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PostPosted: 15 May 2012 00:28 
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Kargil Review Committee
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The Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security constituted on the basis of the Kargil Review Committee report had six chapters. The Ministry of Defence had been nominated as the nodal Ministry for the Chapter VI, on 'Management of Defence'. The Chapter contains 75 recommendations, of which 63 recommendations have been implemented. Action on four recommendations is in progress. Eight recommendations of Chapter VI relate to the establishment of Chief of Defence Staff. A decision on this matter will be taken after completion of the ongoing consultations with political parties.

The HQ Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) has been created to enhance jointness and build synergy amongst the Armed Forces, including in the areas of Long Term Plans, force capabilities, joint training, intelligence, capital acquisition, joint doctrines, etc. The Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) has been created to exercise command and control over tri-Service and Coast Guard assets deployed in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Joint exercises/operations are carried out from time to time.

This information was given by Minister of Defence Shri A K Antony in a written reply to Shri ArjunMeghwal in Lok Sabha today.

I wonder if this includes intel reforms? Didnt KRC talk about Intelligence too? Can any guru comment on this?


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PostPosted: 15 May 2012 01:27 
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75-63= 12 out of which 8 relate to CDS.

So what do the remaining 4 relate to?


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PostPosted: 16 May 2012 04:55 
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Essential reading.

http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/47412674/ ... 7LnIWsXGZU

Learn the secrets of espionage in ‘The Art of Intelligence’
Henry Crumpton served 24 years as an undercover officer, led hunt for Osama bin Laden


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PostPosted: 17 May 2012 03:43 
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China threat: Govt reviews security of Dalai Lama
Quote:
Shishir Gupta, Hindustan Times
New Delhi, May 15, 2012
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After the Dalai Lama went public on the Chinese threat to his life, New Delhi has quietly undertaken a security review and asked the Tibetan government-in-exile to upgrade the security of His Holiness, with concurrent instructions to the Himachal police.
Last Sunday, the Dalai Lama
had told an English newspaper that he could be poisoned by a female Chinese agent through touch while seeking his blessings.

Talking to Hindustan Times, Nodup, security minister for the government-in-exile, confirmed that a threat assessment of the Dalai Lama had been carried out, and his security upgraded after his latest statement.

“We have decided to upgrade his security, both while travelling abroad and at Dharamshala,” said Nodup, stating that the Tibetan spiritual leader was currently on a trip to Europe and would be back by May-end.

When asked how credible was this threat against the Dalai Lama, Nodup said that some months ago, an input was received from Tibet about a possible assassination attempt on the spiritual leader. Beijing, however, has trashed the theory.

While Indian agencies also do not have any credible input on the Chinese trying to target the Dalai Lama, they do not want to take chances and have ordered a review of his security. The matter, incidentally, has not been brought before the high-powered committee in the home ministry.

While the Dalai Lama’s inner security cordon comprises highly trained Tibetan security guards, the outer periphery at Dharamshala is handled by a team of 70 Himachal Pradesh commandos, headed by an additional SP from the CID. Besides this, visitors and guests of the Dalai Lama are screened by trained security experts in mufti.



Terror Games

Quote:
Already beleaguered and wracked by infighting, India’s external intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) has been a subject of much mirth in the sub-continent this month after the five Pakistanis it identified as infiltrating terrorists turned out to small time businessmen and a security guard from Lahore.

The RAW bosses are now at their wits end to explain the faux pas as it stands accused of poor due diligence and general incompetence.

Fact is that the RAW got photographs of the five so called terrorists on May 2 from a credible source, who identified them as Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) cadres with mission to hit India. Concurrently, there was credible input from foreign agencies that LeT was out to target three vital installations in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Punjab. The five photographs were discussed between the RAW representative and Intelligence Bureau sleuths the same evening as the latter was not convinced about the antecedents of the five persons.

On that day, the Indian agencies had the following inputs:

* Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, Reliance Refinery at Jamnagar and HPCL-Mittal Refinery were targets of LeT terrorists as the proscribed group had not only conducted research of these strategic sites on the internet but also conducted area reconnaissance.

* Threat from LeT had gone up as photograph of one of the five identified terrorists was found super-imposed on an old (expired) Gujarat state driving license. This forged license was handed over to Indian agencies by the same source.


While the IB was still skeptical about the five photographs as they could not corroborate the ground, the RAW was very confident about its input as terror attack appeared imminent.

On May 3, a high powered group headed by Home Minister P Chidambaram with National Security Advisor Shiv Shanker Menon, Home Secretary Raj Singh, RAW Chief Sanjeev Tripathi and Director IB Nehchal Sandhu met to discuss the threat. Even if it is now established that it was Pakistani ISI which baited the RAW with false information, Home Minister P Chidambaram had no option that day except to raise a nation wide alert and disseminate the photographs to state police through the established multi-agency centre under the IB.

After the 26/11 massacre in Mumbai, no Home Minister or Intelligence chief wants to hold back inputs and there is no bar on mobile vendors and security guards to be active members of LeT terror group. Even if the five persons in the photograph are innocent, the fact is that India is under serious threat from the jihadists from within and those based in Pakistan. The intriguing aspect is the alacrity with which the information reached the four mobile vendors and one security guard in Lahore within hours after it was released by MAC to the state police in India.

Rather than blaming RAW for this fiasco, Home Minister P Chidambaram took it upon himself on the decision to disseminate photographs to the state police. For Chidambaram it was a collective decision of the high powered group to disseminate the photographs among the state police as well as place the three vital installations on red alert. But the Indian agencies chose to absolve themselves by blaming the other through articles in media.

Given the fact that LeT terror apparatus is intact in Pakistan, Indian intelligence agencies need have synergy with each other rather than fights as the only beneficiary in the latter case is the mentor agency of Lashkar in Pakistan.

The photograph fiasco actually highlights the need for RAW to increase its coverage of Pakistan so that it has the capacity to independently verify intel on ground. No point blaming the MAC under IB for sharing the information with the state police without verification. The fact is that RAW should have build up the intel on ground before asking MAC to share it with Maharashtra, Gujarat and Punjab police.

The flip side, however, is that counter-terrorism and intelligence are 24X7 games for countries and you win some you lose some. The RAW fumbled on photographs but managed to foil a terror attack in Chandini Chowk and provided vital clues in the Iranian Quds inspired attack on Israeli diplomat in February this year.

Rather than being defensive, Home Secretary Raj Kumar Singh should take up the issue of threat from Lashkar amir Hafiz Saeed with his Pakistani counterpart next week during the bilateral home secretary level dialogue.

One must understand that Indian hinterland has been free from terror since September 7, 2011 Delhi High Court blast. Home Minister and Indian agencies should be allowed one mistake. :roll:


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PostPosted: 17 May 2012 03:57 
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I dont like the tome of the article. Its not a mistake to alert your forces to deter a terrorist attack. The writer is having it both ways.

BTW the new info in the article is that there were two sets of inputs:

Pictures five suspects from TSP, including one on a state driver license- In hindsight looks like planted by TSP. Fact that the suspects were alerted within an hour shows coordination.
The other inputs on the target list. Where did this come from?

Quote:
Concurrently, there was credible input from foreign agencies that LeT was out to target three vital installations in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Punjab.
Note plural for sources.


Were these also in cahoots with the TSP?
Or were those regular alerts?

All that India can be alert about is that info from TSP can be disinformation spread by the official agency there.


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PostPosted: 17 May 2012 04:26 
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The blog post seems confused. If the author had just highlighted the details of the inner workings of this terror threat & kept his opinions out, the article would seem more coherent.

I would blame repeated PMOs starting with Gujral for RAW's handicap. Cant tie someone's right hand and blame him for not fighting effectively. I dont know how many other covert activities & capacity building measures have been curtailed due to blue turban's kiss-fest with the pakis.


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PostPosted: 17 May 2012 17:57 
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Won't tolerate censorship, warns Anonymous after hacking Supreme Court site
Quote:

New Delhi: Hacker group "Anonymous" has brought down the websites of the Supreme Court and the Congress party.

The hacking is reportedly to protest against file-sharing websites like Vimeo. "We cannot let censorship happen..Operation India engaged," says an audio message posted on the websites by the hackers. (Hear message posted by Anonymous, warns "Operation India engaged")

Internet Service Provides like BSNL, MTNL, Airtel and others have all blocked the sites, reportedly in response to an order from the Department of Telecom.


I visited both of them and they seem to be doing fine.

Though, this is a timely reminder of something else we should focus on - India must develop the requisite cyber infrastructure and focus more on cyber security. I heard some panelist say in Washington the other day that the blitzkrieging by China for which India is doing its own miilitary build up, might not even come in the form of a ground offensive. It is more likely to be a cyber offensive or may be an air campaign. We must watch out for Chinese in the cyber dimension, they've even frustrated the Americans by their cyber "activities".


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PostPosted: 18 May 2012 15:15 
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Slain terrorist Merah planned to attack Indian embassy in Paris

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Mohamed Merah, the terrorist who was shot dead by the French Special Forces in Toulouse on March 22, had also planned to attack the Indian Embassy in Paris, French daily Le Monde reported.

Quoting sources from the Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence and the Special Forces who took part in the 32-hour siege of Merah, Le Monde alleges that the young killer's Taliban handlers in Pakistan had ordered him to attack the Indian mission here. “That was the target given him by the Taliban who prepared him for jihad during his training in Pakistan in the summer of 2011,” Le Monde reported. However, the paper says, Merah finally decided against the attack, given the difficulty of the enterprise.
...


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PostPosted: 18 May 2012 20:05 
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Political-bureaucrat nexus is not ready to allow the development of 'thinking culture' in civil intelligence agencies . They fear it more than anything else for we all know why . All MAC do is like a collection & forward depot for mails & making an entry for mail delivered & stuff like that . There's no analysis like in field of strategic risk management , its not absence of trained manpower but complete distrust . Nothing tells more about the sorry state of analysis in our intelligence agencies then this : country's HM & internal intel chief discussing/analyzing the perceived 'threat' based on five photographs & related information . Contrast this with IA's ODA loop in time of Kargil War onset . Imagine Gen. Malik sitting with DM and discussing whether the bunker on hill is a threat or not for a start & everyone down below waiting & being kept in dark .


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PostPosted: 19 May 2012 01:19 
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That's true Satya ji. It's clear as daylight. SPS should resolve this? And I think Pakistan desk head should take some blame too as ultimately it's his responsibility


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PostPosted: 19 May 2012 14:54 
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Shyamjee

It seems handbook on how to tackle a potential terror threat & input has not been written or forgotten . SPS to my understanding has been formed for one to carry on the legacy of late Sh. K S jee ie to study evolving global trends & their effect on India. The french jihadi -TSP connection is something to study by SPS . SPS's main task is not action but inputs-advise-formation- feedback the policy loop . On actual field action , i hope at most its an observer only anything more will be khichdi last thing we need now .
Someone need to brief media in clear terms what's expected of them on use of information related to terror threat & same to state police . This micro-management show is no good for one of the following is true : 1) GoI has been scared via external sources of an impending bigger than 26/11 attack serving their own agendas. ( check out the defense deal timeline for one & their relation with such terror threat or foiled attempts) . 2) there's such a dearth of information coming from TSP on terror front that every tip is considered worthy of a mini CCS meeting 3) MHA's media advisor taking his role a bit too seriously to project Chiddu as man to serve & to protect but whom ?
On issue of Pak desk ideally they should been consulted but what to do with mine is bigger problem . They got so blinded that not even a single person right up to MHA & IB didn't question how they got passport size photographs or they fall for photographer or clerk in govt. office my friend/ on my payroll something like that .


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PostPosted: 19 May 2012 20:40 
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India and the fight for the Rose Garden
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Instead of succumbing to false hopes of peace, India must consider the adverse consequences of withdrawing from the Siachen glacier
:
The problem is: this is hardly a solution. India wants the existing positions of the two countries in that area recorded. If this is not done and the procedure listed above is followed, it will fritter away its only advantage: its physical occupation of the Saltoro ridge. Pakistan rejects any demarcation of existing positions as it feels this will bestow a “legal” right on India to claim this territory. The farthest it has gone towards agreeing with India is agree to record the ground positions on a map—to be included as an annexure in an agreement—while the text of the agreement continues to spell extant claims.
:


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PostPosted: 19 May 2012 21:05 
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Guys,

One of the India's famous spy masters Maloy Krishna Dhar Passed away today evening. I just got a call from his son. I'll be posting his last message on his website maloykrishnadhar.com in a day or two.

My his soul rest in peace.


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PostPosted: 19 May 2012 21:34 
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chackojoseph wrote:
Guys,

One of the India's famous spy masters Maloy Krishna Dhar Passed away today evening. I just got a call from his son. I'll be posting his last message on his website maloykrishnadhar.com in a day or two.

My his soul rest in peace.


Bhagwan Unki Atmaan Ko Shanti de.


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PostPosted: 19 May 2012 22:00 
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Wow what a loss. Truly an intelligence hero. His book India's Intelligence Unveiled was exceptional.


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PostPosted: 19 May 2012 23:42 
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CJ please pass on our condolence from all of us at BR to his family. A big loss for the country. I still have his books on my shelf... True patriot RIP


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PostPosted: 20 May 2012 03:31 
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satya wrote:
Shyamjee

It seems handbook on how to tackle a potential terror threat & input has not been written or forgotten . SPS to my understanding has been formed for one to carry on the legacy of late Sh. K S jee ie to study evolving global trends & their effect on India. The french jihadi -TSP connection is something to study by SPS . SPS's main task is not action but inputs-advise-formation- feedback the policy loop . On actual field action , i hope at most its an observer only anything more will be khichdi last thing we need now .
Someone need to brief media in clear terms what's expected of them on use of information related to terror threat & same to state police . This micro-management show is no good for one of the following is true : 1) GoI has been scared via external sources of an impending bigger than 26/11 attack serving their own agendas. ( check out the defense deal timeline for one & their relation with such terror threat or foiled attempts) . 2) there's such a dearth of information coming from TSP on terror front that every tip is considered worthy of a mini CCS meeting 3) MHA's media advisor taking his role a bit too seriously to project Chiddu as man to serve & to protect but whom ?
On issue of Pak desk ideally they should been consulted but what to do with mine is bigger problem . They got so blinded that not even a single person right up to MHA & IB didn't question how they got passport size photographs or they fall for photographer or clerk in govt. office my friend/ on my payroll something like that .


Satya jii ... Thanks. IMO - my observation of arab intelligence services - they report one thing using their techniques and pass on to decision maker. The strategist taking into consideration regional situation/history provides advice which can sometimes be starkly different to what the intel agency is saying. Then decision maker makes the decision. I think SPS should be performing this role of providing advise.

Thanks for the inputs - Very interesting. Any specific deal you are referring to - Apache?

I agree with you - no point in having a mini CCS meeting for every input and highly inefficient.

---------------------------------
Double success:

Thailand: India foils Pak bid to ‘grab’ Dawood aide
Quote:
Abhishek Sharan, Hindustan Times
New Delhi, May 14, 2012
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India has foiled Pakistan’s bid to secure the custody of Muzakkir Sayyed alias Munna ‘Jinga’, a Mumbai-born aide of fugitive Indian don Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, from Thailand.

Sayyed, a sharpshooter, had led an attack on rival don Chhota Rajan in Bangkok in September
2000.

The 10-year jail term of Sayyed, who was housed at a Bangkok prison facility after being convicted for orchestrating the attack on Rajan, ended recently. Pakistani diplomats, allegedly armed with fake documents and passport details of Sayyed that identified him as a citizen of their country, had contacted their counterparts in Thailand a few weeks ago - while he was still incarcerated in a Bangkok prison facility — to “grab him”, said a CBI official on the condition of anonymity.

“Pakistani officials told Thai authorities that Sayyed was a Pakistani citizen — on the basis of papers submitted by them, including a fake passport created after his flight to Karachi from Mumbai in 1999 — and demanded that he be deported to their country as per Thailand laws,” said the official.

Image

It was suspected that Sayyed and five other members of the team, which attacked Rajan on Dawood’s orders, had allegedly received training and logistical help from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Incidentally, the ISI is also suspected to have sponsored the don’s stay and activities since his orchestration of the March 1993 Mumbai serial blasts.

Alerted by the Indian embassy in Bangkok and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), the CBI scrambled to halt Pakistan’s attempts to take Sayyed with them in the nick of time.

“The Thai authorities had already accepted the Pakistani position. But we challenged their contention and got the deportation stayed,” the official said.

Thailand is likely to deport Sayyed to India soon,” said the official, “But Pakistan is cagey about India getting hold of Sayyed because he can divulge details on how its agencies had abetted the attack on Rajan, which was an act of international terrorism.


India gave US coke trail
May 17, 2012 - Rajnish Sharma |
Quote:
Hard, credible evidence provided by Indian intelligence agencies to the United States that Dawood Ibrahim’s key aides Chhota Shakeel and Tiger Memon were actively pumping in high-quality cocaine into the American market compelled the US treasury department to declare the two as narcotics smugglers and impose sanctions against them.
Sources involved in compiling the evidence against Shakeel and Memon indicated that the duo could well be the single biggest suppliers of cocaine to the United States.
The dossier provided by Indian agencies to the US has details on how Shakeel and Memon were supplying cocaine to US drug syndicates through a vast network of associates in South Asia, West Asia and Africa. It also contains details on how funds from cocaine sales are being used by the “D Company” for terror strikes in India and Afghanistan.
Highly-placed government sources said New Delhi was trying for over a year to convince Washington that it was in the interests of America’s own national security to impose sanctions against Shakeel and Memon.
“A lot of effort has gone into this for the last one year. It was only after the US was totally convinced with evidence provided by India and realising how badly their own country was affected by this narcotics trade that they went ahead with imposing sanctions against the two criminals,” a senior Indian intelligence official said.

This means no American company or individual can now have business dealings with Shakeel and Memon, and all their assets in the United States have been frozen with immediate affect.
New Delhi has welcomed the US move, and asked “those countries harbouring them to bring them to justice”.
The Indian agencies also provided details of how the Dawood gang was smuggling high-grade heroin to Western Europe, particularly through Africa. “While the United States is a huge market for cocaine, in Europe it’s heroin that is in high demand,” the official said.


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PostPosted: 20 May 2012 10:27 
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shyamd wrote:
CJ please pass on our condolence from all of us at BR to his family. A big loss for the country. I still have his books on my shelf... True patriot RIP


I will definitely do that.


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PostPosted: 20 May 2012 11:35 
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chackojoseph wrote:
Guys,

One of the India's famous spy masters Maloy Krishna Dhar Passed away today evening. I just got a call from his son. I'll be posting his last message on his website maloykrishnadhar.com in a day or two.

My his soul rest in peace.


What? He wasnt that old, I didnt think.

One couldnt always agree with his views, but there was no questioning the fact that he was a patriot. Something that can scarcely be said of some in todays bureaucracy and government services. Rest in Peace, Sir!


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PostPosted: 20 May 2012 12:00 
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He was born in July 1938. I'll will post an overview on him. I am still writing up the press statement for sending it to rest of the media.


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PostPosted: 20 May 2012 23:52 
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Bad apples in IB, RAW are making mockery of govt

Quote:
In a major goof up, an intelligence alert about a possible strike by Pakistani terrorists was found to be false. The Pakistani nationals were discovered to be businessmen.
MADHAV NALAPAT NEW DELHI | 20th May


Home Minister P. Chidambaram shakes hands with J&K Chief Minister Omar Abdullah at the meeting of Chief Ministers on NCTC, in New Delhi earlier this month. PTI

week ago, Indian security agencies issued an alert warning of terror strikes by Pakistani individuals whose names and photographs were made available to the media. Even while congratulations were pouring in on the sleuthing done by the IB and RAW, the supposed terrorists turned out to be petty businesspersons in Pakistan. Thus far, there has been no sign of any effort at fixing responsibility on just why the Counter-terrorism Group at the Home Ministry failed to check its facts before releasing information.

Because of the avoidance of public accountability that characterises security agencies in India the public has remained in the dark about the sequence of events that led to the goof-up. What is the reason for the cover-up, why even the Pakistan desk of RAW was kept out of the loop when innocent names got outed as terrorists planning an imminent strike?

Those following developments say that the reason lies in the closeness of several key IB and RAW officers with the politically influential, and using the latter as sources for information, much of which turns out to be misleading. The Pakistani names in question were, according to sources in the UAE, "revealed by a source in Dubai who was introduced to Indian intelligence personnel by an individual with strong political connections". Because of the influence wielded by this person, the information given by the newfound source was uncritically accepted. Although a check on the persons named by the source was carried out by the Lahore station of intelligence agencies, :?: having been informed of the high-level Indian contacts of the Dubai source, the officer doing the fact check merely rubber-stamped the report sans any enquiry. Those dealing with the penetration of agencies by hostile aliens say that the likelihood is high that the source was himself an ISI plant, whose task it was to give wrong information that would, when released, show up the incompetence of Indian security agencies. These sources say that all too often, "influential individuals from India come in contact with undercover ISI operatives in Dubai and London, thereby compromising national security".

Is it to protect the influential individual who — sources claim — introduced the renegade source to the Dubai station that the entire matter has been hushed up, with orders given to cover up the sequence of events that led to the fiasco?

Last week's fiasco over the Pakistani names and photographs underlines the need for a clean-up of Indian security agencies.

Officers say that Home Minister P. Chidambaram has "politicised the security agencies, in contrast to Shivraj Patil, who never sought to carry forward a political agenda via the IB". This accusation is denied by those close to the Home Minister, who claim that he has been responsible for a "massive improvement in the functioning of the agencies under him". A source claims that "an offer of a governorship has been made to the present IB director, so as to motivate him to carry out his duties in a manner that is politically advantageous to his patrons". However, those close to DIB Nehchal Sandhu say that such a charge is unfair, and that the IB has remained "100% apolitical" during his watch.

Another organisation where several reports of alleged misfeasance have been cropping up is the Aviation Research Service (ARC). Those within the organisation say that its chief till recently, A.B. Mathur, wanted to launch a comprehensive enquiry into at least three deals, the first involving the purchase and fitting of aircraft for special purposes, the next involving the purchase of parachutes from an obscure supplier at inflated prices, and the third involving the purchase of technical systems. They claim that "higher levels dissuaded Mathur from pursuing his demand for a full enquiry, as they know that political protectees (i.e. officers enjoying high-level patronage) are involved in these scams". Mathur is due to leave on a UN mission for Kosovo by the month-end, his objective of cleaning up ARC (where a particular officer is even known to his colleagues as "Mr Ten Per Cent") unfulfilled. Even the NTRO, which deals in activities that are wholly technical, has been subjected to allegations of graft and impropriety, and once again, there has been very little effort at fixing responsibility via an enquiry.

Officers pushing for accountability are hoping that the PMO will take the initiative in conducting a comprehensive in-house enquiry, especially into ARC transactions that don't pass the smell test. "The bad apples in IB, NTRO, ARC and RAW need to be removed. However, their political patrons are blocking action," an officer concluded.


Satya Ji confirms what you said.


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PostPosted: 21 May 2012 01:07 
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chackojoseph wrote:
He was born in July 1938. I'll will post an overview on him. I am still writing up the press statement for sending it to rest of the media.



Thanks for the effort. But please do double check for spelling and grammar. He is beyond retraction.


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PostPosted: 21 May 2012 05:35 
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An intelligence officer who wielded the pen with equal ease


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PostPosted: 21 May 2012 12:06 
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chackojoseph wrote:
Guys,

One of the India's famous spy masters Maloy Krishna Dhar Passed away today evening. I just got a call from his son. I'll be posting his last message on his website maloykrishnadhar.com in a day or two.

My his soul rest in peace.

Damn. Truly a great loss.


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PostPosted: 30 May 2012 08:20 
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Indian Army’s unpaid spy dies in oblivion - British-born Sydney Wignall discovered the secrets of China’s expansion across Tibet to the borders of India and Nepal

Quote:
India never forgets its enemies, but sometimes has difficulty remembering its friends like the recently deceased British mountaineer who risked his life to gather information about China’s military build-up in the Himalayas.

Sadly, New Delhi has ignored the death of Cheshire-born Sydney Wignall who died a few weeks ago in the UK at the age of 89. A British-born hero and unpaid spy of the Indian Army, he used both brains and brawn to discover the secrets of China’s expansion across Tibet to the borders of India and Nepal.

Wignall suffered frost bite, dysentery and regular beatings at the hands of Chinese army guards during his two-month incarceration in a rat-infested prison in Tibet. After his release, he received profuse thanks from his Indian Army contacts for the valuable data he obtained. But the only ‘reward’ he claimed and obtained was a supply of cricket bats and balls for the children of a Nepalese village school that he visited on his way to Tibet.

In 1955, seven years before the Indian Army’s disastrous rout at the hands of Chinese forces, Cheshire-born Sydney Wignall was inspired to lead a Welsh Himalayan Expedition to try and climb the 25,355-foot-high Gurla Mandhata peak in Western Tibet.

Sponsored by the Liverpool Daily Post newspaper and Life magazine, the ostensible objective of the team was to place the flags of Wales and the Chinese Republic on the Gurla Mandhata summit.

Unbeknown to his fellow climbers, however, Wignall had also agreed to gather information for the Indian Army intelligence worried about China’s secret military build up in what was then the autonomous region of Tibet.

Although he and his fellow climber John Harrop, together with their Nepalese liaison officer Damodar Narayan Suwal, were captured soon after they crossed the ill-defined Nepalese border, the information that Wignall collected was the equivalent of intelligence gold dust.

It was gratefully received and analysed by his Indian Army contact, Lieut-Col ‘Baij’ Mehta, who was later killed during the Chinese invasion of Arunachel Pradesh in 1962. It was passed on to an equally grateful Gen KS Thimayya, who later became India’s Chief of Army Staff. He tried and failed to persuade Jawaharlal Nehru of China’s aggressive intentions.

Tellingly, Wignall subsequently had little time for Indian politicians, especially Krishna Menon, who allowed their communist sympathies to blind them to Beijing’s aim of dominating South Asia.

Wignall had met Menon many years earlier in London in 1940, seven years before Independence, when India’s future defence minister and other fellow left-wing activists toed the Soviet Union’s then policy of avoiding confrontation with Adolph Hitler. Menon called 18-year-old Wignall ‘impertinent’ and Wignall formed the impression that Menon was ‘vain, arrogant and conceited.” He called him ‘A thoroughly detestable man.’

Wignall’s Indian heroes were the likes of Gen Thimayya, Col Mehta and Brig John Dalvi, who, in 1962, had only 2,700 soldiers under his command to resist a Chinese division of 12,000 that swept down on him from the Thagla Ridge in what was then known as the North East Frontier Agency or NEFA.

Brigadier Dalvi’s 7th Brigade, which ran out of ammunition, suffered 90 per cent casualties. Those who survived the immediate onslaught died overnight because they had not been supplied with adequate tents, sleeping bags or warm winter clothing. Brigadier Dalvi himself was captured and tortured. A broken man when he was released, he died a few years later much before his time.

It was while he was preparing for his Himalayan expedition in 1955 that Wignall made contact with a retired Indian Army officer, one Lieut-Col Toby Tobin, who was then the vice-president of the Himalayan Club and editor of the Himalayan Journal. Tobin told him, “You might be able to do some friends a favour” before introducing him to a contact called ‘Singh’ at the Indian High Commission in London.

What followed thereafter was like something out of a John Buchan novel. Singh briefed Wignall about the bellicose statements that some Chinese generals had been making about territorial claims to large parts of Northern India, Nepal, Sikkim and Burma. For that reason the Indian military authorities were interested in rumours of China’s intention of building a military highway in west Tibet, close to the sacred lake of Mansarowar.

“You happen to be the only one visiting what to us is the most sensitive area in the whole border region,” Singh explained. “From a vantage point on the north-west ridge of Gurla Mandhata you would be able to see, with a telescope, any sign of a military encampment in that area, and you could look for evidence of the building of that military highway to west Tibet.”

Supplied with maps provided by the British War office, Wignall and his team soon embarked on their 6,500-mile trip from London to the borders of India, Nepal and Tibet. Within days of crossing into Tibet from the Khatang Pass, however, the three lead members of the team were arrested for illegally crossing into Chinese territory.

For the next two months they were held in freezing, rat-infested rooms and interrogated by a team led by Gen Chang Kuo-hua, the military commander of Tibet. These were hard-line party supporters, very different from the likes of 21st century Chinese communist VIPS like millionaire Bo Xilai who had his son Bo Guagua educated at Harrow, Oxford and Harvard.

General Chang was made of much sterner stuff. His minions beat up and abused the British mountaineers, subjecting them to mock executions and telling them, “You intended disguising your illegal armed invasion of China so that the Tibetans would not know you are agents of a foreign power, Western Fascist Lackey Imperial Running Dogs.”

Wignall himself was told, “Sign the confession that you are a Western Fascist Lackey Imperialist Running Dog of the American CIA and we will be very good to you. Otherwise you will be severely punished.”

Although they were under close surveillance during their captivity, Wignall and his friends were able to extract vital information, both from their interrogators and from some of the more friendly guards.

In what was then the pre-satellite age, Wignall managed to accurately estimate the strength of the secret Chinese army base at Jitkot, 17 miles from Tklakot close to the Nepal border. More importantly he was able to gauge that China’s strategic highway from Lhasa would reach Tklakot within the next two years. And from General Chang he heard how Beijing laid claim to India’s Aksai Chin and NEFA regions, as well as parts of Nepal, Kashmir, all of Sikkim, all of Bhutan and parts of northern Burma.

Much of what Wignall discovered was confirmed and reconfirmed before, during and after the 1962 Chinese invasion of India. He himself neither asked for, nor was given any form of compensation by the authorities in India.

Wignall did brief members of the British Foreign Office about his adventures when he returned to London, but his main satisfaction was extracted from the belief that he had taken high risks for the right reasons. In later years he became an underwater archaeologist, uncovering wrecks in British, Portugese and Panamanian waters. A handful of Indians may still remember both his affection for the country and his perilous exploits in the Himalayas. For them he remains a much-loved friend of Mother India.



http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20120530/main6.htm


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PostPosted: 30 May 2012 08:22 
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... Korea.html

this is curious stuff- but IMVHO sterling intel work.
excerpts:
Quote:
US and South Korean special forces have been parachuting into North Korea to gather intelligence about underground military installations, according to a senior US officer.
"The entire tunnel infrastructure is hidden from our satellites," Gen Tolley said. "So we send (South Korean) soldiers and US soldiers to the North to do special reconnaissance."
"After 50 years, we still don't know much about the capability and full extent" of the underground facilities," he said, in comments reported by the National Defense Industrial Association's magazine on its website.

Gen Tolley said the commandos were sent in with minimal equipment to facilitate their movements and minimize the risk of detection by North Korean forces.



and here is the pious denial

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... Korea.html

excerpts
Quote:
The United States military has denied reports attributed to the head of its special forces in South Korea that his men have been parachuted into North Korea to gather intelligence on the regime's network of underground military facilities.
spokesman for US forces in South Korea has dismissed the media report.
"Some reporting has taken great liberal licence with his comments and taken him completely out of context," Colonel Jonathan Withington, of the public affairs office of US Forces Korea, said in a statement.
"No US or ROK (Republic of Korea) forces have parachuted into North Korea," he said. "Though special reconnaissance is a core special operations force mission, at no time have SOF forces been sent to the north to conduct special reconnaissance.


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PostPosted: 01 Jun 2012 02:29 
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A place of study for India's scholar-soldiers
Quote:

Arjun Subramaniam
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THE FUTURE: ‘I am not decrying the need for operational excellence, but we need to find a way to generate more scholarship in the armed forces,’ was K. Subrahmanyam’s argument. Photo: The Hindu Photo Library
THE FUTURE: ‘I am not decrying the need for operational excellence, but we need to find a way to generate more scholarship in the armed forces,’ was K. Subrahmanyam’s argument. Photo: The Hindu Photo Library
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The best way to carry forward master strategist K. Subrahmanyam's vision is to establish a world-class Indian National Defence University

Not many from my generation of soldiers and scholars who were born in the 1960s, had the opportunity to interact and learn from the late K. Subrahmanyam, unarguably, the father of modern Indian strategy.

I am not about to sing the praises of him simply because I am not qualified to do so, and also because eminent people like Air Cmde Jasjit Singh and the National Security Adviser (NSA), Shivshankar Menon have offered befitting tributes in various forms. Surprisingly, on the two occasions that I was privileged to meet the “master,” we spoke only about the proposed Indian National Defence University or INDU.

Our interactions

On the first occasion, I sought an audience from him as a PhD candidate at the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC). I wanted to pick his brains on the changing nature of warfare and on my hypothesis that irrespective of the nature of an adversary, air power had a role to play in coercion. He listened to me indulgently, endorsed my hypothesis and for some unfathomable reason, shifted the topic to that of the future of INDU. He told me about how his dream was to see INDU come up before he passed on; about how he worried that unless we focused on core issues we were likely to get overwhelmed by peripheral issues like what kind of a campus or infrastructure would it entail or who would be the president of the university or what would be the share of the various services in the organisational structure?

The core issue, which he so rightly pointed out, was whether we would be able to find the right people to teach, research and perpetuate a culture that nurtured independent strategic thought and supported the larger issues of multi-disciplinary national security. He signed off that session by asking me how many faculty members at DSSC at that time had a PhD. When I told him “none, but three of us are enrolled currently,” he impatiently brushed me off and said “not enough young man. I wonder how many among you will be willing to give up the prestige and status of your military ranks and devote yourself to professional military education and building intellectual capital within the national security establishment?”

However, he quickly added, “You know, I am not decrying the need for operational excellence, but we need to find a way to generate more scholarship in the armed forces.” To say that the encounter was a defining moment for me would be an understatement.

The second and last time that I met him was only for a short while during tea after a talk at the National Defence College. Even though he was indisposed, he made sure that he honoured his commitment to deliver his customary talk on “India's Nuclear Strategy.” When I met him, he did not recognise me, but his eyes lit up when I reminded him of our encounter at Wellington. “Yes! I remember,” he remarked and quipped in his traditionally acerbic style. “We are where we left off four years ago, aren't we?” I could only mumble “yes, Sir.”

INDU's moving force

While his achievements in the realm of nuclear strategy and as the architect of the Kargil Review Committee are widely known, not many know that he was also the moving force behind the initial concept paper of INDU, and the push he gave to the whole proposal in terms of converting it from concept into reality. If we want to honour the legacy of modern India's foremost strategist, I think it is time we take a close look at whether we are going about the process of building intellectual capacities in the right manner. Instead of mere number-crunching, we need to ascertain how many of the existing PhDs in the three services are capable of, and inclined to assume academic roles in various institutions under INDU. A rough estimate of the total no of PhDs would put the figure at around 35-50. Of these, barely 15-20 of them are actively pursuing scholarship by contributing regularly to professional and technical journals, something which is absolutely essential to assume faculty positions at institutions of repute. Many have degrees from universities that are not very well known for scholarly rigour and I do not think there is anyone who has a PhD from a global university — quite a sorry state for a country with such a large military as India has.

With the formation of INDU a few years away, we still have time to put our house in order. While creation of world-class infrastructure is important, unless we have the right faculty and content developers, we stand no chance of gaining world-class stature.

It would be pertinent to learn from the Air University's experience in the U.S. in the mid-1990s. Facing a crunch of PhDs on the faculty, the University's Air Command and Staff College lost its accreditation for award of a post-graduate degree until it made good the numbers. We need to identify potential faculty members and identify opportunities at home and abroad that will facilitate quality PhDs in reasonable time-frames. It is time we change gear on INDU — there can be no better way to carry forward K. Subrahmanyam's legacy than to create a truly world-class Indian National Defence University.

(The writer is Assistant Chief of Air Staff. The views expressed are his own.)


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PostPosted: 01 Jun 2012 03:46 
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The US NDU used to be called NDC and got upgraded to NDU status. The Air Uty etc are force specific colleges.

Indian option is to start a green field NDU or upgrade the NDC. I prefer the greenfield NDU for it can encompass many non-military strategic areas of study.

However so long as INC and IAS babucracy is there, there wont be any INDU.

It goes against their grain of thinking.


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PostPosted: 01 Jun 2012 03:56 
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ramana wrote:
The US NDU used to be called NDC and got upgraded to NDU status. The Air Uty etc are force specific colleges.

Indian option sis to start a green field NDU or upgrade the NDC. I prefer the greenfield NDU for it can encompass many non military strategic areas of study.

However so long as INC and IAS babucracy is there, there wont be any INDU.

It goes against their grain of thinking.

India needs atleast 2 or 3 NDU establishment in various corners. North east, South and North west centers.

It should be a place for all knowledgable people to have talks.


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PostPosted: 02 Jun 2012 05:41 
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Military Intelligence staffer caught trying to sell secrets


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PostPosted: 02 Jun 2012 07:57 
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any news about the theft in south and north block that occurred earlier this year?


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PostPosted: 02 Jun 2012 09:32 
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One more disincentive from Nehru dynasty perspective is the fact that a NDU might develop a nationalist perspective on things which is against their internationalist point of view.


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PostPosted: 04 Jun 2012 10:36 
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On the infiltration of the IB by foreign agencies -

Quote:
While working for South China Morning Post in Delhi in 2000-2001, I was a regular at the Shahe Mardan Shia Imambara in Jorbagh. My close friend, Raghu Nath Behura, a 1979 batch ips officer, was then DD (Pakistan) in the Intelligence Bureau. One day, he showed me a bunch of photographs shot inside the imambara. Spy cameras had caught me sitting on the floor along with 2-3 gentlemen whom I didn’t know. Behura said they were Shia officials of the Pakistani high commission who frequented the imambara and requested me to cultivate them in the national interest.

“We won’t ask you to steal papers or plant a device,” Behura assured me. “Get pally with them. Occasionally we might tell you to mention something while talking to them and report back their reaction. That’s it.” I asked Behura what would happen if the Pakistanis discovered my IB links. Won’t the ISI break my legs in Islamabad or Karachi if professional duties took me to Pakistan, or thrash me in Birmingham or Bradford? Behura replied: “Pakistan hasn’t infiltrated the IB and will never find out. So you needn’t fear for your safety.” Almost as an after-thought, he added: “But God save you if you decide to spy on Americans for us. There will be a race among IB officials to give your game away!”

http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?281107


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PostPosted: 04 Jun 2012 14:41 
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Mean while..
Military Intelligence staffer caught trying to sell secrets
Military Intelligence staff caught stealing info for Pak
"The DRI had got intelligence that a staffer working with Military Intelligence was trying to negotiate a deal for passing on classified information. The input was shared with the Army officials and a trap was laid. Following which the staffer was held in Thiruvananthapuram," a senior DRI official, who did not wish to be identified said.


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PostPosted: 04 Jun 2012 14:46 
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More on this op:
Military Intelligence staffer caught trying to sell secrets

Quote:
Sources said the soldier was trapped by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) in an elaborate operation that involved a “double agent” and a relative of the soldier in Dubai.


Quote:
Shivdasan was working for the recently created Technical Support Division (TSD) within MI. This special unit, headed by Colonel Honey Bakshi, is believed to have access to a range of privileged information. The unit had recently come under scrutiny on charges of illegal surveillance, an allegation that was denied by former Army Chief Gen V K Singh who accused retired Lt Gen Tejinder Singh of leaking incorrect information. The TSD unit was created in the last two years and functions from within Army Headquarters.

Sources said the DRI received information on an individual trying to sell “sensitive information” in April. A preliminary probe, sources said, established that Shivdasan had contacted a relative of his in Dubai with an offer to sell classified information. Shivdasan, who hails from Kerala, found it convenient to receive the money at Kochi. His relative got in touch with an “agent” in Dubai to broker the deal. This agent, sources said, turned out to be a DRI informant who is said to have laid a trap for Shivdasan in Kochi.


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PostPosted: 04 Jun 2012 15:52 
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Regarding the Outlook article, Please read the coments of a OUTLOOK reader, which explains the author ABDI !

[/quote][/quote]
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?281107
This chap Abdi is crazy; I wonder how he got space in Outlook for this silly piece. He declared Mr Kazmi as innocent. And his reason- That he and Kazmi belong to the same religious sect(Shia) and both are journalist!!! Wow!! Since Mr Abdi did not want to help IB or RAW he is sure that Mr Kazmi won’t help Iranians either!!!!!! WOW what logic!! This guy is better than Pakistani conspiracy theorist Zaid Hamid!!! Did this brilliant chap Abdi ever meet Kazmi? No! Did Mr Abdi has any incriminating evidence that Mr Kazmi was framed by Cops? No!! So how on earth sane people can declare Mr Kazmi innocent? I have no clue!! Why would Outlook publish this incredibly mindless, silly and outrageous article??- Mr Vinod Mehta is losing it!! Why is it impossible for Muslims to acknowledge the simple fact that there ARE Muslims who are terrorists??? Why do they have to ALWAYS blame police, intelligence agencies, Israel and America for everything???
========================================================================================
[quote"]On the infiltration of the IB by foreign agencies -

Quote:
W Behura replied: “Pakistan hasn’t infiltrated the IB and will never find out. So you needn’t fear for your safety.” Almost as an after-thought, he added: “But God save you if you decide to spy on Americans for us. There will be a race among IB officials to give your game away!”

http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?281107
[/quote]


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PostPosted: 04 Jun 2012 18:28 
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http://maloykrishnadhar.com/

Quote:
As I was growing up, my father’s work often played at the center stage of some of the turbulent times in India’s history, though often I was too young at that time to realize what was happening. He handled the terrorism desk for years, handling the Khalistan separatist movement, and later the Pakistan sponsored terror in Kashmir and beyond. Again, it is amazing the respect he garnered through his approach to work and life. As he lay critically ill, one of the calls I got was from a man who was once a Khalistani separatist and later joined the mainstream political process. He told me about how many people in Punjab would miss him terribly, because in the midst of a terrible crisis with excesses committed on both sides, he was a rare officer. A man who was willing to listen and empathize without shooting first, yet also a man without fear. One story of my father’s from this period, which he recounted later in one of his books, was of the terror siege at the Golden Temple that came to known as Operation Black Thunder. He pleaded to not deploy crushing force that would have led to high collateral damage but instead had trusted men on the inside whom he wanted to supply. As a senior IPS officer, he could have delegated the terribly dangerous task, but he dressed up as a fruit seller, with a basket of fruit on his head concealing weapons and walked into a complex with hundreds of heavily armed terrorists to get the weapons to his men.


:shock:


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PostPosted: 04 Jun 2012 18:50 
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^^
This reminds me. How is his book "Open Secrets"?


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PostPosted: 04 Jun 2012 20:13 
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India World War Three Scenario - ahead of s m krishna's visit to the SCO summit I would like feedback on this. The west is relentlessly trying to plant WW3, it should be noted that all the previous wolrd wars were planned to an extent and did not occur in a forthnight, to save the western dominance. For that they need France, somewhat weak, although high morals like democracy and freedom of speech. They are trying make India the France of WW3 who will be attacked from all sides (by China and Pakistan), and then in the name of saving democracy wage a big war. And that is why they are trying to alienate India on all sides.


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PostPosted: 04 Jun 2012 20:30 
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Gaur wrote:
^^
This reminds me. How is his book "Open Secrets"?


Gaur saar,

Karan M posted this in the army thread
Karan M wrote:
Depressing read about the truth of the Indian system. Please read through - I came across this review while going through MK Dhars eulogy and reading about the person.

Note what his investigations revealed about KGB penetration and how the ruling party completely manipulated the system.

It makes clear what VK Singh and Anna Hazare types (inflexibly honest) are up against.

Quote:
India’s Intelligence Unveiled

BOOK REVIEW:Open Secrets. India’s Intelligence Unveiled by M K Dhar Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia

Released when intelligence agencies of major global powers are facing flak for incompetence and fabrication, Open Secrets is the first attempt to break the taboo of shielding the Indian intelligence fraternity under a permanent veil. “As powerful a weapon as a fusion bomb”, (p India’s intelligence infrastructure has been weaponized by the governing class to hit the governed. Like the police, civil administration and judiciary, it has been used as a handmaiden to suit petty political ends and crush constitutional liberties. Dhar, an operative in India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) for three decades, has a muckraking tale to tell.

Since Indira Gandhi’s time in the 1960s, the IB director has answered solely to the prime minister and home minister. The refusal of political masters to allow induction of expert staff from lateral fields has perpetuated a servile “police culture” in the bureau. “An average IB officer is not oriented with the techniques of war pursued by mujahideen and fidayeen fanatics.” (p13) Non-productive human assets clutter the bureau. Lack of in-service checks fosters a “breeding ground for Goerings and Himmlers in the backyard of constitutional democracy”. (p 1

No meaningful cooperation between state and central intelligence entities exists, especially when different political parties rule at the center and in the states. Coordination among the three prime central agencies, IB, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation), is non-existent. The Kargil and Surankote intelligence failures are two glaring illustrations of a divided house of Indian spook (see Kashmir’s snake in the grass June 7, 2003).

Dhar gives a clarion call for freeing intelligence organizations from the machinations of the executive. Legislation to make the agencies accountable to parliamentary committees is a crying necessity. Election prospecting, verifying credentials of ruling party candidates, researching the weaknesses of opposition candidates, toppling and interfering with elected governments and other dirty operations victimizing the innocent are shameful tasks assigned to agencies that should be protecting national security.

As a budding officer of the Indian Police Service in 1965, Dhar learned the nitty-gritty of grassroots intelligence collection in Darjeeling, Siliguri and Naksalbari (northern Bengal). His unusual techniques of raising human assets were encouraged with subventions from the police Secret Service Fund. Meetings with Charu Majumdar and Jangal Santhal, forefathers of India’s extreme Maoist movement, convinced Dhar that violent agrarian revolution was not far off. However, politicians from Calcutta (now Kolkata) and Delhi showed no intentions of addressing the economic woes of the rural populace. “Indian rulers blindly follow the firefighting ideology in dealing with great social and economic fault lines.” (p 71)

In 1968, as a bolt from the blue, Dhar was advised to join the IB in Delhi. The intelligence technocrats he met there were “cast iron cookies” who swore by regimentation and loyalty. The abject submissiveness of officers robbed them of initiative and measured aggression. The IB reeked of factionalism, corruption and nepotism. Trainers treated the ruling Congress Party as Caesar’s wife in the political analysis classes. They totally neglected “economic intelligence” and its relevance to unrest in society. Coastal security was unheard of as a concept. The curricula had a myopic strategic view and general officers were anomalously segregated from technical officers.

Posted to Manipur after training, Dhar was released “into troubled water like a scared fry”. (p 95) Battered by Naga-Mizo rebellions and Meitei agitation for statehood, Manipur was in coma. Dhar raised very sensitive human assets and gained access to inner cores of the Imphal valley. Wanting political and bureaucratic support to survive, he cultivated assets inside the Manipur administration. His reports that Meitei ultras were being taken to Sylhet in East Pakistan for military training were treated as overreactions by the IB headquarters. “They thought that a greenhorn with only about four years experience was trying to act smart.” (p 107)

On prime minister Indira Gandhi’s visit to the region in 1969, Dhar’s “humint” (human intelligence) inputs on armed disturbances saved the day and exposed the pathetic state of VIP security arrangements. His top-secret negotiations with insurgents succeeded in the conclusive eradication of Mizo militancy from Manipur in 1970. Stalking Naga gangs from hilltop to hilltop on their way to and from East Pakistan was not the only kind of action Dhar took. In 1972, Gandhi’s point persons asked him to topple the Manipur state government. It was the first of many instances of “bleeding in silence at the rape of my conscience”. (p 14

Transferred to neighboring Nagaland when underground armies were escalating jungle warfare with Chinese support, Dhar thwarted and neutralized several militant posses. Since Nagas value the family as an institution, his strategy of involving family in work paid dividends. His personal friendships with key rebel leaders such as K Yallay, Z Ramyo and B M Keyho aided the Indian government’s peace talks in 1974-75. His second tryst with unlawful acts came when Delhi called on him to subvert the loyalty of a section of Nagaland’s elected legislature.

In 1975, Dhar was moved to the just-annexed state of Sikkim. He became the first Indian official to fraternize with the deposed king (Chogyal) and bring his sulking loyalists into the mainstream. To observe Chinese posts along the disputed border, he won over numerous transborder agents who made forays deep into Tibet. During Gandhi’s emergency (a sort of martial rule declared in 1975), he was asked to frame the Chogyal and persuade local politicians to back the bullying Sanjay Gandhi, Indira’s younger son. In 1977, the Janata Party government ordered Dhar to perform a converse action of political prostitution. Such immoral compulsions drove him into mental depression.

In 1979, Dhar was brought back to Delhi to head the IB’s “Election Cell”. Prime minister Charan Singh ordered him to assess “what was required in each constituency to influence the electorate”. (p 233) When Gandhi rode back to power, she asked him to assist the Puri Committee, a tool of political vendetta, to blacken the faces of her opponents.

In 1980, Dhar was placed at the USSR counter-intelligence desk of the IB. He identified four central ministers, more than two dozen ministers of parliament, and layers of the armed forces to be on the payrolls of the KGB. His penchant for digging out skeletons forced a hurried shift to the subsidiary bureau in Delhi, practically the “special branch of the Prime Minister’s Office”. (p 252) From the perch, he espied the astonishing influence of Indian Rasputins like Dhirendra Brahmachari, “Mamaji” and Chandraswami. Indian industry bigwig, Dhirubhai Ambani, and other wheeler-dealers approached him for illegal favors.

After Sanjay Gandhi’s death, Dhar was commissioned to shadow his widow Maneka and her associates. He was even asked to record the conversation of home minister Zail Singh with a Sikh militant on Indira Gandhi’s instructions. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) pressed him to sabotage Devi Lal’s Haryana state government. The entire field machinery of the Delhi IB was mobilized to help the Congress Party win the Delhi municipal elections in 1983. In conspiracy and thuggery, “there was hardly any difference between the durbars [holders of high political position] of Jahangir and the viceroys and those of Morarji Desai and Indira Gandhi”. (p 284)

Dhar was next posted to the Indian mission in Canada with the brief of penetrating the transcontinental Khalistan separatist network. The RAW representatives in Ottawa resented his presence and raked up a turf battle. Dhar accessed extremist Sikh Gurdwaras and sections of the vocal Sikh community. Diplomatic assets ferreted out useful information on Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) links with Sikh secessionists. Dhar ’s uncorroborated information about a terrorist attack involving an Indian aircraft was not taken seriously by Canadian authorities, leading to the Air India Kanishka bombing in 1985.

Returning home in 1987, Dhar joined the Punjab cell of the IB. He vehemently opposed the government policy of “filling up the follies of fault lines with dead bodies”. (p 320) Unlike his colleagues, Dhar’s operations avoided mindless killings of civilians. He drove wedges between feuding Sikh terrorist leaders and outfits and facilitated two secret peace initiatives of prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. Home minister Buta Singh’s own underground group spoilt one demarche. Singh, the Punjab governor, state police and a jealous section of IB officers stonewalled the second plan. One IB faction opposed to Dhar leaked out the identity of a valuable asset and sacrificed him to the bullets of a Khalistani hit squad. Be it Punjab or Nepal, “agent safety was not a part of IB’s professional ethics”. (p 491)

Promoted to the Pakistan Counter-Intelligence Unit (PCIU) in 1988, Dhar launched transborder agents to penetrate Pakistani posts on the Punjab and Rajasthan borders. Rajiv Gandhi’s lackey, Mani Shankar Aiyar (presently a central minister), instigated a crude incident of arresting a Pakistani “cover diplomat” against the counsel of Dhar. The prime minister’s troubleshooters and some of their IB acolytes naively propped up the Bodoland and Gorkhaland agitations in Assam and Bengal.

At PCIU, Dhar discovered that Mulayam Singh Yadav (later defense minister) was in clandestine contact with the ISI. Sincere IB efforts to nab mujahideen and Pakistani agents were frustrated by key Indian politicians in Delhi, Bihar and Bengal. Undeterred, Dhar helped the IB regain a toehold in the Kashmir Valley and penetrated some jihadi training camps in Pakistan.

In 1989, Dhar aided the Assam operations of the IB. The collaboration of politicians and bureaucrats had whetted sub-nationalist aspirations in Assam. After creating Frankensteins, the state government was incapable of planned military action against the ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam). Infected layers within the Assamese regime divulged advance information about Indian army plans and allowed insurgents to cross over into friendly Bangladesh. Fat amounts from the Secret Service Fund of the IB for “missions” in Assam were never utilized for the putative purpose.

In 1991, Dhar was posted a chief of the IB’s secret technical wing. Groupism and favoritism ruled in this “breeding ground of inefficiency”. (p 423) Policing mentality occluded opening the doors of intelligence to scientific specialists. The abject condition of Indian intelligence’s cipher breaking cost the life of Rajiv Gandhi. Ministry mandarins and greasy alley manipulators defeated Dhar’s reform proposals. Apart from diplomatic constraints on aggressive intelligence collection, he was enjoined by diehard Gandhi family hangers-on to record exotic audio and videotapes about a romantic liaison of P V Narasimha Rao, just before his confirmation as prime minister in 1992.

Back at PCIU, Dhar busted many ISI networks across India and tapped “fountain organizations” that hovered over the peripheries of Islamist outfits. Frustrated by red tape, he took unapproved measures to raise “talents” inside Nepal and Bangladesh for mapping ISI fields. Certain “special projects” penetrated targets in Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore and Peshawar.

In November 1992, prime minister Rao ordered Dhar to arrange a discreet meeting with the supremo of the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), the fountainhead of Hindutva. The wily Congressman actually had “old linkages with the Sangh as a student”. (p 466) Reminded that the stability of Rao’s job depended on subordination, the PMO tried to force Dhar to “cooperate” with the Ambanis by implicating their corporate rivals.
Dhar’s final struggle was against the erroneous persecution of fellow IB officers who honestly investigated the infamous ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization) espionage case of 1994. Mention of the prime minister’s son as a suspect rushed Rao to prevail upon the Kerala state government and the CBI director to “go slow” and bury the trail. The accused were exonerated without due process. Indian rocket/missile security was compromised. Dhar’s efforts after retirement to get the case reopened invited death threats and assassination attempts.

Open Secrets is a depressing hidden camera fixed on the systemic failures of Indian polity and intelligence. It illuminates the weaknesses of India’s national security setup and exhorts urgent patchwork.


http://telespy.blogspot.in/2008/07/indi ... eiled.html
http://maloykrishnadhar.com/


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