Bharat Rakshak

the LCA programme was 'not' about just producing a fighter to the IAF to replace Mig 21s. it was govt of the day's decision to create modern infrastructure to cater to the future AEROSPACE needs of armed forces in general and IAF in particular. hence ADA was created specifically for this after both HAL and other private enterprises were unable to take up the challenge - as the programme was quite ambitious -

1. FBW/CLAW

2. CARBON FIBER COMPOSITES

3. MMR

4. TURBOFAN ENGINE

5. A WHOLE HOST OF AVIONICS INCLUDING GLASS COCKPIT.

6. EW

it was a right decision. we just had to leapfrog straight to 4+ generation. there was no other option. after all how long you want to keep importing and be held to ransom for TOT/MONEY/SPARES??

a 2009 interview -

LCA programme over the hump - 2nd gen to 4+, says ADA director, Dr PS Subramanyam

remember this was necessary to bridge the gap with other countries - even if it meant delay because we had to reinvent the wheel in many ways. without any 'datapoint/database' to build on particularly wrt to design/testing/flight testing etc..(does the loss HF Marut programme ring a bell here??). the infra needed also meant even building the blocks for ADA/ADE!!!

now it was also necessary to do the whole hog for other reasons too -

1. indian armed forces are never lenient to local manufature even if it proves itself in real trials. they have to be 'completely proven' and should cater to the 'modern needs' of the day before they see induction. i don't have to illustrate this as it is well known. these are waived if it is an import where OEM's word is taken without batting even an eyelid - but well it is another matter.

2. the other reason being creating a whole set of datapoints/base for future use. this was wrt all the 6 main points referred above. this means you would have at your disposal sufficient ways (datapoints) and means (infra - including trained manpower) to build, test, operate and provide.

has the investment even though miniscule - been dead?? or has it paid back already?? this is very important. what is obvious to me is that the second question has been answered in good measure. one can check Jaguar Darin, Mig 27, Mig 21 Bison, Mig 29 upg, SU 30MKI or even IJT Sitara for an answer.

......................................

CM,

now the real question is - was the IAF not in the loop in all this at all?? i would be 'shocked' if they were not!!!
it is true they were apprehensive and thought it was risky about the fruition as was the govt too - which is why the programme was run in phases with committees reviewing and giving the go ahead. so -

1. project definition (started 1987)

2. FSED to prove the concept with TDs (funds released 1993).

3. prototype development/testing leading to IAF config for IOC - till now.

i find it hard when you say FBW or for that matter any other requirement was some fancy idea from DRDO/ADA. it just could not have been for obvious reason. why would ADA do it if IAF was the end user particularly when it will delay the matter even further?? was LCA born of some vague ADA idea?? IAF gave its ASR in 1985 which changed later on in 1994 AFAIK. i can't fathom the thought IAF was not in the loop in all this!! afterall it was ACM Idris Latif's pet project!! IMO it got due attention as long as he was there and was sidelined after he left the scene as been borne out in open media. it seems they simply thought LCA will not fly just like LM!! so why bother?? the delay was not just due to ADA and the science community as you seem to imply. there was a whole lot of reasons.

- 80s to early 90s india's cash crisis meant funds were a problem.
- due to the loss of only other fighter programme Marut meant ADA had to literally start from scratch!!
- add to that no MIC. they had to be created afresh, manpower needed to be scoured from different sources.
- sanctions.
- attitudes of the user.

let me give an example to the last point above. take IJT Sitara which was designed and produced in a record 3 years - thanks to LCA. IAF was never in the picture and once it started flying with french Larzac engine they come and ask for a change in the engine as they want more thrust. HAL scurries around for a new engine and there is none. finally russians are called in and they design and develop a new engine for the IJT which takes away another 3/4 years!! if IAF had been actively part of it from the top it could have been easily avoided right?? same is the case with LCA they never took active part in the development but for the last 6 years. all along it is like 'ok. i have given my requirement. now deliver!! and remember if you don't deliver on time the requirements may change. i don't care how you do it but do it' no where does national projects are run like this. what surprises they can sit on for decades for AJT, MMRCA and not talk about delay!! there are instances where aircrafts have been inducted at IOC and have been worked upon actively later to the standard but in India alas...

unless there is an active loop of 'feedback/development' programme these things will keep happening because none is clear. it is not like going to a shop and buying a dvd player. these are complex programmes involving great capitals with long gestation periods which calls for equal participation by all the stake holders. pointing fingers, talking in different voices will take one no where. obviously this means having a clear vision about one's needs, drawing them up, sticking to it, being part of it as an equal and taking it to its logical conclusion.

inspite of all odds, peanut budgets - ADA has done a stupendous job if you look at timelines/technologies developed and used across other platforms but all they get is brickbats. very odd!!!

didn't we once discuss on the MTOW and T:W requirements.. what is the NLCA max config, and the needed power requirements? does it require 26.5k lbs thrust?

Guys, on the verge of the LCA proving to be a success why this self-flagellation about the program?

Good question, Ramana. a better discussion would be on remaining test points, slow pace of a/c manufacture, weapons fit, time for weaponization to be complete, differences in weapons between Mk1 and 2, radar for Mk2 etc. All this rona dhona is pointless.

Ramana saar, given that we're almost at page 100, perhaps the next iteration of the thread can start with the positives and help people remember what has been achieved, despite the odds.

If you can show me proof that in 1985 ASR the IAF wanted the LCA to have F-16 performance, I'll stop this argument as my whole premise is compromised. It would be insane for the IAF to make such a demand - replace the MiG-21 with an F-16. From TKS's writing, the IAF was looking for a far more modest MiG-21 replacement. It was the DRDO's initial plan/proposal that was overly ambitious:



Again,

, and



Point is, TKS is "whining" about the same - overpromise and underdeliver tendency of the agencies involved. ANd all of the above is around 1982 - long before IAF drew up any ASRs!! Kind of hard to believe that the IAF had floated an F-16 requirement in those days, as a MiG-21 replacement no less, and the DRDO responded with all of the above.



Not sure we went "on our own" at all. They just hooked the LCA project to a technological superpower that was utterly whimsical (and even capricious towards Indian POV), and paid the price (rejecting safer, albeit less fancy alternatives). A mistake that we rue till this day, and might even in the future.

The only aspects of negative criticism I don't like is the absence of correction feedback on how it should have been done given constraints we have faced. Constraints include, brain drain, sanctions, budgets and cost restriction from babudom, management issues, Gov sector policies, MUTUs and MPTPs insides, etc.

All negative criticism are actually constructive criticisms if they include a feedback to corrections. I know it is hard to provide corrections and is easier to blame on things.. and at the same time, there should be more accountability from these performing sectors to be more responsible especially in asking for the right budget, right plan, usability and requirements coverage and scope, etc.

Lessons learned can be easily forgotten if not documented or carried forward to future projects. hence it is important we move on from LCA, NLCA to Mk2, Mk3 and on to AMCA.

It obviously impossible to get the ASR from 1985 and post it online here. But these things about the LCA are well known , especially to the old timers like Sunil Sainis, George J (GJman who still does a cameo appearance every now and then), B.Harry (who passed away, but what brilliant work he did in writing about this. Our DDMs should learn from him) and of course the likes of Enqyoob. Unfortunate that many of them stopped coming here for a variety of reasons. But they all did a great job of publishing and writing in the BR Monitor that documents much of what happened.

A good place to start will be here BR LCA/Tejas Resources which has a couple of published articles and in particular the one by Air Marshal MSD Wollen he absolutely would know the ins and outs of what happened those days from where he was..According to him , the



The ASR has gone revisions since 1985 (twice I think) and what we have today is of a higher requirement (obviously, don't blame the IAF, the situation changes, but that will result in delays and budget hikes).


It is possible that the planning and definition and requirements of what went into Tejas was done by others in IAF , possibly above his pay grade and he was not in the loop. But facts are facts.

The IAF knew that it was ambitious alright, but it was required for very very good reasons. Read up the articles in the BR Monitor archives on how the IAF wanted those addressed. There were four programs if I remember correctly (Gripen, LCA, Novi Avion and I think an Indonesian program which got killed) that looked at exactly similar small, lightweight , single engine fighters and all of them came up with remarkably similar configurations (Delta winged, FBW, high composite). That 3 countries come to a similar solution is not an "accident" or a whim of "technocrats" or whatever. Those were sound logical choices.


Firstly, there was no other like that anywhere in the world at that point in time (the F-16 and M2K and Mig29 are bigger planes) and the Mig21 was outdated.

Also, despite all the skepticism, it WAS designed and developed in about ten years. With work starting in 1989 to first flight in 2000/1, it is about 10 years, DESPITE sanctions and 90s economic crisis.

Where we lost out is during the flight test stage from 2001 to today due to lack of prior experience and of course the well know reasons of IAF going comatose from 2000 to 2007!



Despite all the "skepticism", the tech developments have delivered fully, except in Radar(bad choice of agency there) and Engine (that was always tough, but partly there). The IAF ASR in 85 did reflect the F-16 acquisition by Pakistan , just like the Arjun's revised one in the 80s, reflected the possible transfer of M1-A2 to Pakistan (Zia Ul Haq got his 72s from the mangoes after witnessing firing trials of M1 Abrams in Pakistan) .

In fact, this whine about "I wanted an evolved Mig-21, while you give me an F-16 in a Mig-21 form factor" is uncannily similar to the whine in the Arjun case "I want a 50 ton Evolved T-72 while you give me Western Style MBT of 57 tons!" In both cases, you got what you wanted. To go back and claim ifs and buts and what was "really wanted" and if only we had done X or Y and not done what we currently did, we could have got "something" a decade ago is simply being ridiculous.



What I meant was singing up with the Yugoslavs. We burnt our fingers with them the 60s/70s in shipbuilding. They were the closest to us in terms of ideology and rhetoric and requirements (Socialism, Non Alignment and replacing Mig-21s) and I just thank the heavens some very smart Foreign Service babu decided to hitch our program with theirs. That would have been monumentally stupid , similar to hitching the Marut program to an Egyptian engine!

The cold hard fact is that the Americans were willing to support us a lot more in the LCA program than the French did in critical areas. Pokhran-II and the subsequent events are a catharsis that drained the poison that blocked Indo-US relations nu-necessarily for all those years since the 60s. That is gone now and I don't see why we cant have relations with the US on the lines that France has with the US in defense and other matters.

-del-

Aligning with US would be a hard fought exercise, and it would take years longer than our lives we could make especially considering our history and facts. There is a big difference in the way we think and how US thinks, and operates. Of course, we imbibe everything masan do, but selectively.

Alternatively I think project plan itself could have anticipated these, and accommodated all these. Sleeping from Marut and without a Mig21 equivalent in the middle, it is going to be a task that will face these kind of challenges in addition to socio-political challenges we face.

If I were to architect this, I would have gone subsystem and distributed approach, first in assimilating technologies. Taken ownership like Jaguar or Mig29s, and then slowly converting or change parts, with heavy investments. We should now be flying Jaguars and Mig21s with Kaveri engines.

Radars for Jaguar replacements (instead of 2032s) should have been considered long time back. May be we were weak in getting influence by the same socialistic setup, and tie ups, and gray hair brained officials at helm. However, our scientific and engineering community thrived to meet challenges, all because of the inherent qualities we have.

It is still no late to invest heavily into Kaveri, all home grown, test facilities equally gromov or other western setup. All indigenous Kaveri will put us in a real advantageous space, and would make us really arrive on manufacturing fighter jets.

Engines and radars are heart and brain of the jets. We must have put time and efforts, some 50 years back.

Not self flagellation, but rather I hope stopping the LCA pgm and the folks associated it FROM flagellation for actually succeeding, despite being set up to fail , and letting grumpy old folks of the "three legged cheetah" or the "Mig 21++" persuasion with whatever axe to grind (was the three legged cheetah man pushing the Gripen ?) getting away murder, literally, facts and background and their own record and role in letting industry and capability from the period 1960s to 1985 rot, because the LCA didn't do what they wanted to, that is fail and disappear?

may be it was a conundrum to project the force (cheetah), and the leg aspect is a riddle to fighter jet 3 legged undercarriage. may be there is a genuine interest, but acceptable only in the form they like. please remember, they always wanted indigenous technology. IAF hated imported stuffs in LCA... but slowly are accepting US engines in it for the initial orders.

In about 1982 or so Mrs Gandhi attended a summit in Central America (Cancun?) and Reagan was there too. He invited her to visit the US. She did and brought along VS Arunachalam on specific request. VSA was later asked to present a wish list to Pentagon subsequently. He did not ask for RLG but they threw it in along with FBW contract. In the 80s the US was very serious in working on the LCA to wean away India from the USSR. So there was some self interest too.

This is FALSE; actually a lot of things on BRF get wrongly painted in B&W when in the real world the reality is somewhere in between.

IAF's ASR for what is today known as MRCA too was very modest to begin with in fact originally it was supposed be essentially a follow up order of the M2K's latest variant , to say that IAF wanted LCA to have a F-16 level performance in 1985 itself is a baseless claim.

Going by the kind of platforms IAF has inducted till date and the way it goes about shortlisting them and evaluating them it sounds highly unlikely that back in 1985 i.e. hardly 5 years after USAF started inducting what was then world's most advanced fighter AC , IAF would demand for an AC of matching performance . Going by that yardstick IAF should have floated an ASR for F-22 like performance for the MRCA .

The ASR requirements by themselves are functional in nature no one says that they need a cranked delta design in ASR , that choice is essentially the one made by designer. In fact even the MTOW is listed as a 'range' and not a fixed number . Basically only performance and functional specs for designated mission requirement are listed. This impression that ASRs are written to match a certain platform is something I have only read on BRF.

So, I see why this is being an issue.. the real user should know how to state requirements rather give design inputs.

example: instead asking for 100kN engine, ask for a T:W ratio, and a MTOW capacity, capability to drop these type of bombs, missiles, payload, turn rate, etc.

This should have been verified much earlier, for example we get so many modifications from IA and IAF requests only later in the lifecycle. the issue may be with either teams, one not yet ready, and the other not in belief drdo labs will deliver.

I think, these are challenging industrial character building exercise.. we have to face it.

Have you even read the ASR? the First line says that it should be equivalent to current generation. At the same time, there was hardly any difference between scripting a 1 digi + 3 manual and quad FBW. In terms of time, yes may be bit extra, but we still needed the foreign help in validation and the sanctions would have screwed it. If not FBW, there was always something else that could have brought the project under sanctions.

LCA is definitely something that matches the ASR first line. Even now, people crib that when inducted, it be outdated.

No I have not; but I have read other ASRs which are in public like IN's request for short range AD missile they are very generic in nature i.e. most of the OEMs will qualify. Again current generation simply means what most of the world operates and not the latest AC out there. Even today if you will say current generation fighter AC Su-30 MKI the MRCA contenders and even the eagle family will make the cut, F-22 and F-35 are still future generation as far as rest of the world is concerned.

On CLAW and FCS again you are confusing it with the ASR issue; IAF if you would know did induct Mig-29 around the same time period and it neither had anything digital about it nor was the airframe itself unstable in any axis. The quad FBW was a choice which was made by the design team.

SaiK the following video on Luptonga's channel is a very good one that illustrates the challenges in developing technology although this is about missiles. It is a must watch for technically minded jingos. Watch the whole video - but I have linked the video below to a point where they have realised that even plans for future tech should be based on knowledge of what is achievable and what is not based on knowledge of of "national technical ability" . That was probably not known in earlier days when the LCA was being planned
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=pl ... aI#t=1695s

CM

let's look at tks article itself for the answer you are seeking. lets see what tks says in 1982.





read the highlighted portion. it makes it amply clear AirHQ desired DRDO to build modern fighter aircraft and the outline was received from drdo which was to be debated in a conference for field opinion!!

that answers your point IAF knew all along and was part and parcel to the proposal. they knew it was FBW in 1982 itself!! so your point that it was scientific community's wish to have FBW is wrong. there were 3 parties to it as i wrote in my last post - GOI, IAF and DRDO/ADA. as i said previously (read PS's interview too i linked) the idea was to leapfrog from 2+ gen to 4+ gen as there was no other option!! IAF itself would not have accepted a 3rd gen aircraft in 2000!! they themselves wanted a 'modern' aircraft as highlighted above. besides it was not just building a replacement for Mig 21. it was much broader in creating MIC for aerospace needs and closing the gap with the rest of the world.

also tks opines that it was ambitious -



answered below -



BRMONITOR - WOLLEN

add to that the FSED funds only came in 1993. this point was raised by you too which answered previously.

so as per the tks article the conference was held and some other groups wanted LDP too to be added too. so various field opinion was heard and that was it. infact ACM latif was upset as told by tks about his presentation.



so what happens later?? IAF finalises its ASR in 1985. is it even conceivable even from a layman's pov that it did not call for FBW particularly when it had been known and debated in a conference in 1982?? or was the ASR was watered down?? (inconceivable IMO) which only IAF can answer as we don't have ASR in open source.

ofc the delays happened but not 'only' beacuse of ADA but others incl IAF which has been dealt earlier on.

^ Boss no one ever floats a ASR or even a RFP stating we are looking for not so modern or ancient AC; so not sure what is the point in emphasizing the modern part.

Also your quoted para itself says that proposal was sent in by DRDO so where is the confusion; tail less delta concept and FBW choice in the proposal has to come from someone who wishes to design and build an AC, no air force will ever say we want our AC to have canards or not have a tri-plane config but instead be a tail less delta.

Having said that it would be interesting to look at the ASR and see what kind of performance specs were lined up back in 1985 specially in terms of max speed, altitude, weapons load, STR and ITR.

Its very much in open domain. The same trap was Arun project that wanted Western type tanks and then Army chose Soviet type.

The thing is that, even the non stable delta / quad fbw was current generation of the expected end of development of LCA in original timeline.

Added later...

IAF is gungho about delta carnad with quad fbw. M2K to Rafale is the proof.

Chacko you have picked your side so it's difficult to discuss stuff with you when you are not open to revisit your stance; I am like that on some issues so I know.

You see you now bring in Arjun into this discussion , why ? Arjun's case is different it was ready and IA said no to it and was replaced by a clearly inferior tank , has IAF done the same to Tejas ? Yes we have read about IAF big wigs in media being critical of the project itself, but why should it evoke such a strong reaction ? I see this being the case in every project across various industries the 'tu-tu main main' never ends however it does not mean that the party at another end simply wants the project to fail. IN chief himself was critical of the NLCA so going by the sentiments being expressed here should I conclude that IN too is against NLCA ?

seems you have not followed CM's posts where he has been saying FBW was not IAF's requirement and that it was 'scientific community's' wish. i was answering him quoting tks article.



yes it was sent by DRDO and IAF knew in 1982 itself that it would be FBW. and even the conference called for eliciting field opinion does not say whether IAF later in 1985 watered down the ASR based on the inputs from the conference. OTOH the fact that ACM Idris latif was upset at tks'S presentation gives an inkling AHQ did not go with it (tks presentation) IMHO only.

IAF is gungho about those platforms because of their 'CAPABILITY' and not because the way they look; that is what I have been saying all this while ASR talks about capability not if the design is a delta canard or a tri plane config. IAF btw is gungho about the Su-30 MKI too and in future should be happy with the PAKFA too, now are they tail less delta canards ?

Pragnya across the industry the way things work are if you send in a proposal with certain 'xyz' feature listed down; the end user will take it at face value. If DRDO included FBW in it's proposal back in 82 then the whole debate should end there, it's plain and simple.

Key thing to note is that the quad FBW which was to be designed with American assistance ran into rough waters because of Khan playing bait and switch. It is unfair to do a post mortem on this aspect and pin the blame on any one party for when the choice was made no one knew about the future, who knows something similar could have happened with ADA opting for the Ana-Digi FBW which the French were supposed to help us with too.

Delta carnard is not about looks and is all about capability. An unstable carnard with quad fbw is easily the most maneuverable out there.

The 'excuse' that the ASR did not say this and that is the Achilles heel of the arguments. We can use the same argument against that since ASR did not specify, it was up to the designer. It works both ways.

MKI purchase was more political. Yes, the tailess delta is futuristic and not the current gen. The LCA delta experience will lead to next stage of evolution that's F-22 / PAK FA design.

This is not true; case in point my first love the Mig-29.


Chacko my point is very simple i.e. the delays in Tejas program are due to more bigger systemic and technological deficiencies than IAF not providing moral support to the ADA and DRDO . I am in fact willing to say that IAF should induct the Tejas in it's current avatar. Having said that I do strongly believe that there is no need for making this a IAF vs ADA-DRDO slinging match.

Btw you comment about ASR not being specific and hence it being a designer's call sounds very ITVTY to me , you see with projects like Tejas eventually the thing does meet the ASR .


All foreign weapons imports have a political back drop, however it is not like political tone overrides IAF's requirements , MRCA tender is a classic example of the same.

MRCA was most transparent when it came to selection. Show me the SU-30 procedure.

I totally dis agree that the delta design caused the delay. It was the infrastructure build, the manpower etc



it took just 6 years for the concept to be shown inclusive of sanctions. (minus 1993 as funds were sanctioned and 2001 as it flew in jan.)

Added later...

The design also continues to be not just current and has never caused a problem in the LCA testing and other phases. The wing redesign is on account of IAF's 2004 ASR.

negi, you can't compare the induction of the Mig-29 in the 80s with that of the LCA. Even if the the LCA had been designed without an FBW, it still could not have been ready for induction before the late 90s. Especially since the main funding did not materialize before 93. Now which aircraft did the IAF select for induction in that period? The MKI, which as you know is an unstable triplane with an all digital quad-redundant FBW. The LCA had it been ready for IOC by the end of the 90s without an FBW would have looked thoroughly outdated compared to any other aircraft which was being inducted at the time anywhere in the world and was unlikely to have been acceptable to the IAF (even if they originally had been averse to an unstable FBW equipped jet when the program was beginning).

negi saab, that is exactly what i have been telling to CM. and that IAF knew it in 1982.



agree totally.

and again it is not a post mortem i am doing. i am only trying to tell CM that his beleif that FBW and other bells and whistles were not IAF's requirement but wishes of the scientific community ala DRDO/ADA - is wrong.

Abhibhushan sir read your post, Veena -> Vina please

One CAN specify flying attributes, that warrants a FBW system, and FADEC for engines. For example, one could write requirements such that it forces the designer to choose a particular system.

BTW, if IAF starts designing then IAF should have built a plane for itself. Why ask DRDO etc to build one. It is quite silly to say, IAF did not ask for FBW or FADEC or this and that technology.

Analogy: Did the Televisions viewers care about viewing High Definition channels? why did HD TV came out? Is this the fault of designers and thinkers?

technical advancement is part and parcel of this engagement.. we can't just trash that and argue FBW was not asked by IAF.

In fact, IAF need to ask for it.. It is the desire to match the world.. if pakis are flying FBW systems, do you all think IAF will accept anything less?

If we progressing as a reactive society, then we will never be proactive ever.

Abhibhushan sirjee,

I am a great fan of your posts and blog. I disagree with posters here that a large part of the blame is on the IAF's festish for foreign 'things'.

For example, I think the trainer blame (according to me) falls fair and square on HAL. as a company, it should have had a flying prototype from funds resourced internally. For example isn't M&M doing the same with NM5, GA-10, GA-18. Aren't Tatas and Mahindras coming up with prototypes of the FICVs, MPVs and trucks and Bharat Forge and L&T with howitzer's?

As a company HAL was terribly short sighted or lazy or inefficient to visualize and capitalize on a sure-hot marketing opportunity.

Who is comparing ? I merely posted it as a data point to show how IAF inducted an aircraft without digital FBW around the same time period when ASR for Tejas was supposed to be have been drafted, nothing more nothing less.


This is again a BRF fad; who says that anything without a digi quad FBW is an outdated AC ? If your AC can meet performance parameters no one cares if it is quad FBW digi or analog for that matter. Even the M2K is not a full quad FBW AC and yet it was the original platform of choice when IAF wanted a follow up order for the M2K (and this was in 90s) which later lead to MRCA tender.

MKI was selected much later and it was primarily selected again because of the need for a deep penetration strike AC to claim that IAF selected it because it has quad FBW is like placing cart before the horse; fact is at that point in time there was no one in the west willing to sell a platform in that league to India and obviously Ru had the Flanker on offer; now if it is a quad FBW design is a different matter.

Btw I am not sure if FBW is the piece which caused the apparent delay; to me it looks like bigger and more fundamental modules like the radar and engine took a lot of time to finalise and integrated with the AC, the FBW afaik has been working like a charm since the first test flight.

In the above case of the DFBW, I was specifically refering to the incident where Dassault's "hybrid" proposal, which was supported by the IAF,was disregarded by the ADA in favor of Marietta's DFBW. In general though, my point is very straightforward: The IAF specifies performance and timeframe requirements. But not HOW those are to be achieved. Point is, were the requirements so exotic that technologies such as DFBW, composites etc were compulsory and hence DRDO's response? Somehow I doubt that.

Even an a/c such as the Mig-29, without all of the above technologies was rather effective in its role of Air superiority. Again, with reference to TKS's article, the IAF it seems was not very convinced about the way DRDO was going about meeting the requirements for a MiG-21 replacement.

Under the circumstances, I find it rather unconvincing that the delays and difficulties that were faced by the LCA program were largely a result of the IAF's "step motherly" treatment of the project. Once again, there is no doubt about the technological/industrial achievement of this program, but I cannot agree that it achieved it's second goal - that of providing the IAF a fighter in a given timeframe. AFAIK, it has not happened that the DRDO has provided the IAF with something competitive and the IAF has summarily rejected it. The idea that the IAF does not support indigenous products is utterly unproved. Perhaps they could have been more involved, as was the Indian Navy, and that comparison has its own flaws, but there is little to suggest that the IAF as an institution was all about "phoren" maal, and had no tolerance for SDRE products/projects - ridiculous.

End Result: If the IAF is to be blamed for being "hands off" and "shortsighted", the ADA folk need to be blamed for being "overambitious" and "impractical".

+1 - I have been trying to say this but could not get it across.

Vinaji, assuredly, I have read much of what you suggested above. But I am certainly not convinced that the LCA delays happened mainly due to the "non involvement" of the AF.

Negi,

Remember whatever the ASR for MRCA was, which you call "very modest" F-16, F-18, Su-35, Gripen didnt make the cut. Infact there are exactly 4 planes in the world which can probably make the "very modest" MRCA ASR cut, F-22, F-35, Eurofighter & typhoon. Infact the only new entrants into that club by 2030 might be PAKFA & JXX.

That is indeed a "very modest" ASR.