Marten wrote:Substantiate your statement that Marut was a DISASTER. And you can definitely do away with the condescension because you do not in any way constitute an expert on the Marut.
Calling you out is not being foul-mouthed - it is a necessity owing to your propensity to continue BS-ing based on your own previous posts.
Sirjee,
Asking Sanku ji to substantiate whatever he says is patently unfair. Why do you hold such high expectations?
You see, you need to always assume that Sanku ji does not read what he posts and he of course he does not read what others post. He only posts what he thinks is right. Unfortunately what he thinks is right is not really understood by others.
For example take this case. He calls the Marut experiment a disaster - in terms of developing a fighter - ab inito without any expertise whatsoever and with no notable industrial background in the country (remember this was in the 1950s). When called out he pulls out that article from BRF to back his assertion that the project was a "disaster".
Now let's see some excerpts from that article:
Exhibit 1:
The Marut was conceived to meet an Air Staff Requirement (ASR), that called for a multi-role aircraft suitable for both high-altitude interception and low-level ground attack. The specified performance attributes called for a speed of Mach 2.0 at altitude, a ceiling of 60,000 feet (18,290 m) and a combat radius of 500 miles (805 km). Furthermore, the ASR demanded that the basic design be suitable for adaptation as an advanced trainer, an all-weather fighter and for 'navalization' as a shipboard aircraft. It was directed that this aircraft be developed within the country. As an aside, it might be worth noting that the design philosophy and ASR for the current Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) is quite similar.
Now do note the bolded portion, particularly the colored bold. Keeping in mind that the ASR was conceived by the IAF in the mid 1950s, what they were looking for was a state-of-the-art fighter being developed in India as a first attempt.
Now look at the much maligned (by Sanku ji and a new Jonny Come Lately) production side:
Exhibit 2:
The task of meeting the ASR was assigned to Hindustan Aircraft Limited (now HAL Bangalore). However, in 1955 no infrastructure capable of supporting the programme existed in India. And there was scant appreciation on the part of the government of the technological hurdles that would need to be surmounted.
Along with the government I would include the IAF folks who drew up the ASR (perhaps even then they had bouts of brochuristists)
Hindustan Aircraft, in 1956, possessed only three senior Indian design engineers and the entire design department boasted only 54 personnel. The prototype shop had 60 people on staff and the entire strength of the production engineering department amounted to just 13. Worse yet, no hangar space was available for the construction of prototypes, no machine shop existed for prototype engineering, and there were no test equipment, structural test rigs or a flight test laboratory.
In fact, the Hindustan Aircraft complex lacked even a suitable runway from which the new aircraft could begin flight testing. The entire infrastructure had to be built from scratch. Much effort was invested in building up a viable design and testing infrastructure. And by the time the first prototype of the Marut commenced its flight test programme in 1961, Hindustan Aircraft employed 18 German design engineers, a design department possessing 150 personnel, a prototype shop with 631 personnel including 39 supervisors, and a production engineering department with more than 100 personnel.
Note the investments that were then made and which, to a certain extent, helped when we went for the LCA.
Yet despite all these hurdles and also thanks to Kurt Tank, the first plane flew in 1961:
Exhibit 3:
After a comprehensive three month ground test programme, HF-001, with the late Wg. Cdr. (later Grp. Cpt.) Suranjan Das at the controls, flew for the first time on 17 June 1961. This aircraft's first official flight took place a week later on June 24th, in the presence of the then Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon. By then HF-001 had IAF roundels applied to it and had been assigned the serial number BR 462.
So, a programme which Sanku ji labels as a disaster, isn't it surprising that despite the ab inito nature of this task the first plane flew within 6-7 years of the programme starting with the ASR being framed?
Exhibit 4:
We all know that the Marut suffered from the lack of a suitably powered engine. Well now look at what the article has to say about this:
The design of the HF-24 had been based around the availability of the 8170 lbs. (3705 kg) afterburning Orpheus BOr 12 engine. Unfortunately, the British requirement for this powerplant was discarded and the Indian Govt. declined to underwrite its continued development. In retrospect, this was a very shortsighted decision on the part of the Indian Government. The manufacturer had asked for £13 million as development costs, not a large sum even by the standards of the 1960s. And the Government's decision not to underwrite the costs of the BOr 12 development was to haunt the Marut programme for ever. In the even that the BOr 12 was no longer an option, the design team was forced to adopt the non-afterburning 4850 lbs. (2200 kg) Orpheus 703 for the initial and interim version of the fighter. India now initiated what was to prove a lengthy and frustrating search for an alternative power plant to the Orpheus BOr 12.
So the fact that lack of a suitable engine stymied the project was due to the stupid babus at HAL right, Sanku ji?
There are many more details about the search for a suitable engine. However, let's get back to Sanku ji's comment about the project being a disaster. The plane actually saw action in the 1971 war. And this is what the author of the article has to say about that:
Exhibit 5:
There is wide consensus about excellent handling characteristics of the aircraft. Most pilots who have flown the aircraft describe it as pleasant to fly and excellent for aerobatics with fine control responses. And its ability to out-accelerate the Hunter led one pilot to describe the Marut, with undisguised affection, as the Hunter Mk.II ! The Marut offered a stable gun platform and packed a formidable punch. While the Marut's pilots expressed an understandable desire for more thrust than the Orpheus 703 offered, they were unanimous in their view that the aircraft proved itself a thoroughly competent vehicle for the low-level ground attack profile.
Throughout the December 1971 hostilities, the Marut squadrons enjoyed extremely high serviceability rates (in contrast to the late 1960s), this undoubtedly owed much to an improved spares situation and the original design's emphasis on ease of maintenance. It should also be noted that from January '71 onwards, an improved version of the Marut with a lengthened wing cord (giving it greater wing area and hence greater lift), numerous cockpit changes and a sophisticated ISIS gunsight, started entering squadron service.
On one of these, a Marut returned to base without escort on one engine, from about 150 miles (240 km) inside hostile territory. On another occasion, Wg. Cdr. Ranjit Dhawan, flying his Marut through debris that erupted into the air as he strafed a convoy, felt a heavy blow in the rear fuselage of the aircraft, the engine damage warning lights immediately glowing and one engine cutting. Fortunately, the Marut attained a safe and reasonable recovery speed on one engine. Consequently, Dhawan had no difficulty in flying his crippled fighter back to base. Another safety factor was the automatic reversion to manual control in the event of a failure in the hydraulic flying control system, and there were several instances of Maruts being flown back from a sortie manually.
And the last Exhibit:
The Rolls-Royce RB.153 was considered for a while, but Hindustan Aeronautics was neither able to accept the terms of the proposed contract nor, at the time, was ready to consider the major redesign of the fuselage that adoption of the RB.153 would have entailed. In the event that by the early 1980s, the Air Staff requirements for a TASA (Tactical Attack and Strike Aircraft) and a DPSA (Deep Penetration and Strike Aircraft) were fulfilled by foreign aircraft, the need for a upgraded Maruts became somewhat superfluous. And by the mid-1980s enough Jaguars and MiG-23BN/27s were joining the IAF, that the Marut programme no longer remained viable.
So as is happening with the Arjun vis a vis Tin cans, it so happened that the IAF did not find it necessary to at least keep a local product humming even as it went for foreign planes (nobody begrudges them of that but sure they could have continued to keep on supporting the Marut?).
Sorry for a long post but I find it absolutely hilarious that Sanku ji uses this article of all articles to prove that the Marut programme was a
Disaster?
mood. Not due to the lack of progress, but this thread biting the dust. Sure, there is disappointment that I am not seeing a dozen of them based in Sulur. This thread, a delight for the paki/chins who troll this site.
