Bharat Rakshak

There is a difference between being pro Arjun and being anti T 90. As you correctly pointed out, there is plenty of space for both. Shook Law here, seems more interested in making sure that the services requirements get stalled (MMRCA, tanks) -- unless the supplier name happens to be a spelt with Capital B, followed by a o, etc, and failing that some where else located in the west. (either full or subsystem)

Apart from the fire control system what else is new in terms of HK capability?
A so called BMS which will have issues in fleet wide deployment because India is deploying its own BMS which is to be integrated with F-INSAS/CIDSS?

Given there is no company with a B followed by an O etc competing for the T-90 replacement, what you have posted is not factual as far as the tanks are concerned.

As regards the MMRCA, he is not the only one to hold the view that the IAF should have held out with more Sukhois, upgrades, LCA and then directly jumped onto an all 5G bandwagon with the JSF, FGFA and AMCA.

- is whether the JSF would be available anywhere near the timelines India needs for urgent acquisition.

Armour Relitk which is many time stronger then K-5 , New FCS Kalina with very high kill probabilty , Catherine FC & Catherine XP TI , More powerful engine , new transmission , BMS , 360 * protection , Newer Gun 2A46M5 ( Indian T-90S uses 2A46M1/2 same as T-72 ) older guns cant fire newer 3BM59/3BM60 rounds , Isolation of Crew from open Ammo , MRS

T-90MS is virtually a new tanks under older name....Much like Mig-35 is as different from Mig-29

^^Oh I see...so it's more like Arjun!

There is a difference between being pro Arjun and being anti T 90.

Yes except that the Russian also teach Avadi how to manufacture it and therefore a working product is in IA service.

But , Maharaj Ji, where is the actual testing of the Tincan 90 MS in the conditions of Ladhak, Sikkim etc, in the extreme cold and summers.

You just take the brochuritis that it actually works (just because it is cold in Russia as well), Krasnapol for eg, failed miserably in the Himalayas (it may work in Russia). So, where and when did the T-90 MS go through all the testing and hoops and loops that the Arjun will be made to run through for "proof" that it works at Ladhak and Sikkim.

Or is the answer really really very simple. All that the DRDO can offer the brass is a poori bhaji /idli sambar out of their canteens on a visit, while the Natashas offer cold cash and warm cuddly Natashas (case in point Vik Ad) . Maybe, the DRDO should appoint their "agents" to deal with the brass and all deals will be closed just as promptly as it is done with the Natashas!

This MS (mega sh*t) is in no one's service, including the Russians. Now Sanku Maharaj Ji has decided that it is a "working product" in IA service ? All it exists now is in some untested and unproven form waiting for sucker to buy it and become a guinea pig.

For example the issue with Krasonopol was that it was used in a different altitude than designed for.

Yet it was for better or for worse the only system. It was purchased during Kargil in a hurry. So net net very different circumstances

Ah. Now I see. T-90 was designed not for the use in the plains of Eastern Europe ,but actually for the Himalayan heights. So , this wont fail like the Kransapol and the Indian Army can just go ahead and induct 400000000 copies of T-90 MS. However, since the Arjun is meant for the plains of Western India, it will fail in the Himalayas definitely and we don't even need to trial it there.



Indeed. Now since there is no "hurry" and the T-90 MS is designed specifically for the Himalayas, we can go ahead with all speed and buy 400000 of them, and oh, also make sure that we dont let any pesky Arjuns in the Punjab and Jammu theaters as that will cut into our Himalayan optimized T-90 MS purchases.

Perhaps you forget that this is not a political debate where unfortunately bluster passes for meaningful content

Ok. Since you are for "meaningful content", can you please explain how/ why a "Correct altitude for Himalayas & cold weather optimized" (your reasons) T-90 has "Strategic Flexibility" , while the Arjun doesn't.

ts “nominal ground pressure ...

This is validated by history, says Lieutenant General (Retired) RM Vohra, who won a Mahavir Chakra in the 1971 war while commanding 4 HORSE, a tank regiment equipped with Centurion tanks. He says the 42-tonne Pakistani Patton M-48 tanks got mired in the soft soil of Asal Uttar, in Punjab, while the 51-tonne Centurion moved around that battlefield easily.

Yes except that the Russian also teach Avadi how to manufacture it and therefore a working product is in IA service.

This is not unlike the INSAS saga being discussed in the small arms thread.

If we cant get the OFBs to robustly manufacture small arms, given that ALL the pieces are available, isnt tanks a stretch (rhetorically speaking)? Isnt there a fundamental reason for the Tatra "indgenisation" saga? The Brahmos manufacturing units have their own issues in the setup.

These are all linked. And can not be solved by blaming IA. Unless of course, these are handed over to IA directly, some what like Naval shipyards, and even then, despite being better, their delivery records are not quite stellar.

Unless some one has a fix for a working manufacturing establishment, which coupled with a design department which is responsive, churns out prototypes and final products at a rapid clip, with changes being incorporated quickly, there is no point asking the forces to use Indian products.

Today, if IA wants a small change, this seems to become a reason to spend 5 more years on the drawing board, 5 more years to make the prototype and 5 further years to actually get it working in a LSP.

By which time of course a guaranteed order of 1000 units is must, and no changes will be entertained.

This really can not continue, it is simply unacceptable (irrespective of whose fault it is)

While I agree with you that OFB needs to step aside,\

we currently have a superior tank in service which was clearly demonstrated in the competitive trials. It's only logical to induct it in greater numbers and phase out the tin can.

Russia isn't particularly well known for its quality. I'm not sure what you're trying to get at by bringing in the example of Russia teaching us how to manufacture it.

How? If we cant manufacture it in greater numbers, how can we induct it? This is the part where it becomes "chicken and egg"

It is not good enough for CVRDE to put together a blue print, blue prints are not what get fielded, we need to fix the manufacturing engineering part of the puzzle.

Where are the big orders saar so that we can manufacture in great numbers and induct them ???

Production and quality control is a big pain in the a$$ no matter which country although I agree that we can do much better in this area and we will eventually.

They have shown immense difficulty in even making small numbers of Arjun, with a multiple slippages and delays and long turn around times for defect rectification, and have shown no indication that they can make the even T series without a lot of help.

Some bigger orders that came their way was for T 72 upg package and overhaul contracts.

However, we are forced to accept that from the destoryers at GRSE, to INSAS to Arjun at Avadi, we are being repeatedly let down by OFBs in a nearly criminal manner.

Also the OFBs can not claim that it is a hard problem and therefore not deliver, other countries do, and even if they don't, it does not matter, since they need to fulfill the services requirement.

In the end, the final issue is that the services dont get what they asked for and is promised to them by the the Mil-Ind complex -- with the promised quality and the promised timelines.

The important thing is that they have delivered on Arjun come what may have been the problem in the beginning

The article

Unless the facts don't come out I don't think it's right to blame Avadi.

I can offer no hope or explanation to you on these issue till the system which governs our mil ind complex changes. Until that doesn't happen we will keep crawling like this only.

How? If we cant manufacture it in greater numbers, how can we induct it? This is the part where it becomes "chicken and egg"

The indigenous project to build a Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) is being quietly buried by the army. Instead, the army’s tank directorate has proposed keeping faith with the home grown Arjun tank, while incrementally improving it into the future backbone of the army’s strike forces.

Senior army sources tell Business Standard that the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), which oversees the army’s tank force, has formally proposed that the Arjun be gradually improved through successive models --- Mark II, Mark III, Mark IV and so on --- rather than attempting a major technological leap into the unknown, which is what the FMBT would be.

On Dec 06, 2010, Defence Minister AK Antony had informed parliament that the “FMBT is likely to be developed by the year 2020.” He said the army had already conceptualised its requirements and the DRDO was carrying out a feasibility study.

Now, by consensus between the DRDO and the DGMF, the future of indigenous tank building is to flow from the Arjun. Two Arjun regiments, consisting of 128 tanks, are already in frontline service. And a Mark II version of the Arjun is undergoing trials in Rajasthan. The army has committed to buying 118 Arjun Mark II tanks after trials are successfully concluded.

These orders for just 246 Arjuns are insignificant, complains a senior DRDO official, given that the army fields about 4000 tanks. To evolve the Arjun through successive models, the army would have to operate the tank in larger numbers and cooperate closely with the DRDO. This, says the DRDO official, would require a mindshift amongst senior army generals who tend to favour imports.

Three important realizations drive the DGMF’s new proposal. Firstly, there is growing acceptance of the Arjun, after its strong performance in field trials. Secondly, the need for an industrial “eco-structure” for providing spares and maintenance backup for the Arjuns that are already operating. This would come up only if a viable number of tanks are in service. Finally, the DGMF believes that there are no recent breakthrough technologies in armoured vehicle design, which eliminates the logic for building an entirely new tank.

This DGMF decision not to develop an FMBT stems from the difficulty it faced in drawing up specifications for the new tank. A key hurdle was in reconciling the need for a four-man tank crew (like the Arjun, and unlike Russian tanks that have a three-man crew) with the simultaneous wish for a lighter tank that weighed not more than 50-tonnes. The 60-tonne-plus Arjun has been criticised as too heavy.

Says a key general: “All contemporary three-man-crew tanks weigh 50-tonnes, like those being built by South Korea, Turkey and Japan. Adding a fourth crew member also adds roughly 10-tonnes of weight, due to increase in the tank size and weight of armour. But we were asking for a 50-tonne FMBT that would have a four-man crew. It just didn’t add up.”

Meanwhile, Israel Military Industries (IMI), which provides consultancy to the DRDO on tank design, has advised that the Arjun could be gradually pared down to below 60 tonnes, from the 65 tonnes of the current Arjun Mark II.

In a 2008 seminar, organized by the DGMF, Israeli Major General Yossi Ben-Hanan --- an acclaimed tank designer who fathered Israel’s successful Merkava tank --- told an attentive audience that tank design is evolutionary, each design building upon the previous one. The Israelis began designing their Merkava Mark-1 MBT in 1970; today they have the world class Merkava Mark-4.

The DGMF’s proposal to scrap the FMBT indicates that it has bought into the concept of evolutionary development. The Arjun Mark II, which is currently undergoing field trials in Rajasthan, has 79 improvements over the Mark I that is in service. These include: the ability to fire an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM); a panoramic electro-optical sight for the commander; an improved suspension; and an auxiliary generator for powering the Arjun’s electricals when the main engine is not running.

The army has not responded to an emailed request for comments for this article.

Arjun is a patch work of multiple sources of subsystems and material sources
Like MTU for engine
Gun barrel from Russia
Transmission from Germany

I am perplexed by the above
It just means instead o starting from scratch afresh
Arjun variants are to be made

Natasha only gets strengthend wit this
Because the need is now an derivatives may arrive in future
So lets buy now and make them later

It does not men end of abandon but competition

Arjun is a patch work of multiple sources of subsystems and material sources

Like MTU for engine
Gun barrel from Russia
Transmission from Germany
Armor from Midhami
Etc
Etc

Senior army sources tell Business Standard that the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), which oversees the army’s tank force, has formally proposed that the Arjun be gradually improved through successive models --- Mark II, Mark III, Mark IV and so on --- rather than attempting a major technological leap into the unknown, which is what the FMBT would be.

This is just one article by Shukla. Lets not start dancing in our lungis just yet.

Why would OFB expand infra if they aren't guaranteed orders? "Chicken and the egg" makes no sense.

even a pvt automotive player would be willing to create a assembly line and supply complete modules for OFB to bolt together and slap on the "made in OFB" sticker.

The issues are
1) To show that when in the past they were given large orders for domestic work (such as T 72 Upg) and overhaul they were able to expand infra to do that, esp considering that they have been doing T 72 for donkey's years
2) To show the prototype infra for LSP works as advertised before it can be scaled, there would be no point in scaling a system which does not work will it? So the LSP line for Arjun has to deliver (time, quality, responsiveness) before any one can plan to extending it.

The issues at Avadi are not merely limited to Arjun, they are institutionalized over a large range of product.

The Avadi upg/overhauled T 72s have had accidents like barrel bursts (leading to death of tank crew, including officers)
The Parliamentary committee had come down heavily for the quality culture (in 2004-6 time frame, they would show "ready" Arjun to visiting delegation and as soon as the show was done, pull it back in since the tanks were not working in reality)

These issues need to be fixed. Period.

The same factory makes the T90.... Whats your point? ...

--Ashish