPMFs is the CRPF. It is this force which has 200+ battallions but is unable to deliver, and there are lots of weaknesses, one of which is its leadership. This force has unfortunately become cannon fodder for not just the Maoists, but also the stone throwing rascals in the valley...the key problem for the CRPF is that it is structured to operate in aid of the local armed police. In areas where the local armed police is robust, like in Punjab during the early 90s, the CRPF was quite effective. Unfortunately, the armed police in the Maoist territories and Kashmir valley ( with the exception of the SOG) is a pathetic joke, and hence, are unable to provide any local knowledge or intelligence to the CRPF..as a result the CRPF is getting hammered. Frankly, it is not correct to expect a Central reinforcement like the CRPF to have local knowledge..and that is where the state police has entirely failed..
So, the point about IPS leadership should be directed more at the state armed police rather than the CPMFs who barely have 1-2 officers from the IPS in their org structures...
The higher leadership of BSF, ITBP, SSB, CISF, CRPF are almost ALL IPS officers. All the IG level posts in important areas, (and all the IG level posts in Delhi, of course), are held by IPS officers. A large number (majority) of the DIG's are also IPS officers, although the VI CPC had clearly said that these should be set aside for cadre officers.
In fact, the Dantewada DIG, who was in charge during the massacre of CRPF personnel there, was also an IPS officer.
The real problem with the CPMF is structural. They just do not have the kind of General Staff backbone that the IA has, nor do they have the vital supporting services on the scale the IA has - Signal units, ASC, Medical units, Intelligence Units, and this greatly degrades their performance. The major failing in the Home Ministry has been to just raise battalion after battalion of paramils without actually doing the hard work of creating the appropriate general staff and the logistics. This is why we have the CPMFs being rushed as penny packets to deal with insurgents..they arrive without the support infra, lack local knowledge, the local splice has packed up, or worse is in cahoots with the insurgents, and the Paramils get massacred. Contrast this to the IA, where even before deploying any battalion in CG, they first set up a sub-area-this is the general staff, that the CPMFs lack
There is something in this, but frankly, the CPMFs have a highly developed Medical infrastructure, along with Signals, air component, etc.