Bharat Rakshak

why our media is falling into the trap - .

The two sides have agreed as follows:-

1) The area within the triangle Indira Koli - point NJ 9842 - Karakoram Pass will be vacated by the armed forces of the two sides.
2) The armed forces of the two sides will be re-deployed south of point NJ 9842 so as to conform with the Simla Agreement.
3) The modalities and time-frame of the re-deployment as well as the monitoring arrangements worked out by the military experts are annexed.
4) Neither side shall attempt to alter the status of the area within the triangle Indira Koli - point NJ 9842 - Karakoram Pass, pending delineation of the Line of Control.
5) A Joint Commission comprising experts from both sides will be set up in order to examine the question of delineation of the Line of Control. The Joint Commission shall commence work immediately after the completion of the re-deployment of forces and submit its report to the two governments within a period of six months thereafter.

NDTV is running an anti-national show

rohit,

can you study this and place Khor on the maps you have already linked earlier, so that it becomes clear to us how the AGPL moves 'north' from NJ9842 to Khor - which is the indian position.

TIA.

SIACHEN WILL come up in the secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan on 11-12 June. The last parley was held a year back on 30 May 2011; then, the two countries failed to agree on the modalities for demilitarisation while agreeing ‘in principle’ to the need. The talks in May 2011 were held after a gap of three years.

As the date approaches, it is being suggested that the operation was, at the outset, a misadventure committed by the then military commanders Lt Gen ML Chibber and Lt Gen PN Hoon, as Gen Chibber is said to have admitted later. It is also being said that a come-down on its position by India would positively impact the confidence-building measures; some analysts are looking at the issue as a ticket for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the Nobel Peace Prize.

This media hype is misleading, given that astute military minds have applied themselves to the situation. Articles on the subject are being written by those who have neither seen the area nor possess adequate knowledge of war. India has strong reasons to be satisfied with the operational situation in Siachen, having dominated the Pakistani positions and having mastered the art of countering the vagaries of high-altitude weather.

Post the devastating avalanche at Gayari in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Pakistan has built a sustained campaign for taking forward the process of demilitarisation. Initial conciliatory statements by Pakistan Army chief Gen Kayani were followed by a media blitz aimed at pressurising the Indian side to toe the Pakistani line. Recently, Choudhary Ahmed Mukhtar, the erstwhile defence minister of Pakistan claimed that the armies of both countries are the biggest hurdles in resolving the issue. In the next breath he declared Gen Kayani as the best bet for reaching a solution. By so saying, he has left the Indian army as the only identifiable hurdle in the talks. This is propaganda at its best

Pakistan has a strong reason for doing what it does. At present, all Pakistani positions west of Gayari are cut off from their supply route. The entire middle of the Pakistani defence line below the Saltoro ridge has been effectively hollowed out. This implies that the Pakistani posture on the glacier is at its weakest. With Gayari gone, the Pakistani logistical advantage in the Saltoro range is gone. Yet, quite incredibly, there are some Indian analysts who feel like suggesting the possibility of Pakistan joining up with China to cut off Siachen in a pincer east-to-west movement.

For India, yet another significant development is on the China front, wherein the country’s increasing presence in the Pakistani held India territory of Gilgit-Baltistan is a cause for concern. This has happened in addition to Pakistan’s unilateral and illegal conceding of the Shaksgam region to China way back in 1963. Now if we vacate the Saltoro Ridge, China will gleefully exploit the attendant free run north of the vacated areas and will definitely put the new-found bonanza to strategic use; all the more reason for India to move cautiously on demilitarisation.

There is one more important aspect that needs to be kept constantly in focus while dealing with Siachen. Avalanche or no avalanche, Pakistan will always look upon Indian presence of the Saltoro ridge as a forcible occupation. No agreement will be strong enough to deter Pakistan from attempting, at some point in time, to restore what they perceive to be a national shame. Pakistan is not averse to building international pressure against India on the subject, especially so, by firing the gun from the shoulder of its trusted ally, the United States or by involving China as a partner in the dispute. It is, presently, actively pursuing both options.

INDIAN EXPENDITURE and effort to regain the Saltoro Ridge, if demilitarised, would escalate as a geometric or logarithmic progression. In fact, cost escalation for India will begin the moment any unfortunate decision to demilitarise is taken. Building a new line of defence further down which will require more infrastructure and troops involving prohibitive expenditure. As and when the conflict escalates, the money saved over the years will go down the gutter in nanoseconds. A much larger number of soldiers will be called upon to sacrifice their lives than the few who are becoming unfortunate victims of the weather at present. More dangerously, this may trigger a sub-continental conflict.

In all matters concerning territorial dispute, India’s sole objective is security. Pakistan’s proposal that both sides withdraw to positions prior to the occupation of the Saltoro Ridge is unacceptable. India, while dealing with Pakistan, must always keep in mind the mistakes of returning Hajipir pass.

NDTV's broadcast rights must be revoked effective immediately and proceed legally against the editors of the channel

. . . so that it becomes clear to us how the AGPL moves 'north' from NJ9842 to Khor - which is the indian position.
.

What was the motive for this article published in the Hindu just one day before the scheduled talks?
Hindu Siachen was almost a done deal in 1992

How did The Hindu get hold of 1992 draft?

Note that the article is by a "Special Correspondent". Who is the author?
I remember watching a TV debate recently, where Siddharth Varadarajan (Editor of The Hindu) was pushing for India's withdrawl even without Pakis agreeing to authenticate AGPL. Why?

^^SS, you've mail.

rohitvats ji,

Would be much obliged if you could please ping me @ chetakbrf at geemailonlee.

Need some advice. TIA.

We cannot do any deal on Kashmir or Siachen or Sir Creek with Pakistan as the GOP cannot control Non State actors ........ Is that too difficult to convey to Paki diplomats during talks?

It has and is being conveyed. The pakis come right back at you and say: "Help us control our non-state actors who are radicalizing the country further because of core issue 1, 2, 3 etc. Give us our way and they will have no base and 'south asia' will enter a new age prosperity ... and MMS/Zardari will win the Nobel. Else, we'll take you down because you have a small (Hindu) heart."

This is what in some ways Cohen means when he says " Pakistan negotiates with a gun to its own head."

A textual analysis of the drafts presented by India and Pakistan during the talks on the Siachen issue in New Delhi in November 1992 reveals how a virtually done deal on this costly dispute was scuttled exactly 20 years ago. The Hindu could not have published them at a more opportune time (June 10, 2012). On April 18, 2012, Pakistan's Army Chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, referred to the several rounds of talks since and said, “You know that they were close to a solution but then nothing came out of it. We want this issue to be resolved and it should happen. It is a tough mission for us and them, which has its costs.” In sum, he is prepared for a settlement — based necessarily on a fair compromise.

That was precisely what the 1992 drafts and the unsigned agreement that followed had ensured. Initially, each side's offer was a non-starter. Pakistan proposed an upturned demilitarised triangle — marked by Indira Col in the northwest; point NJ9842, where the Line of Control (LoC) ends in the south, and the Karakoram Pass in the northeast. A joint commission would delineate the LoC beyond NJ9842 after the troops withdrawal.

India agreed to the delineation of the LoC, but insisted on the definition of “existing positions” of both sides and the places where they would deploy. The area so vacated would be “a Zone of Disengagement” bounded by the specified “existing positions.”

Amended offer

Faced with deadlock, Pakistan amended its offer to read: “The armed forces of the two sides shall vacate areas and re-deploy as indicated in the annexure. The positions vacated would not for either side constitute a basis for a legal claim or justify a political or moral right to the area indicated. The delineation of the LoC from point NJ9842 to the Karakoram Pass will form part of the comprehensive settlement to follow the re-deployment of troops.” According to Indian negotiators, the idea that the delineated LoC must end up at the Karakoram Pass was not pressed by the Pakistani side.

Now, surely to specify existing points to be vacated and record them in an annex is to “authenticate” them. This does not differ from India's draft, which provided: “India: The Indian Army shall vacate their existing positions at … and … redeploy at … Pakistan: The Pak. Army shall vacate their existing positions at … and … redeploy at …”

Pakistan's revised proposal fully met India's insistence on authentication of existing positions. The deal was struck between India's delegation, led by its Defence Secretary at the time, N.N. Vohra, and his Pakistani counterpart. The then Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit repeatedly testified to the accord in public. Matters did not end there. In the technical talks that followed thereafter, it was agreed that: (1) India would withdraw to Dzingrulma and Pakistan to Goma, at the base of the Bilaford Glacier; and (2) surveillance was to be conducted by helicopter.

On January 24, 1994, India confirmed in a non-paper to Pakistan that in 1992 “a broad understanding had been reached on disengagement and redeployment, monitoring, maintenance of peace and implementation schedule. … Both sides agreed that to reduce tension in Siachen, the two sides shall disengage from authenticated positions they are presently occupying and shall fall back to positions as under: …” Ancillary details were set out.

P.V. Narasimha Rao scuttled the deal in 1992. Benazir Bhutto followed suit in 1994, resiling from the concession on authentication. She denied the agreement and cited, instead, the India-Pakistan Joint Statement on June 17, 1989, which India had earlier resiled from: “There was agreement by both sides … on redeployment of forces … The future positions on the ground so as to conform with the Simla Agreement … the Army authorities of both sides will determine these positions.”

At that time, in 1989, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Humayun Khan, had told the media the accord envisaged relocation of forces “to positions occupied at the time of the Simla Agreement.” India's Foreign Secretary at the time, S.K. Singh, said he would “endorse everything [Humayun Khan] has said.” The very next day, however, the Ministry of External Affairs was instructed to deny the deal. The then Army Chief insisted in the talks being held on July 10, 1989, that existing positions be identified. An effort was made during Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Islamabad on July 16, 1989, to resolve the deadlock by extending the LoC northwards. India's offer, described by Iqbal Akhund, Pakistan's National Security Adviser, was a fair one. The line “should run due north, that is, up to the Chinese border in a ruler-straight line,” dividing the zone. But nothing came of it.

From 1985, the basis of all the parleys was mutual withdrawal. On July 18, 1998, Defence Minister George Fernandes subverted it. “India needs to hold on to Siachen both for strategic reasons and wider security in the region.” None of the Prime Ministers or Defence Ministers had made such a claim before.

Lt.Gen. M.L. Chibber, former GoC-in-C Northern Army Command, who was responsible for planning and mounting Operation Meghdoot on April 13, 1984, in Siachen, emphatically declared, “Siachen does not have any strategic significance. The strategic importance being talked about is all invention.”

Mr. Fernandes' stand wrecked the talks on Siachen held on November 6, 1998. The DGMO, Lt.Gen. Inder K. Verma, dutifully declared that day, “How can you ask us to vacate this position? We don't care either about money or the number of casualties we suffer.” But, of course, this violates the Simla Agreement. It says, “Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter this position.”

Hopes were revived when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the jawans at the Siachen base camp on June 12, 2005 that “the world's highest battlefield” should be converted into a “peace mountain.” He added: “Now the time has come that we make efforts that this is converted from a point of conflict to a symbol of peace.” In the talks with Pakistan, he said, “the security of our nation would be kept in mind.”

The then Army Chief, Gen. J.J. Singh, who had mounted a campaign on Siachen, said on June 21, 2005, “We have given our viewpoint to the government on converting the Saltoro ridge and the glacier into a demilitarised zone.” He spelt out two demands — authentication of existing positions and a monitoring mechanism. Ironically, on November 4, 1992, both these demands had already been conceded.

Trust is a political decision for the highest leadership to take, based inter alia on military advice. No government can allow a veto to the army.

The last paragraph of India's non-paper of January 24, 1994, said, “An Indian delegation at Defence Secretary level is willing to visit Islamabad in February 1994 with a view to negotiate a formal agreement on Siachen on the basis of the agreement reached (in 1992).” Now, 18 years later, India should revive that offer and put the sad episode behind us.

Gen. Kayani hinted at much more than a Siachen settlement. He said that “peaceful coexistence is necessary for both countries. There is no doubt about that.” This explains Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar's repeated statement that “we are not going to be bogged down by an older mindset.” This is precisely the impression this writer formed in February from extensive interviews with officials, diplomats and others in Islamabad. Centuries ago Demosthenes said: “In important transactions, opportunities are fleeting; once missed they cannot be recovered.” Only Prime Minister Singh's visit to Pakistan can shape the relationship for a promising future.

Amazing that Noorani finds Kayani sooo brotherly and trust-worthy and is fawning over every word he utters while minces no words towards Indian stand.

ndia goes into Monday's Siachen talks with its army's hardline position in Islamabad [ Images ], but if it makes some effort to probe attitudes over there, it might be surprised, says Jyoti Malhotra

India may have already ruled out a breakthrough in the Siachen dispute with Pakistan when the two defence secretaries meet on Monday, but the fact remains that both sides will take serious judgement calls on the progress of the bilateral relationship that could have a serious bearing on a possible visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [ Images ] to Pakistan later this year.

Significantly, for the first time since 1992, when India and Pakistan nearly agreed to disengage, authenticate their respective ground positions and withdraw troops from their eyeball-to-eyeball locations on the Siachen glacier, the Pakistani army and Dr Singh seem nearly on the same page.

As far back as 2005 while on a visit to Siachen base camp, Dr Singh had announced the best thing the two countries could do was to stop the ecological destruction of the glacier on which troops from both countries had been stationed since 1984, and convert it into a "mountain of peace".

His UPA government has never formally disowned that statement, although Defence Mminister A K Antony, briefing journalists last week after the Cabinet Committee on Security cleared the line for Defence Secretary Shashikant Sharma's talks in Islamabad, insisted it was impossible to expect a "dramatic announcement or decision on an issue which is very important for us, especially in the context of (our) national security".

In fact, it is the Indian army [ Images ], speaking through officials on the condition of anonymity, that has considerably hardened its position, certainly since the near-breakthrough in 1992 and more so since the Kargil [ Images ] conflict in 1999.

According to defence ministry sources, Sharma will tell his Pakistani counterpart during the 13th round of the Siachen talks over the next two days that Pakistan must not only 'authenticate' troop positions of both armies on the Saltoro ridge of the Siachen glacier, but follow with a proper 'delineation' of the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the map as well as on the ground, which in turn should lead to a 'demarcation' of the border.

Only then, the sources said, would India consider disengaging and redeploying its troops from the heights of the Saltoro ridge of the glacier on which Indian troops have been stationed since 1984.

This position by the Indian army is much more hardline than the positions it took in 1989, when Rajiv Gandhi [ Images ] and Benazir Bhutto [ Images ] were prime ministers and a deal on Siachen was almost said to have been done, or in 1992, when then defence secretary and current Jammu & Kashmir [ Images ] governor N N Vohra nearly broke through the Siachen deadlock.

Of course, the Indian army argues the Kargil invasion in 1999 had changed the entire discourse and vindicated its position that the Pak army is not to be trusted.

In 1989 and in 1992, the Indian army's insistence that the Pak army authenticate its ground positions, both current and those it would relocate to, included one significant compromise. Which was that the authentication of positions would not be put into the main document but in the annexures to the main document.

On the other hand, after the Indian army evicted soldiers of the 6 Northern Light Infantry at Kargil, it began to get much more powerful, with the result that the earlier compromise offer of authentication in the annexures was not repeated.

That is why the Indian army's newest three-step negotiating position with the Pak side on Monday-- to authenticate, delineate and demarcate -- is doomed to fail from the start. The Pak army believes itself responsible for Pakistan's security, especially vis-a-vis India, and will never negotiate from a starting position of weakness.

Considering the correspondent, who cannot even travel to Rawalpindi (a mere 25 km from her house in Islamabad) without permission, but shared breathing space with Kayani -- and even a briefing, admittedly with three other Pak journalists, by the cream of the army officer corps -- certainly means the army is sending some sort of a message that it wants to seriously talk to New Delhi.

The Pak military analysts Business Standard spoke to were unwilling to threadbare analyse the meaning of Kayani's gesture, but pointed to two distinct changes taking place in their army, the first related to terrorism and the second to India.

But, if Sharma is willing to look beyond the obvious and probe beneath the surface in his conversations with his counterpart, as well as with Pak army officials, he just might be surprised on what he comes up with.

New Delhi: The Defence Secretaries of India and Pakistan on Monday began talks on the military standoff on Siachen. Reports say that Pakistan wants withdrawal of troops from the glacier, but it could reject a settlement on Sir Creek if India refuses.

Stung by the occupation of strategic heights in the Kargil sector in 1999, India has insisted on the authentication and demarcation of current military positions on Siachen.

The move is aimed at thwarting the possible re-induction of troops by Pakistan after any demilitarisation of the glacier.

"There are several reasons for turning down (a meeting with) Lavoy. It is to tell the Americans that you cannot be bad-mouthing us day in and day out and then expect a meeting with Pakistan's most powerful personality," the official said.

The thrust of Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch is that the military should provide a non biased military risks of the matter to government and let the government decide, by taking a political call on the risks involved. I agree with this approach.

I am afraid that is blatant mis-representation of Katoch. You are deducing things that he did not imply. The beginning of the paragraph :

OK, so let us hear your "accurate" representation of Katoch between the role of the military and government?

You have already accused me of "blatant misrepresentation" implying maligned intent or lack of knowledge. Is there any point in having a discussion?

This is what in some ways Cohen means when he says " Pakistan negotiates with a gun to its own head."
The great thing about Pakistan negotiating with a gun to their own head is that they can only pull the trigger once.

.....

Pakistani nukes seem to defy Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. They are both very secure and, at the same time, could fall into the hands of rogue elements if Pakistan disintegrates.

There is a famous local saying: "The land is so barren and the passes so high that only the best of friends and fiercest of enemies come by.''