Protection on tincan == Protection on IFV
![ROTFL :rotfl:](./images/smilies/icon_rotfl.gif)
![ROTFL :rotfl:](./images/smilies/icon_rotfl.gif)
![ROTFL :rotfl:](./images/smilies/icon_rotfl.gif)
![ROTFL :rotfl:](./images/smilies/icon_rotfl.gif)
Thanks, I couldnt for the life of me place it. I thought it was some variant of Stryker at first, but the silhouette was all wrong.rohitvats wrote:Warrior IFV of the British Army.Sanku wrote:Can any one id this vehicle<SNIP>
Sanku wrote:Can any one id this vehicle
Is there a supposed implication that
Protection on tincan == Protection on IFV
The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965 A Strategic and Operational AnalysisThe Indian attack on Lahore in particular and Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in general
has remained the subject of too much propaganda and too little analysis. On
Pakistani side the Battle for Lahore was seen as a superhuman effort while on
the Indian side it exposed many glaring weaknesses in the Indian Army at unit,
brigade, divisional and corps level.
On the other hand the total failure of the main Pakistani attack in Khem Karan
was ignored or forgotten in the smoke screen of glory created by official
propagandists who successfully shifted the entire public attention on laurels of
Aziz Bhatti etc. Thus, many glaring failures like surrender of an entire tank
regiment on Pakistani side in Khem Karan were overlooked. If Niranjan Parshad
was sacked on the Indian side no one realized that the Pakistani GOC 1st Armored Division survived unceremonious dismissal simply because he was close to the then army chief.
Unfortunately, instead of dispassionate analysis the Battle for Lahore or Ravi-Sutlej Corridor as one may call it was overclouded by tales of heroism at individual and unit level on the Pakistani side.On the Indian side, it led to various drastic changes in high command and re-thinking about unit employment.
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/mili ... ction.html
Crossing Ichhogil Canal: How Lt-Col Hayde did it
by Maj-Gen Kuldip Singh Bajwa (retd)
IT was September 6, 1965. The troops of 11 Corps stormed into Pakistan in Amritsar-Khemkaran sector. The goal: to secure the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal in Lahore�s outskirts. On Sept 8, 1 Corps proceeded to Pasrur-Sialkot sector. The goal: to secure the near bank of the Ravi-Marala Link Canal. This strategy of offensive-defence was launched to relieve critical pressure of the Pakistani attack in Chhamb-Akhnur sector.
As the decision was taken in a hurry, there was little time to prepare troops mentally and emotionally for the inevitable. Troops could not be recalled from the units. The artillery and signal parties could not match with the infantry battalions. This resulted in the failure of communication.
The operational scenario in 15 Infantry Division in Amritsar sector was dismal. Of the seven infantry battalions that went into action, six had wavered under the first impact of the enemy fire. Only 3 JAT had resolutely advanced to the Ichhogil Canal, captured Dograi on the east, and Batapore-Attoke Awan in Lahore�s outskirts. This was a remarkable military achievement.
The brick-lined Ichhogil Canal, 112 feet wide, 30 feet deep, with a depth of 20 feet of fast flowing water, ran parallel to the border, 8 km inside Pakistan, and only a short hop to Lahore. The home bank was lined with concrete pillboxes. On the east bank, astride the Grand Trunk Road (GT) from Amritsar to Lahore, Dograi was a sizeable town. The whole complex was a strong defence structure.
In the early hours of Sept 6, 3 JAT bypassed the Pakistan border post at Wagah and captured Ghosal-Dial villages after a sharp fight. Though Commanding Officer 15 Dogra tasked to advance to the canal, Commander 54 Infantry Brigade accepted his plea that his battalion was in no state to undertake the mission. Subsequently, Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, Commanding Officer 3 JAT, readily agreed to take the challenge.
Just past 9 am, 3 JAT advanced to the canal with C Squadron Scinde Horse. Near Dograi. Though the battalion came under accurate artillery fire, it moved forward to quickly attack from the northern flank. After a stiff fight, one company from 3 Baluch ran back from Dograi over the debris of the bridge, partially demolished a little earlier.
By 11.30 am, 3 JAT was in full control of Dograi and the canal bank. However, it came under heavy machine gun, mortar and observed artillery fire from the tall buildings of the Bata Shoe factory and the Attock Awan village across the canal. Though Pakistani Sabres had destroyed most battalion support weapons, reserve ammunition and defence stores carried in the follow up transport, the enterprising Lt-Col Hayde chose to tackle the situation very aggressively. He led C and A companies across the demolished bridge to secure Batapore on the left of the GT road and Attok Awan on its right.
Around 2 pm, two enemy tanks marched down GT Road from Lahore. Machine guns opened up. While firefight was going on, the Pakistani tanks broke contact and sidestepped behind Batapur. Having seen this, the machine gunners also pulled out.
The C Company grabbed this opportunity and pushed forward deeper into Batapur. Soon after, three truckloads of Pakistani soldiers were seen rushing from Lahore at great speed. Subedar Pale Ram, who had reached the far edge of Batapore with a C Company platoon, demolished the first two at point blank range. The third turned back to flee. Meanwhile, the two Pakistani tanks appeared from Batapore, and tried to cross over to Attock Awan. The leading tank brewed up with a direct hit from the Scinde Horse troop of tanks. The second Pakistani tank and the third lorry were destroyed while both were trying to escape.
3 JAT effectively dealt with the enemy reaction. The battalion had fought at Ghosal-Dial, Dograi, Ichhogil Canal, and Batapore-Attocke Awan. There was no communication with the brigade headquarters. Despite the outstanding feat of 3 JAT being known through the armour radio net, no senior commander had come forward to determine the operational situation on the ground. Except for a troop of tanks on the east bank of the canal, there was no sign of any follow up force. The demolished bridge over the canal was fast crumbling away. Lahore was intensifying.
By mid-afternoon, Lt-Col Hayde was seriously concerned about the fate of his two companies across the canal. He had sent an officer to the brigade headquarters but no response.
At about 3 pm, the tank troop commander, informed Lt-Col Hayde that his squadron commander had asked him to pull back to Ghosal-Dial. The gallant 3 JAT pulled back the two companies from across the canal, abandoned Dograi, and were back in Ghosal-Dial by 5.15 pm.
In the generally depressing operational scenario on the first day of the war, the gallant 3 JAT led by Lt-Col Hayde stood out in the highest traditions of military grit and valour. Their outstanding achievement of putting two companies across the Ichhogil Canal practically in Lahore�s outskirts was not exploited. In the words of Field Marshal Maurice Comte De Saxe, French Army, �When we have incurred the risk of battle, we should know how to profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to custom, with the possession of the field.�
Major-General Karl Von Clausewitz, the well-known military thinker of the Prussian Army, said, �Next to victory, the act of pursuit (in this case exploitation of the crossing of the Ichhogil Canal) is the most important in war.� Exploitation of success in battle, whenever it comes, is vital, as the elements that caused or assisted in it may not obtain again.
During the operations in 1965, the stout and gallant 3 JAT was the only battalion that crossed the formidable Ichhogil Canal. This exceptional operational achievement was, however, overshadowed by their subsequent recapture of Dograi on Sept 21-22. The cry that involuntarily comes from the heart �Bravo 3 JAT!� is tinged with regret at this lack of recognition of an operation outstanding in its own right.
NEW DELHI: India is undertaking an ambitious programme to upgrade its entire fleet of over 2,000 infantry combat vehicles with advanced weaponry and night-fighting capabilities, even as it inducts more T-90S main-battle tanks, upgrades its T-72 fleet and plans a futuristic "smart" tank for battles beyond 2020.
Army chief General Bikram Singh is pushing hard for speedy modernization of the 1.13-million force, especially the fighting arms of infantry, artillery and mechanized forces, which had virtually stalled over the last few years due to shoddy management of procurement projects as well as bad blood between his predecessor Gen V K Singh and the defence ministry.
The Army wants to bolster the "shock and awe" capabilities of its mechanized forces, which includes 63 armoured corps regiments and over 30 mechanized infantry battalions, in tune with its war doctrine that lays stress on being prepared for high-intensity, fast tempo and short-duration battles. Both strategic mobility and enhanced firepower are required for rapid offensive thrusts into enemy territory.
While infantry combat vehicles may be the slightly poorer cousins of tanks in terms of armour-protection and weaponry, they perform the critical task of carrying soldiers into the battle zone backed with fire support. Apart from being amphibious, they are also useful in urban combat and asymmetrical warfare.
"The plan is to provide desired offensive capabilities to our BMP-II and BMP-IIK infantry combat vehicles, which can carry 10 soldiers, on three fronts: thermal imaging integration, armament upgrade and engine upgrade," said a source.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations show the overall cost of this entire project could touch Rs 10,000 crore. The armament upgrade alone, for instance, would be worth over Rs 5,000 crore, with the BMPs to be equipped with two twin-missile launchers on each side, 2nd-generation-plus ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles) and 30-mm automatic grenade launchers.
"It also includes TIFCS (thermal imaging fire control systems) to increase accuracy of weapon systems and panoramic sights for the commanders to be able to look in all directions," said the source.
While over 950 BMPs have already been fitted with thermal imaging modules, the rest will now be equipped with advanced "TISK" systems that integrate ATGMs, auto-canons and PKT machine guns to ensure they can be fired accurately at night. "This integration should be completed by mid-2014. The existing 285 horsepower engines of the BMPs will also be upgraded to 360 horsepower," he said.
As for the armoured corps, they have already inducted around 800 of the planned 1,657 Russian-origin T-90S tanks and 124 indigenous Arjun tanks (the Mark-II version of which is being developed with "89 improvements"), apart from upgrading its old warhorse fleet of T-72 tanks.
Even if the IFV project was going as smooth as makhan it would have taken at least till 2020 to get it designed and fully tested. And another 10-15 years of production to completely replace the legacy BMP. So I reckon the BMP upgrade is required any way.Arun Menon wrote:^BMP upgrade seems to be needed since the IFV project is now in limbo, but why do we need to upgrade these old T-72s, why not replace all of them with Arjuns?
Hope its an indigenous solution using the Nag or the Cannon-launched Laser Guided Missile.Austin wrote:Army to upgrade entire fleet of infantry combat vehicles
..with the BMPs to be equipped with two twin-missile launchers on each side, 2nd-generation-plus ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles) ..
You are insulting yourself Surya, dont. These dont know what a vehicle means from a tank. To them they are all the same. They are here for one line comedy.Surya wrote:Is there a supposed implication that
Protection on tincan == Protection on IFV
I can now safely retire - the youngistan brigade can carry on the good fight
It seems to be a Bradley - unfortunately all these IFVs get cut up like butter by RPGs
Thanks for the extra information ManishManish_P wrote:Rohit is right, as usual
The photo is of a British Warrior IFV, which was attacked by a mob in Basra, Iraq
The fire was caused by Molotov cocktails thrown at it by the mob
The crew suffered burns but no one was killed
Anyway OT for this thread
and endWhy does it have to take the MOD/IA/DRDO so long to realise that we have huge numbers
Unless there is a revolution in the DRDO
The problem with FICV project lies with MOD - there is some game plan afoot to give back-door entry to DPSU into the deal. The IA is keen for private players to participate in the project and come up with some solution.Pratyush wrote:The Rusies are already working on a universal family of Armored vehicles. So BMP 3 or no BMP 3. We will be buying from the Russians by 2015-16. While shelving the FICV project.
And the story will continue.
This is exactly what I feel. The private companies can't bear the cost of this continuous stalling process while tax-funded/bailed DPSUs can.rohitvats wrote: The problem with FICV project lies with MOD - there is some game plan afoot to give back-door entry to DPSU into the deal. The IA is keen for private players to participate in the project and come up with some solution.
The Defence Ministry today approved a Rs 2,820 crore proposal to provide night-vision devices to the Army to enable its tanks and infantry combat vehicles to have capability to fight in both day and night conditions.
Under the plans to do away with the night blindness of Army's mechanised fleet including the Russian-origin T-90 and T-72 tanks and the BMP Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICV), around 5,000 thermal imaging sights would be procured from defence PSU Bharat Electronics limited, they said.
For the T-72, which are the main stay of the Indian Army, 2,000 pieces of TI sights would be procured for Rs 1,000 crore while 1,200 pieces would be bought for the T-90 Main Battle Tanks for Rs 960 crore.
1,780 pieces of TI sights would be inducted for the BMP Infantry Combat Vehicles for Rs 860 crore, they said.
The Army has been worried over night-fighting capabilities of its armoured columns and reports had earlier suggested that only 50 per cent of the tank fleet of the forces had this ability.
Meanwhile, the ministry also cleared a proposal to upgrade the existing inventory of M-46 130mm artillery guns to 155mm guns through the Ordnance Factory Board.
The OFB has plans of modernising its facilities under a Rs 15,000 crore plan in the ongoing 12th Defence Plan.