This analysis, is interesting if we read between the lines. It does take a smug look at the chinese position militarily w.r.t America. There are some unique view points which are given in this article
Till now some, including myself, were working under the impression that since margins are more in case of exports, China exports more to the world and does not consume so much. This is off course a very simplistic way of looking at things, because Chinese per-capita GDP is not that too high that they can consume so much. But this interplay, that fixed investment, drains so much from the Chinese savings that little is left for purchasing goods produced by china is interesting to say the least. Moreover it ignores the billions of FDI that flows into china.Plans for industrial expansion are implemented with little thought to markets or margins; instead, maximum employment is the driving goal. Private savings are harnessed to finance the industrial effort, leaving little domestic capital to purchase the output. China must export accordingly.
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China's industrial base by design produces more than its domestic economy can consume, so China must export goods to the rest of the world while importing raw materials.
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The very model of employment and market share over profitability misallocates scores of resources and breaks the normally self-regulating link between supply and demand. One of the more disruptive results is inflation, which alternatively raises the costs of subsidizing the interior while eroding China's competitiveness with other low-cost global exporters.
The wealthier coast depends on trade that is now faltering, and the impoverished interior requires subsidies that are difficult to provide when economic growth is slowing substantially.
As far as the India-Tibet-China dynamic comes into play this is what is said in the article
Again assumptions.For India, an independent Tibet without Chinese forces would be interesting, but a Tibet where the Indians would have to commit significant forces would not be. As much as the Tibetans represent a problem for China, the problem is manageable. Tibetan insurgents might receive some minimal encouragement and support from India, but not to a degree that would threaten Chinese control.
But this is not where the article goes off the rails and looses its objectivity. Rather it is something else
America has a military force, which is used primarily to project power outside its home base. Hence in its enemies or shall we use the diplomatically correct term "potential enemies", it tends to look at the ability to project power outside its shores. Stratfor falls victim to this fallacy or shall we say narcissism. China does not have to challenge US in open seas of Western Pacific or Indian Ocean. They do not have to keep the sea lanes open from Indian Ocean to Pacific. Rather just like the Britishers did to the Spaniards, they only have to defeat US at their own home ground. The defeat of the Spaniards signaled the end of the first empire, i.e Spanish, on which sun never set and birth of the 2nd empire, i.e. British, on which sun never set. America's biggest strength is not its power projection capabilities, it is the awe associated with it. If that edifice is challenged successfully in South China sea, it will collapse everywhere else.The configuration of the South China Sea and the East China Sea render China relatively easy to blockade. The East China Sea is enclosed on a line from Korea to Japan to Taiwan, with a string of islands between Japan and Taiwan. The South China Sea is even more enclosed on a line from Taiwan to the Philippines, and from Indonesia to Singapore. Beijing's single greatest strategic concern is that the United States would impose a blockade on China, not by positioning its 7th Fleet inside the two island barriers but outside them. From there, the United States could compel China to send its naval forces far away from the mainland to force an opening -- and encounter U.S. warships -- and still be able to close off China's exits.
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The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is primarily configured as a domestic security force -- a necessity because of China's history of internal tensions.
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Having been designed for internal security, the PLA is doctrinally and logistically disinclined toward offensive operations. Using a force trained for security as a force for offensive operations leads either to defeat or very painful stalemates.
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The PLA was built to control China, not to project power outward, and strategies built around the potential need for power projection are risky at best.
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there remain enormous limitations on China's ability to project military power on a scale sufficient to challenge the United States directly.
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China therefore faces a significant strategic problem. China must base its national security strategy on what the United States is capable of doing, not on what Beijing seems to want at the moment. China cannot counter the United States at sea, and its strategy of building ports in the Indian Ocean suffers from the fact that its costs are huge and the political conditions for access uncertain. The demands of creating a force capable of guaranteeing access runs counter to the security requirements inside China itself.
The assumption that PLA is configured for internal security duties ignores the history of PLA in Korea, Tibet, against India and against Soviets.
Further read again the words quoted above which have been highlighted in bold. Now during the korean war, America sent with impunity its ships to the yellow sea. Later on during the reign of Mao it positioned its armada literally in the middle of the Taiwan straits, on the west coast of Taiwan.
By 1990s when China went berserk and fired missiles over Taiwan, America could no longer position its ships in the middle of Taiwan straits, but had to position its forces further away on the east coast of Taiwan.
More than a decade after that when North Korea sank a South Korea vessel, America decided to carry out naval exercises with South Korea. Even those naval exercises had to be shifted away from yellow sea so that they were not seen threatening to China.
If we trace a line from 1950, to present we observe that till 1980s US was in a position to do what is pleases inside Chinese EEZ and some would say even inside Chinese territorial waters. Since then American ability to act inside what are claimed by Chinese as their seas, has diminished. So much so that the now the safest thing for Americans to do would be to enforce a blockade from outside the island chains surrounding China. And going further in time, we can see this diminishing even more.
All the american CBGs have to come from west coast of america. All the chinese CBGs will have to come from Hainan or somewhere nearby. If an american ship is damaged it will have to limp back to american western shore or take refuge is some 3rd nation, which will be highly an unappealing scenario anyway one looks at it. In case of China this would not be the case. In other words China has a home advantage compared to America in the 2nd and 3rd island chain. China's Lines of communications are shorter. America's are massively long. PLAN will not need to have one-to-one parity with USN as far as number of ships and CBGs are concerned for a successful challenge. And when PLAN does achieve this one-to-one parity with USN, the battle would essentially be over for USN. We learned this in 1962.
, Chinni m******d k****e they won't agree that easy ( as if TSP has agreed forever ? guessing ) 
