Continued from previous thread - to be read in conjunction with YIP's land war scenario.
For map reference,
this link will be useful. To get a feel for the physical picture, try Google Earth.
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The heli-dropped infantry companies were tasked with seizing water locations, identifying minefields and interdicting Pakistani forward patrols. They made contact with the enemy within about an hour of being dropped and skirmishes began. Due to their limited mobility, their effectiveness was largely compromised and so they decided to hold as many strong points as they could until reinforcements arrived. Nevertheless, their presence west of the railway line linking Fort Abbas to Harunabad had the effect of unsettling Pakistani defenses along the canal line. Meanwhile, canal breaching operations by 66 Engineer Regt., supported by Bde. Arty began south of Harunabad and after 3 hours of bitter fighting and significant casualties in which one crossing was called off, one bridgehead was established between the Kalianwali and 7R Distributaries about 2 km west of the railway line. By noon, one battalion of 11 Mech. Inf. supported by a tank regiment and an air defense battery had established a firm base for further exploitation. Welcome though the news was at 14 Div. HQ, no one was complacent. They knew the most difficult battles were ahead of them; this one was merely a feint.
The plan to force Pak 10 (I) Armd Bde northward from Khanpur hinged upon sustaining the momentum of the offensive towards Khairpur. The necessary speed of advance could be maintained only by traveling in the open country, which was further south of Fort Abbas. The logistical support for this effort would be along the Hakra Right Distributary, so as to be near a water source as well as to avoid being exposed to air interdiction in the open desert as much as possible. That, in turn, meant that the canal-line defenses along the Hakra Right Distributary would have to be neutralized first and secured for the logistical support vehicles to follow. This was to prove the sternest test for the units tasked with assaulting it.
With about 6 hours of daylight remaining, recce elements of 7 Cav. crossed the border south of Fort Abbas and charted the minefields’ layout. Guided by the recce sorties, the main force of three T-72 regiments from 7 and18 Cav. from Anupgarh and Hisamki swung north in a three-pronged attack on the Hakra Right Distributary at points about 10 miles apart. The going was slow and the resistance was fierce, but the sustained shelling and the lavish expenditure of bunker-busting Carl Gustav rounds by supporting infantry breached the defenses as far west as Marot to a degree by nightfall. Under the cover of darkness, 3 more battalions of infantry moved in to mop by the remaining resistance, while the tanks broke through and continued northeast to threaten the Bahawal canal. It was in this crucial mopping up operation that years of counter-insurgency experience carried the day.
The jawan and the junior officers of of 2010 shared many of their regimental forefathers’ qualities – battle endurance, unflinching loyalty to each other and pride in their colors. However, in one crucial aspect, the newer generation was completely different – all ranks had years of experience of being under fire. While a full-fledged war is without a doubt far more intense and frightening than a COIN operation, lessons learned the hard way in counterinsurgency still proved valuable. Jawans knew how to react under fire – they returned fire instead of freezing up and waiting to be ordered to do so. Captains and Majors took care to know what was happening on their flanks instead of merely focusing on communications up and down the echelon. In doing so, they did not surrender a hard won position for fear of an attack on their flanks. The troops exercised good fire discipline and tactical movement, learned as much in the dhoks of the Pir Panjal as in the jungles of Nagaland. While none of this made a significant difference at the section or platoon level in terms of casualties, it made a huge difference at the company and battalion levels. Put simply, the follow-on engineer companies the next day could construct defensive minefields, shore up the damaged bunkers, dig holes, put up barricades and road-blocks and set up traffic lanes for the logistical vehicles that would follow.
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