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PostPosted: 08 Jul 2012 23:01 
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The debate in India on integration of armed services and appointment of CDS continues to fester without any end in sight. While the topic came to forefront after Kargil & Parakram, in reality it has been ongoing for decades (Even Air Marshal PC Lal touched upon it in his book).

The most recent example of integration issues is over the control of armed helicopters.

This thread will funnel news & debate on this wide subject.


Last edited by Aditya G on 08 Jul 2012 23:12, edited 2 times in total.

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PostPosted: 08 Jul 2012 23:07 
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Lt Gen Harwant Singh (retd) writes in IDR Issue Vol 24.4 Oct-Dec 2009 (recently posted online):

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... defence/0/

Quote:
...

The clandestine and incognito travel of Tipnis (dressed as Wing Commander) to Srinagar to alert the air elements there for taking part in the Kargil operations merely highlights that the escalation bug had bitten hard. Tipnis notes in the article in Force that, “there was total lack of army–air force joint staff work.” So much for those, who still continue to pitch for Chiefs of Staff Committee systems. Committees cannot fight and win wars.

...

xisting arrangement of Chiefs of Staff Committee with its conflicting views, turf tending and differing recommendations can only confuse the political executive, resulting in delays and dithering that would prove disastrous in the event of grave national emergencies demanding quick responses. The Chiefs of Staff Committee has repeatedly and completely failed to synergise the collective combat potential of various wings of the defence services. The Kargil episode brings out the imperatives of single point of advise to the government from the defence services on national security issues and an authority that can synergise the full potential of the armed forces.

A nuclear and emerging economic power, (in the midst of potentially unstable regimes) with ambitions to exercise influence for the stability and security of the region and to safeguard vital national interests, cannot have an antiquated and potentially dysfunctional decision making and operational system in the defence apparatus. The delay in adopting the CDS system and integration of service headquarters with the MoD could prove very costly to the nation. Existing integration of defence services headquarters with the MoD is a complete farce, in fact a joke and a meaningless exercise.

...


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PostPosted: 09 Jul 2012 00:17 
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Is the defense review board's report in public yet. This issue was central for the board.


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PostPosted: 09 Jul 2012 19:20 
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The last service chief to have spoken about CDS in clear terms was ACM Naik:

http://www.asianage.com/india/naik-no-u ... te-cds-095

Quote:
...

Amid a debate whether a new post of CDS should be created in a bid to create more integration in the armed forces, Mr Naik on Tuesday said it is not going to be “indispensable” for the country and that there is no necessity for this at least for the next five to 10 years.

“Though I am not opposed to the institution of a Chief of Defence Staff, I have doubts about the urgency for having such an institution in India. We need not emulate other countries as our requirements are different”, Mr Naik told reporters.

He was asked to comment on his recent remarks that there would be no need for a Chief of Defence Staff in the near future.
“We have fought several battles in the last five decades and there has been excellent synergy between the various wings of the armed forces. We are also not involved in military expeditions in other countries like the US is in Afghanistan. I don’t think a CDS is going to become indispensable for India, at least not in the next 5-10 years,” he said. —PTI


Why the timeline? Is it related to (development of) our nuclear arsenal?

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_no ... ik_1542227

Quote:
Chairman of chiefs of staff committee, Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, on Wednesday said the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was not acceptable in its present format, and that the concept required national debate and he saw it coming at least 10 years later.

CDS has always been a hotly debated issue within the ministry of defence and the armed forces. It was one of the recommendations of a group of ministers (GoM), post Kargil, when the need for joint-manship and synergy between armed forces was felt, resulting in the Andaman and Nicobar Command on an experimental basis.
...


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PostPosted: 10 Jul 2012 07:56 
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I am posting this here, do not know the future of this thread, but you do not get a more credible set of authorities to opine on defense sector reforms than these gentlemen.

Seems the Naresh Chandra Committee report is not public yet.

A Call for Change: Higher Defence Management in India - BD Jayal, VP Malik, Anit Mukherjee and Arun Prakash


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PostPosted: 10 Jul 2012 12:24 
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An article was published in Indian Defense Review (IDR) in 1999, which was re-published here on Bharat-Rakshak in 2000. A discussion also took place which I think was not archived.

It is an interesting exercise to compare the actions outlined in that article and the changes that have taken place since then in higher defense management here in India.


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PostPosted: 10 Jul 2012 19:28 
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The reason for the need of the Naresh Chandra committee was because the last such recommendations were from the Kargil Review Committee, which did recommend the post of a CDS. This has not been executed upon yet. There is a general acceptance that the KRC implementations made so far have not resulted in significant material changes in higher defense management and hence a new review. We shall see, what comes of it. The last specific defense review was by Arun Singh in early 90's. The Arun Singh report is still classified.


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PostPosted: 10 Jul 2012 22:35 
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The article I am talking about was written by yours truly.


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PostPosted: 22 Jul 2012 14:29 
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This is the second part of Lt Gen Harwant Singh's article about lack of proper IAF support during Kargil war, again worth a read:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/kargil-controversy-army-pinpoints-iaf-failures/

This is Air Marshal RS Bedi's response to the above article and the mud slinging is very disheartening. Portends real lack of synergy and sorry state of affairs:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/kargil-controversy-an-iaf-response/

Wanted to highlight a section from the above article:
Quote:
Here it must be conceded that the air force was indeed faced with a nebulous task of engaging targets at heights ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 ft. Reduced air density has adverse effect on the aerodynamics of the aircraft and the weapons. Even the engine combustion and on board computers do not conform to normal behaviour. The aircraft as a weapon system does not perform to the specifications. Having realised the challenge, the air force did not take long to recover from this consternation and meet the seemingly impossible task. Understandably, it took some time before honing the skills and becoming effective. Type of aircraft, weapons and the delivery mode were all modified and adjusted to match the target environment. But to quote my article in Hindustan Times to suggest that in the light of the above, the air force was not prepared to support the army is nothing but twisting the logic to prove a point. It was the unusual nature of the task that had the air force contemplating and not its incapability or the reluctance as has been implied.

The IAF doesn't practice high altitude warfare? Why this sudden shock on their part when most of the borders of India are at high altitudes only.

Quote:
It’s a well known secret that the government took the decision unilaterally and merely informed the service chiefs around May, 16 or 17. Knowing the politico-bureaucratic penchant for keeping the armed forces out of the loop did not surprise the chiefs. And that perhaps restrained them from approaching the government for review of its decision, despite severe handicap of terrain and the nature. No nation in the world displays such disregard towards loss of human life as we do in this country.

The political leadership takes war decisions on its own and the service cheifs exercise restraint, and don't have or want any say in the matter?

Quote:
The allegation that “IAF had long contended that the use of air power in direct support of ground battle is its most inefficient utilisation” is right perhaps but it seemed to have been forgotten that the army in its zest to acquire armed helicopters gave a commitment to the air force that it would not ask for close air support from the air force in the future. Taking the army’s commitment seriously, the air force cut short close air support training of its fighter pilots which was subsequently stopped altogether by the successor CAS.

Also at one time, when the army was in the process of enhancing its force level, the IAF too projected the matching increase in the strength of fighter squadrons for the purpose of providing close air support to the additional newly raised army Divisions. The MOD referred the case to the army which did not support IAF’s case. One can only wonder at the wisdom of the powers that be then.


The above part is really confusing, as the Army is yet to get armed helicopters and IAF has ceased training its pilots for close air support in apprehension for the future. Also, in the second part, they want more air assets citing reasons of close air support. Really shows the pathetic state of close air support and why the Army is pinning for armed air assets.

Overall was a disheartening read, if the response to aggression is so timid, no wonder the enemy doesn't dither from attacking again and again even being inferior. Some heads need to roll seriously for this.

Quote:
No nation in the world displays such disregard towards loss of human life as we do in this country.

The thing I have been talking about all this time. :(


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PostPosted: 22 Jul 2012 16:59 
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Ivanev wrote:
This is the second part of Lt Gen Harwant Singh's article about lack of proper IAF support during Kargil war, again worth a read:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/kargil-controversy-army-pinpoints-iaf-failures/

This is Air Marshal RS Bedi's response to the above article and the mud slinging is very disheartening. Portends real lack of synergy and sorry state of affairs:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/kargil-controversy-an-iaf-response/

Wanted to highlight a section from the above article:
Quote:
Here it must be conceded that the air force was indeed faced with a nebulous task of engaging targets at heights ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 ft. Reduced air density has adverse effect on the aerodynamics of the aircraft and the weapons. Even the engine combustion and on board computers do not conform to normal behaviour. The aircraft as a weapon system does not perform to the specifications. Having realised the challenge, the air force did not take long to recover from this consternation and meet the seemingly impossible task. Understandably, it took some time before honing the skills and becoming effective. Type of aircraft, weapons and the delivery mode were all modified and adjusted to match the target environment. But to quote my article in Hindustan Times to suggest that in the light of the above, the air force was not prepared to support the army is nothing but twisting the logic to prove a point. It was the unusual nature of the task that had the air force contemplating and not its incapability or the reluctance as has been implied.

The IAF doesn't practice high altitude warfare? Why this sudden shock on their part when most of the borders of India are at high altitudes only.

Quote:
It’s a well known secret that the government took the decision unilaterally and merely informed the service chiefs around May, 16 or 17. Knowing the politico-bureaucratic penchant for keeping the armed forces out of the loop did not surprise the chiefs. And that perhaps restrained them from approaching the government for review of its decision, despite severe handicap of terrain and the nature. No nation in the world displays such disregard towards loss of human life as we do in this country.

The political leadership takes war decisions on its own and the service cheifs exercise restraint, and don't have or want any say in the matter?

Quote:
The allegation that “IAF had long contended that the use of air power in direct support of ground battle is its most inefficient utilisation” is right perhaps but it seemed to have been forgotten that the army in its zest to acquire armed helicopters gave a commitment to the air force that it would not ask for close air support from the air force in the future. Taking the army’s commitment seriously, the air force cut short close air support training of its fighter pilots which was subsequently stopped altogether by the successor CAS.

Also at one time, when the army was in the process of enhancing its force level, the IAF too projected the matching increase in the strength of fighter squadrons for the purpose of providing close air support to the additional newly raised army Divisions. The MOD referred the case to the army which did not support IAF’s case. One can only wonder at the wisdom of the powers that be then.


The above part is really confusing, as the Army is yet to get armed helicopters and IAF has ceased training its pilots for close air support in apprehension for the future. Also, in the second part, they want more air assets citing reasons of close air support. Really shows the pathetic state of close air support and why the Army is pinning for armed air assets.

Overall was a disheartening read, if the response to aggression is so timid, no wonder the enemy doesn't dither from attacking again and again even being inferior. Some heads need to roll seriously for this.

Quote:
No nation in the world displays such disregard towards loss of human life as we do in this country.

The thing I have been talking about all this time. :(


Sometimes i really wonder if some of our senior forces guys would appear more credible if togged out in paki army uniforms?

The IAF has been the main kabab mein haddi for the Joint Chief's issue for the longest time.


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PostPosted: 25 Jul 2012 08:13 
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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 133911.cms

Quote:
...

The committee's suggestions for the military — details of which have been accessed by TOI — also buries the proposal for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the single point military adviser to the government. Instead, it has recommended that a permanent Chairman Chiefs Of Staff Committee be appointed from among the three service chiefs, allowing India to have four four-star generals.

..


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PostPosted: 02 Aug 2012 19:45 
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Permanent Chairman or CDS

Quote:
CDS / Permanent Chairman of COSC are not the panacea for required politico-military connect. Military advisory cells (comprising serving and veteran military officers) should be established with the Prime Minister, External Affairs Minister, Defence Minister, Home Minister and NSA, which could be headed by two-three star level officers. CDS / Permanent Chairman of COSC and Service Chiefs should be permanent members of the CCS. Serving and veteran military officers should form part of NSCS and NSAB. Full integration of HQ IDS with MoD duly interfaced with MEA and MHA should be ensured.

As for RMA, there have been suggestions that only an Act of Parliament like the Goldwater Nichols Act / Berlin Decree or the political leadership can break usher it. It is difficult to identify a political leader who can push for this especially where bureaucratic advice is lacking. The fact is that bbureaucratic inertia prevents implementing even recommendations of various committee reports. Government being lackadaisical, the onus falls on bureaucracy that is not organized to think strategically, prefers isolation and uninterested in wider knowledge base. Therefore, the military must work double time to convince powers that be.

The author is a veteran Lieutenant General of the Indian Army


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PostPosted: 02 Aug 2012 19:47 
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Streamlining defence

Quote:
The Task Force on National Security has submitted its report to the government. Cleverly, it has recommended the appointment of a fourth four-star officer as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOS), with the three service chiefs as members alongside. This gets around the tricky problem of a five-star rank officer as Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), out-ranking, and, therefore, lording it over the three services chiefs. In theory, the service chiefs would be free to disagree with the chairman, but, with the Integrated Defence Staff and the Strategic Forces Command, with nuclear weapons under its control, reporting to CCOS, what the military will, in effect, have is a CDS by another name. Together with recommendations to establish a desperately needed Special Forces Command controlling the Army paratroopers and para-commando, the Navy’s marine commando, and the IAF’s Garud detachments, a genuine integration of the acquisition process, and commonality of all logistics structures across the three services — except for the operational logistics arms that will stay with the services, and which reform is, presumably, a precursor to a separate and unified Logistics Command — some organisational transformation may finally get underway.

Actually the Task Force has had a wide scope. It has, for instance, suggested separating the posts of the head of DRDO and science adviser to defence minister to avoid a conflict of interest. After all, one of the reasons for DRDO getting its way all these years without delivering performance commensurate with financial investments in its projects is because the same person overseeing DRDO projects also tells the defence minister about the indigenous projects to prioritise and fund. What is proposed, instead, is a National Technology Council chaired by the defence minister that will include a representative of not just the Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) but also of the budding private sector defence industry. This will even out the playing field somewhat, depending on whether the defence minister prevents the combined megaphone of DPSUs and the Department of Defence Production from drowning out the voice of the private sector.

Also mooted is a scheme for cross-postings of military officers in the ministry of external affairs at many levels, including as joint secretaries, the creation of a bureau of political-military affairs, endowing the Vice- Chiefs of Staff of the three armed services with financial powers akin to that of the defence secretary, and posting of a Major-General-rank officer or equivalent from Navy or Air Force as additional secretary in the ministry of defence (MoD). Further, the Task Force has advised drafting a National Security Doctrine (NSD), and for each of the services to configure their separate service doctrines in line with the NSD.

But the government in its wisdom made the Task Force’s report and recommendations run the gauntlet of inter-ministerial process of consultation. A decade ago the recommendation for a CDS by the Committee on Higher Defence Organisation chaired by K.C. Pant was killed by a similar process. This time around though, the inter-ministerial process is sought to be constrained and time-bound. The concerned ministries whose reactions are being elicited — with the response of the MoD carrying the most weight — are required to furnish detailed explanations for opposing any of the Task Force’s recommendations. And all the reactions are to be submitted to the Prime Minister’s Office within three months.
The Cabinet Committee on Security will then be convened to weigh the Task Force’s recommendations in the light of MoD’s formal reactions, should these differ, and approve, amend, or turn down each recommendation in turn. With Cabinet approval in hand, the recommendations are expected to be swiftly implemented.

The fact that the consultative process is not an open-ended, time wasting, bureaucratic obstacle race, and that no individual armed service or ministry can veto the Task Force’s recommendations, is at once the main innovation and a relief this time around.


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PostPosted: 02 Aug 2012 19:49 
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Can we relabel this thread to higher defense management or something appropriate. Feel we have a need for such a thread. Thanks.


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PostPosted: 04 Aug 2012 06:04 
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Why dont we rename it Naresh Chandra Panel Recommendations and we can debate them here.


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PostPosted: 04 Aug 2012 06:05 
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X-posted...
Blog report discussing the Naresh Chandra panel recommendations;

Task Force to recommend Chairman Chiefs of Staff

I guess its a twist on the idea of CDS to deflect IAF's permanent grouse.

Quote:
Task Force to recommend permanent head, Chiefs of Staff Committee

The Report of the Task Force on National Security, headed by former cabinet secretary Naresh Chandra is the result of the first-ever focused exercise since the Kargil Review Committee, headed by the late K Subrahmanyam, of 10 years ago. After that no such holistic review of all aspects of national security was taken up.

Naresh Chandra's report is a significant intellectual work undertaken by the UPA government, and will leave behind how it views national security in the post - NDA. The Naresh Chandra committee had intelligence experts like PC Haldar, former chief of IB, KC Verma, former chief of R&AW, and former NIA chief Radha Vinod Raju. It also had former defence officers like Adm Arun Prakash, Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy, and former DGMO Lt Gen VR Raghavan, apart from bureaucrats like Brajeshwar Singh and Vinod K Duggal. Suman K Berry, director, National Council of Applied Economic Research, senior journalist Manoj Joshi, former Mumbai police commissioner D Sivanandan, former diplomat G Parthasarathy, former chief of Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar were also part of the Task Force. B Raman, strategic expert and former intelligence officer with R&AW, was advisor to Naresh Chandra.

The Task Force report will be judged on the basis of its recommendations in the area of better management of defence forces and security set-up. It must bring in new ideas to improve the intelligence set-up and show ways to improve the national security apparatus dealing with internal issues. Naresh Chandra's Task Force had a few sub-committees that dealt with internal security, defence-related and intelligence-related issues.

As per Rahul Bedi, India's well-known expert on defence-related issues, "Drastic changes need to be made to resolve the many fault-lines plaguing the military. But the Task Force recommendations need to be implemented swiftly and sincerely for these problems to be resolved." Bedi added, "What is urgently required is the equivalent of the Chief of Defence Staff or permanent chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is likely to be recommended by the Task Force to the government." The issue is highly sensitive and the chiefs of Navy and Air Force are against any such move. Bedi further said, "It is expected that the Task Force will introduce the provision of theatre command for greater efficiency, better financial economy and technical joint-ness of all three forces."

There are also apprehensions about the Task Force's suggestions not being accepted or not being implemented. Soon after the Kargil conflict of 1999, the then government had set up the Kargil Review Committee whose recommendations were reviewed by the GoM in 2000-01. With the help of four task forces, this GoM made 350 recommendations, several of which were accepted by the government and implemented, but over the years the speed of implementation of reforms has died down.

The DIA and NTRO were created after a comprehensive review of national security then. The most significant issue will be to see if the government is serious in responding to the suggestions made by the Task Force, like creating the post of a permanent chairman, chiefs of staff committee, or creating an entry point for uniformed officers at higher levels in the ministry of defence, and sending civilian officers to the defence forces headquarters.

Panel recommends military preparedness to deal with 'assertive’ China
Josy JosephJosy Joseph,TNN , 25 Jul, 2012

NEW DELHI: India has to be prepared militarily to deal with an "assertive" China even as it seeks to build bridges of cooperation with Beijing, the Naresh Chandra Task Force on national security has recommended.

The committee's suggestions for the military — details of which have been accessed by TOI — also buries the proposal for a CDS, the single point military adviser to the government. Instead, it has recommended that a permanent Chairman Chiefs Of Staff Committee be appointed from among the three service chiefs, allowing India to have four four-star generals.

The panel has given a set of recommendations for reforming the national security architecture, covering both intelligence and military apparatus, as part of its mandate to review it.

It has recommended a re-look at the process of blacklisting truant defence firms, separating the post of DRDO chief and SA to the RM, appointing military officers up to the rank of joint secretary in the MoD, creating new Special Forces Command etc. The recommendations of the panel are being studied by individual services and agencies that would be affected by the changes. Their responses are expected to be with the government over the next few weeks.

While conceding that there has been improvement in Sino-Indian relations in recent years, the report has conceded that it is "still clouded in mistrust". The committee, headed by the former cabinet secretary, says, "There is concern about China's policy of "containment" of India, marked by growing Chinese interest in countries of South Asia. China will continue to utilize Pakistan as part of its grand strategy for containing India in a "South Asian box". "China's growing assertiveness on the border and in its territorial claims on Arunachal Pradesh has intensified misgivings," the committee says. "The crucial concern is whether China will become militarily more assertive and nationalistic as its economic and military power grows, or whether it will abide by the policies advocated by Deng Xiao Ping," the report says. More importantly, across Asia there is concern that as Beijing grows "the US will become more circumspect and accommodating in dealing with China," the panel says. The committee has recommended that the government take an immediate decision on the existing recommendation that the Army be given management of Sino-Indian borders, and retain operational control over forces deployed in the areas.

On Pakistan, the committee suggests that it "remains both unable and unwilling to set its house in order, or put in place economic policies that can increase or sustain growth". And there is "nothing to suggest that the Pakistani military has given up the use of radical Islamic groups to promote terrorism in both India and Afghanistan." But its biggest concern is Pakistan's ambition to use Afghanistan for strategic depth. The panel has recommended that India "should spare no effort, politically, diplomatically, economically and through military assistance to ensure that Pakistani efforts to convert Afghanistan into an extremist run, pliant and client state are frustrated".

Calling for better coordination between the MoD and MEA, the panel recommends that the MoD set up a bureau of politico-military affairs. "The primary role of this Bureau would be liaison with the MEA on issues and actions having foreign policy applications," the committee says. It has recommended that MEA affairs also consider accepting officials from civil services and armed forces on short duration (five years) deputations.

Set up agency to steer defence R&D, recommends Task Force on national security

NEW DELHI: The Naresh Chandra Task Force on national security has recommended that the chief of the DRDO should not be the SA to the RM. In a statement of its no-confidence in DRDO, the panel has suggested the setting up of a new agency for steering futuristic military research.

The committee has recommended the setting up of an Advanced Projects Agency (APA) to undertake high-risk futuristic military research. The APA must be chaired by the SA to RM, it says. "This institution's aim will be akin, though not necessarily identical to China's 863 programme, or the work of DARPA in the US," the report says. :mrgreen:

The APA will "identify, fund and guide cutting edge projects relating to the country's futuristic security requirements. The SA must be assisted by UGC chairman, DG of CSIR, director of BARC and the heads of TIFR and IISc, Bangalore. According to the committee, APA would fund research in institutions like IITs, universities and private laboratories. "The APA will not be involved with DRDO, though it will encourage collaboration between the organisation and the sectors it funds," it says.

On separating the post of DRDO chief and SA to RM, the report says, "The task force recommends that two independent officers should hold the appointments. One as DG, DRDO and secretary, Defence R&D and the other as SA to RM."


"The SA to RM should focus on futuristic requirements of India's defence and strategic needs, while the DG DRDO must assume responsibility for managing the DRDO's laboratories and research centres and ensuring the on-time delivery of projects undertaken there," it adds. The panel has decried the failure of the defence technology and industrial base to deliver "badly-needed capabilities to the armed forces".

It has also recommended the setting up of a sub-group on defence technology, comprising representatives of DRDO, military, private sector, academia, military and other stakeholders. The group will make programme to reach targets in developing indigenous design and development capability, besides auditing the performance of DRDO and DPSUs for their performance and accountability.

{This means no confidence in the CAG too. Also is this the Planning commission by another name?}

Panel concerned at defence readiness
Fri, 27 Jul 2012 | Gautam Datt, Mail Today

New Delhi: The fighting capabilities of the armed forces continue to remain a serious cause of concern as the task force appointed by the government on national security has claimed it was given "disturbing details of operational shortcomings".

The Naresh Chandra panel, in its report to the government recently, has noted that at the moment no system exists through which the political leadership is given a comprehensive exposure on joint forces operational capabilities, sources said.

The panel carried out the second scrutiny of the security structure after the Kargil War, the first being the Kargil Review Committee of 2001 whose recommendations itself have only been partially implemented.

In its recommendations, the Naresh Chadra panel wants a defence operational status report to be prepared annually. Sources said the panel has advocated that the cabinet panel on security should be informed on the preparedness on the basis of the operational status report. This report should be prepared by chairman chiefs of staff committee, the sources added. The aim of such a move is to ensure that the defence minister is aware of the exact picture of battle preparedness of the armed forces.

The panel also suggested streamlining of the Special Forces. It has recommended a separate command structure under the chairman chiefs of staff committee.[/b] It envisages a wide range of role for special forces including dealing with foreign backed proxy wars and combat search and rescue operation or handling hostage crisis. The panel stressed on integrated Special Forces of the three forces which are working independently at the moment.



Also read my old article in BRM on What Next?

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... amana.html

Indian interests in Afghanistan

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... amana.html

Challenge of China

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/I ... amana.html


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PostPosted: 04 Aug 2012 12:49 
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CCOS seems like a workable India ... given the minimum delta from current setup.

What are the forces that he could command directly?

- ANC
- SFC
- 50th Para (I) Bde
- Special Operations Command
- Amphibious Division

I believe ANC already reports to CoSC


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PostPosted: 04 Aug 2012 19:49 
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Aditya G wrote:
CCOS seems like a workable India ... given the minimum delta from current setup.

What are the forces that he could command directly?

- ANC
- SFC
- 50th Para (I) Bde
- Special Operations Command
- Amphibious Division

I believe ANC already reports to CoSC
I am afraid this one more four star general, is just the inability of politicians to be able to cut through the vested interests of various stake holders from MoD, DRDO, DPSU and the three services. We needs some serious integration from policy level down on ALL matters to become a modern force.

CoSC as of now essentially has SFC in its effective control, as CoSC is part of NCA structure. ANC is joint only in name, has no teeth. New things like Special forces Command cannot be on its own completely, can it?, a new intelligence council and so forth may go to this permanent CoSC, however there are many things such as theater commands, intra-service rivalries (example lead on rotary assets), standards for communications and integration, the ability to provide a unified view to the government on behalf of ALL of the military would be missing from such a post. Maybe this is the best, our establishment can get done at this time.

I do not blame anyone else but the weakness of our government to achieve this end result. Fairly weak and disappointed. Hope we get more concrete information for the report is unlikely to be ever made public.

The presence of so many IB, RAW and home ministry type of people in such a task force leads to be certain type of mindset to retain bureaucratic control of the forces, which is at the heart of the matter.

Need some fundamental changes in DRDO itself, do not know, if it was in the remit of the task force to do so.


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PostPosted: 06 Aug 2012 03:04 
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http://www.asianage.com/columnists/stre ... efence-991



THE ASIAN AGE

Streamlining defence

Aug 02, 2012


Description: bharat karnad1_0.JPG

Bharat Karnad

When talking to uniformed officers in higher military training institutions and forums, I try to emphasise the perils of an industrial age military. The country has far to go to get anywhere near the technologically-efficient, cyber-savvy, 21st-century modern armed forces of the world.

By this measure the United States military, on a scale of one to 10, scores 10. The next most proficient armed services in terms of being operationally networked with modern weapons is the British military, scoring seven. The Indian armed services, by this reckoning, rate a miserable two or less.

We are lucky that the minor foe the Indian military considers its chief adversary and is most prepared to fight — Pakistan — has armed forces on par with our own, quality-wise. It is the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), however, that in bulk may resemble its Indian counterpart, but is undergoing transformation. Because anything the Chinese undertake to do they do with thoroughness, strategic foresight and speed, the PLA, with rapid modernisation underway, expects to get near enough to the US’ standard of military proficiency by 2035, give or take five years. The danger is real, in the event, that the Indian military will be left so far behind, that inside of 15 years it may be reduced to near impotence in hostilities involving the PLA.

That the country is stuck with a military that apparently cannot think straight is in part because there is so little meaningful strategic thinking being done by the uniformed brass when making force planning and acquisition decisions. Modernising, for example, is just another word for a series of programmes to replace one-for-one weapon systems already in the employ of the various combat arms.

This sad state of affairs persists because there is no single officer in the military tasked with the responsibility for creating an integrated force. Thus, the three armed services are on different wavelengths and time-tables to achieve intra-service connectivity, for instance, without any regard to connecting with each other. Hence, the Air Force claims it will be on a comprehensive communications grid by 2015, the Navy is almost there, while the Army still has far to go.

The Task Force on National Security has submitted its report to the government. Cleverly, it has recommended the appointment of a fourth four-star officer as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOS), with the three service chiefs as members alongside. This gets around the tricky problem of a five-star rank officer as Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), out-ranking, and, therefore, lording it over the three services chiefs. In theory, the service chiefs would be free to disagree with the chairman, but, with the Integrated Defence Staff and the Strategic Forces Command, with nuclear weapons under its control, reporting to CCOS, what the military will, in effect, have is a CDS by another name. Together with recommendations to establish a desperately needed Special Forces Command controlling the Army paratroopers and para-commando, the Navy’s marine commando, and the IAF’s Garud detachments, a genuine integration of the acquisition process, and commonality of all logistics structures across the three services — except for the operational logistics arms that will stay with the services, and which reform is, presumably, a precursor to a separate and unified Logistics Command — some organisational transformation may finally get underway.

Actually the Task Force has had a wide scope. It has, for instance, suggested separating the posts of the head of DRDO and science adviser to defence minister to avoid a conflict of interest. After all, one of the reasons for DRDO getting its way all these years without delivering performance commensurate with financial investments in its projects is because the same person overseeing DRDO projects also tells the defence minister about the indigenous projects to prioritise and fund. What is proposed, instead, is a National Technology Council chaired by the defence minister that will include a representative of not just the Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) but also of the budding private sector defence industry. This will even out the playing field somewhat, depending on whether the defence minister prevents the combined megaphone of DPSUs and the Department of Defence Production from drowning out the voice of the private sector.

Also mooted is a scheme for cross-postings of military officers in the ministry of external affairs at many levels, including as joint secretaries, the creation of a bureau of political-military affairs, endowing the Vice- Chiefs of Staff of the three armed services with financial powers akin to that of the defence secretary, and posting of a Major-General-rank officer or equivalent from Navy or Air Force as additional secretary in the ministry of defence (MoD). Further, the Task Force has advised drafting a National Security Doctrine (NSD), and for each of the services to configure their separate service doctrines in line with the NSD.

But the government in its wisdom made the Task Force’s report and recommendations run the gauntlet of inter-ministerial process of consultation. A decade ago the recommendation for a CDS by the Committee on Higher Defence Organisation chaired by K.C. Pant was killed by a similar process. This time around though, the inter-ministerial process is sought to be constrained and time-bound. The concerned ministries whose reactions are being elicited — with the response of the MoD carrying the most weight — are required to furnish detailed explanations for opposing any of the Task Force’s recommendations. And all the reactions are to be submitted to the Prime Minister’s Office within three months.

The Cabinet Committee on Security will then be convened to weigh the Task Force’s recommendations in the light of MoD’s formal reactions, should these differ, and approve, amend, or turn down each recommendation in turn. With Cabinet approval in hand, the recommendations are expected to be swiftly implemented.

The fact that the consultative process is not an open-ended, time wasting, bureaucratic obstacle race, and that no individual armed service or ministry can veto the Task Force’s recommendations, is at once the main innovation and a relief this time around.

The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi


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PostPosted: 16 Aug 2012 19:53 
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MN Kumar wrote:
Couldnt find an appropriate thread for this:
INS: Indian Nuclear Service by Bharat Karnad

Quote:
The Task Force on National Security, chaired by Naresh Chandra, the all-purpose bureaucrat, had an open-ended brief. The one area, however, the Task Force was expressly told to keep off by the National Security Adviser related to the country’s nuclear deterrent in all its aspects. This may be because the Manmohan Singh regime is intent on leaving a legacy — a spruced-up nuclear secretariat — and it didn’t want the Task Force to muck around, disturbing and complicating the efforts already underway with its recommendations. The former Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command (SFC), Lt. Gen. B.S. Nagal, was hired after his retirement to, in effect, fashion in the PMO an Indian version of the professional and effective Pakistani nuclear secretariat — Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Chaklala.

What Lt. Gen. Nagal picked up about nuclear strategic issues during his tenure at SFC is hard to say. As an infantry officer (Jat Regiment), he has left no paper trail in terms of articles in professional journals, etc. to betray his thinking, certainly nothing on strategic subjects. Then again, may be he was selected because of the PMO’s confidence that he would implement plans it had chalked out.

Actually, as I have argued in my books and other writings, Pakistan SPD’s professionalism and competence in nuclear strategic matters is principally the result of painstaking and rigorous efforts over a long period of time to seed and nurture a force manned by a specialist cadre, and this is no bad thing for our SFC and the nuclear cell in the PMO to emulate. It will be an improvement on what presently exists. The capacity for deterrence heuristics requires considerable acquaintance with nuclear deterrence history and practice, enabling the SFC and the PMO nuclear cell to give the intellectual lead in shaping nuclear strategy.

The central point about the success of the SPD and every other nuclear force is that the nuclear secretariat is run by a corps of officers with real expertise — top to bottom — who are recruited after intensive tests and psychological profiling. In a recent book, Vice-Admiral Verghese Koithara (retd) delves into some of the complexities of operationalising the nuclear arsenal and refers to appropriate “socialisation” of the personnel involved without, however, once mentioning the need for a dedicated nuclear officer cadre. Such a body of officers is at the core of professionalising the nuclear forces.

Indeed, without a specialist cadre that is fully versed and immersed in all aspects of nuclear deterrence — from designs of nuclear weapons and missiles to conceiving and designing command and control networks, from nuances in deterrence theory to practical problems of mobility, and from nuclear forensics to technology for secure command links — the country will be stuck with what we have: a Strategic Forces Command with military officers on its rolls who are professionals in conventional warfare but rank amateurs in the nuclear field. They have to perforce learn on the job, only for such learning to go waste once their three-year term ends, and they are posted elsewhere. Appointments at all SFC levels are considered by the regular military officers as posting to be ticked before returning to the parent service. This is not how a professional SFC is obtained.

And yet such a strategic force leadership is an absolute imperative. The lack of nuclear specialists in SFC ranks should concern the military but apparently it doesn’t. Most uniformed officers are contemptuous of IAS officers looking after child and family welfare one day, rural electrification the next, and on the third day landing up as defence secretary with not a clue and nothing to recommend such posting other than their ability to negotiate the bureaucratic maze of regulations and rules of business. This is no different from the SFC staffing pattern. Conventional military officers manning the SFC come into the Command with minimal familiarity on nuclear issues.

On nuclear security matters, everybody in and out of uniform seems to have an opinion. It is the mark of a generalist culture which pervades the military as well, and is the reason why it will be difficult to wean the conventional military services away from the system of rotational postings in the SFC. Nuclear security discipline-specialisation can happen only if a “nuclear forces” option is made available to newly minted officers at the NDA stage with a follow-on course before commissioning exclusively into the SFC.

We will know soon enough what Lt. Gen. Nagal has been up to at the PMO. But whatever he is doing, it wouldn’t have hurt to have the Task Force on National Security report on nuclear forces. Much of what the Task Force has recommended in the conventional military sphere seems reasonable and, even though there was no nuclear security-knowledgeable person as such in the group, it would have been useful to juxtapose their thoughts on the restructuring and functioning of the SFC with what the PMO is doing to revamp nuclear command and control systems.

The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.


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PostPosted: 04 Sep 2012 09:18 
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An Indian Marine Corps ? -- Prakash Katoch

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Did ancient India have a Marine Corps? Yes, it did. Considering that aircraft and helicopters were not on the scene in medieval India other than in epics of Ramayan and Mahabharat, the Navy or rather ‘Naval Infantry’ of the Chola Empire could well be classified as the Marine Corps of that period. Historical records actually mention of Chola Navy having a core of Marines including trained saboteurs who were trained pearl-fishermen employed for diving and disabling enemy vessels by destroying / damaging the rudder. The Imperial navy of medieval Cholas was composed of a multitude of forces in its command. In addition to the regular navy, there were many auxiliary forces that could be used in naval combat. Chola Navy had the capacity to establish beachheads and or reinforce the Army when required. Expeditionary voyages of the Chola Navy were accompanied with other naval arms of ancient India. Chola Navy played a vital role in the conquest of then Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Bengal and present day Indonesia. The array of Hindu temples built in South East Asia stand witness to exploits of the Chola Navy.

As per recorded history, Chola Admirals commanded much respect and prestige in the society, even acting as diplomats in some instances. From 900 CE to 1100 CE, the Chola Navy had grown from a small backwater entity to that of a potent power projection and diplomatic symbol in all of Asia. The early Chola naval ships are known to have rudimentary flame-throwers and catapult type weapons but at the height of power of the Chola Dynasty (985-1014 CE) the Cholas incorporated foreigners, mainly Arabs and Chinese, in their naval ship building program and developed modern combat ships of that era that gave them blue water capability. What is more significant is the organization and classic employment of Naval Infantry in Chola conquests in foreign lands. Chola Navy was thus effectively employed for securing beachheads, against sea pirates, protection of SLOCs, trade commerce and diplomacy, extending Chola influence to China and Southeast Asia. The Tang dynasty of China, the Srivijaya Empire in the Malayan archipelago (now Indonesia) and the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad were their main trading partners.

Ironically, India has been slow in learning lessons from past history. That is the reason we never drew strategic value from recorded history of the Chola Navy and neglected our Navy in the initial years after independence. In fact, the military as a whole was neglected despite the 1947-1948 war with Pakistan till we were shamed in the 1962 Sino-India war. In the utopian fallacy of everlasting peace, we could not recognize the fact that on the high seas lay the country’s hopes, even ignoring the words of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan who said in 1897, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean, will dominate Asia. This ocean will be the key to the seven seas in the 21st Century. The destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.” However, over the years the importance of the sea has dawned to some extent, egged on by the fact that 97 percent of our trade is by sea, presence of foreign navies in the area, expanding arc of Somali piracy and above all Chinese strategic designs in IOR including their port building activities in countries like Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Seychelles. In 2008 a senior Chinese naval officer had suggested that China and the US should divide the Pacific Ocean; China to keep western half and the Indian Ocean and the US to keep the Eastern half from Hawaii.

The establishment of Baaz, a new maritime-cum-air base at Campbell Bay in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is a strategically sound step considering proximity of the base from the Malacca straits and Indonesia - strategically overlooking the mouth of Malacca Straits and across Aceh in Indonesia. Baaz will significantly increase India's strategic reach in the region, considering Campbell Bay is about 300 nautical miles from Carnic – a major forward operating base of India Navy on the southeastern fringe of mainland India. Considering the expanding arc of Somali piracy and threat to SLOCs, India should also open strategic dialogue with countries like Maldives, Mauritius and Indian Ocean Rim countries for establishing joint anti-piracy facilities.

When the Kargil Review Committee and the GoP were recommending establishment of an ANC (Andaman & Nicobar Command) they surely did not have a toothless organization like the one in the present shape – looking over the shoulder at mainland India for troops despite an enormous area of responsibility. What needs to be added to strengthen India’s strategic muscle is a Marine Corps. Ironically, the Indian Navy’s case for raising of a Marine Brigade has been languishing with MoD for over a decade now, without headway for lack of strategic thought an absence of requisite politico-military connect. Establishment of a full fledged Marine Corps as part of an Integrated Commando Command (ICC) and locating the Marines in the area of responsibility of ANC needs to be given due consideration. This will assist the ANC and dilute to some extent the present disadvantage of the ANC looking to the mainland for troops that may be unworkable in the emerging strategic environment given ANC’s vast regional responsibility and possibilities of the IOR heating up. Why do we need Marines – simply because they have a different mission and they are designed for flexibility and speed as opposed to more conventional forces meant for protracted engagement, mass action and holding ground. 21st Century requirements clearly establish the need for expeditionary forces in the three Services. The Marines should be configured as a self-contained military, with sea, land and air elements and as part of their tasking also to take land from the sea, as naval infantry. The requirement is to have a smaller, more agile organization with a specific mission and training, designed for short engagements rather than open-ended campaigns – an organization with flexibility in the short term, with specialists who can always step down and execute generally when required. That would also relieve some of the pressure on the Army’s Infantry facing problems of turnover especially in counter insurgency areas, particularly by infantry regiments responsible for contributing manpower to Rashtriya Rifles units.

The author is a veteran Lieutenant General of the Indian Army


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PostPosted: 14 Sep 2012 23:49 
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Posting here - else, it has to go to all three threads for each of the services.
Firepower India 2012
Quote:
Keynote Address – Lt Gen Ramesh Halgali, AVSM, SM, DCOAS (IS&T)

An integrated space cell can be established at HQ IDS to streamline flow of communications, surveillance, Electronic Warfare, Signals intelligence and Meteorological data. The IRS satellites could serve a dual purpose by supporting both meteorological applications and military surveillance. Integrated military mobile communication systems should also be developed.
The way ahead is to enter into Joint Ventures, Buy and Make, fast track our own R&D by harnessing existing capabilities. It is imperative to achieve supremacy in all kinds of warfare.

Opening Remarks by Chairperson – Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, former Director CLAWS

In recent years, Pakistan is investing heavily towards the development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs). The Pakistani thought process is governed by the assumption that the threshold of use is lowered due to low yield and ability to cause fewer casualties. But the world community is aware of the pitfalls of such a mindset and there is a realisation that Pakistan‘s quest for TNWs must be stopped.

Ballistic Missiles of Pakistan and China – Emerging Threats: Dr Manpreet Sethi, Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi

It has acquired both MIRVed and MARVed capabilities. Missile tests are carried out for design validation, for operational purposes and training with mobile missile units.

China‘s conventionally tipped missiles are under the operational control of SAC. It can exploit ambiguity for deterrence and cause huge psychological impact.
Pakistan‘s motivation for developing Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) lies in its Cold Start strategy. The message it intends to give out is – ―not only will I use the weapon first but also get away with the use‖. It has a large enough arsenal for disarming first strike and small enough strike to remain under adversary‘s threshold of retaliation. It aims to send out a political message and not display military effectiveness – display of brinkmanship.

Emerging BMD Technologies Embracing Space Frontiers and India's Future
– Lt Gen VK Saxena, VSM, Commandant, Army AD College

Trends in Naval Guided Missile Systems – Rear Admiral (Dr) S Kulshrestha

Precision Engagement Platforms / Weapons / Systems Technologies – Mr Arijit Ghosh, Country Head – Defence & Space, Honeywell

Special Address: Precision Delivery of Firepower – Dr Prahlada, VC, Defence Institute of Advance Technology, Pune

China’s Space Programme and ASAT Capability – Air Marshal M Matheswaran, AVSM, VM, DCIDS (PP& FD)

India’s Military Requirement in Space – Wg Cdr RK Singh, Research Fellow, USI

Helicopter in Combat: Today & Tomorrow – Lt Gen BS Pawar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), former Commandant, School of Artillery and ADG Army Aviation

Evolving Future (Precision) Warfare Capability through Defense Experimentation – Cmde Rajeev Sawhney (Retd), Director, Strategic Development & Experimentation, Phantom Works, India

Valedictory Address – Air Chief Marshal P V Naik, PVSM, VSM (Retd)


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PostPosted: 24 Sep 2012 08:08 
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Indian armed forces mulling three joint commands

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The brass of Army, Navy and IAF are "informally'' discussing the "contours'' of the cyber, aerospace and special operations commands, which will synergize efforts and assets of the three services in these "critical areas'',
sources said.

Quote:
The prevalent view is that a three-star Army officer (Lt General) should head the Special Operations Command, while an equivalent rank from IAF (Air Marshal) can steer the Aerospace Command. The Cyber Command, in turn, will be headed by a Vice-Admiral from the Navy.


Quote:
This means the commanders-in-chief of the three new commands will "not be rotated'' among the Army, Navy and IAF. India's two existing tri-Service commands - the Strategic Forces Command and the Andaman & Nicobar Command - as well as the integrated defence staff follow a "rotational'' policy at present.


Quote:
"It will ensure the new command in question can be 'mothered' by a single Service on a continuous basis. The Army, after all, has domain expertise in special operations, IAF in aerospace and Navy in cyber and information technology. The commands will draw elements, assets and manpower from all the three services as well as the government below the three-stars,''
said a source.

-Ankit


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PostPosted: 24 Sep 2012 19:59 
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It is also possible that the joint commands would go to the new four star officer envisioned as a peer to the service chiefs, in the role of CDS.

The new CDS would be meaningless, without control of these joint commands.


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PostPosted: 24 Sep 2012 20:06 
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Reforming national security decision-making
Defence planning in India has been marked by knee-jerk reactions to emerging situations and haphazard single-service growth --
Gurmeet Kanwal


Quote:
With projected expenditure of 100 billion US dollars on military modernisation over the next 10 years, it is now being realised that force structures must be configured on a tri-Service, long-term basis to meet future threats and challenges....

Conclusion

A fluid strategic environment, rapid advances in defence technology, the need for judicious allocation of scarce budgetary resources, long lead times required for creating futuristic forces and the requirement of synergising plans for defence and development, make long-term defence planning a demanding exercise. The lack of a cohesive national security strategy and defence policy has resulted in inadequate political direction regarding politico-military objectives and military strategy. Consequently, defence planning in India, till recently, has been marked by ad hoc decision making to tide over immediate national security challenges and long-term planning was neglected. This is now being gradually corrected and new measures have been instituted to improve long-term planning.

It is now being increasingly realised that a Defence Plan must be prepared on the basis of a 15-year perspective plan. The first five years of the plan should be very firm (Definitive Plan), the second five years may be relatively less firm but should be clear in direction (Indicative Plan), and the last five years should be tentative (Vision Plan). A reasonably firm allocation of financial resources for the first five years and an indicative allocation for the subsequent period is a pre-requisite.

Perspective planning is gradually becoming tri-Service in approach. It is now undertaken in HQ IDS, where military, technical and R&D experts take an integrated view of future threats and challenges based on a forecast of the future battlefield milieu, evaluation of strategic options and analysis of potential technological and industrial capabilities. Issues like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air defence, electronic warfare and amphibious operations, which are common to all the services, are now getting adequate attention. However, unless a CDS is appointed to guide integrated operational planning, it will continue to be mostly single-Service oriented in its conceptual framework.


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Joining forces: Admiral Arun Prakash


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PostPosted: 10 Oct 2012 05:19 
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Dated but important article

Helping Hand

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HELPING HAND
- The most important person in New Delhi is not the PM
Diplomacy: K.P. Nayar

Returning to India after nearly a year’s gap, it seemed like a good idea to find out who is the most important person in the national capital’s corridors of power at a time when the United Progressive Alliance government is in a state of perpetual paralysis or stumbling from one misstep to another. The answer was not difficult: Naresh Chandra, former cabinet secretary, governor and later ambassador to the United States of America.

“Important” is not to be confused with the “powerful” in New Delhi. Powerful men and women are aplenty all over the country, starting from Rahul Gandhi to Mamata Banerjee, but important persons are fewer.

In the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government, the most important person was, without any doubt, Brajesh Mishra, the prime minister’s principal secretary, who later served concurrently as national security adviser. It was to Mishra that everyone went for decisions for six continuous years. Mishra was important because he could find solutions to vexing problems within the government and ensure that his solutions were carried through, but there was little that he could do in terms of resolving political problems in spite of being Vajpayee’s eyes and ears.

Naresh Chandra is much less important than Mishra in the present-day set-up in New Delhi in that sense. In part, that is because Chandra holds no office and has no post within the Indian State which would enable him to directly push through anything he may want to. Actually, Chandra’s importance, for that reason, is all the more impressive because he is critical to the present-day state of affairs in New Delhi in spite of what would be a clear handicap for most others who may find themselves similarly placed.

........

On Raisina Hill, the seat of power in New Delhi, Chandra has become the man for all seasons. His latest brief, unannounced and hugely under-reported, is to bail out the defence minister, A.K. Antony, who is facing mounting criticism for allegedly allowing the country’s defence preparedness to slip under his watch.

It is to Antony’s credit that from the day he took over as defence minister, he has waged a relentless campaign against corruption in defence purchases and other areas in his ministry. But those who know Antony are not surprised that in the process, he has created a gridlock in military acquisitions because of his obsession for transparency.

Those whom he has deprived of commissions, bribes and fancy junkets have prodded others, including sections of the media, to accuse Antony of making India weak by holding up the modernization of the army.

It is also to Antony’s credit that he has belatedly recognized that there is some merit in such criticism even though much of the motivation for these complaints is not altruistic. The defence minister was alarmed when he was told the other day that he had blacklisted so many foreign suppliers for corrupt practices that the only technology now available to Indians in some sectors is from companies which still use the know-how of the 1960s.

So sweeping has Antony’s blacklisting been that every firm that is a leader in one area or another in cases of some critical defence needs is out of the competition for bids with his ministry. After some deep introspection, when his ministry dominated front page news in an unflattering light for months, Antony has concluded that his primary responsibility as defence minister is to protect the country and guarantee its security, and not to fight corruption at every turn.

So, Antony has now turned to Chandra, who will soon seek a balance between the need for probity in military acquisitions and the urgency of getting the best equipment as quickly as possible.

A year ago, a task force was set up under Chandra’s leadership to examine defence preparedness as a follow-up to the Kargil review committee’s report on that brief conflict with Pakistan. Since Chandra is already engaged in that work, it has been possible for Antony to quietly entrust him this additional and much more sensitive job of untangling the mess created by the ban on an unacceptably large number of international defence producers.

As part of his task force responsibilities, Chandra has further been requested to examine the case for a chief of defence staff, who will be the “first among equals” made up of the three service chiefs.
The case for such a post has been enhanced by the unsavoury controversy about the date of birth of General V.K. Singh, the army chief.

Chandra has taken on another task that has defied previous attempts: the revamp of India’s intelligence. Additionally, in the last one year when he has headed the national security advisory board, Chandra has changed not only the composition but also the substance of this board.

To start with, he advised Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who chose Chandra as the NSAB’s head in early 2011, not to pack the board with Indian foreign service officers. Singh promptly cut down their number from seven previously to two in the current board.

Chandra was behind the induction of an industrialist for the very first time into the board. But most important of all, he saw the need to have representation from a region where national security is most at risk: the volatile Northeast.

His lasting contribution to the demands of present-day national security will be that by the time his chairmanship of NSAB is over, Chandra will have transformed what was earlier an ivory tower talking shop on foreign policy into a solid forum dealing with more urgent domestic threats. Earlier, he was tapped by the government after a series of corporate scandals to head a reform panel on corporate governance. No wonder Naresh Chandra is the man for all seasons in New Delhi.



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PostPosted: 10 Nov 2012 06:06 
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Parliament needs more ex-generals

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Leave alone not getting an offensive mountain corps, the very concept was gutted by defence minister A.K. Antony, who is proving to be one of the great mishaps the military has run into. He has both conspicuously failed in his one-point agenda to remove the taint of corruption, and with his risk-averse attitude has actually compounded the problem with decisions being delayed, or, when taken, having been controversial. He started with zero aptitude — and not being a quick study on issues alien to him — has not graduated over the years in office beyond the kindergarten-level in terms of understanding national security-related issues. Nor has he developed an instinct for making correct decisions.

Worse, he has introduced the give and take of politics into military choices by configuring a grand bargain that saw him approve a full-fledged combat aviation arm for the Army in the face of severe resistance from the Air Force and then, to placate Vayu Bhavan, mooted a “joint solution” that the Army has been enjoined to work out with IAF, entailing the formal burial of the offensive mountain corps concept, because of the IAF’s belief that it can unleash its aircraft for punitive strikes against the Chinese Army in Tibet, and that this is enough to deter the hard-headed men running the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

It puts one in mind of the joint air-land exercise put up by the 4th Infantry Division in Ambala in 1958 to over-awe the visiting Chinese military delegation headed by the PLA commander in Tibet. Screaming Hunter aircraft overhead in ground attack mode, dropped bombs, made repeated strafing runs and cleared the path for advancing infantry — all of which impressed the Chinese commander not a whit. “This is all very impressive,” the Chinese commander is reported as telling his Indian counterpart commanding the 4th Division, Maj. Gen. B.M. Kaul, “but, tell me, will you have the aircraft in a real war?” The PLA general got his answer three years later with the 7th Brigade of Kaul’s own 4th Division being decimated on the Namka Chu river at a time when Kaul himself was appointed commander of IV Corps created overnight for him by his distant uncle, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister’s complaisant defence minister V.K. Krishna Menon and an “obedient” Army Chief, Gen. Pran Nath Thapar. All this happened, it must be remembered, as the IAF remained inert throughout the war.

Going by his recollections of his career, the IAF Chief in 1962, Air Marshal A.M. Engineer, did not push for the Air Force to go into action. Maybe, like his more recent successors, he too subsided in his belief that air action is inherently escalatory. What’s the guarantee that IAF won’t again escape, doing nothing in another showdown in the Himalayas? And then, the Army bereft of any real offensive capability that would have won the PLA’s respect, will be compelled to merely defend. We know where that will get the Army — another ignominious end.


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PostPosted: 11 Nov 2012 14:55 
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Quote:
Leave alone not getting an offensive mountain corps, the very concept was gutted by defence minister A.K. Antony, who is proving to be one of the great mishaps the military has run into.



Thought it was the PM who has put the mountain Strike Corps on the backburner, not Anthony. Anthony had cleared it.


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PostPosted: 23 Nov 2012 07:29 
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Technological Sovereignty in ICT

Pains my heart to see us struggle in what we ought to excel at.

Quote:
Issues/Perspectives:
India currently is an assembler and integrator of defence ICT solutions and severely lags in design and development areas

The dominance of DPSU’s in development of all major core military equipment in India has led to a situation of under-performance and inability to produce world standard products

Hesitancy on the part of the private sector to participate in defence technologies including ICT due to lack of economies of scale and limited funding

The Transfer of Technology regime is very restrictive in nature and if foreign support is withdrawn, availability and deployment is affected
India’s contribution in terms of design and development in ICT field is very minimal. This state of affairs is unsustainable and impinges heavily on India’s national security

Lack of trust between the private industry, defence forces and the government


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PostPosted: 30 Nov 2012 00:37 
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A long paper on civ-mil relations and other aspects, which eventually culminate with CDS and integration debates.

Civil Military Relations in India
Quote:
India has not as yet taken even the first baby step towards integration (something the British did as far back as 1964). India is light years away from the issue that the UK PUS highlights, that of refining integration further by way of better role-clarity and accountability for the different actors involved in the CMR process. Only if we jump the first hurdle will we get to the second. The naresh Chandra committee must provide the critical springboard – India simply cannot afford to waste any more time with defence reforms. a substantive amendment to the allocation of Business rules must also be undertaken, forthwith, so as to integrate the services with the apex structure of the Government of India from their current position of subaltern outliers.

having integrated the MoD and only then, must a Permanent Chairman Joint Chiefs of staff (PCJCs) be appointed as the Principal Military adviser to the government. The PCJCs (a four star), chosen from amongst the serving Single Service Chiefs with a fixed four year tenure, will be a key strategic player and a bridge between the strategic and operational levels. as the Prime Minister’s principal military adviser, he will be in the policy–making loop of all national security organizations like the nsC and ministries concerned with security like home, external affairs and finance.75 The PCJCs and the Chief of Integrated staff Committee (CIsC) together, may be entrusted with the responsibility of driving the process of jointmanship, that of developing close working relationships among the three services and the development of joint capabilities especially in the field of cyber warfare and Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Isr). at some point in the future, India may even upgrade this position to a five star CDs, with a four star Vice Chief of Defence staff (VCDs) (CIsC rechristened), to drive jointness and strategic processes.

Concurrently, India must move towards significantly enhanced cross- pollination in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the National Security Council (nsC), with much wider representation for the military. Until now only IPS and IFS officers have held the position of the National security adviser, maybe it is time for the government to pass on the baton to a military officer. One of the Deputy National Security Advisers, should, in any case, always be from the defence services. The practice of having a Lieutenant General or equivalent as a Military adviser, in the NSC, because only secretary level officers can hold the appointment of Deputy national security advisor is a clever bureaucratic ruse that should not fool the political class. The key determinant must be expertise and competence and not clerical notions of equivalence – if the civil services so deem fit they may offer only Secretary level officers for the posts, in so far as the Defence services are concerned, any Lieutenant General or equivalent should be eligible, domain expertise and personal competence being the clinching criterion.

The strategic community must be energised with a view to develop domain specialties, encourage deep debates and ensure constant strategic vigil. India must move from a ‘sarkari hotbed’ approach to one based on cross-functional expertise. It may be a good gesture to invite a renowned strategic affairs expert, of the calibre of C raja Mohan, amitabh Mattoo, sumit Ganguly or Manoj Joshi to head the Institute for Defence studies and analyses (IDsa).76 In Uk, strategic thinkers and independent consultants are being brought in to drive processes in the MoD. In India’s case, they are being kept not only out of MoD but also out of strategic think-tanks . The naresh Chandra Committee will do well to address the anomaly.

within the MoD, authority, responsibility and accountability must be comprehensively reviewed. at the apex level, a Defence Board consisting of the Defence Minister, the Minister of state for Defence, Independent Consultants, the CDs / PCJCs and the Defence secretary may be constituted to provide strategic direction and determine the defence requirements. Concurrently, substantial delegation of powers and authority to service Chiefs must take place – they must be made entirely responsible for operational plans and equipment, albeit with precise budgetary backing as also the authority to flex their budgets. having been allowed greater control of their allocated budgets the service Chiefs must drive capability planning and determine the best balance between manpower, training, equipment and support, etc, that are needed to deliver the defence requirement.

India can no longer afford to continue its indolent roll without an incisive survey of the dangers and opportunities in its security path. The process of forward planning must be subjected to far greater rigour. The refrain that it is not in the Indian ethos to carry out such planning is lazy, self serving rubbish and must be abandoned. India may like to take inspiration from the ongoing churning in the Uk defence and do likewise.77 a national security strategy review, a strategic Defence and security review and a Defence review,78 in that chronological order but with the express purpose of one complementing the other, with clearly enunciated remits, must be initiated forthwith if the nation’s security is to move from flaccidity to greater strategic purpose. These reviews will help India create a usable hard power capability that provides viable strategic options in crisis situations. such options may not deliver every time but they will often enough. It will also enhance the credibility of India’s strategic restraint as a carefully chosen alternative and not as a forced choice.

National Security Strategy Review (NSSR): such a review must help sketch whole of government approach to security, while challenging legacy assumptions about the nature of the security environment encompassing threats from the immediate to the distant – terrorism, conventional threats from India’s adversaries in the neighbourhood, the prospect of destabilising wars in places that matter to India, the possible loss of political influence in regions from where India sources its energy, the prospect of military competition, the emerging threat of state-on-state cyber attacks, the manner in which India should address threats and opportunities in the global commons, the fact that there can no longer be a distinction between home and abroad – the need to integrate external and internal threats in a seamless fabric are some of the issues that the proposed NSSR must address. Having defined the threats and explored the ways to manage risks, the nssr must seek to link the roles and missions of the armed forces to the government’s wider foreign and security policy and help deduce the grand-strategic and military-strategic tenets of planning and direction. In sum, the nssr must try and establish the contours of the evolving strategic context.

Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR): The sDsr, after drawing from the nssr, must attempt to take the process further and arrive at the precise capabilities India needs to invest in, in order to ensure effective delivery of national security policy. such a review must seek to bring defence policy, plans, commitments and cross governmental resources into balance, while identifying the capabilities the nation should invest in the future.

Defence Review: The Defence review must focus on the management, structure, organisation, process and work culture in the MoD with the specific purpose of delivering the precise capabilities outlined in the sDsr. The same will entail a paradigm shift from ‘bureaucracy’ to ‘empowerment and discretion.’ key decision makers (service Chiefs /Vice Chiefs) must be empowered to take decisions, allowed greater discretion to make these decisions while being held responsible and to account for their decisions – both for the choices they make and the choices they defer. accountability for the correctness of choices made must be determined not by the strength of processes but by the viability of outcomes. To be properly accountable, one also needs the power to act, therefore, accountability must be matched with commensurate decision-making powers.

Acquisition Reform: reform acquisition processes and the defence industry, in accordance with global trends, sound management practices and pragmatic choices such as self-reliance in strategic high end areas, a viable domestic industry based on inherent strengths, private sector participation and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as also global off-the-shelf purchases where essential and feasible, must form the edifice of our approach.

Institutional equity, which is the principal argument of this paper, will pave the way for greater strategic acuity. In doing so, the civil–military relationship in India will also graduate from infancy to adolescence. all these years, the detachment of the political class has given the bureaucracy necessary wriggle room to push the military to the fringes of decision-making. It is incumbent, therefore, on the same political class to make amends and restore the balance. such restoration must be predicated on the twin principles of unambiguous political control and intelligent outreach. India is in a moment in its CMr discourse when it needs sagacity more than anything else to bring an antiquated framework in line with modern sensibilities; we may also like to take note of the kautilyan adage that the chariot of state is a many wheeled mechanism and therefore cannot rest on one wheel alone. The military and civil wheels conjointly must provide the national security underpinnings to drive the chariot of state. Sixty five years since independence, we need to breathe new life into the barren relationship between the political principal and the military agent. Dismantling the levers of bureaucratic control may be a good way to begin.


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PostPosted: 30 Nov 2012 17:54 
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ShauryaT wrote:
\Until now only IPS and IFS officers have held the position of the National security adviser, maybe it is time for the government to pass on the baton to a military officer.


It is my understanding that GoI relies on NSA to be a non-military person.


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PostPosted: 01 Dec 2012 09:54 
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Aditya G wrote:
It is my understanding that GoI relies on NSA to be a non-military person.
I think the NSA institution itself is fairly new and evolving in India. Ideally, not only military but even civilian experts should be considered for the position on the lines of a Kissinger or a Scowcroft.


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PostPosted: 12 Jan 2013 00:29 
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http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... es-command

Quote:
...

Once the "formal joint proposal'' of the three Services is finalized, IAF chief Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne will take it up with the government in his capacity as the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee. In fact, the "urgent need'' for the three new commands is likely to come up during the Combined Commanders' Conference to be addressed by the Prime Minister on October 19.

The prevalent view is that a three-star Army officer (Lt General) should head the Special Operations Command, while an equivalent rank from IAF (Air Marshal) can steer the Aerospace Command. The Cyber Command, in turn, will be headed by a Vice-Admiral from the Navy.

This means the commanders-in-chief of the three new commands will "not be rotated'' among the Army, Navy and IAF. India's two existing tri-Service commands - the Strategic Forces Command and the Andaman & Nicobar Command - as well as the integrated defence staff follow a "rotational'' policy at present.

"It will ensure the new command in question can be 'mothered' by a single Service on a continuous basis. The Army, after all, has domain expertise in special operations, IAF in aerospace and Navy in cyber and information technology. The commands will draw elements, assets and manpower from all the three services as well as the government below the three-stars,'' said a source.

...


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PostPosted: 12 Jan 2013 01:17 
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^^ IDS currently looking after cyber offensive ops. Lots of nucleus's and new concepts. Will take time. I did my part and explained how the US is raising cyber armies as the way forward. Interesting exchange of concepts, IDS is workng closely with IIT and civvies on this issue too - hiring civvies for tasks too.


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PostPosted: 01 Mar 2013 04:42 
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A game of monopoly

Quote:
The military variant of that old saw about India being a rich country with poor people owing to god-awful governance is that there is no real dearth of monies allotted to defence but every reason to doubt these are always spent wisely, or even well.

The sustained downturn of the economy has compelled the finance ministry to warn the ministry of defence (MoD) of a budgetary cut of almost `10,000 crore in 2013-14. Finance minister P. Chidambaram’s forthright statement, that “if the (Budget) is cut for this year, it is cut; you cannot do anything about it,” was in the context of defence minister A.K. Antony demanding `45,000 crore in addition to the `1.93 lakh crore Budget in the last fiscal, and his more recent attempt to talk up the direness of the threat from China, besides Pakistan, now militarily ensconced in nearby Gwadar. The fact that this is unlikely to impress the North Block into loosening the purse strings notwithstanding, the three armed services will push their separate expenditure priorities.

The Air Force will emphasise, in the main, the acquisition of Rafale for its MMRCA (medium-range, multi-role combat aircraft) programme, four squadrons of the “super” Su-30 for the China front, airborne warning and control systems and tankers, roughly in that order. The Army will push for a mountain strike corps, a combat helicopter fleet to fill its newly formed aviation arm and 155-mm artillery; and the Navy will want the ongoing warship induction schedule to be on track and the import of yet another conventional submarine. This is where things get appalling. The limited resources will ensure the three services remain dissatisfied. But how is inter se prioritisation achieved with the Indian government lacking a mechanism for it?

In the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who, keeping in mind the security threats and challenges, would rank-order the individual service expenditure programmes in a scheme of genuinely integrated procurements, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is the only available forum for this task. Ideally, the COSC is where the competing demands and requirements would be professionally debated and discussed threadbare with the three service chiefs at the end of this arduous process agreeing amicably on a single tri-service list of acquisition priorities in descending level of importance. In practice, however, every member of the COSC insists on his service’s needs requiring immediate sanction which, if conceded, would leave the fighting abilities of the other two services in the ditch.

Being equal in rank and there being no protocol and rank-wise superior CDS in the chain of command, the service chiefs feel no need to reconcile their differing priorities. The traditional Monday morning meetings of the COSC during the budgeting period, therefore, continue to be what they are for the rest of the year — pleasant meetings of military brass engaged in banter and the business of consuming tea and samosas. According to a former service chief who was chairman, COSC, he could devote only 15 per cent of his working hours to consider the demands of the other services, as most of the time was taken up by his own service-related interests and issues. He conceded that as chairman, he favoured his own service, aware that the chiefs of the other services would do the same when occupying this largely ceremonial post held in rotation. The COSC, in other words, doesn’t help in untangling issues or leaving the civilians in the MoD bureaucracy less befuddled.

In the event, the job of slicing a bigger piece of the defence budgetary pie falls on the senior staff in the service headquarters. This they do by pitching their demands to the joint secretary dealing with the concerned service, before the chiefs do much the same thing with the defence secretary and, more directly, to the defence minister. Because most generalist IAS officers in the defence ministry have no technical competence, nor any feel for the subject, in order to judge which service deserves to get what, leave alone why it should be prioritised, the difficult decisions are usually kicked up to the defence minister. As a workaday politician, the average defence minister, his skills limited to spouting platitudes about patriotism and self-reliance in defence, and reassuring all and sundry that the armed forces are prepared to meet all threats, is even more clueless. This prompts each of the service chiefs to try and personally hard sell his service’s needs to him in extreme terms. Even a seasoned politician may be intimidated by this tactic the first time around. But with each passing year he becomes inured to the fearful scenarios being painted if this or that acquisition doesn’t come through. In the event, he arbitrarily alights on the procurement priorities, allowing all manner of extraneous factors to come into play, including constituency-servicing imperatives and political pressures from the top reaches of his own party to buy this or that piece of hardware. Bureaucrats then generate ex post facto rationales for the decisions so taken.

Obviously, there is something drastically wrong with this system, starting with the missing role of the political institutions in articulating the primary, secondary and tertiary threats; laying down clear guidelines for strategies to deal with each of them; outlining the force structures in the short, medium and long term; and tackling meta-strategic issues, such as establishing a programme for sharply reduced dependence on foreign-sourced weapons platforms and making the armed services responsible for the time-bound indigenisation programmes. Doing all this is the responsibility of the Cabinet in the more advanced democracies, with the legislature exercising severe oversight.

In the Indian setup, however, the first three roles are, for all intents and purposes, expropriated by the military services, which adhere only lightly to conventional security directives from government because the bulk of the politicians are disinterested in national security and foreign policy issues. The government of the day, in the event, mans the financial spigot, MoD bureaucrats concern themselves with the processes of decisionmaking, traffic in files, and act as facilitators of corruption (and should a scam surface, the Central Bureau of Investigation is there to provide comic relief, playing the dim-witted desi Keystone cops), and Parliament, as always, is a rubber stamp.


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PostPosted: 06 Jun 2013 04:04 
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Great power ambition sans the attitude
Quote:
Although there are people and institutions capable of articulating a strategic vision, bureaucratic lethargy and turf battles prevent them from executing it

A reputed international weekly recently devoted a cover article to arguing that India’s quest for greatness would be stymied by the absence of a strategic culture. Ever since George Tanham’s seminal essay on Indian strategic thought, published in 1992 by RAND, suggested the absence of strategic thinking, many writers and commentators have weighed in, both supporting and contradicting Tanham. Interestingly, what Tanham suggested was that India was indeed a “strong” cultural entity, but somehow the nature and characteristics of that culture either prevented or avoided strategic thought. The article in the Economist (April 5, 2013) goes much farther, and says there are many in India who write and comment on the absence of institutions capable of giving the country strategic direction. But those in power have deliberately taken decisions to deny the country those institutions out of departmental jealousies, lethargy or plain wrongheadedness.

Criticism of our strategic culture is not new, and to those who have worked in South Block for decades, the history of trying to put in place procedures and institutions are most often a case of one step forward, two steps back. Paraphrasing Rahul Gandhi’s speech at the CII recently, he said what is wrong in India is that as few as 5,000 people take all the decisions for a billion Indians. Are there really as many as 5,000 is the first question that comes to mind because the number of people crippling this country’s strategic culture is less than 10.

Defence Planning Group

Between the publication of Tanham’s essay in 1992 and the weekly’s justifiably disparaging remarks, attempts have been made to build institutions. The earliest attempt goes as far back as 1986 when a Defence Planning Group was set up under a rotating three star officer with vacancies for scientists and diplomats. Since the absence of a military input is one of the chief complaints of both Tanham and the Economist, it is bizarre to note that the Defence Planning Group was eventually allowed to wither by the armed forces themselves and inter-services rivalry. So the blame has to be shared pretty widely. Tanham was so bemused by the absence of thinking beyond continental and territorial defence that he blamed both history and culture.

Historically, India was just a part of the greater British Empire, the defence of which was strategised in Whitehall. Within the folds of the empire, India had two roles — one, as provider of troops and, secondly, as a continental command under an army Commander-in-Chief. The C-in-C therefore often saw himself as an independent commander who chafed at the bit at being ‘directed’ by a Viceroy, who according to the C-in-C, was merely the civilian head of government. A classic instance is the creation of the present state of Iraq after the First World War when the troops and government administration departments were sent from India, the political direction came from Whitehall and the naval element from the C-in-C of the Far East Fleet in Singapore. The air force element was under the land force commander. This arrangement was repeated every so often, as to disable New Delhi’s independent strategic thinking and limit Indian army HQ thinking to territorial defence. So crippling was the empire’s straitjacket that in 1939, in the absence of any strategic directive, New Delhi’s first operational order for the Second World War was the digging of defences in the North-West frontier against a Russian attack — a replay of the great game of the previous century! Culturally, Tanham ascribed the absence of forward planning to abstruse theories of Hindu concepts of tomorrow and time.

Since Tanham’s time, India has become a nuclear weapons state, China has risen astonishingly and Pakistan has ceased to grow and turned into a state at war with itself. The Indian armed forces have grown exponentially, but no civilian leader, according to the Economist, has the faintest idea of how to use India’s growing military clout. The army seems most of all to be structured for a blitzkrieg against Pakistan while the navy is preparing to counter China’s ‘blue water adventurism.’

The services appear to have their own strategic plans and the organisation that would centrally direct strategic thinking — the Ministry of Defence — is the most distrusted by the armed forces. A ministry that could provide a centralist view on world affairs and geopolitical initiatives — the Ministry of External Affairs — is described as ridiculously ‘puny’ in numbers. The sanction for larger numbers already exists but the foreign services mandarins refuse to laterally recruit suitable candidates to get on with the job. Vacancies for foreign service officers in the Ministry of Defence to augment their ‘woeful ignorance’ go repeatedly unfilled. The Economist has ignored the six months of happy times after George Fernandes, the Defence Minister, was retired due to a TV sting operation, and replaced temporarily by Jaswant Singh. He inducted Arun Singh, a former Minister of State for Defence, to head a committee to restructure higher defence management. More was achieved for reforms during those few months than in a half century before or a decade since. :D The crucial reform of integrating the service headquarters under a Chief of Defence Staff failed due to opposition from just three individuals. :evil:

Most observers agree that a permanent hurdle to structural reforms and financial streamlining remains the Ministry of Defence. The ministry consists of generalists who are invariably in opposition to the military whose officers are educated for a minimum period of three years (a year every decade) on strategic thought before they are posted in billets where they could contribute to strategy. Curiously, both Tanham and the Economist wrote their essays on Indian strategic thought because both were investigating the possibility of India becoming a great power. The inference from both is that the absence of a strategic culture will hamper India from punching its weight. True, its weight is light compared to that of China but with the advantages India has going for it — the English language, democracy, a military culture and tradition, a fine navy, a small but active foreign office — it could, with the setting up of coordinating institutions, punch well above its weight. It doesn’t, largely because of bureaucratic lethargy, jealousies and turf battles, and an indifferent political class.

Non-alignment 2.0

The Economist notes that the nearest that India’s strategic community has come to writing out a vision of how to match foreign policy with the deployment of the armed forces, whose budget today is near $ 46 bn, is the unofficial document, Non-Alignment 2.0, written by people both inside and outside the government. The document proves that people of the right calibre can be called upon at any time to articulate a vision but there are an equal number of incompetents in government who will prevent the former from executing that vision. Sadly many of them populate the Ministry of Defence and have, for instance, batted stubbornly in favour of defence PSUs and limiting FDI in the sector to 26 per cent when it is 49 per cent elsewhere.

The result is that India, which is at the bottom of the heap in HDI, is also the world’s largest arms importer. To paraphrase Manmohan Singh, “the enemy is within.” The latest attempt to restructure higher defence management — the Naresh Chandra Committee — has put in a report full of sensible recommendations. It is not public yet but it is reliably learnt that the overwhelming opposition to it comes from — where else? — the Ministry of Defence. :(

(Raja Menon retired as Rear Admiral in the Indian Navy)


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PostPosted: 13 Jun 2013 08:28 
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Services moot cyber, aerospace & special forces commands
Quote:
The Chief of Staff Committee (CoSC), a body comprising the Chiefs of the three Services, met yesterday to fine-tune an upcoming policy on having three additional tri-Services commands with each of the Services heading one of it.

However, unlike the existing tri-Services commands or staff formations in India, which have Commanders appointed by rotation from each of the three Services, the new Commands will be entrusted with one service making it the overall in charge with officers and staff coming in from all three services.

The CoSC, headed by Air Chief Marshall NAK Browne, at its meeting yesterday fine-tuned the policy for having three new tri-Services commands, the aerospace command, the cyber command and the special forces operations command.

According to the existing suggestions made at the CoSC meeting yesterday, the IAF is likely to get the aerospace command, the Navy will get the cyber command and the Army will be responsible for the special forces operations command, sources said. The logic for each has been assessed. The number of special forces with the IAF - called the Garuds - and the under the Navy - called the Marcos, are too small in number to be sustainable on their own.

These will be brought under the control of the Indian Army which has some 10,000 troops trained and kept ready for any ‘commando style’ operation.

Also, the Army provides the National Security Guards with some its best trained men. This will be fitted within the newly increased capacities by way of specialised planes like the just-inducted C-130-J and the soon-to-be-inducted heavy lifter - the C-17. Both can land on mud-strips. The C-130-J demonstrated it at a recent exercise called Livewire in the desert. The proposal is to base the aerospace command with the IAF that will draw forces from the Army and Navy besides getting some component of the DRDO. In the future, the specialised ‘X-band’ radars, which can spot a 6-inch object some 4,600 km away and can provide live imagery, can be aid to this command.

The need to have one Service in-charge of one command stems from the ‘not-so-smooth’ experience of India's only operational theatre command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands which has a Lt-General, Vice-Admiral or Air Marshal heading it by rotation. This model had not been successful according to the feedback and assessment of the CoSC, hence the need to have one Service responsible for the command and draw the mandated resources from the other two.


http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20130613/main2.htm


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PostPosted: 03 Aug 2013 10:03 
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Possibly a planted story by MoD ...

http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/in ... 65310.html

Quote:
New Delhi: Army is learnt to be locked in a tussle with Air Force and Navy over the post of the Strategic Forces Commander as it has staked sole right over the position which manages the nuclear arsenal of the country.

...

It is learnt that the Army has told the Government that it wants the post of the SFC to be reserved for its officers on the ground that majority of the strategic arsenal of the country is with it only, sources said here.

The Army is believed to be of the view that the post of the SFC should not be given to either Air Force or Navy as at present they do not have much of strategic assets, they said.

The other two Services, it is learnt, have opposed this and said the Government should continue with the present system where the Lt Gen-rank officers of all the three Services get a chance to head the formation in rotation.

At present, the post of SFC is held by a Navy officer -- Vice Admiral SPS Cheema.

...


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PostPosted: 15 Sep 2013 21:59 
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OT here but posting as an example of kind of issues that arise from integration:

http://www.idsa.in/jds/2_1_2008_Synergi ... rd_ABansal

Quote:
Alok Bansal

Summer 2008 (Note: article is prior to 26/11 and resultant organization changes)
Volume: 2
Issue: 1
Debate

....

Differences between the service conditions of the IN and the CG, especially the lack of common or equivalent rank structure and difference in promotional norms, has the maximum potential to cause problems in any future cooperation between the Navy and the CG. IN inducts officers through the National Defence Academy and the Naval Academy and as direct entrants in the technical branches. The CG officers are also inducted through the Naval Academy, but while the Naval officers join the Academy as cadets, the CG officers join as Assistant Commandants. This anomaly can be basically attributed to the fact that the CG officers at the time of induction are usually older than their naval counterparts. As a result, by the time a naval officer finishes his Midshipman’s time and gets commissioned, his course mate in the CG is already an Assistant Commandant of one and a half year seniority. Later, when a CG officer comes up for watch-keeping ticket, the naval officers who have already got the ticket are still junior to him. In the past CG officers have got their tickets under naval officers who were technically junior to them – purely by taking into account years of service. Further, if a CG officer got his promotion at the right time he could become a Commandant in eight years. By this time a much senior naval officer would not have been considered for promotion to the rank of Commander. In the absence of clear cut directives and common rank structure, the Commandant got equated to the Commander and led to serious problems.

One of the most glaring examples pertains to a CG ship based in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the early Nineties. The ship commanded by a naval Lieutenant-Commander, entered Campbell Bay during one of its patrols to the southern group of islands. When it had to sail, a problem arose as to who should make the sailing order.14 Commander CG District Ten (COMDIS 10) based at Campbell Bay was a Commandant who in service was much junior to the Commanding Officer (CO) of the ship who had not yet been considered for promotion to the rank of Commander. Both the CO and the shore authority felt that they ought to make the sailing order based on their own logic and thinking. The CO eventually made his sailing order and left harbour but was asked to return back by the Commander CG Region (COMCG) based at Port Blair. The CO of the ship at this juncture expressed his intention to hand over command to his Executive Officer (Second in Command). The CO was subsequently allowed to make the sailing orders and the matter was somehow hushed up and no clear cut directives were issued at that time on this contentious issue. This sort of an ambiguity can be catastrophic in times of war. Even today there are problems regarding the issuing of sailing orders in ANC, where the sailing orders for CG ships are being issued by COMCG rather than the Commander in Chief of ANC.

Another incident pertains to joint operations in Palk Bay. During an escort operation, which involved an IN and a CG ship jointly escorting a merchant ship repatriating Sri Lankan refugees, the CO of the IN ship, a Lieutenant Commander, was appointed the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC). However, the CO of the CG ship, who was a Deputy Commandant and whose total service was almost three and a half years less than the commissioned service of his naval counterpart, objected to it claiming that he was senior as he had become a Deputy Commandant before the naval officer had become a Lieutenant Commander. In order to avoid unpleasantness and to skirt the issue, an even more senior naval officer was appointed the OTC and the shore authority controlling the operations requested higher ups about the relative seniority of the COs by signal but failed to receive a definite reply.

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