Bharat Rakshak

The annual NATO 'Reforger' exercises held across the breadth of Germany each autumn are the main tactical exercises of the NATO tank forces. Fictitious Orange and Blue armies, composed of units from different NATO countries, fight mock battles to test their tactical skills, and the ability of their logistics units to repair and maintain them. 'Reforger '82' was the first time the M I Abrams was involved in such a demanding series of tactical exercises. The battalions of the 64th Armor were committed mainly to the 'Blue' Army.

At dawn on the morning of 13 September 1982 a Canadian 'Orange' task force, consisting of a mechanized infantry company backed by several Leopard I tank companies, began 'attacks' against opposing Blue forces. The main defense line of the Blue 3rd Inf. Div. (US) was met, and 'battle' was joined with elements of the 2/30 Infantry outside Dingolhausen, FRG. About noon a Canadian infantry platoon deep in the rear of the friendly Orange forces began moving forward to assist in clearing out stubborn American resistance at Dingolhausen. While passing through a wooded area far outside the battle area, it stumbled on to a tank battalion hidden in the woods. The tanks were slab-sided, like the later-model Canadian Leopard Is; but more ominously, they carried on the turret fronts the bright blue marker squares that characterized them as 'enemy' Blue Army tanks. The Canadian platoon was quickly 'wiped out'.

The commander of the hidden Blue tanks informed division that his concealed position had been discovered. Although forced to launch its counter-attack prematurely, his ruse had worked. Most of the 'enemy task force' had flowed by without noticing his tanks. Now it was time to take advantage of the Canadian Orange troops' mistake. Lt.Col.John Kelsey ordered his tanks to prepare for action. To the delight of the tankers, their M1s could hardly be heard by the dismounted guards' at the wood's edge due to the quiet turbine engine. More appealing was the tanks' response as the battalion charged out into the open.

One of the M1 companies charged into a
 Canadian mechanized infantry company which
was riding into action on M113 APCs. The
 Canadians were 'wiped out' before they could react.
The second Abrams company was ordered to swing 
further out from the woods to attack the Leopard
 company supporting the infantry. The Leopards
 were caught with their pants down as they were
 refueling at a POL point. Nine Leopards lined up
in a neat row suddenly became victims, with the IR 
rotating amber maneuver beacons signaling wiped out. With two of the M1 companies engaged, the third Abrams company homed in on another Leopard company attacking 2/30 Infantry at Dingolhausen. They struck unexpectedly from the rear; and there were suddenly a lot more static Leopards littering the German plains. For the coup de grace the second M1 company, after bypassing its victims at the POL point, swung behind another Canadian Leopard company attacking towards the Blue force lines. The company commander radioed to supporting AH-1S TOW Cobra attack helicopters lurking in hover behind the tree line of the Steigerwald on the Canadians' right flank. The Cobras popped up and began missile attacks on the Leopards, while the M1s simultaneously attacked them from the rear. The result: Orange Task Force wiped out. One of the Canadian officers later recalled: 'One minute it's quiet, with no contact; the next minute you are overwhelmed - swamped with quick, whispering death.'

The commander of the 3rd Inf. Div. , Maj.Gen. F. K. Mahaffey, summarized his feelings about the M1's performance in 'Reforger '82': 'Operationally the M1 exceeded our expectations during "Reforger". The fighting capability of the system proved to be so much more than previously assumed that it required a new perspective on mounted combat. During the exercise, there was an initial tendency to treat it as "just another improved tank". But all this changed as the exercise evolved and the full potential of the M I became apparent to all. The umpire adjudication process served to highlight a mindset existing among too many that the tactics and employment of the M1 units should conform to the doctrine developed for the much slower, less survivable M60 tanks. In this regard it is important for all to understand that what makes the M I units truly different - by an order of magnitude - is the tank's extraordinary capability to fire while moving at high speeds [30-40 mph] with an accuracy and effectiveness, by day or night, at least equal to that of an M60 firing from a stationary position.

These views were shared by the tankers as well. SFC J. Fields, a platoon leader with 2/64th Armor: 'As we swung and faced the enemy you could see the mass confusion they were in, with the tracks [M113S] and tanks nearly bumping into each other trying to get out of there. They were totally caught by surprise . . . It's just remarkable that you could have four tanks running in pattern with the gun tubes oriented in the right direction and moving at 40 mph.' The commander of I/64th Armor, Lt.Col. J. Quinn: 'The second day was the most devastating. We had two of my companies and the 3/64th Armor attacking on line in Bowling Alley West. That was a magnificent sight. We just completely overwhelmed the Orange forces. There was nothing they could have thrown up there to keep our two battalions from rolling right on through. They absolutely could not react to the speed of that tank no matter how hard they tried. And I know that they tried harder and harder every day to plug their holes, but once we found the hole we were through it and in their rear so fast they just could not react. We kept them disrupted, confused and just generally frustrated for three days.' One tank loader added: 'It seemed like the enemy didn't have a chance, even though they had us outnumbered.

And Indian Army wants more T-90s and Apaches rather than combination of Arjuns + LCH

This is very different from Arjun + T 90 mix were 1600 T 90s are there in the plan (and the decision was taken about 10 years ago and has NOT changed since) -- the tentative plan calls for something like 1500 Arjuns too, but it is only any body guess when they will come.

Please do share a link where this grand plan is outlined by someone in the IA.

Sanku-> if there were orders the tanks will be made.

HAL on other hand after facing several criticism on failure to set up a production line for Tejas , HAL has promised smooth supply of aircrafts once final IOC of the aircraft has been achieved . it was also informed that once final IOC is achieved HAL in next 3 to 6 months from there onward will be able to produce 8 aircrafts per year , plans are gradually to increase the production to 16 aircrafts per year .

Please do share a link where this grand plan is outlined by someone in the IA.

Well made! Finally a detailed documentary on Arjun MBT.

Any links? Looked around, found nothing so far. 1500 does sound good though.

This is based on the statement given by Minister of state for Defence in NDA cabinet, this is also captured in one or two reports of standing committee for defense.

This has always been the grand plan, IFF some one can persuade those making the tanks to actually make them.

It is one thing to plan and want, and another to actually create a working product in enough numbers.

.........

Actually nachiket, your critisim is not well founded. For example you say we are buying, when the tense is we brought, in 2004. Since then the T 90s are done deal. This is before the Arjun LSP was even ready for a user trial. So repeatedly trying to bring in T 90 is entirely irrelevant to the discussion.

The ONLY question is
Avadi has a line for 100 T 90s a year. It seems to be producing 100 T 90s a year, it can handle upgrades to those as and when they come and the production line does not shut down because a upgrade

OTOH 124 Arjuns were ordered in 1998-99. The Arjuns were in shape to be inducted in any practical sense only by 2007-8. Since then has Avadi been making its 50 tanks a year? Why/why not.

That is question 1.

Question 2 is. If IA has asked for Mk II. Is is fair for Army to ask for Mk II or should it go for Mk I and discard Mk II?

If it is acceptable for IA to want Mk II (Sarawsat is on record accepting that the Mk II is needed) -- how soon can be made ready and manufactured.

I think instead of looking for scapegoats on why things are not happening, the focus should be on making things happen -- the crucial thing is quick development and deployment of Mk II.

Mk II was supposedly tested in 2012 (it was supposed to be and there were reports that it was going to Thar) -- my intrest is more in knowing what became of that -- by all indications -- Mk II is a great looking beast. Did it work as advertised? Is Avadi starting its manufacture?

Why is no body focusing on Mk II tests is the question -- otherwise it will be the same saga -- everybody will blame somebody but net net, there will be no Arjun's ready when they are needed.

6DRDO initially said that this was "impossible" given the weight constraints,but R&D is certainly taking place.
.

The GSQR envisaged the weapon system to have a
range of 10 Km, rate of fire of 8-
10 bombs per minute, with a burst fire
capability of 12-15 rounds per minute. For portability, the mass of the
equipment was not to exceed 700 kg and the weight of the three main
components required for man/mule packing was not to exceed 450 Kg.
<snip>
The LRM developed by DRDO could not achieve the GSQR parameters as the
desired range and rate of fire or burst
fire capability could not be met with a
low weight Mortar which was an inconsistency in the GSQR framed by the
Army. Director General (DG) Artillery, decided against going ahead with the
project. As a result, DRDO foreclosed the main project from December 2004
after incurring expenditure of
9.29 crore. Subsequently the other project for
Smoke and Illumination ammunition was also foreclosed in December 2005
after incurring an expenditure of
1.08 crore. Army HQ while asking for
foreclosure of the project in Decemb
er 2004 accepted that the range of 10000
meters was not achievable with the low weight stipulations. It was also
accepted that a mortar system with such QRs is not available in the world
market and therefore a fresh GSQR was being initiated.

65T Arjun MK-2 cannot be the FMBT because the specs for that are a 3-man crewed tank weighing about 50T.It should also have a superior main gun,auto-loader,missile firing capability-anti tank and anti-air,the latest self-defence suite,better armour protection,and networked commns.The DRDO initially said that this was "impossible" given the weight constraints,but R&D is certainly taking place.

^^^

We have been over this "chicken-and-egg" question many times over already. If the IA only places 116 Arjun Mk.2 orders then why should Avadi build a factory that will build 200 units/year?

The FMBT was called out as a joke on BRF the moment the specs came out. As Sanku saar likes to say, "BRF ahead of the curve!".

Same Old. Same Old.

It seems the main plank of arguments for T-90 is to repeat a set of lies and misinformation "N" number of times and hope it sticks. We are seeing a rerun of the same again.

Army makes Arjun jump through real and imaginary hoops and then people ask where are Arjuns? IA asks for improvement on Mk-1 without stating why Mk-1 is inadequate in first place - if T-90 with all its warts and pimples can be 'backbone' of the IA, god knows why Arjun cannot be. This when Arjun wiped the floor with T-90 during comparative trials.

Treatment of Arjun program by the army borders on being criminal.

IA asks for improvement on Mk-1 without stating why Mk-1 is inadequate in first place - if T-90 with all its warts and pimples can be 'backbone' of the IA,

FMBT PSQRs were formulated in 2010 before the army reluctantly realised that it is impossible to be built under the current technology frontiers I think the army 'vision' has been to ask for ridiculous product specifications from DRDO and then buy expensive crap from Russia citing inability for DRDO to meet specifications.

It would be amusing, except for the serious repurcussions this has led to; such as - 70% of our armour being night blind.

So effectively the army vision has landed us with an armoured force capable of fighting between 9 am - 5pm (10 am - 5pm in winter)

Lets cut to the chase, are are you saying that instead of asking for Mk II, more orders for Mk I should be given?

DRDO too agrees that the list of 63 improvements should be rolled in before the Mk II is made in bulk. It is typically common sense that the new batch should be as far upgraded as possible. This has been the case of Indian T 90s as well.

Please answer in yes or no to the above question, since the decision has to come down to yes and no, in the end.

Why do you disagree? Can you list the 63 improvements and mention why you think they are not needed/not present in T 90?

Sanku, why are we continuing to buy T-90S when we know it has a lot of flaws (some of which are corrected in T-90 MS) ? We should stop production of T-90S by the same logic, right?

The step motherly treatment ot Arjun is causing khujli to a lot of posters here. The way IA handled T-90 purchase is to be followed in case of Arjun also.

And yes, Mk1 should be ordered as long as Mk1 is better than the T-55s and T-72s that are in service.