1. Just as there are no silver bullets, there are no silver BPJs - so unless one is seduced by Bollywood interpretations of what BPJs can do or marketing spiel masquerading as fact in one of those "Futureweapons" shows on Discovery etc., some realistic expectation setting might be the need of the hour.vasu raya wrote:Thanks ArmenT, one hopes there would be a full de-briefing session that would be made public and clarifies that there is no mismatch between the weapons the rebels are using vs. the BPJs the UN contingent had. The statistics on the protection offered by various BPJ designs in a frontal assault position and in prone position should make matters clear. Kargil was another instance where the soldiers were moving exposed on the forward slopes of the mountains and took bullets in the face-neck area.ArmenT wrote:^^^
Not all BPJs protect all sides of the torso. Some protect only the frontal and back area mainly. So it is possible to get hit in the side and not have adequate protection there. The arm pit area is a particularly vulnerable area in many BPJ designs. If the vest doesn't fit well, a bullet could also pass through the gap between the neck and the BPJ (especially if in a prone position). Finally, different BPJs have different ratings. Some can stop rifle bullets, others only pistol bullets. Some only stop lead bullets, others can stop steel bullets as well. You get the idea.
Anyways, main title of the article here Indian jawans killed in Sudan took on rebels for one hour: UN says that they fought for 1 hour, thats more than enough time for a heli-borne or a turbo-prop based squad to arrive on the scene as re-inforcements
2. Troops, and usually the most tactically savvy and well equipped ones frequently choose to dispense with heavy protection (and a ceramic insert is pretty heavy) in favour of some other tactical advantage that they hold more important in a battle - like ease of maneuver and fire. Sometimes, like in Kargil and the Battle of Takur Ghar that can actually be a life saver.
3. A well sited ambush, executed competently, will always cause casualties. Remember what happened to a 1 Para Cdo team led by Maj. Mohit Sharma in Kashmir a few years ago. Unless the SOP was to have a very aggressive force protection posture with helicopters etc. providing overwatch and that was not followed, no one is owed any public briefing or explanation.
4. As the COAS said post the beheading, this is an operational and tactical matter that the on ground commander will have to deal with. The fact that this is a thankless UN mission will make it more difficult, but as India has shown in the Congo, we can get very aggressive, if the UN allows it. That's pretty much the only relevant question here.