Bharat Rakshak

I have a proposal on Siachen that should satisfy all concerned....Thinking out of the box...

Why not move off the Glacier/Saltaro ridge on to Ghyari. That way all the peace-nicks on both side of the border will get their troop free Siachen. Indian Army will still be in control of siachen and Baki army will save a packet on expenses. The PM's on both side of the border will get to share the no-b@ll pi$$ prize.

ShauryaT....

"There is no attack force coming in from the Glaciers or the Saltoro, so I do not get the import of this question." ..

you need to get ur geogrphy right..there are ingress routes from the southern glacier region into the Ladhak valley..if u let go Siachen then u should be prepared to let go Ladhak and make a last stand at Khardung La!!!

Ladhak will become double vulnerable both from east and north.

Everybody is talking of Pakis reoccupying the heights..however what abt possibility of chinese occupying these heights? then which reserve force of yours will come into play??

Siachen has to be held at all costs.

This ambigous/lax attitude towards our own territory emboldens our enemies and gives them hope of squeezing us more.

I was talking to Lt Gen Hoon ( Retd) who was one of the architects of Op Meghdoot and the plans at that time were to go much deeper into POK to secure our borders and to cut off KKH or atleast reach close to it almost till Skardu !! . However, Mrs Gandhi cautioned against that and gave permission for occupying Saltoro heights.

Even authenticating the AGPL is only at best a precaution and no more.

....I am convinced on the matter that Siachen can be held, without physical control. The only risk, as I see it is a stupid frontal assault like the one at Kargil, if demilitarization breaks down, for supposed political compulsions and moralistic positions by the political masters, which is an Indian problem and this assumes that all monitoring mechanisms break down with TSPA or IA failed to monitor and react in time.

Although our positions on the Saltoro Ridge are impregnable, Pakistan has the advantage of better communication from the plains. Its forces can trek to Saltoro in a week, while we will take three weeks. If Pakistan does a Kargil there, it will be totally impossible to evict Pakistan. In the circumstances, a step-by-step approach to peace in Kashmir with Siachen as the first step can be suicidal. Demilitarisation of Siachen should only be a part of the complete peace arrangement in Kashmir.

The writer, a retired lieutenant-general, was Vice-Chief of Army Staff and has served as governor of Assam and J&K

You may be convinced, but the IA is not. Otherwise they would not be opposing demilitarization for so long.

Pardon me but I think "demilitarization breaking down" is just a euphemism for the pakis walking in and capturing our positions as soon as the last Indian soldier leaves Saltoro.

Any other option to take back our positions which you come up with will also involve significant loss of life with less than favorable chances of achieving the objective.

Policy-makers now have to re-evaluate national security, ecological security, and human security. Which is most important? It is unlikely that the three can be separated, as they are all entwined. A pull back without trust may lead to another bout of fighting if Pakistan were then to occupy the heights on AGPL. This will be a greater ecological and human disaster.

Glacier outburst flows, extreme weather conditions, and events such as avalanches, it seems, may increase due to global warming in the near future. In Figure 1, the timeline ended at 2010 with a question mark for subsequent years. It would augur well for both sides to conduct more joint scientific studies and, without any loss of face on either side, put in place an AGPL agreement within a reasonable time frame.

umm....and how does one achieve that?

I glanced at the proposal...seems to be built on hope that Pakis will be honest. Talks about opening another front (military and economical) if Pakis renege. Have not seen a response to many Paki infractions in recent times. The Infy and other 'bigs' opposed Op. Prakram...so who knows how much support and will a future govt. will have to take on Pakis if the back off. At the same time it is certainly not the best of situation for our soldiers.

Siachen myths
The ‘Siachen’ problem still remains formidable. Over the years both India and Pakistan have built their respective narratives over their claims to the region, the origin and history of the conflict, and even its geography. There is little common ground between the two and it is futile at present even to attempt a reconciliation seeking change in attitudes. Without further ado we should accept the current reality for what it is and construct a solution that will be equally disagreeable to both sides, but acceptable to each because it will still provide substantive benefits to both. A resolution that will allow each side to claim victory and sell it successfully to its people. At least on two earlier occasions we came close to a resolution. Let us begin again determined to complete the process, irrespective of perceived petty gains to this side or the other.

This attempt has to start with demolishing some myths. Myth number one is that the conflict is about the ‘Siachen’ glacier. Actually, it is about occupation of the Saltoro Ridge. A glacier is by definition, ‘moving ice’, of sudden and deep crevasses and sharp rocky heights, where no troops can be deployed. Of the glaciers that abound in the Karakorum Range, Siachen at 77 km is the longest and lies to the east of the Saltoro Ridge. Saltoro is a sharp mountain ridge running north to south, large parts of which India occupied on 13 April 1984 and continues to hold till today. Fierce sub-unit attacks launched by both sides in these formidable altitudes over the years effected only minor changes till the cease-fire in November 2003 brought an end to fighting. Indian forces have to cross several treacherous routes across Siachen glacier to reach and sustain its defensive positions to the west on the Saltoro. Pakistani forces are mostly west of the Saltoro ridge on lower ground and have to climb sharply in order to approach the ridgeline. Ghyari was one such base on the side of a hill, over which the snowy mountain descended suddenly. An early self goal by India was not publicizing this reality effectively. As a result it is ‘Siachen’ that wrongfully symbolizes in both countries the contested battleground.

The second myth is that the region is of great strategic importance. This is an illusion. In practice, occupying the ridge provides no advantage to either side. The mistake arises when one looks at a flat map of the area spread on a table and imagines that either the Karakoram Pass on the Indian side, the Khunjerab Pass on the Gilgit Highway to Xinjiang, or the Shaksgam valley to the north near China can be reached. Any one who thinks so has not been to the area and cannot read a map. He should instead be shown a pictorial of the area with its perpetual snow covered ridges, glaciers and their crevasses and snowy mountain redoubts. Indeed if either side, or China, were to attempt to capture any area of significance on the other side, it will entirely avoid the Saltoro Ridge or the Siachen Glacier. The reality is that the terrain makes it impossible for any troop movement across it in either direction except by small groups of skilled mountaineers. It allows no domination or access to any area near by. In today’s era of continuous aerial or satellite observation deploying on the ridge does not contribute to visual domination. The importance of ‘High Ground’ to military strategy ended soon after the Second World War. Occupying the Saltoro Ridge serves no purpose other than claim occupation of the ridge-line and deny its possession to the other. This may have made some sense in New Delhi decades earlier as a means of preventing silent encroachment through cartographic aggression and denying access to foreign mountaineering expeditions from Pakistan. Today, this reasoning has lost all meaning.

The third myth is about ‘trust’. That it needs a certain level of trust between two sides in order to negotiate and sustain an agreement in this area, and till mutual trust is developed, a solution is not possible. This is a misperception. In a state of relations between India and Pakistan today where both continue to perceive the other as an ‘enemy’, there will be no trust for many years. A solution based on goodwill and trust can never last and must never be the basis for negotiations. An agreement is possible when both sides perceive an advantage in having one and see benefit in adhering to its terms. Penalties for non-observance can be built into the agreement. Or, provisions for punishment can be incorporated or implied in case the other side violates the agreement.

The fourth myth is that occupation of this remote mountain redoubt is relatively cost free. With a burgeoning economy India can easily afford whatever extra expenses are required for this operation and in any case, leakages of developmental expenditures and corruption are much more costly to the nation. But, in reality the cost of maintaining forces in these forbidding mountains has increased substantially over the years. A back of the envelope calculation would suggest that it is in the region of at least USD 750 million a year, depending on what expenses are actually included. For Pakistan it may be about a third of this amount. But, in terms of the percentage of overall GDP it would be about thrice as expensive as for India. Some in India consider this a good enough reason to continue the occupation as it bleeds Pakistan more. That in the end both patients may die does not apparently seem to matter. By all accounts this level of expenditure is better spent elsewhere, rather than in despoiling this pristine environment. Indeed the costs come at the expense of vital socio-economic spending, the absence of which is generating other insecurities in both countries.

The final myth is that if India were to withdraw from the Saltoro Ridge the Pakistan Army will promptly occupy it. The implication then is that the Indian political leadership will immediately ask the Indian Army to recapture the positions. This is seriously underestimating the political leadership, which knows that it has other options than committing soldiers to certain death. In today’s situation punitive actions can take many forms. Should counter measures be warranted they could be considered in another more favourable area, and where costs to the other side are higher. Another countermeasure, the real Kautilyan option, may be for the Indian forces to withdraw from the Saltoro Ridge in such a pre-planned manner as to ensure that Pakistani forces are compelled to occupy it. In which case, Pakistan will be inflicted with enormous financial and military costs for no practical advantage. Indian forces could then deploy short of the formidable Siachen glacier in comparative comfort. The additional costs imposed on Pakistan may perhaps even hasten an economic collapse.

Towards a solution
What then of a solution? Surprisingly, several possible options are available and have been discussed by both sides. In each case, a planned and systematic withdrawal is urgently warranted. The issue on which a solution has been stalled is on the modalities to bring this about. Should present positions be drawn on a map and signed, by one or both countries and/or by international observers/organizations? Should the Line of Control (LoC) be extended first beyond NJ 9842, based on present dispositions on the ground? Should such presence be merely ascertained unilaterally through satellite photographs?

Having done that, the entire area can be entirely vacated and declared a demilitarized zone under international acceptance and satellite supervision. There can be many variations to such an option and numerous options are available. Diplomats and strategists on both sides can use their ingenuity to adopt the least objectionable option. A certain flexibility will be required, based not on trust, but the minimum acceptable position for either side commensurate with its interests.

Another option would be to demilitarize the area and convert it into an international peace park for high altitude environmental exploration. Should this approach be accepted it will not compromise the fundamental interests of either side. Instead it could lead to many positive outcomes. Who knows, we may ultimately even develop mutual trust.

A first step may well be to construct a joint memorial to all the valiant soldiers of both countries who laid down their lives here, including those of the jawans of the Northern Light Infantry.

The need will be to have a binding/auto-response punishment mechanism that cannot be blocked by bhai-chara, aman, economy, west-kya-kahega and other politicial considerations.

rime Minister Manmohan Singh has put in place the full set of officials who will to support his desire to settle the Siachen dispute with Pakistan in a "Big Bang" visit across the border in a few months. The other dispute on the brink of resolution is Sir Creek. While the two nations have found a solution to Sir Creek, Siachen remains a problem because Indian Army chiefs starting from General A.S. Vaidya and continuing to General V.K. Singh have refused to support what they perceive will be a major concession to Pakistan, as it is India which will have to withdraw.

Please start from the events unfolded in 1984. If Siachen has no strategic value to India then why did we carry out operation meghdoot and occupy the glacier? Because this is the start of the whole problem isn't it? Otherwise we won't be debating today.

In July 1949, the UN delegation led by Hernando Sampiers from Columbia convened an Indo-Pak conference at Karachi to delineate the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Lt. Gen. Maurice Delvoie of the Belgian Army was the UN military adviser. The Indian delegation led by Gen. Shrinagesh comprised Vishnu Sahay, H.M. Patel, Gen. Thimayya and Gen. Manekshaw as members. Although very junior in rank, I was the secretary of the delegation. The Pakistan delegation, led by Gen. Cawthorn, had two civilian and two Army officers. Gen. Nazir Ahmed and Gen. Sher Khan were its military members. The latter was member-secretary. Today, I am the only surviving person who was present at that conference.
Jawaharlal Nehru held a meeting to brief the Indian delegation. Girija Shankar Bajpai, Nehru’s principal foreign affairs adviser, was also present at the meeting. I took down the salient points of the briefing. The UN Resolution of August 13, 1948, recognised the legality of Kashmir’s accession to India. Pakistan had to withdraw all its forces from Kashmir before plebiscite, while India could retain her forces till plebiscite was complete. The factual position of troops on the day of the ceasefire, i.e. January 1, 1949, was to be the basis for delineating the ceasefire line. India and Pakistan had conflicting claims. As the UN had accepted India’s legal status in Kashmir we should have bid for the no man’s land to be made inclusive to us.


At Karachi, Gen. Delvoie presented a notional line as the basis for discussion. We were horrified to find that this line was almost a complete reproduction of the line claimed by Pakistan. We had a Herculean task contesting against both Gen. Delvoie’s notional line and Pakistan’s claim line. It took us seven days of hectic discussions to delineate an agreed 740 km ceasefire line on a quarter-inch map, from Lalealli in the south to NJ 9842 in the north. By and large, we managed to get an agreement on our claimed line except for minor adjustments. Using the no man’s land argument, we succeeded in getting the 200 square mile Tilel Valley. Pakistan desperately tried for this Valley, eventually bidding for equal share, but failed. The MiniMarg area beyond the ceasefire line but south of the Burzilbai pass was to be kept demilitarised to deny Pakistan infiltration routes into Tilel Valley. No one at that time thought that military operations could take place at the forbidding heights beyond NJ 9842. In any case, the ceasefire line was only something temporary. After plebiscite it would become irrelevant. Thus, we drew a straight line running north from NJ 9842 to the glaciers. It is easy to be wise after the event. It would have been better if the line beyond NJ 4982 had not been left vague. On the basis of the no man’s land argument the entire Siachen glacier should have been made inclusive to India. A straight line north from NJ 9842 makes half the region, including parts of the Saltoro ridge, inclusive to us.


Pakistan soon violated the clause of MiniMarg’s demilitarisation. This was in keeping with Pakistan’s practice of violating all written and verbal agreements, as in the case of the Standstill Agreement in 1947, the Karachi Agreement (ceasefire agreement) of 1949, the Tashkent Agreement of 1966, Simla Accord of 1972, Lahore Declaration of 1999 and the joint statement of 2004 to not allow cross-border terrorism from Pakistan or Pakistan-controlled territory. In view of this, an agreement on Siachen without Pakistan categorically accepting the Actual Ground Position Line, and without a realistic punitive clause, makes little sense.

For nearly half a century till 1984, Siachen had no military presence from either side, not even during the 1965 or 1971 wars. Mountaineering expeditions towards K2, the second highest peak in the world, and other peaks were taking place. From the late 1960s, Pakistan started cartographic aggression by showing Siachen as a Pakistani territory. Some US maps followed suit, favouring a most friendly non-Nato ally. Apart from Siachen providing Pakistan access to Nubra and Shyok Valley, this region also provides access to Gilgit from the illegally gifted Shaksgam Valley by Pakistan to China. There was a sharp increase in foreign mountaineering expeditions into this area from the Pakistan side. Pakistan started giving permits to expeditions to show its administrative control over this region. In 1984, we received confirmed intelligence of the Pakistan Brigade at Skardu commanded by Pervez Musharraf launching a commando operation to occupy the Saltoro ridge. We preempted Pakistan by 48 hours and beat back its attack. The approach to the ridge from the Pakistan side involves a steep climb from 12,000 to 22,000 feet, making defences on the ridge impregnable. Operation Meghdoot conducted on April 13, 1984, in small helicopters, was a most hazardous operation which was successful. In the next nearly 20 years, Pakistan launched four major and several minor attacks till 2004 when a ceasefire came about. As the governor of Kashmir, I visited Saltoro positions in 2004. No doubt living at those forbidding heights is most difficult, but with improved technology for living and excellent medical cover, our casualty figures have not been too high. We have suffered about 1,000 casualties in Siachen since 1984, with a ratio of nine to one of non-battle to battle casualties. Our current casualty figure is about 10 per year. For the Pakistan Army, living at 12,000 feet and repeatedly attacking those dominating defensive positions, the ratio of battle and non-battle casualties is in reverse. I recall that in November 1948 during the battle of Zojila at a height of about 10,000 feet, when we had no snow clothing at all, due to sudden heavy snowfall we suffered 200 cases of frost bite in one night. Many had to be amputated. In the mid ’60s, commanding a battalion at the height of 16,000 feet for two years, I found our casualty figures not much less than now in Siachen as we did not have comparable living facilities or medical cover

Abhijitm: If one goes through this entire thread and the archives, I think one will get a good view of the issues and how things originated and the various view points.

CHANDIGARH: The highest battlefield in the world, Siachen glacier, hides a warming truth, recently discovered. Geologists have discovered hot water from geothermal sources in the glacier which is nearly 15 degrees warm in plunging -40 degree Celsius weather. The hot source has come as a relief in the freezing conditions as it can now be used for growing vegetables, setting up green houses on the glacier besides cutting down heavy reliance on expensive fossil fuels.

The Indian army had outsourced the project of first discovering ground water in Siachen sector as soldiers were being compelled to melt ice from the frozen Siachen river to quench their thirst and for all other purposes. Ritesh Arya, the project director, known for establishing a record in the Guinness Book of World Records, for discovering water sources at highest altitude in Ladakh, told TOI from Leh,"We had drilled holes a decade ago for the army, in coordination with 4 Engineers Corps, to discover underground water sources in Siachen. Last year, we were assigned a task to explore and develop geothermal source in Siachen Base Camp by Indian Army. We explored the site for geothermal development by drilling borewell but it was a tough task especially as it was assigned on' no water, no money' basis."

It took several months before the source of geothermal site was discovered, in October, last year." We wanted to test the source in winters. We finally visited the site on 18 April, 2012 with engineers from 17 Eng Corps and the discovery of geothermal source at base camp was established,"said Dr Arya.

A PU alumnus, Dr Arya, said that the borewells for groundwater in Siachen has been giving 24 hours water even in winters when temperatures drop to minus 40 degrees. "Though the temperatures of the source are not very high but still the water can be put to good use for developing green houses for growing vegetables, bathing, washing etc. So far the army is relying only on fossil fuels for heating water which is a very expensive proposition at the altitude of 19000 feet," he said.

Raising concern about the shrinking of Siachen glacier the geologist said, "The glacier has receded sharply and we are investigating how much. The glacier should be demilitarized, as the Pakistan army is mooting, and instead it should be developed as a geothermal tourist destination for which it has vast unexplored potential."

Absolutely. Without such an understanding, it is of no use. On the trust issue, what you do is verify and constantly monitor. So, start with the absolute minimum level of trust. I do not think TSPA has capacity or balls to confront and challenge the IA. Look at what they did at Kargil. Sent in resigned folks of NLI in the guise of local boys and disowned them. If they did not have the gumption to confront us in 1998, when arguably we were weak from a decade+ of non-investment, the discrepancy between us and them have expanded exponentially today and this discrepancy will only grow, in the years and decades to come. Example 10 years ago, could not think of dedicate satellites for each of the forces, today we can afford to think of such ventures easily.

My hope is the babus and politicians work double over time, to gain some significant movement in key areas of concern for India. Namely, the Jihadi infrastructure. I also feel that there is as much mistrust on our own polity as with pakistanis. But, even our babus and politicians are getting wiser. All said and done, MMS has not moved an inch, except for platitudes. Let us see.

the article also says Pakistan had no intention of occupying the saltoro ridge which is a total lie given that they were frantically buying snowgear in Europe and making preparations which was clear to Indian intelligence. This brigadier is a big time liar !! how come we give so much mileage to PA clowns??

He potrays occupation of Saltoro by IA as mischief and games played by 3 indian army officers..how can this crap be published on this forum beats me or even published in India !!

I think the INC is tired and in Neville Chamberlin mode of "Peace in our times".

Robert McNamara thought he was fighting in Vietnam for the cause of freedom and stop the communist takeover of Vietnam by China and Russia. Vietnamese were also fighting for their freedom. They thought that the Americans were there to occupy their nation and continue the colonization of the French. The American realized very late that they were in the middle of a civil war. The result was 2.7 million vietnamese and 58,000 Americans dead. My point is, it will not be the first time that everything India says is doubted in Pakistan and vice versa.

what happens if the PA occupies the Saltoro ridge and actually roll down the Siachen? .