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M1G-23MLD Pros and Cons
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Westerners might find it interesting to read a 32page Soviet Air Force supplementary air combat manual called Aide-Memoire for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-I6A, F-4E and Kfir C.2,published not long after the Bekaa Valley clashes. At that time both Soviet pilots and those from its client states were still trained mainly in the orthodox - some might say 'inflexible' - air intercept tactics originating from the 1960s, which were mastered to perfection during the MiG-21 era, from the early 1960s to the 1970s. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet Union and its client air arms flew the MiG-23M/ML/MLD in the same way as the MiG-21 as a high-speed point interceptor closely guided and supported by the GCI. It took the Russians 12 years to exploit the Flogger-G/K as a true air superiority fighter. The Aide-Memoire for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-I6A, F-4E and Kfir C.2 refers to the MiG-23MLD(Export) version, powered by the R35-300 turbojet, rated at 28,700lb (127kN) in full afterburner, without the aerodynamics and flight control system improvements of the VVS-FA MIG-23MLDS. According to the manual, the aircraft's main parameters, defining its manoeuvring performance, turn out to be slightly better than the McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II and definitely better than the IAI KfirC.2. However, the MiG-23MLD's air combat performance, as quoted in the manual, is cited as definitely inferior to the McDonnell Douglas F-15A and General Dynamics F-16A. There are only a few areas within the MiG-23MLD's envelope where it could boast performance equal to, or slightly better than, the third-generation US fighters.
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One of the major advantages of the MiG-23 in combat with the F-15A and F-4E is its compact appearance and relatively small size, along with the fact that the wings are set at a 72° swept angle for high-speed flight. Combined with suitable camouflage, this would make low-level visual detection and tracking very difficult, particularly from above and in head-on encounters.
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Conclusions and BVR Considerations
The manual concludes that the MiG-23MLD(Export), armed with the R-24/R60MK AAM combination, could be considered reasonably capable of holding its own against all types of enemy fighters. However, it could gain the edge over the F-15A - the most capable of its rivals - only through multiple simultaneous 'slash-and-dash' attacks by several aircraft from different directions and from long range. These would have to be mounted in a decisive manner and would involve a high degree of co-ordination between the groups once the WVR phase was entered into, and there would have to be a timely exit from combat.
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In order to expand the search zone in a high-threat environment, the Flogger pilot was required to fly a 'weaving' or zig-zag flight profile, with his attention focused on a visual search pattern below the lower limits of his own forces' ground radar coverage, (usually below 1,OOOft [300m] in Central Europe in the 1980s). However, it is well known that MiG-23 pilots had problems with the rearward and downward field of view, as the fighter was designed with a low-drag canopy faired into the fuselage, although the canopy-mounted rear-view mirrors expanded the rearward field of view to some extent. Consequently, during low-level sorties, the Flogger pilot had a great deal of difficulty in keeping a turning 'bogey' in view, or during a visual search below his aircraft and pilot workload was excessively high in this mode of flight. On the other hand, the MiG-23MLD has fast acceleration - thanks to a low-drag airframe and the aerodynamic qualities of the fully-swept wings - and its high speed could make it more difficult for an unseen attacker to satisfy his aiming requirements in the consequently reduced intercept time. This aspect of Flogger operations could be another defensive factor when flying in enemy or disputed airspace.
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During BVR combat, the manual emphasises that attacks should not be initiated without offensive advantage and the prospect of firing the 'first shot'. The general rule: 'Who shoots first - kills first and dictates the outcome of the engagement' should be seen as a particularly important dictum for the MiG-23 community. If the MiG-23 was dictating the outcome of the engagement, the aircraft could exploit this advantage to the full, using the 'slash-and-dash' attack technique - the preferable method, and often the only one available against F-16s and F15s.
If an unknown type of 'bandit' is encountered, it should be assumed that it is an F-15 - the most capable and hence the most dangerous, enemy fighter. The manual stresses that the MiG23MLD is prohibited from closing head-on with any such adversary, as these may well be F-15s with better radar performance and longer-range BVR missiles. For this reason, one piece of advice that the manual directs specifically at GCI officers is that during fighter sweep operations it would be strictly against the rules for them to vector MiG-23s in head-on attacks against non-identified bandits. However, if such a situation is unavoidable, then the tactics recommended to MiG-23 pilots and GCI officers are as follows: "If the distance to the 'bandits' exceeds 12nm (20km), the MiGs should immediately make a sharp turn away from the target, descending and pulling high-g and then reverting to a 'side-on' or 'tail-on' missile attack. If the target is detected side on, the MiG-23MLD pilot should use chaff and turn away sharply in order to evade the Sparrow missiles, and then revert to attack."
In order to mask a group attack, the manual recommends that own forces' fighters be flown in carefully spaced formations. These are usually known as 'cells' - virtual square 'boxes' of airspace with 1,200ft-long (400m) sides, within which enemy airborne radars are incapable of discriminating the presence of multiple targets. (However, this is only valid for earlier PD [pulsed Doppler] radars without the raid cluster resolution mode introduced in the mid/late-1980s.) In other words, a group of aircraft would be displayed as a single target on an airborne radar display at a distance of more than 8nm (15km). When tracked by enemy radar, all the aircraft within a 'cell' would then execute simultaneous manoeuvring (the so-called 'burst' manoeuvre) in the horizontal and vertical plane, in order to break lock and initiate a massed attack. In a 'real world' situation there would always be the chance that a BVR missile launched at the maximum permissible range might be out-manoeuvred by the enemy. Consequently, in a head-on attack, the advice is for the first R-24R (R-23R) to be launched at 90% maximum range (below 6nm [11km] at low level and 15nm [28km] at medium/high level). The second should follow at 60-70% maximum range (below 4nm [7.5k] and 10nm [20km] respectively).
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WVR Combat Considerations.
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The manual assures MiG-23 pilots that the F-15A or F-16A have no valuable advantage in their close air combat weapons. However, these US new-generation fighters are regarded as being much more manoeuvrable, and could consequently achieve a weapons employment solution in their turning engagements much easier and earlier than the MiG-23MLD. In view of this, MiG-23MLD pilots are strongly advised that prolonged turning engagements against F-15As and F-16As, both offensive and defensive, should be avoided by all means. Attack manoeuvring should be broken off at the latest by the end of the first minute of the engagement if no weapon employment solutions have been achieved by then. The manual also advises the pilot to maintain high speed (not below 485kts [900km/h]) during combat as the lower the speed, the greater the 'bandit's' manoeuvring advantage. Manoeuvres which would cause considerable loss of speed - and therefore energy - are permitted only when necessary for weapons employment or missile evasion. MiG-23MLD pilots are advised to avoid any turning combat in the horizontal plane vs the Kfir C.2.
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