Bharat Rakshak

You are a first class troll who is consuming bandwidth making ridiculous arguments and making others to take the bait.

I guess the only part of "buttress your argument" that you got was "butt". Congratulations, you've earned your epithets.
So much for your comprehension.

Gyong La was fiercely contested in 1987 and after a flag meeting was agreed both Army's will descalate, but as usual PA stabbed IA in the back.

Rite, somewhere in the horses behind was a stuck a request to "buttress your argument". Honestly speaking, if you say to someone, (paraphrasing) "despite your sanctimoniousness and your verbosity and your aggression, your argument stinks like a horses rear end, and your argument is based on BS, and oh btw. you are forgetting our recent experiences with Pakistan".

Do you expect me to address your argument or get distracted by the adjectives? I am having a fairly decent, and at least to me, fruitful conversation with Ashutosh, Rohit and others, but what do you expect when you start of the bat with a bouncer like that?

I think Rohit is doing a marvellous job here, and I do not see what purpose would be served by witholding details that parties on all sides are very well aware of. All that will happen is that the arguments for retaining control over the enrire area will get drowned out in a Goebellsian "Siachen has no strategic importance" refrain.

Just a couple of points that have not been brought up already:

For those really interested in learning about what can happen in a glaciated area, please study the operations in the glaciated Kaksar area during the Kargil war. Also study the amount of trouble caused by one heavy mortar position that was established by the infiltrators (I forget the location, but I recollect reading about it in "A Ridge too Far".

Second, if Rohit were to enlarge his map only marginally, there might be a small, barely populated village called Thoise that might show up.

Sorry, you're not at all being decent or to the point (other than some googled-babble, what with your statement about someone having drunk too much bhaang.

Point is your opinion is what you have, and everything else is based on pure fartology. How you deal with adjectives are your problem, as it is, you're the one creating the suitability for these.

Have you considered the entire deception of Kargil at all or are there too many adjectives here affecting your comprehension?

Sudeepj: Enemy guns on those ridges would not matter all all..would they?

We are the status quoist here. So its the other sides job to say why we should not do what

Let the other side prove with 1000% certainity while we find wrongs there. And as of now they proved sh*t. Remember sudeepj was ready to offer to Pakistan even the upper nubra valley & then changed tacks when shown that the upper valley starts right from Dzringulma. He started with opinions not facts. His is a search for getting his opinion to win, not searching for truth. The least we can do to help him is to actually not help him

Indian officials involved in the Siachen negotiations stressed that there has been no change in India's position. India wants both countries to authenticate their current positions on the AGPL (actual ground position line). This would establish the respective positions of the two armies. This is necessary because of a prevalent trust deficit on both sides. India says demilitarization or withdrawal of its troops from the heights of Saltoro Ridge can only happen afterwards. India continues to maintain this position, say sources.

"Authentication" is when each country signs off on their respective position. "Demarcation" is an agreed border which is first "delineated" on the map and then marked on the ground.

The truth is, as General VR Raghavan, former DGMO, says, Pakistan does not occupy the Siachen glacier. Their positions are much lower down the mountainside. Pakistan has been reluctant to authenticate its positions because it would reveal that Pakistan does not actually sit on the glacier. Indian troops occupy the watershed heights which is the reason for India's insistence on authentication.

Besides, given the history of Pakistan army trying to find ways change the ground position in Siachen, most recently during the Kargil conflict in 1999, the Indian army is wary of Pakistani suggestion of demilitarization.

Former secretary in MEA, Vivek Katju says, "It (withdrawal) will have major political and strategic implications."

The MoD stand has been: Demilitarization could be an option on the table. Only AFTER Pakistan agrees to the demarcation of the line of control. Kudos to those that are making sure this is not forgotten.

Sudeepj, about your question on whether the highways can be affected by shelling - search for posts by RayC on this. Read some of it, and let us know how these affect your opinion.

btw, when you posted a clip from Malhotra's book, did you consider there could be Brigade Commanders on this forum who would have posted their insights?

any treaty with pakis == cheap toilet paper.

Captain Bana Singh, who led the charge against the Pakistani incursion at Siachen Glacier's highest post in June 1987, is of the view that the world's highest battleground should not be demilitarised.

The intrusion had taken place at a height of 6,500 metres - the highest point on the glacier - and this peak was renamed Bana Top in the braveheart's honour.

"Thousands of people have lost their lives fighting for Siachen. This (the regaining of territory after numerous supreme sacrifices) does not happen in a day. It would not be good to demilitarise Siachen. But the government will take the final call," the armyman, who was awarded the Param Vir Chakra on January 26, 1988, for his act of exceptional bravery, said.

"Demilitarisation is a long process. The government needs to carefully assess what is right and what is wrong. We should guard against a Kargil-like situation where we vacated the posts and they (Pakistan) came and occupied them," the honorary Captain pointed out.

At the same time, he maintained that the government must take all shades of opinion into consideration before arriving at any conclusion. "My personal view, however, is that the glacier should not be demilitarised," he reiterated. He conceded that the economic cost of troop deployment at Siachen was astronomical. But he said: "It is for the higher authorities - the ministers sitting in Delhi - to see how expenditure can be curtailed."

Pakistan army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who visited Skardu after the recent avalanche that killed over 130 military personnel of the country, had recently expressed the hope that the Siachen issue would be "resolved so that both countries don't have to pay the cost".

General Kayani had said: "There will be a resolution and we want that there should be a resolution (of the Siachen issue). In fact, other issues must also be resolved."

Though his statement was considered significant and a climbdown of sorts from Pakistan's hawkish stance on the issue, it failed to impress Captain Singh. The latter believed that General Kayani had not taken everyone on board before making the demilitarisation offer.

The Line of Control between India and Pakistan was originally drawn on a 1:250,000 map with a thick sketch pen that left a variation of hundred plus metres at any given point besides not always following ridgelines – a source of constant acrimony. Then was the naiveté of not drawing any line beyond NJ 9842 that in 1984 led to the discovery of Pakistan creeping up the Saltoro Ridge, followed by its preemptive third dimension occupation by India. The Siachen issue is not about Siachen Glacier but the Saltoro Massif. Strategic significance of the latter can hardly be gauged by armchair warriors.

Before the euphoria for demilitarization of Siachen grips the country with visions of a peace prize and another ‘landmark’ agreement before the next general elections in 2014 eggs us to draw another foolish line on the map, there is need for serious strategic introspection – ‘paid’ media hollering to ignore military advice notwithstanding. Major fallouts of hurried demilitarization of Siachen are as under:

• Widening the China-Pakistan handshake (collusive threat) to include Gilgit-Baltistan (reportedly being leased out by Pakistan to China for 50 years), Shaksgam Valley (already ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963), Saltoro-Siachen region (that Pakistan may reoccupy through “Kashmiri Freedom Fighters” or cede to China), own Sub Sector North (SSN) east of Siachen with Chinese sitting on the northern slopes of the Karakoram Pass if not on top of it already, and Aksai Chin already under Chinese occupation.

• SSN and Eastern Ladakh will become focused objectives of Chinese strategic acupuncture. Defence potential of SSN will be totally degraded with western flank exposed and KK Pass to north, which India stopped patrolling years back for fear of annoying the dragon. We continue to remain thin in Eastern Ladakh against Chinese threat via Aksai Chin – heightened more now with possibility of two front war.

• Our next line of defence will perforce base on Ladakh Range with possibility of Leh coming within enemy artillery range.

• Ladakh and Zanskar Ranges will be targeted for terrorism by ISI nurtured groups while Pakistan will say they are ‘out of control’. ISI has been nurturing Shia terrorist outfits with an eye on Ladakh since late 1990s.

The recent media frenzy has exposed the citizenry to the arms lobbies, which may be the tip of the iceberg but what about global games being played by countries whose economies are largely based on weapon exports. Look at the manner in which India and Korea were partitioned – recipe for centuries of strife. Look at the deceit by the British in forcing Skardu into Pakistan’s lap. Look at the aftermath of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria – heightened conflict and who makes the moolah through arms sales, oil, re-construction and power? Why are the Ottawa University, the Atlantic Council and the National Defense University, Washington not discussing a ‘Peace Park’ astride the Durand Line? Will demilitarization of Siachen increase the chances / avenues of conflict between China-Pakistan and India?

Protagonists of total demilitarization from Siachen with suggestions to keep reserves ready for offensive action in case of double cross need to answer the following:

• If the whole exercise is based on trusting Pakistan, what exactly has Pakistan done to earn that trust? Has the anti-India terrorist infrastructure including 40 terrorist training camps in POK been dismantled? Has ‘any’ progress been made in punishing the perpetrators of 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks?

• How will Ladakh be defended post de-militarization?

• What force levels we will need to hold ground - mainly along the Ladakh range? On face value ‘many more times’ the current strength north of Khardung La will be required – remember while one brigade was deployed in Kargil earlier, post 1999, the same area is held by a division with nine battalions deployed on the LC and additional troops required during summer months to check infiltration.

• Where and in what quantum will reserves for Saltoro Ridge locate, how will they be acclimatized, time frame for launch and what is our capability to launch them at those heights on a ridge already occupied?

• What troops will we need to counter infiltration and possible terrorist influx into Ladakh? Even requirement of placing reserves on the Zanskar Ranges will need examination.

• Expenditure on establishing next defence line post-demilitarization; posts, bunkers, gun positions, helipads, administrative echelons, new communications infrastructure with increased quantum of troops, time frame, tenability, maintenance and recurring expenses.

• Effect of demilitarization on population in the area, especially the Nubra and Shyok Valleys considering army provides livelihood to most.

Nawaz Sharif’s call for Pakistan to take the lead and withdraw troops from Siachen glacier is nothing more than a political statement and Kayani’s call to resolve the dispute saying his country follows “the doctrine of peaceful co-existence with its neighbours especially India”, words of a sly fox. Without remorse for her dead during the Kargil conflict, Kayani is capitalizing recent loss of soldiers in an avalanche to rake up demilitarization because:

• Pakistan is at great disadvantage vis-à-vis India at the Saltoro Ridge with Pakistan holding Gyong and Bilafond glaciers on lower ground to the West.

• The situation in Gilgit-Baltistan is becoming explosive due to neglect of Shia dominated areas, enforced demographic changes, subtle but deliberate conversions to Sunni form of Islam and state sponsored Shia massacres. Any outbreak of insurgency will adversely affect communications to Siachen.

• In conjunction Shaksgam Valley, ceding Gilgit-Baltistan region to China for 50 years (reported by USA’s Middle East Media Research Institute) can extend to Siachen-Saltoro through to Aksai Chin, forcing Indian defences south and increasing the vulnerability of Ladakh region.

• Demilitarization will open avenues of infiltration and terrorism into Ladakh. Since late 1990s, Pakistan’s ISI has been nurturing Shia terrorist organizations including Tehreek-e-Jaferia (TJP) and its many sub groups with an eye on Ladakh and Zanskar Range south of it.

To say that Pakistan will be in no position to re-occupy Siachen is foolish. Even while Indian troops were deployed at Saltoro, the Kargil intrusions were never visualized on plea that terrain was not negotiable. Additionally, in 1984, when both India and Pakistan rushed for Gyong La, an agreement was reached following a flag meeting for both parties to withdraw. Indians did, but the Pakistanis re-enacted their back-stabbing legacy and occupied the pass in clear violation of the agreement made hours ago.

Compared to Saltoro Ridge, we have many times more troops deployed on Ladakh and Pir Panjal ranges in Kashmir, some of them holding equally, if not more, tenacious posts including some in glaciated terrain. Equally dangerous avalanches occur periodically in such areas resulting in loss of lives. Yet, there have been units who have done a full tenure in Siachen without losing a single man to weather and terrain. Yoga and religiously following pre-induction training saves precious lives.

Lack of strategic forethought and political unilateralism has been typical to India ever since Independence. More significantly, ambiguity and deceit have been the hallmarks of China and Pakistan. Ask yourself have they ever bothered about world opinion? Will their expanding nexus and US pullout from Afghanistan, not make Pakistan more uppity? India would do well not to look at Siachen in isolation. In case of Siachen, first the AGPL and posts held by both sides must be duly delineated on ground and map. We need dispassionate analysis of all issues mentioned above before taking any step towards demilitarization.

Lt Gen PC Katoch is a Special Forces veteran who has commanded the Siachen Brigade

Views expressed are personal

People can search for who are raising their voices for Indian "withdrawal". There will be a common spectrum of logic, tone, and even turn of expression. Think why Christian Science Monitor might allow Saira Yamin to post the following from Honolulu :

http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0425/How-a-glacier-could-thaw-dangerous-India-and-Pakistan-freeze

Look, I put forward 5 criteria to decide whether its worth fighting a war over some territory that we claim.
(in no particular order)

1. Strategic Significance. [Can loss/gain of the territory affect our posture in other areas]
2. Economic Interests. [Can the loss/gain of the territory cause economic damage to the nation]
3. Cultural Interests. [Is the territory deeply woven into the cultural fabric of the nation]
4. Costs of Sustaining Operations in men and money. [Are the costs of sustaining operations too high? (Too: subjective here)]
5. Political Interests. [Will the loss/gain of the territory affect our internal politics? Will it change our external political situation?]

For something like Abujmad, or Andman and Nicobar islands, the answers are Yes to all five questions. For Siachen, in my opinion, the answers are No to (2, 3, 4, 5) and Generals and soldiers differ on 1. I am tending towards Gen. Chibber's position and not Gen. Hoon's.

If you have a better system of evaluating questions such as these, please post it in the forum, and we will all know more.. For e.g. many have the idea, that our land is our land, and that is their system.. Which is fine with me! Who am I to tell them how they should develop their positions.. Its like religion really, to me this makes sense. To you something else makes sense.. To each his own.

He or any other Pakistani General is not known to have made any such statement in the past and this should be acknowledged as a major departure. For India not to respond will make it appear churlish. It will also heighten Pakistan’s belief in India’s intransigence.

The time has come to seize the moment and respond positively. India should also recognize the stirrings of change in Islamabad in recent months regarding its relations with India. Resolving Siachen will not remove all obstacles to better relations between the two countries. But, it has the potential to be the first useful step allowing positive developments in other areas. The possibilities of greater trade, dealing cooperatively with a post 2014 Afghanistan, and the larger vision of a Southern Asian Silk Route or a revived Grand Trunk Road bring enticing new possibilities. This has genuine win-win potential for both countries rather than the normal zero-sum approach of the past.
Siachen myths

The ‘Siachen’ problem still remains formidable. Over the years both India and Pakistan have built their respective narratives over their claims to the region, the origin and history of the conflict, and even its geography. There is little common ground between the two and it is futile at present even to attempt a reconciliation seeking change in attitudes. Without further ado we should accept the current reality for what it is and construct a solution that will be equally disagreeable to both sides, but acceptable to each because it will still provide substantive benefits to both. A resolution that will allow each side to claim victory and sell it successfully to its people. At least on two earlier occasions we came close to a resolution. Let us begin again determined to complete the process, irrespective of perceived petty gains to this side or the other.



The second myth is that the region is of great strategic importance. This is an illusion. In practice, occupying the ridge provides no advantage to either side. The mistake arises when one looks at a flat map of the area spread on a table and imagines that either the Karakoram Pass on the Indian side, the Khunjerab Pass on the Gilgit Highway to Xinjiang, or the Shaksgam valley to the north near China can be reached. Any one who thinks so has not been to the area and cannot read a map. He should instead be shown a pictorial of the area with its perpetual snow covered ridges, glaciers and their crevasses and snowy mountain redoubts. Indeed if either side, or China, were to attempt to capture any area of significance on the other side, it will entirely avoid the Saltoro Ridge or the Siachen Glacier. The reality is that the terrain makes it impossible for any troop movement across it in either direction except by small groups of skilled mountaineers. It allows no domination or access to any area near by. In today’s era of continuous aerial or satellite observation deploying on the ridge does not contribute to visual domination. The importance of ‘High Ground’ to military strategy ended soon after the Second World War. Occupying the Saltoro Ridge serves no purpose other than claim occupation of the ridge-line and deny its possession to the other. This may have made some sense in New Delhi decades earlier as a means of preventing silent encroachment through cartographic aggression and denying access to foreign mountaineering expeditions from Pakistan. Today, this reasoning has lost all meaning.

The third myth is about ‘trust’. That it needs a certain level of trust between two sides in order to negotiate and sustain an agreement in this area, and till mutual trust is developed, a solution is not possible. This is a misperception. In a state of relations between India and Pakistan today where both continue to perceive the other as an ‘enemy’, there will be no trust for many years. A solution based on goodwill and trust can never last and must never be the basis for negotiations. An agreement is possible when both sides perceive an advantage in having one and see benefit in adhering to its terms. Penalties for non-observance can be built into the agreement. Or, provisions for punishment can be incorporated or implied in case the other side violates the agreement.

The fourth myth is that occupation of this remote mountain redoubt is relatively cost free. With a burgeoning economy India can easily afford whatever extra expenses are required for this operation and in any case, leakages of developmental expenditures and corruption are much more costly to the nation. But, in reality the cost of maintaining forces in these forbidding mountains has increased substantially over the years. A back of the envelope calculation would suggest that it is in the region of at least USD 750 million a year, depending on what expenses are actually included. For Pakistan it may be about a third of this amount. But, in terms of the percentage of overall GDP it would be about thrice as expensive as for India. Some in India consider this a good enough reason to continue the occupation as it bleeds Pakistan more. That in the end both patients may die does not apparently seem to matter. By all accounts this level of expenditure is better spent elsewhere, rather than in despoiling this pristine environment. Indeed the costs come at the expense of vital socio-economic spending, the absence of which is generating other insecurities in both countries.

The final myth is that if India were to withdraw from the Saltoro Ridge the Pakistan Army will promptly occupy it. The implication then is that the Indian political leadership will immediately ask the Indian Army to recapture the positions. This is seriously underestimating the political leadership, which knows that it has other options than committing soldiers to certain death. In today’s situation punitive actions can take many forms. Should counter measures be warranted they could be considered in another more favourable area, and where costs to the other side are higher. Another countermeasure, the real Kautilyan option, may be for the Indian forces to withdraw from the Saltoro Ridge in such a pre-planned manner as to ensure that Pakistani forces are compelled to occupy it. In which case, Pakistan will be inflicted with enormous financial and military costs for no practical advantage. Indian forces could then deploy short of the formidable Siachen glacier in comparative comfort. The additional costs imposed on Pakistan may perhaps even hasten an economic collapse.

What then of a solution? Surprisingly, several possible options are available and have been discussed by both sides. In each case, a planned and systematic withdrawal is urgently warranted. The issue on which a solution has been stalled is on the modalities to bring this about. Should present positions be drawn on a map and signed, by one or both countries and/or by international observers/organizations? Should the Line of Control (LoC) be extended first beyond NJ 9842, based on present dispositions on the ground? Should such presence be merely ascertained unilaterally through satellite photographs?

Having done that, the entire area can be entirely vacated and declared a demilitarized zone under international acceptance and satellite supervision. There can be many variations to such an option and numerous options are available. Diplomats and strategists on both sides can use their ingenuity to adopt the least objectionable option. A certain flexibility will be required, based not on trust, but the minimum acceptable position for either side commensurate with its interests.

Another option would be to demilitarize the area and convert it into an international peace park for high altitude environmental exploration. Should this approach be accepted it will not compromise the fundamental interests of either side. Instead it could lead to many positive outcomes. Who knows, we may ultimately even develop mutual trust.

A first step may well be to construct a joint memorial to all the valiant soldiers of both countries who laid down their lives here, including those of the jawans of the Northern Light Infantry.

Look, I put forward 5 criteria to decide whether its worth fighting a war over some territory that we claim.
(in no particular order)

1. Strategic Significance. [Can loss/gain of the territory affect our posture in other areas]
2. Economic Interests. [Can the loss/gain of the territory cause economic damage to the nation]
3. Cultural Interests. [Is the territory deeply woven into the cultural fabric of the nation]
4. Costs of Sustaining Operations in men and money. [Are the costs of sustaining operations too high? (Too: subjective here)]
5. Political Interests. [Will the loss/gain of the territory affect our internal politics? Will it change our external political situation?]

For something like Abujmad, or Andman and Nicobar islands, the answers are Yes to all five questions. For Siachen, in my opinion, the answers are No to (2, 3, 4, 5) and Generals and soldiers differ on 1. I am tending towards Gen. Chibber's position and not Gen. Hoon's.

If you have a better system of evaluating questions such as these, please post it in the forum, and we will all know more.. For e.g. many have the idea, that our land is our land, and that is their system.. Which is fine with me! Who am I to tell them how they should develop their positions.. Its like religion really, to me this makes sense. To you something else makes sense.. To each his own.

The Government of India is required to defend all territory that belongs to the Republic of India even if it has
1. No strategic value
2. No economic value
3. No cultural/social value
4. No political value

The only relevant criteria is the cost (human and financial) of defending such territory. The human and financial cost of defending Siachen is high but bearable. Successive governments have invested in equipment, etc to improve conditions for the men deployed to defend Siachen. In my view, additional expenditure is required to further improve the living conditions of the soldiers defending Siachen. Our country can more than afford it.

sudeep,

I don't think you understand. Siachen is as important to defend as New Delhi. What India can bear to defend New Delhi, India can bear to defend Siachen.

^^^It is in PA hands.

Let us just hear what the other side is thinking. Let us keep our on-ground arguments to ourselves. The Good Friday circle is quite active. Those who want to stay put on the glacier have their own arguments. By countering the Good Fridayers we are showing how we think about the whole issue which in turn is analyzed in a very systematic way to draft responses that may work on wider opinions.