China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

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Aditya_V
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Aditya_V »

Sipri looks like Psy-ops more than anything else, Saudi Arabia purchases from US and UK make India defence contracts look relatively puny, similar other Gulf state Purchases. UK purchases from US for virtually everything in their subs is completely ignored. NATO country purchases from other NATO countries also do not make it to the list.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Cain Marko »

Surya wrote:This continues to be one of the worries I have and no one has explained to me how we will survive a surprise missile barrage.

Unless our assets have solid cover to withstand the initial surprise attack we will be in trouble.

and we need lots more Brahmos to hit back at everything they possess - not 10s and 20s.
+100! I"ve always had the same question - a debilitating surprise attack could make a lot of fighters and other assets unavailable. And frankly, it seems we can expect this some time soon.

What is the counter strategy? MKIs from Bareilly and Pune to take over major air ops? Where are IAF Prithvis located, they'd be useful along with the Brahmos.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Ankit Desai »

This is not exactly military news but a developing story in China.

Censors block online rumors about coup as China battles infighting within ruling party
Chinese censors have blocked internet content speculating a military coup amid reports of serious power struggle within the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that threatens to disrupt a smooth transition of power when its general secretary and President Hu Jintao completes his term later this year.
The struggle has come to the fore after the party's Chongqing city head Bo Xilai was removed from his post as his deputy had reportedly sought asylum in the US. Bo, who is a CCP founding member's son, was a contender for the party's top post.
-Ankit
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by rohitvats »

You can recognize an article (actually, farticle) written by Chor Gupta by just sampling the number of abbreviations in the article...Non-Line of Sight Battle Support Missile??? I mean....what the fvck!!! is there a line of sight battle support missile???? And the comment about massed fire assaults and MBRL is made as if the joker has discovered some hidden secret....guess what we were doing in Kargil before infantry went in for the final assault???? yup....using fire assault to soften the enemy and pin him down. All the above is given. What we need to do is get the infra up ASAP at least in middle sector...from the Chinese side, the height of the Tibetan plateau means that the gradient to the LAC from Tibet is relatively shallow while in our case it is very steep. But once you come up, the region is extremely rugged...IMO, the PLA can induct and sustain more troops in the region. However, the lines of communication are limited and axis of advance can be only through the valleys - which are narrow and few. The mountain ridges compartmentalize the sector and lateral movement is next to impossible - at least for any large body of men. The higher reaches around the tri-junction areas (India/Nepal/Tibet) are worse off than Siachen - the terrain is so bad. If I were a PLA general, I'd make a dash for the disputed pockets (Barahoti pass area) and sit tight...no point going further...they would not reach anywhere.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by NRao »

China has been about large numbers. And, that has its own strengths. However, if the first wave can be absorbed then they are in a decent amount of trouble. This is not 1962, although there are some amount of parallels.

Secondly, what if, their gamble does not pay off? After all IA has the advantage of taking risks that the PLA does not.

What bothers me is the second front is now manned by china too. Pakis have been sidelined. But with time IA will solve that too.

Like I have always said, there is a very small window within which China can act. That window is slowly closing, although the likes of GoI are helping keeping it open.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Kanson »

rohitvats wrote:You can recognize an article (actually, farticle) written by Chor Gupta by just sampling the number of abbreviations in the article...Non-Line of Sight Battle Support Missile??? I mean....what the fvck!!! is there a line of sight battle support missile????
:D If there is any award for mindless use of jargon, he should get that. For quite sometime, he is using this NLOS prefixing all missiles that comes for discussion, If I could recall correctly. Even Prahaar is addressed as NLOS, when Prahaar was not fully evolved and exact details were not forthcoming from the development agency.

At present only missile from Indian stable which has enough details to confirm as NLOS is long range Helina.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Kanson »

Cain Marko wrote:
Surya wrote:This continues to be one of the worries I have and no one has explained to me how we will survive a surprise missile barrage.

Unless our assets have solid cover to withstand the initial surprise attack we will be in trouble.

and we need lots more Brahmos to hit back at everything they possess - not 10s and 20s.
+100! I"ve always had the same question - a debilitating surprise attack could make a lot of fighters and other assets unavailable. And frankly, it seems we can expect this some time soon.

What is the counter strategy? MKIs from Bareilly and Pune to take over major air ops? Where are IAF Prithvis located, they'd be useful along with the Brahmos.
Missiles/rockets are considered as long range artillery. If the long range of such missiles acts as an advantage for the adversary, it also gives us some advantage. You can have monitoring radars at vantage points, that gives us enough warning to hide or act if we have the necessary counter strike options.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by NRao »

^^^^^

In addition, missile/rockets have a predetermined path. Many a times mountain slopes can be used to shelter artillery, etc.

IA has tested a Brahmos that is capable of turning around or diving vertically to attack a position. Not too many place to hide. I am not too sure, but, I do not think the Chinese have something in the same class - yet.
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Re: Chinese hacking redux.....

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by shiv »

The ballistics of artillery shells is supposed to be completely different at high altitude than what is tabulated for lower altitudes so I guess each area where artillery is to be place has to be customized in some way I guess - at least in terms of equipping the men with the correct parameters of feeding them onto a computer.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Don »

Awacs and J-10's

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by svinayak »


Is China the next superpower?

Many people see China's strength mainly in its economy and although China's economy now ranks as the second largest in the world, its per capita income is still roughly 10 times lower than that of Japan and the United States. Due to The low standard of living China is forced to export. And that's what the Chinese economy is, an export- oriented economic system. This has made China overwhelmingly dependent on consumers in the West. Chinese exports, which go through the global sea trade routes, are dominated by the U.S. Navy. This forces Beijing to invest its resources to build a modern navy to protect its interests. Aside from the economics and naval buildup, China faces enormous domestic issues. The east side of its territory is inhabited by secessionist-
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by S_Prasad »

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world ... .html?_r=1

INteresting Read of what the Chinki think .....
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by NRao »

S_Prasad wrote:
Chinese Insider Offers Rare Glimpse of U.S.-China Frictions

INteresting Read of what the .....
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Garooda »

China has funded or plans to invest in several major infrastructure projects including ports in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma, in a policy described as a “string of pearls” with which to ‘choke’ India.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... -plan.html

This could get interesting as the US does operate drones from Seychelles. Dheere Dheere sahi but they are strategically positioning around the Indian Sub-continent.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by vivek_ahuja »

NRao wrote:^^^^^

In addition, missile/rockets have a predetermined path. Many a times mountain slopes can be used to shelter artillery, etc.

IA has tested a Brahmos that is capable of turning around or diving vertically to attack a position. Not too many place to hide. I am not too sure, but, I do not think the Chinese have something in the same class - yet.
Except that the Brahmos must be compromising its range to be able to do that. It already has only bare minimum ground-launch range to be useful against China. Air-launched Brahmos missiles will do better, but then you are coupling aircraft that would be needed for other tasks on launch duty for the Brahmos, making it into a longer range PGM rather than a force-multiplier. Also it forces the delivery aircraft of having to fight past the Chinese air-defences in order to provide any useful deep-strike range to the Brahmos.

Brahmos is very nice for use against Pakistan, and surely has use in a tactical FEBA support role in Tibet, but its not a counterforce weapon against China the way some might suggest. The ground launched versions are sorely lacking range to attack some of the deeper Main Operating Bases for the Chinese forces.

Nirbhay will fill that role when it comes in. Its subsonic, has long-range and will not require air-launches for hitting deep inside China, freeing up aircraft for other tasks near the border and keeping them safe from Chinese air-defences.

Added Later: Brahmos high-speed capabilites make it ideal for attacking deadly long-range, Army/Corps level air defences (read Chinese S-300 batteries) which are anyway placed on relatively open terrain and cannot be hidden if they are operational.

-Vivek
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Surya »

vivek


true

based on official range

one hopes.... :wink:
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Don »

China’s military rise
The dragon’s new teeth
A rare look inside the world’s biggest military expansion

http://www.economist.com/node/21552193

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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Don »

http://news.yahoo.com/us-miscalculates- ... 14473.html

US miscalculates China military growth: study
The United States has underestimated the growth of China's military as policymakers have taken public statements at face value or failed to understand Beijing's thinking, a study said Thursday.

The report prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission said the United States had a mixed record on predicting the rising power's new weaponry, including largely missing the emergence of more advanced submarines.

As for the speed of military modernization, the study found "identifiable cases of miscalculation" with China developing anti-ship ballistic missiles and stealth fighter-jets earlier than the United States expected.

US analysis could have improved if more experts read Chinese or even looked at open publications such as academic technical journals, it said.

"US observers should not take at face value statements from the Chinese government on military policy, as they could either be deceptive, or simply issued by agencies" such as the foreign ministry "that have no real say over military matters," it said.

The staff report was prepared for the Commission, which was set up by Congress in 2000 to assess security implications from China, and does not represent the view of the body or of the US government.

The study said that US experts "may have failed to fully appreciate the extent to which the Chinese leadership views the United States as a fundamental threat to China's security."

It said that China's views were "inflamed" by incidents including the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which the United States said was accidental, and the US show of naval force near Taiwan in 1996 after Beijing's missile tests.

The study said that US experts assumed in the late 1990s that China would never catch up militarily to the United States and would put a low priority on its defense industry compared with other parts of the economy.

"A decade on, it is now clear that much of the conventional wisdom about China dating from the turn of the century has proven to be dramatically wrong," it said.

"To avoid being similarly caught off-guard in 2022, US analysts should carefully reexamine many of their widely held assumptions about the Chinese government and its policy goals," it said.

China said its military spending will top $100 billion in 2012, the latest sharp increase. While many experts believe its actual spending is much higher, it remains far below the $613 billion requested by the US Defense Department for fiscal year 2013.
...
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by svinayak »

China military warned on rumours
China's official military newspaper has warned soldiers to ignore internet rumours and maintain absolute loyalty to the party, following online rumours of a coup last week.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Christopher Sidor »

Exploring Unmanned Drones as an Option for China’s First Carrier --- Jamestown Foundation Dated 30-March-2012

There are people who are claiming that it will take PLAN a significant amount of time to master its naval aviation wing. This is based on a fallacy known as "mirror-effect". The reasoning given was that since it took USN soo long to master naval aviation, it will take PLAN a similar time. They forget that when USN, RN and the IJN were trying out carrier based aviation, there were a few countries attempting the same. Now there are a plethora of countries which have naval aviation experience, and some of these countries will not be averse to pass on the their expertise to PLAN. We should not forget that the Chinese manned space program did not suffer from all the delays that other countries space and manned program suffered from, as there were countries which were willing, if not eager, to share the know-how with the Chinese.

But we are digressing from the topic. What the above mentioned article says that in stead of having a human element in carrier aviation, the Chinese might go in for a unmanned aviation complement for their carriers, so as to "leap-frog" the current known limitations of carrier aviation. For example the cost of F/A-18 hornet was USD 55 million. The cost of a unmanned weaponized UAV is less than half of the same. And we are not even considering the operational cost, just the acquisition cost. Consider what the article claims
The combination of size, space and economics of UAVs suggest an extremely tantalizing possibility for naval combat situations. For example, the Northrop Grumman X-47B (Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator or UCAS-D) footprint is at least one third smaller than the F-18E. If the wings are collapsed, the X-47B footprint is further reduced. Not only is the X-47B’s horizontal cross section smaller but also the vertical cross section. If UAV weight reductions match the footprint reductions, it could even be possible to stack helicopter or fixed-wing UAVs in multiple columns in the hangar bay or on the flight deck of the ex-Varyag. This could dramatically increase the overall number of UAVs that could be flown, increasing strike potential. The typical compliment of the Kuznetsov-class carrier is 41 mixed rotary- or fixed-wing assets. Taking into account the savings in size and weight, it could be possible that as many as 60-plus UAVs could be mission capable at any one time. Flying times and range also are significantly greater for UAVs depending on the variation.
This makes sense as going forward in naval aviation or plain vanilla air force, the human element will get eliminated. Also it is difficult to replace a fighter pilot, as the training and competence take time to build up and replace. For example the IJN aviation progressively suffered as the war in pacific went on, because of the attrition in its fighter pilots. In fact come 1945 a majority of its best aviation pilots were long gone. The same happened to Nazi air force post 1943. Does that mean that we, as in Indians should be worried? Well not exactly.

A few months ago, in Dec-2011, Iran bought down a stealth drone of US. Not via guns or fighters but by attacking its communication link with its base/controller. That is the greatest weakness of UAV, whether armed or unarmed. This does not mean that we should be complacent. Rather that would be a mistake. We should take this breather to expedite our owned armed UAV program, if we have any, and target for autonomous capability. For example programming the UAV to accomplish a mission on the ground without any interaction with its home base or carrier.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Singha »

UCAVs might see some use as strike role, but are plenty far from running a CAP air defence grid.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Christopher Sidor »

As we sit and discuss the current capabilities of a UAV it does seem that it is ideal for strike role and as a surveillance platform. If we look back to the history or shall we say evolution of fighters, then initially too, planes were viewed primarily as surveillance platforms. History records instances where opposing pilots used to wave at each other while they went on with their work. It was later on that guns were added to the planes. The reasoning was for them to shoot down enemy surveillance platforms.

Now look at where planes have evolved to right now. We have fighters, bombers, pure surveillance planes, transport, etc. They have completely morphed and taken on roles which are mind boggling.

The future of UAV will be on similar lines. Right now we do not see them suitable for limited roles. Just like fighters planes have their beginnings in humble single propeller surveillance planes, Armed UAV too have their origins in surveillance drones. UAV will serve in the near future in all of the current roles which manned planes are serving. And UAV is just a subset of the entire gamut of Unmanned Vehicles.

What these Unmanned Vehicles will do is return the balance of war not to the person who can field the largest army, but to those who can manufacture the most of them. Ever since the American Civil war ended or shall we say the Indian Mutiny was crushed, it has been an article of faith that god is on the side of the biggest and mightiest armies. That will change.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Singha »

well whoever can field and train the mightiest army would have the most cash to produce the highest number and best UAV/droids/mecharobots too. these things wont be cheap as capabilities increase. already they are approaching $100 mil at the high end global hawk level.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by NRao »

The Chinese hav a much, much cheaper method of attaining all these things: steal or hire.

I suggest India invest in something similar before venture beyond where they are today. And, IMHO, specially the IN, is doing a pretty good job of planning and deploying that plan.

Also, one more thing that will be crucial/critical is to invest in pooling - as in with other like minded nations.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Austin »

Interesting analysis by APA

Advances in PLA-N Carrier Aviation
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by shiv »

Singha wrote:produce the highest number and best UAV/droids/mecharobots too
Pakistan has a high number of Oedipal entities that have a name that looks like what I read "mecharobots" as when I saw the word. :) Sorry. OT
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Singha »

well there you go. a 200 mil field army right there once the chinese have implanted a control chip in each brain.
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Don »

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/china ... 6ac839afff
Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: How Much is Enough?

Publication: China Brief Volume: 12 Issue: 8April 12, 2012 03:56 PM Age: 1 daysCategory: China Brief, Elite, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific

By: Michael S. Chase

The modernization of China’s nuclear missile force capabilities has led a number of analysts to ponder the question of “how much is enough” for China. Some have speculated that China may take advantage of the declining numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals to “rush to parity” with the nuclear superpowers. Others have even argued China already could have secretly amassed a much larger number of nuclear weapons than is widely believed, apparently basing this conclusion largely on their interpretation of the motives behind China’s large-scale construction of tunnels to support Second Artillery Force (SAF) operations (Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2011; “China’s ‘Underground Great Wall’ and Nuclear Deterrence,” China Brief, December 16, 2009). No compelling evidence has been provided to support these assertions, however, and several analysts have shown that they are based on questionable sourcing and flawed research (Asia Security Watch, January 9; Federation of American Scientists, December 3, 2011). Nonetheless, Chinese nuclear force modernization is real in both quantitative and qualitative terms. As the latest Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China indicated, China is moving toward a larger and more survivable force consisting of silo-based and road-mobile ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

These force modernization developments should come as no surprise. China has long sought an assured retaliation capability, though for many years China lived with a relatively modest and potentially vulnerable nuclear force [1]. More recently, however, China has been modernizing its nuclear forces in pursuit of “effective” nuclear deterrence, a requirement that can be traced to Chinese military publications such as the 1987 edition of the authoritative book, The Science of Military Strategy. More recently, China’s national defense white paper in 2006 described China’s nuclear strategy as requiring a “lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs” but official Chinese sources provide little in the way of specifics with regard to how many nuclear weapons or what type of force structure is required to meet this objective (State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2006). Non-governmental experts in the United States estimate China currently has a few hundred nuclear warheads [2]. Given China’s lack of transparency, however, analysts must draw their own conclusions about how many nuclear weapons Beijing believes will be enough to allow China to achieve its deterrence objectives in the future.

The writings of Chinese strategists shed some light on this problem in that they suggest quite strongly that China will continue to modernize and expand its nuclear missile force These same strategists, however, see little benefit to be gained by amassing thousands of nuclear weapons in an attempt to achieve parity with the United States and Russia. With respect to its nuclear missile force, China has shown determination to maintain the secure, second-strike capability that is required to ensure that it will have a credible strategic deterrence force—even in the face of advances in adversary ISR, precision strike and missile defense capabilities. Yet the writings of Chinese strategists strongly suggest going much beyond what is required for an unquestionably credible assured retaliation capability would lead to diminishing returns at best and strategic instability at worst. For example, Major General Yao Yunzhu of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), a prominent analyst of nuclear issues, argues China adheres to the views of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, who clearly believed “deterrent effectiveness does not increase in proportion with numbers of nuclear weapons,” but rather that “a survivable and invulnerable small arsenal can be equally effective in terms of deterrence” [3]. Along similar lines, Sun Xiangli argues the experience of the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War shows the pursuit of a “war-fighting” strategy “does not substantially increase the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.” Moreover, because it requires a very large nuclear arsenal, it consumes “substantial economic and technological resources.” Worse still, Sun argues, large arsenals and “war-fighting” strategies lead to strategic instability and increase the risk of nuclear war [4].

Assessments such as these appear to reflect the longstanding views of senior leaders. As a recent article based on Chinese military publications and the memoirs and selected works of key figures in China’s nuclear weapons programs points out, “Chinese leaders have believed that nuclear weapons were basically unusable on the battlefield and that once mutual deterrence was achieved, a larger arsenal or arms racing would be costly, counterproductive and ultimately self-defeating” [5]. China thus is unlikely to attempt to exceed the United States or Russia in terms of the number of nuclear weapons it deploys. Nonetheless, there is ample reason to believe Beijing will increase the size of its nuclear arsenal as needed to ensure that it maintains an assured retaliation capability in response to perceived security challenges. This could result in substantial increases to the quantity and quality of China’s nuclear arsenal.

Indeed, many observers expect China to field a larger and more sophisticated nuclear force over the next 10 to 15 years. The DIA presentation in the annual worldwide threat assessment provided Congress expresses this foreign consensus. Last year, DIA Director Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess Jr. testified “[China] currently has fewer than 50 ICBMs that can strike the continental United States, but probably will more than double that number by 2025” (DIA Public Affairs, March 10, 2011).

At least three key factors are likely to influence Chinese decision-making about what exactly it requires in terms of nuclear force structure. First, at a broad level, China’s perception of its external security environment and its relationships with major powers is an important consideration. At a more operational level, China also must consider potential nuclear and conventional threats to its silo-based, road-mobile and sea-based nuclear forces. Finally, China also will weigh its concerns about future missile defense developments that could undermine its ability to maintain an assured retaliation posture capable of deterring potential adversaries.

Chinese scholars suggest missile defense is the most important factor in determining China’s future requirements. According to Yao Yunzhu, for example, U.S. missile defense deployments will be “the most significant factor that will influence China’s nuclear calculus” [6]. Furthermore, according to Chu and Rong, “Trying to retain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent in the face of a BMD system, China may increase its nuclear arsenal until it is beyond doubt that it is large enough” [7]. Chinese writers rarely provide specific numbers, but Chu and Rong suggest perhaps 200 nuclear warheads could be needed today, with that number possibly increasing to 300 or 400 in the future.

Yao writes China will need to “reevaluate the sufficiency of its nuclear arsenal to counter U.S. missile defense systems and retain a guaranteed ability to retaliate.”Yao argues, however, such a reassessment will result only in variation in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal, not in changes to the “basic nature” of China’s nuclear policy. In short, as Yao puts it, the purpose of Chinese nuclear missile force modernization “is to keep valid its longstanding nuclear policy” [8].

Implications of Chinese Nuclear Missile Force Developments

In recent years, the SAF has made impressive strides in the development of its nuclear deterrence capabilities. The deployment of road mobile ICBMs is giving China the assured retaliation capability it has long sought for its growing, but still relatively small nuclear missile force. Over the next ten years, China can be expected to continue to strengthen the SAF’s nuclear missile force, which will remain the most important element of China’s nuclear deterrent posture. Perhaps the most vital development in this regard could be the deployment of MIRVed road-mobile ICBMs.

China almost certainly does not plan to build thousands of nuclear weapons, but the development of Chinese nuclear capabilities still will have major implications. First, the SAF’s growing nuclear arsenal will make China a more important consideration in discussions about future nuclear arms control agreements. Chinese nuclear force modernization will become a more important consideration for Russia and the United States as they reduce the size of their own nuclear arsenals. Moreover, China’s integration into the global nuclear reduction process that President Obama outlined in his 2009 Prague speech, as well as that of the other nuclear powers, will eventually be required to make further progress toward his long-term vision of a world free of nuclear weapons—a goal recently echoed by Hu Jintao (Xinhua, March 27). The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reflects this challenge, stating, “over time” the United States “will also engage with other nuclear weapon states, including China, on ways to expand the nuclear reduction process in the future.”

Chinese scholars expect that China will face greater pressure as a result. Teng Jianqun of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-run think tank China Institute for International Studies, for example, sees Washington’s approach as still focused mainly on Russia, but notes “as bilateral disarmament progresses, the US will certainly pay increasing attention to China’s arms control policies” [9]. Beijing, however, is clearly reluctant to be drawn into the process, especially given China’s small nuclear arsenal relative to the U.S. and Russian arsenals. As Teng explains, “American and Russian stockpiles make up more than 90 percent of the world’s total nuclear weapons. Though both nearly have halved their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, their total number of nuclear weapons is still many times greater than that of states with small nuclear forces. Only when the two great nuclear powers have reduced their arsenals to an appropriate level will China follow suit.” It should be noted, however, that government-affiliated Chinese analysts have not specified what number would constitute an “appropriate level,” suggesting Beijing will remain reluctant to enter into such negotiations.

Second, beyond the implications for arms control, challenges for escalation management that arise from the SAF’s growing capabilities and evolving doctrine also merit consideration. In particular, some of China’s thinking with respect to using the missile force to send signals aimed at influencing an adversary raises the possibility of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation in a crisis. The risk of miscalculation could be heightened by uncertainty over the message that one side is trying to convey to the other or by overconfidence in the ability to control escalation. Some of the signaling activities described in Chinese publications easily could be interpreted not as a demonstration of resolve or as a warning, but as preparation to conduct actual nuclear missile strikes, possibly decreasing the ability of policymakers to successfully manage an unfolding crisis or even escalating a conflict rather than limiting its destructiveness.

Indeed, some Chinese sources raise troubling questions about potential miscalculations that could result from attempts to increase the intensity of deterrence during a crisis or a conventional conflict. For instance, one SAF publication suggests Chinese missile force units can attempt to deter an adversary by conducting simulated missile launches. For China’s solid-fueled mobile systems, this involves deploying the mobile missile forces to training areas and fake launch sites just before the enemy’s reconnaissance satellites are about to pass overhead. The mobile missile units can then prepare their equipment, erect the missiles and conduct pre-launch inspections. China’s liquid-fueled missiles also can carry out simulated launch preparations. The purpose is to persuade the enemy to believe China’s missile forces are prepared to strike enemy targets, thus convincing the enemy to abandon activities that China considers particularly threatening. According to the same SAF publication, such simulated missile launches “make the enemy believe that our missile forces are already in a situation of waiting for an opportunity or conducting pre-combat exercises; because of this, the enemy will consider the consequences and abandon some of its activities” [10].

Although Chinese authors appear to demonstrate at least some awareness of the danger that actions intended to deter an adversary could instead trigger escalation, discussions of these risks in the relevant publications are quite limited. For instance, Zhao Xijun notes deterrence must be calibrated to maximize the chances of achieving the desired results. If the level of threat is too low, it will not influence the enemy; but, if it is too high, the enemy may lash out in desperation. Zhao also offers a cautionary note that deterrence operations accidentally could trigger escalation if they are poorly timed: "Whether the timing for conducting the military deterrence of the missile forces is correctly chosen will directly affect the progress of deterrence and its outcome. If the appropriate timing is chosen, then deterrence will deter the enemy, contain the eruption of war and obtain the objective of peace with the small price of deterrence. If inappropriate timing is chosen, then deterrence may cause the situation to deteriorate, even leading to the eruption and escalation of war" [11]. Nonetheless, how Chinese decision makers would determine the “right” timing is not clearly specified, and the available sources suggest that Chinese thinking about the risks of specific actions may be rather underdeveloped. Importantly, they do not appear to reflect a detailed assessment of how potential adversaries might react to some of these actions, which could make attempts at escalation management in a crisis or conflict extremely challenging and potentially very dangerous.
Christopher Sidor
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Christopher Sidor »

^^^^
The Chinese have a tendency to speak one thing and do something entirely different. The above analysis can at best be defined as what is available in the public domain with regard to Chinese thought process on number of nuclear weapons.

If we were to take India's case, then we need nukes not only for Chinese cities, but also for massed Chinese Armour, Chinese troops, Chinese naval forces, Pakistani cities and some spare just in case. All urban dwellings having a population of 30 lakhs or more are valid target. Further one-to-one weapon mapping, i.e. designating one missile to one target is never enough. We need secondary delivery systems, i.e. SLBM, air to surface long range missiles, along with Surface-to-Surface missiles. In such circumstances, do we have the necessary uranium ore to target all of these targets?
Philip
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Philip »

There is a key flaw in China,its geography, that India and other nations worried about China's aggro must note and exploit.China has only one seaboard,unlike India or the US which have two or in truth three.The US has the advantage of having two oceans to ingress and egress from,our IOR is also not that bad as ,the ocean opens wide in the south towards Antarctica.China ,despite its huge landmass,is however constrained by the so-called "island chains",which it has planned to progressively control or dominate.Therefore,containing PLAN operations within the inner two island chains,as until it possesses true carriers it cannot challenge the US in the Pacific,will force it to stay within a designated and protracted body of water,the seas bordering SoKo,Japan,Taiwan and the Indo-China Sea,where the Phillipines and Indonesia complete the ring.The Indo-China Sea is the largest body of water from which China can breakout from the encirclement,through the two above mentioned island nations and into waters bordering Oz and NZ.This is one reason why China is claiming almost all the small island territories and extending unilaterally its sovereignty over the entire maritime region.By keeping the region in dispute and forcibly occupying the islands close to Indonesia and the Phillipines,China is physically extending its borders-just as it is doing in the Himalayas with India,so that it can later on establish forward bases or outposts ,making "breakout" even easier.Once "breakout" is achieved by PLAN forces,the "string of pearls" which it is assiduously threading together will enable it to hop from logistic base-to-base,connecting up all the way to its main IOR and Gulf naval base at Gwadar.This is why the PRC is also now trying to get Arctic "certification" from the nations that use the northern passage through the Arctic Sea,increasingly accessible because of global warming.However,the PLAN and PRC merchantmen would have to run the gauntlet of waters dominated by Japan,Russia-and one can see the glee with which the USN from Alaska would welcome into its crosshairs any PLAN ships !


What the Phillipines is now bravely doing,stopping the Chinese expansion through its little navy,has to be supported to the hilt,as if the Phillipines fails to stop the Chinese "takeaway" so close to its island landmass,the Chinese will be breathing right up the nostrils of all the ASEAN states in the maritime sphere.Indian needs to accelerate its naval cooperation plans with Vietnam and permanently have on station in the Indo-China Sea a squadron comprising both surface and underwater assets ,as well as land-based LRMP assets ,operating either from Vietnamese air stations and/or from the A&N islands to keep the PLAN firmly inside the first two island chains and preventing it from "breaking out" into the IOR in force in a crisis.

For this,the IN requires apart from the diplomatic agreements with the ASEAN nations,extra surface vessels and especially subs to counter the dozens of subs that China possesses,which year after year are increasingly being of new construction.
Don
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Don »

About 340+ K-8 now have been exported...

http://chinesemil.blogspot.ca/2012/04/z ... e-k-8.html
Monday, April 16, 2012

Zambian Air Force buys more K-8 trainers from China

Image

K-8 Karakorum has been an export success for Chinese arm industry.

The Zambian Air Force has officially taken delivery of another eight K-8P jet trainers from the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC), bringing the number in service to 15.

The aircraft were delivered to Mumbwa air base in Zambia on March 21 and officially accepted during a ceremony there last Thursday, according to Zambian media. Zambian Air Force (ZAF) commander Lieutenant General Eric Chimese said that the jets will enhance the military wing’s ability to patrol the country and safeguard its airspace.

“Increased mining and economic activities have put pressure on us to monitor who is flying in and out of the country,” he said. “In order for us to remain relevant as an air force, the significance of keeping our aircraft in a state of readiness cannot be overemphasized. As professionals, it is our duty to ensure that aircraft is maintained and ready for use whenever required.”

Defence Minister Geoffrey Mwamba said during handover that the government was committed to ensuring that peace continued to prevail in Zambia, the Times of Zambia reports. “In accepting the new aircraft, I wish to pledge my government’s commitment to keep the machines in optimum condition by regularly providing resources for spares. This is in an effort to improve standards in the defence forces in order to make them viable and sustainable. I urge you to make maximum use of the equipment and take care of it,” Mwamba said.

“For the lifespan of the aircraft to be guarantee, spares for maintenance need to be provided as and when required. We call upon CATIC to render due and timely support in this regard,” he added.

CATIC vice-president Liu Jianhai said his company had provided Zambia with different aircraft and other services since 1979 and was happy that the good relations between Zambia and China had continued.

In 1999 Zambia received eight K-8s in kit form. “Last year in November, we witnessed the handover of a fleet of upgraded old K-8P aircraft by CATIC. This is in addition to other machines that the government is currently in the process of sourcing from CATIC, such as helicopters,” Mwamba said. “All this underscores the wonderful relations we share.” According to the Jane’s information group, Zambia’s air force is hampered by a lack of spares and a shortage of flying hours. Although it has sufficient capacity to transport troops and cargo, its combat capability is very limited. Transport capacity was boosted by the delivery of five Y-12 and two MA60 aircraft from China in 2006.

Indeed, China has a close relationship with Zambia, especially after signing a military cooperation protocol in 1998 regarding training of the Zambian Army. The Chinese and Zambian defence ministers met in Beijing in July 2005, agreeing to continue military co-operation.

“It must be borne in mind however that aviation equipment is by nature costly and given our delicate economic situation, re-equipping ZAF to stay abreast with technological advancements in the aviation industry will not be done overnight,” said Chimese.
Austin
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by Austin »

Russia-China Su-35 Fighter Talks Frozen
Negotiations on the sale of Russian advanced Su-35 Flanker-E fighters to China have been put on hold over Beijing’s refusal to buy a large consignment, Russian state-controlled arms exporter Rosoboronexport said on Tuesday.

“We have been promoting the Su-35 fighter on the Chinese market,” Rosoboronexport deputy chief Viktor Komardin said.

“However, China only wants to buy a limited number [of aircraft] whereas we want [to sell] a large consignment to make [the deal] economically viable.”

He offered no indication of the numbers involved

The negotiations have been ongoing for more than one and a half years.
tejas
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Re: China Military Watch - Jan 11, 2011

Post by tejas »

abhishek_sharma thank you for that article on pervasive corruption in the PLA. It was a shocker to me. I knew of massive corruption in the CCP but routine buying of promotions in the PLA :eek: :eek: This is a MUST READ article and is tremendously good news for India. Hopefully the PLA can teach India a lesson in the near future like the one they "taught" Vietnam in 1979 the last time they saw major combat. Looks like Mao's epithet of paper tiger is staring them in the face.The whole damn country is one large mafia. I for one will sleep easier tonight.
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