Bharat Rakshak

Colonel,

FM 3 speed reading? Or should I say seletctive reading.

As I said those are the basics. Thereafter juxtapose threat perception, gound realties and then we guesstimate.

I never said cut and paste in totality.

Sir,

I did not mean to imply any cut and paste at all, merely stating what the USArmy is doing, the problems they're encountering, and the solutions that they're coming up with. I am merely suggesting a guide as to watch similar developments within the InA. The InA, may in fact, come up with a whole different set of solutions. Thus, knowing what others did will help understand what the InA would or would not do.

As for FM-3 ... (BIG SIGH OF RELIEF) ..., I was going to ask you on a course on FM speed reading. I thought I was doing something wrong if it took me over a year to read that thing and you did it in less than 2 months.

seems obvious that CS will be differently positioned vis a vis TSP and China. with TSP we play a battle of annihilation in their space, with China we play a hold the line and blunt the big spear and deny them a political victory game.

it seems to me that a Phase II attack by China, particularly in the mountains is vulnerable to counter SF operations in their rear. a significant amount of confusion in the rear causes the II and III forces to get their lines of comms all tangled up and the big thrust forward loses momentum. anyway, the terrain precludes large flanking manouevres by either side. and not even the americans have enough choppers to move enough men around speedily

but anyway - in arunachal we need other answers than armoured units. it will be all infantry and artillery with CAS when the gods permit

As of now, doesn't it seem that CS is an exclusively Pak-focused doctrine? IOW, India has no offensive intentions around any of its other neighbours.

as stated boldly in our foreign policy. indeed India has no aggressive intent beyond her borders with anyone. just that the pesky paks are getting too pesky and will have to be swatted for the sake of the world (we are the nearest to the dung heap)

in that respect, we only need enough armour to overwhelm TSP forces. Geograhpy makes other armour irrelevant - largely

there is no case for action unless PLA forces have occupied Nepal or Bhutan.

Myanmar/Burma is a more formidable opponent and atleast in the border areas it is not tank country. Normally there are few scenarios where war would be contemplated with Burma - depends once again on Chinese interference in the status quo.

I would like to submit the following piece as an op-ed to BRM. Please review and send feedback!

Thanks
YIP

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An Evaluation of the Indian Army’s “Cold Start” Doctrine

The Indian Army has recently unveiled a new war-fighting doctrine termed “Cold Start”. This doctrine envisages a rapid and integrated initiation of combat operations by all three services, and involves development of “integrated battle groups” comprising of army, air force, and naval formations to execute it.

This newly proposed doctrine has several merits; it borrows from tested war-fighting doctrines of countries with modern and well integrated armed forces. The fundamental power of a cold start doctrine stems from the recognition of the temporal dimension as a decisive factor in modern conflicts, especially those fought with a nuclear backdrop. A rapid response is essential for robbing the opponent of initiative, and for ensuring that all subsequent enemy responses are forced and dictated by the evolution of own combat operations and political initiatives. By dictating the opponent’s responses, Cold Start acts as a mechanism of escalation dominance and seeks to reduce the possibilities of a conflict spiraling out of control.

The Indian Army’s embrace of rapid operations concepts is not a new development – elements of this strategy were tested in exercises and war games held in 2000 and 2001. Exercise Vijay Chakra, held in the plains of Rajasthan in 2000, involved night-time air dropping of a parachute company with armoured combat vehicles, to test how airborne operations can be used to increase the pace of combat deployment. Exercise Bhramastra was held later that year as a brainstorming exercise between the leadership of the three services, to determine how individual service operations and doctrines could be synthesized. However, some key doctrinal differences emerged through this session, which will be discussed later. The army further tested elements of this doctrine in 2001 through Exercise Poorna Vijay, which involved an air drop of a full parachute battalion as well as day-night operations by I Strike Corps.

The deliberations on a cold start doctrine for the army were given further impetus by the experience of Operation Parakram, the full-scale deployment of India’s armed forces after the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001. Operation Parakram saw the IAF being deployed to combat stations in a matter of days; the bulk of the Indian Army was moved to the western theatre of operations in two to three weeks. Subsequent reports have tried to portray the movement of the army formations as ponderous, but these reports downplay the surprise and concern felt by the Pakistani military at the rapidity of movement of massive division and corps level formations over hundreds of kilometers. The reality was that the movement by key elements of II Strike Corps was rapid enough to prompt US intervention and caused the removal of the commander who authorized their deployment. The smoothness of the deployment exercise undoubtedly contributed to the Indian Army’s confidence in its abilities to initiate rapid deployments and operations.

However, unexpectedly rapid deployment was not sufficient to permit political initiative to be retained on the Indian side. There was a significant element not related to the actual speed of the movement that contributed to this loss of political initiative: the Indian response was very predictable, and conformed to the widely known pattern of deploying the three strike corps to signal Indian intentions. It is difficult to say with any certainty whether the Indian government intended to use the massive deployment as a bargaining tool in itself or whether the deployment was really a precursor to all-out war. In either case, the actual experience showed that India’s intentions were gauged principally by the movement of the readily identified and tracked strike formations. Predictability can be a virtue in diplomatic signaling, but it can have deadly drawbacks when the shooting begins. After the first few weeks, the army lost any element of surprise, and had to rely on a massive redeployment and an unprecedented concentration of three strike corps in Rajasthan to retain strategic initiative and coercive leverage.

The key lesson of Operation Parakram, therefore, was that predictability of deployment was a significant weakness of the Indian response strategy. The Cold Start doctrine seeks to make the deployment less predictable by taking the onus of attack away from the strike corps and placing it on the forward deployed “holding” corps of the army. Under the new dispensation, the army components of the battle groups would presumably operate under the command of the holding corps, and be deployed in smaller units that are based much closer to the border.

Having key attack elements deployed much closer to the border reduces deployment time in two significant ways: the deployment distances are reduced; equally importantly, logistics requirements for the initial attack force are also reduced. The intended military objects are better masked by having a larger number of smaller units dispersed across the likely theatre of operations, and the inherent rigidity of having a predetermined objective (such as reaching the Indus) is replaced by the flexibility of being able to choose a breach for further exploitation. The unpredictability as well as increased pace of deployment and initiation of combat operations aids in retaining political and military initiative by controlling the decision making and response cycle of the opponent as well as concerned international opinion.

While full development of integrated battle groups envisaged by the doctrine would require additional purchases of combat systems as well as a significant restructuring of the command apparatus of the Indian military, some fundamental elements of the army components of the battle groups can be put together rapidly and easily through a redeployment of existing army assets. Furthermore, the Cold Start Doctrine is a conceptual move that makes Indian response to external provocation and nuclear blackmail less predictable and more flexible than the currently employed doctrine of massive attack, and opens up the possibility of intense but limited and controllable conflicts. In particular, it poses a significant challenge to the Pakistani strategy of state sponsored terrorism combined with nuclear blackmail.

The preceding discussion indicates that the Cold Start doctrine is conceptually sound and may be implementable with existing resources and planned purchases. However, there are significant blocks to its formal acceptance outside the Indian Army.

The most important block is that of political acceptance. Independent India fights its wars with very close political oversight and control. A doctrine that calls for rapid response and initiation of intense combat operations raises the possibility that political controls may become less effective, and that the combat commanders would have far greater latitude for independent initiative than would be deemed acceptable. Cold Start would be a non-starter without civilian institutions that can develop the political framework and objectives to support a rapid response doctrine, and without a politico-military command structure that can withstand the increased decision making tempo generated by the intense combat operations.

The Integrated Defense Headquarters and the Chief of Defense Staff are seen by the army as institutions that would help implement the politico-military framework for supporting this assertive doctrine. However, there are inter-service realities that the Army has to address, before it can hope to have acceptance for the Cold Start Doctrine. The primary doctrinal block; one that surfaced most famously during Exercise Bhramastra and the Kargil War of 1999, is the issue of joint warfare between the army and the air force. The two services have a very different doctrinal view of how joint operations should be conducted. In essence, the army believes that the modern wars are best fought under a unified command, where one commander controls unified formations from all three services. The air force, on the other hand, believes that the different services should coordinate their plans but fight the war separately, in order to achieve integrated political and military objectives.

In the Indian Air Force’s view, assigning air force units by geographic command would cause a gross underutilization of air power. In comparison to army formations that have to be assigned a clearly defined and relatively limited operational area, an air force squadron or wing can operate over hundreds or thousands of kilometers; it can be redeployed in hours or days if required. Likewise, strike targets are defined very differently for the air force, and limiting a squadron of multi-role combat aircraft for close air support or air cover places artificial and unacceptable constraints on employment of air power. It follows from this doctrinal outlook that the Indian Air Force will likely be opposed to “integrated battle groups” and the command structure for conducting integrated operations as envisaged by the army.

The army, as the proponent of Cold Start, bears the primary responsibility for winning formal acceptance for the doctrine. If the army chooses to make this issue a technical one and focuses on replicating war-fighting manuals from other countries, then this initiative will not only fail to win political approval, but will also degenerate into a messy inter-service turf battle. Recognizing the reality of modern warfare would involve significant compromises in the role of the army– for example; a unified Cold Start Doctrine can and should include an “Air Power Only” option that involves exclusive employment of air power assets for punitive operations. The ability of the army to accommodate political realities and opposing doctrinal views will therefore determine whether the Cold Start Doctrine gets accepted or gets put in Cold Storage.

YIP: Nice write up. We will be happy to consider it for BRM. We will be in touch.

A couple of questions regarding the Naval part. YOu talk about the integration involving naval, yet we don't discuss the naval component at all.

Secondly, is there likely to be a difference in the deployment pattern for the navy? Will considerable additional hardware be needed? How does Brahmos fit into this?

Last point, would it be possible to condense the war-game scenario that you wrote up in the DAstra thread into an annotated commentary for BRM? By "annotated commentary" I mean where you use the basic write up, and then include footnotes or other, perhaps, hyperlinks to explain how each stage corresponds to a revised doctrine and why its still a viable option given the Orbat and timelines available. If we need to put together pictures of movement of forces that might be useful as well, and help is available in that regard.

Naval Cold Start - starter for 10

1. ASW assets out at sea permanently (deliberately TSP centric)
2. Aerial recon out at sea permanently (increased in times of tension)
3. first sign of trouble, 1 destroyer and 1 AA ship move into zone cleared by ASW/Air and prepare to catch any TSP ships out in the Arabian sea (less than 12 hrs)
4.a CBG mobilises within 24 hrs, sails into zone within 72, plus additional strike forces
4b. Su30MKI top cover deploys within 4 hrs, aggressive antiship patrols, baiting of haiders and other coastal PAF units for air combat (6 MKI's operating from Pune are sufficient, if combined with Gorshkov and shore based 29's)
5. on go signal - attack any stray TSPN assets at sea, particularly subs
6. Move to choke karachi/gwadar
7. on go - hit karachi/gwadar military ports with combined naval/air assets (include IAF)
8. next stage - hit PA units in Sindh using LACM/air (escalation)
9. fly 'cab rank CAS' and logistics interdiction support for Gujarat based IA Battle group, freeing IAF to concentrate further north
10. if hostilities continue, hit fuel stores in karachi
11. Option: portion of Gujarat BG makes amphibious assault in Sindh, gouges out a kill zone, and is then evaced rapidly from beach head
12. exit when political target reached

hitting the fuel stores are karachi would be #1 due to its disproportionate impact on morale and economy. the CNN footage of huge flames over the city is a psyops victory of value.

YIP:

Excellent write up, as usual, but I do have one quibble. I don't think it is possible to declare a doctrine sound (in more than the sense of being feasible) without an analysis of how an opponent will respond to it, doctrinally or strategically (not just tactically). I haven't seen this question addressed satisfactorily, although I am not expert enough to suggest any answers. Of course you aren't writing a thesis here (!), but someone should address this issue at some point.

So if you are Pakistan, what asymmetric actions will you take to degrade/weaken Cold Start?

The timeframe of cold start ops (10-14 days) leaves little room for any major naval ops imo other than wiping off the PN and hitting shore facilities like docks, warehouses, repair yards and POL storages with missiles from a distance.

IN units sailing from Mumbai and Karwar would need
about 1 day to get ready, 2-3 days of sailing to
reach op areas. That leaves about 7-10 days to
locate and destroy the PN.

PNs response: to sail far out is to die under INs guns, so do not stay in port (targets for IAF or Klubs) but keep sailing around near the coast
protected behind a screen of 2-3 subs and a LRMP picket to detect and evade IN movements.

keep the older Daphne/Agosta for picket duty and
push out the 1-2-3 Agosta90B to try and bag a
IN ship or two using Exocet missiles. try to scare the IN from keeping its capital ships as far from Pak coast as possible.

Mount one or two massed raids by Haiders when LRMP detects some potential target. concentrate fire on 1 or 2 ships to overwhelm the defences and gain a propaganda victory, giving a bloody nose to IN.

at all costs avoid being baited by roving -29s or MKIs and stick to the plan - shelter behind the tough karachi area air defence until the opportunities present themselves to dart out and strike a couple of solid blows. If things look difficult in karachi area (IAF devotes a lot of strike power) then retire back to jacobabad , dalbandin, quetta to wait the war out.

minimize losses, stay in the ring, avoid the killer uppercut, maintain a safe distance.

"victory" is staying alive when the bell sounds.

damages to shore facilities can be repaired later
using arab and chinese assistance.

deploy mujahid & jihadi batallions as a light
screening force to tie up any attempted shore
landings by IA between rann and karachi..the chances are unlikely given the lead time reqd to prepare an amphib landing. holding some barren rocky coast for 10 days is of no great value to india and the enclave wont be tenable after the war when PA can be back in full force.

thats my stab at a asymetric plan to degrade the
naval part of cold start.

Yes YIP try to integrate as suggested by Calvin. It would do more for everyone's comprehension.

Meantime xposting from Op Parakram thread....
shiv
Member
Member # 367

posted 22 June 2004 05:07 AM
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Lessons of Op Parakram - OCRed from Vayu III/2004

More than a year after its ignominious termination, the true story of Operation Parakram can now be told. The Indian threat of war was an empty boast, the Indian armed forces had neither effective plans, nor the wherewithal to "punish" Pakistan. The armed forces blame their political and bureaucratic masters for not having provided them adequate resources, but the armed
forces in fact are to blame for not having a workable strategy.

After the terrorist attack on Parliament, the Cabinet asked the forces to act against Pakistan. There was just one condition - action must be immediate and should not go beyond two weeks. That nothing happened is now history. There have been claims that they were ready to act in early January and again in June 2002. The reality is that they were unready when the only window available was open - from December 13, the day of the terrorist attack, to January 2, 2002 when Tony Blair announced his visit to the subcontinent.

According to reports, the first Army plan was for several thrusts across the Line of Control (LoC), to be launched in early January. The second, after the Kaluchak massacre, was for a deep strike into Pakistan through the Rajasthan border. Both plans were infirm. India did not have the numbers and fire power to punch across the LoC, or sufficient special forces to undertake the task in an effective manner. The second plans' strategy of thrusting deep into Pakistan would have meant an all-out war with its attendant risk of the use of nuclear weapons.

Confronted by the Cabinet mandate, the armed forces wanted a month's time frame, a window that was simply not available. Indeed, it has not been for a long time. The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted 22 days, and the 1971 conflict for 14. As the record now shows, on both occasions India came under enormous pressure from the UN and the great powers to cease fighting.

The armed forces response was based on neither cowardice nor incompetence, but an old-fashioned mindset and organisation that is unable to address the security challenges of the age. The Army, for example, has not been able to reorganise and equip itself to fight short, sharp wars like Kargil or mount deep cross-border strikes. More important, India's combat power is divided between three services, the Army, Navy and Air Force which work separately on their respective war plans and acquisitions.

The country has spent roughly Rs 60,000 crore per year on defence in the previous five years, and this was about the maximum it could without compromising the country's economic well-being. Instead of cutting their suit to fit the cloth, the armed forces constant refrain is that they are not given adequate resources.

All expert advice, including a path breaking Group of Minister's (GoM) report approved by the Cabinet, have suggested that the way to go is to integrate the three services, thereby rationalising costs and maximising fire power. A notable feature of the American campaign against Iraq was how US aircraft, taking off from Navy ships, functioned as airborne artillery for the Army's armoured columns.

The American example reveals that the most important compulsion to integrate is not simply on the need to economise, but to be able to fight wars in a paradigm shaped by what is called the revolution in military affairs. It means the ability of a commander to have total awareness of the location of his enemy's forces at all times, through a fused network of surveillance satellites, radar and unmanned aerial vehicles. Then, using IT -based command and control systems, he can make devastating precision strikes at the enemy's vitals.

Such war fighting requires smaller and more mobile forces, because large and stationary ones will be sitting ducks. Relying on massed artillery, armoured columns and fixed defences, the Indian Army can only hope to fight the last war better. Despite their technological orientation, the Indian Air Force and Navy, too are working along the same track. The three services make battle plans and acquisitions with little reference to the needs of the other service. The lesson of all wars is that the final decision has to be on land.

The GoM which went into the issues related to the Kargil war recommended integration of the three wings of the armed forces as a means of enhancing their combat power and effectiveness. The experience of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the US has shown that breaking service bureaucracies can only be done by the political leadership. The Vajpayee Govenunent skillfull y used the GoM format to execute deep reaching refonns in a host of areas from telecom to labour and textiles.

Unfortunately, the experience of the past two years shows that the old Government had been successfully stymied in critical atea of defence. The new government needs to give another push towards a joint armed force. The Government should immediately announce a Chief of Defence Staff to kickstart the process.

In the next five year plan, the Government could well spend Rs 400,000 crore on defence. This is a huge amount of money for a developing country, and so much more the reason whyil should be spent in a way that ensures that it creates a world class military.

Dr. Manoj Joshi
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So Cold Start clearly is an answer to the lesson sof Op Parakram. The good thing is it came from the services itself. Now to see it integrated.

Calvin, the naval component of Army's Cold Start doctrine dovetails quite nicely with the Navy's recently published doctrine. As in the case with IAF, the Navy has a very different doctrine than the Army. However, unlike the IAF's doctrine, the Navy's doctrine does not have any vital elements that would contradict the army's vision, hence the two services have always had a fairly smooth relationship.

The navy's doctrine deserves a separate article by itself, but so far as army-navy ops go, we should always remember that power projection capabilities are a very sensitive subject. They can raise apprehensions in entirely unintended quarters, so the Indian way of discussing them is to either not discuss them at all or to mask them in a misleadingly plausible scenario. Think about Rudra's and Daulat's posts in this light.

I am indulging in massive circumlocution over here, but the main thing I would like to say is that I believe there are reasons why the army has not expanded on the navy part of IBGs or Cold Start. And because of my interpretation of underlying reasons, I too would be very reluctant to expand on that. But your comments do indicate that a bit more work is necessary to critique how this is actually an Army centric doctrine that is being touted (somewhat misleadingly) as a "joint warfare" doctrine.

Amitabh, the Pakistani response to Cold Start indicates suppresed unease over the development, and an (current?) inability to come to terms with its implications beyond declaring it unworkable. Secondly, if we look at it from a formal logical perspective, it is always impossible to "prove" something; however, it takes just one exception to "disprove" something. This means that even if Cold Start actually works, it cannot logically be called sound because one can come up with a theoretical counter or claim (quite rightly) that it will not work in another circumstance. So there is always going to be difficulty in blessing some doctrine as being "sound". However, there are still good reasons for blessing it as being a very promising approach to breaking the doctrinal stalemate imposed by Pakistan's nuclearization. I think I should rewrite portions of the oped to reflect this thinking, what do you say?

PS
ramana, distill Joshis rhetoric and you come up with a pitch for Cold Start and integrated command. IOW, Joshi is lobbying for the Army in a typical Indian way. What I am trying to say is that this method of boiling everything down to a unified command without addressing the underlying objections to it is not going to work. CDS has not happened so far not because the politicians are unrealistically suspicious, but because of an implicit perception that it is an Army power play.

rudra saar, cost of being more on alert with my limited aging resources in case the IN/IAF combo hit me at short notice is going to strain my bank balance. I'd like to hit the yindu's hard on their H&D but the strain will be high. I worry about maintenance on my equipment and crew fatigue. Without a lot of reserves, how many assets can I keep active at any one time?

and what will I do with the air launched brahmos, those buggers can hit me from miles out, destroy any large radio contrast targets, e.g. karachi oil tanks!

Yogi, I have emailed a few comments to your ****_******@hotmail.com address

Calvin - I will write up an annotated version of Operation Durvasa; I will also update the oped piece to include some discussion on Divya Astra. Johann raised a valid point that any discussion on Cold Start would not be complete without the implications of Divya Astra.

Aah, but we could hold onto Clifton and squeeze the RAPEs for a couple of weeks or months!

PAF Haiders and all the rest in karachi will do precisely what I suggested. If the going is rough, asset preservation is paramount and they will withdraw to the west out of easy reach.

Sure IAF will then have a field day pounding a
few targets like oil tanks, steel mill etc but most of the PA garrison will just melt into the civilian population and cannot be targeted. the naval docks will be adandoned if necessary with vital stores trucked away and stored among civilians . the
wrecked warehouses can be rebuilt later.

PN will put to sea with all speed and hope to remain as a screening force, if pressed they will hug coast and seek shelter in neutral territory like Oman or Iran.

when the war's over they will emerge again like a
little chimp who has escaped the charge of angry
elephant. climb the nearest tree and resume throwing fruit at the elephant below.

the LRMP a/c have a very long range and can operate from bases in west like quetta. they dont need to move much beyond karachi to locate IN anyway

Clifton etc will be thrown to wolves. valuable RAPE will get into their Pajero's and make for their lavish country estates soon as they can.

PAF has around 60 air defence fighters deployed in karachi. a Mix of F-7 and F-16 will contest hard for every inch. Somehow IAF has to find a way to get rid of them either on ground or in the air.

YIP: Agree on rephrasing parts of your article to address the questions raised.

Ramana: I think Paddy's choice of words when discussing his "holding corps" gives away the reality of who really created and championed this new doctrine. Joshy is merely explaining the backdrop further, isn't he, and getting his gratuituous kicks in (at the same time).

RS: What are the distances from Tajikistan to Pakistan? WHat about from Iran to Pakistan?

Tajikistan is suitable for targeting the northern half of Pakistan. however the part near Pakistan
is the rough mountain region (pamirs) and the more developed western part near Panjshir valley (where we hang out) is a bit far - atleast 300km
http://www.grida.no/db/maps/prod/asia/tajik_l.gif

I doubt Tajiks or Iran would get involved in a Indo-Pak conflict unless Pak were totally on point of collapse and they could move in for their share of the spoils.

Iran might "discreetly" provide some assistance
like emergency stops of a/c in need, some low key refueling base deep in the desert, info on PN movements near gwader...but thats all I can see them do.

We need a way to
(a) get PAF off the table in east within 3 days
(b) catch and destroy "hiding" PAF on the ground
in their western airbases.

for (a) we have to pursue a dual strategy
(a1) shoot down anything that flies to engage us,
in any number
(a2) target runways with standoff missiles and
keep them sitting on ground in revetments effectively mission killing them and leaving them exposed to strike sorties

for (b) we need
(b1) bases in iran or afghanistan - we'd need to
get the US kicked out and be afghan's patron saint for that to happen
(b2) get realtime satellite imagery + 600-1000km
range very accurate INS+GPS+IIR guided cruise missiles in some quantity. That capability is a decade out.
(b3) gather together a huge Flanker force and send them by surprise after specific targets like dalbandin or quetta with diversions elsewhere to clear the way.

Once the PAF is off table , Pak has two choices
(a) disperse and save their armour but lose territory to IA BGs. a massive loss of face and morale.
(b) concentrate and try to fight IA BGs , but have IAF come down like ton of bricks on their butt. lose a lot of armour & infantry and then lose some territory. again a big certified loss.

(c) destruction of value targets like HIT, PAC
is a side thread which follows from PAF not
being on scene. addl sorties could be diverted to
rearrange Mudrike and akora khattak as well with napalm, clusters and rocket pods.

Gentlemen,

I would like to point out a counter-model to the Western C4ISR domination of the battlefield and that is the Soviet/Russian central-planning model. The difference between us and them is that we train for every possible contingency that we could think of for an operation. They reherse what they think they're going to do.

Our HQs are significantly larger than the Soviet/Russian/Chinese model because we need to manage all the information coming in towards us and modify our contingencies as they arise. Theirs is to assign specific taskings to each echelon and any changes to the battleplan would be applied to the next echelon while the committed echelon would be left as is.

The advantages of their system over ours is that IF (and a very BIG IF, a VERY VERY VERY BIG IF) they planned right, then their system is just as effective as ours. That means that if they can foresee what's going to happen, they can plan for it.

Such a system also bypasses the need for a strong and secured TACNET. Once the orders are given, the echelon is basically on its own and have no need for last minute changes nor support.

Such a system also allows for a superior casualty tolerance. We're combat ineffective at 25% lost. They at 50%. That's because once at 25% lost, we're no longer capable of having the proper resources to react properly - we don't know who's what, where, or how bad everyone of us is. They can remain combat effective because they don't have to react. They just carry on their mission.

To give you gentlemen an example, the 79 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan is just as every bit as impressive as the American Invasion of Iraq and the Soveits were no where near as technically advance as the Americans are today.

New naval doctrine stresses on developing nuclear triad

http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=230383

A naval cold start seems to me to be much more feasible for us. we have surplus capacity w.r.t. TSPN so that maintaining a sizable fleet in the arabian sea at all times is doable. anyway, we have to patrol the western sea quite aggressively these days. its a short step from there to be able to quickly pull together a critical mass of combatants to threaten TSP at short notice. Either way, the Gorshkov's 29K's will be in much demand, and must practice hard with 30MKI's and IA Gujarat BG in a more integrated fashion

Airforce cold start must be close to being active now. anyway we keep sufficient interceptors on standby at all times. the switch would be to keep strike a/c on short notice and ramp up massively within 48 hrs.

we should also think about roles for the BSF and ITBP and other units working with the IA BG's to prepare/clear/facilitate zones and movements

did they not have all major nodes in control within 24 hrs? massive airborne insertion followed by armour across the syr darya...

mind you in that way the 1842 british advance on kabul was pretty impressive too for its day.

In the middle of winter no less. One hell of an engineering feat.

any accounts on web of this invasion ?

Help yourself rudra. Ivan Yanke Afghan Tango

*******
Some thing to learn in future Kargil adventures of Mushy and to strike on camps beyond LOC.

aam-aadmi type questions :

(1) Is CS intended to act as a deterrent to Dec-13 type attacks ?
(2) If yes would it make sense to clearly identify the thresholds and let the services make autonomous decisions ?
(3) Also if yes to #1 then would it make sense to make the paki-targets public well in advance ?

Added later : US DHS has defined color coded threat levels - each level automatically triggers a bunch of stuff in diff depts - maybe GOI/services can jointly define such thresholds (JDAM attack is "red threshold") and their corresponding color coded targets (army HQ "yellow target")?

the trouble with advanced targeting - unless its army hq, is that when the bombs hit it will be like the sudanese toothpaste factory... i.e. nothing illicit going on onlee

the thing that tsp cannot handle will be uncertainty, confusion, and a threat of counter attack that will force them to maintain high states of readiness that they cannot afford. ofcourse if they have worn down their men and materials being ready, the end up being nanga once again...

i think though that lines in the sand can and should be drawn - proper laxman rekha's - i.e. minor bomb blast = 1 army post bofors'ed, fidayeen attack = LACM attack on home madrassah - or nearest, etc. but we need to deliver, like the yanks do

CS is not a deterrent posture in the classical sense. It merely says that as an when the GOI wishes to act, it has the wherewithal to act. Considering CS as a deterrent implies the need for a casus belli. My evaluation of CS is that it merely gives the GOI a loaded pistol that is cocked and ready to fire as and when the GOI wishes to. Whether the GOI waits for a casus belli is up to them.

In a sense, CS is the Indian equivalent of Star Wars - it forces Pakistan to spend the resources it can ill afford to protect against a threat that might as well be a fictional one.

YIP,

If your OP-ED is intended for those well versed in Indian defence affairs, then my comments do NOT apply.

However, I am not well versed in Indian defence affairs and somethings you've stated just doesn't make sense to me.

1) I've gotten the impression that the Indian civie leadership got a direct veto over Cold Start. That doesn't make sense to me. Civies decide whether where, and when we fight. We decide on how we fight.

2) Can you explain to me the unique situation on which the InAF can go their own way in fighting a seperate war when both the world's dominant military models (American and Russian) dictates that both the air campaign and the ground campaing answers to one commander.

3) Which FOREIGN military manuals are you refering to (American/NATO or Russian/Chinese)? Reading your OP-ED, neither does apply. Can you explain why it doesn't apply?

4) Can you explain why Ex Divya Astra is appropriate for Cold Start? I don't see it. Ex Divya Astra is a fantastic demonstration of fire, BUT not of manouver, which is what Cold Start is - bringing maximun force in minimal time.

Colonel,

YIP has ammalgamated all that has been said in the open media about the concept.

Indeed the connection between the various exercises mentioned by him has not been spelt out and hence the disconnect. I am sure he will do so now that you have raised it.

I am also keen to know the connection of the various exercises with the concept.

I don't think he meant that IAF goes on its own.

YIP,

It is a good summary. I have a few issues that one could clarify to make it a comprehensive document. I think you have done a wonderful start, even if it is not 'cold' .

"An Evaluation of the Indian Army's "Cold Start" Doctrine
The Indian Army has recently unveiled a new war-fighting doctrine termed "Cold Start". This doctrine envisages a rapid and integrated initiation of combat operations by all three services, and involves development of "integrated battle groups" comprising of army, air force, and naval formations to execute it."

Question: How will the IAF sanitise the air as the battle break takes off, contacts, overcomes opposition both mobile and the enemy node and then allows the battle groups to progress beyond? What would be the complementary roles and mutual assistance of the ground forces and the air? What will the role of Network Centric Operations and so on?

"This newly proposed doctrine has several merits; it borrows from tested war-fighting doctrines of countries with modern and well integrated armed forces."

Question: Which? It will help others to understand who know of these foreign doctrines. One could amplify these doctrines very sketchily if desired.

"The fundamental power of a cold start doctrine stems from the recognition of the temporal dimension as a decisive factor in modern conflicts, especially those fought with a nuclear backdrop. A rapid response is essential for robbing the opponent of initiative, and for ensuring that all subsequent enemy responses are forced and dictated by the evolution of own combat operations and political initiatives. By dictating the opponent's responses, Cold Start acts as a mechanism of escalation dominance and seeks to reduce the possibilities of a conflict spiralling out of control."

Qyestion: An amplification would be in order.

"The Indian Army's embrace of rapid operations concepts is not a new development - elements of this strategy were tested in exercises and war games held in 2000 and 2001. Exercise Vijay Chakra, held in the plains of Rajasthan in 2000, involved night-time air dropping of a parachute company with armoured combat vehicles, to test how airborne operations can be used to increase the pace of combat deployment. Exercise Bhramastra was held later that year as a brainstorming exercise between the leadership of the three services, to determine how individual service operations and doctrines could be synthesized. However, some key doctrinal differences emerged through this session, which will be discussed later. The army further tested elements of this doctrine in 2001 through Exercise Poorna Vijay, which involved an air drop of a full parachute battalion as well as day-night operations by I Strike Corps."

Question: What is the connection? Is it anything novel? If so, how?

"The deliberations on a cold start doctrine for the army were given further impetus by the experience of Operation Parakram, the full-scale deployment of India's armed forces after the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001. Operation Parakram saw the IAF being deployed to combat stations in a matter of days; the bulk of the Indian Army was moved to the western theatre of operations in two to three weeks. Subsequent reports have tried to portray the movement of the army formations as ponderous, but these reports downplay the surprise and concern felt by the Pakistani military at the rapidity of movement of massive division and corps level formations over hundreds of kilometers. The reality was that the movement by key elements of II Strike Corps was rapid enough to prompt US intervention and caused the removal of the commander who authorized their deployment. The smoothness of the deployment exercise undoubtedly contributed to the Indian Army's confidence in its abilities to initiate rapid deployments and operations."

Comment: That's as per folks is not the reason for the sidestepping. Rapid Deployment is the raison d'être for the Corps.

"However, unexpectedly rapid deployment was not sufficient to permit political initiative to be retained on the Indian side. There was a significant element not related to the actual speed of the movement that contributed to this loss of political initiative: the Indian response was very predictable, and conformed to the widely known pattern of deploying the three strike corps to signal Indian intentions. It is difficult to say with any certainty whether the Indian government intended to use the massive deployment as a bargaining tool in itself or whether the deployment was really a precursor to all-out war. In either case, the actual experience showed that India's intentions were gauged principally by the movement of the readily identified and tracked strike formations. Predictability can be a virtue in diplomatic signalling, but it can have deadly drawbacks when the shooting begins. After the first few weeks, the army lost any element of surprise, and had to rely on a massive redeployment and an unprecedented concentration of three strike corps in Rajasthan to retain strategic initiative and coercive leverage."

Comment: Not understood.

"The key lesson of Operation Parakram, therefore, was that predictability of deployment was a significant weakness of the Indian response strategy. The Cold Start doctrine seeks to make the deployment less predictable by taking the onus of attack away from the strike corps and placing it on the forward deployed "holding" corps of the army. Under the new dispensation, the army components of the battle groups would presumably operate under the command of the holding corps, and be deployed in smaller units that are based much closer to the border."

Comment: Amplify.

"Having key attack elements deployed much closer to the border reduces deployment time in two significant ways: the deployment distances are reduced; equally importantly, logistics requirements for the initial attack force are also reduced. The intended military objects are better masked by having a larger number of smaller units dispersed across the likely theatre of operations, and the inherent rigidity of having a predetermined objective (such as reaching the Indus) is replaced by the flexibility of being able to choose a breach for further exploitation. The unpredictability as well as increased pace of deployment and initiation of combat operations aids in retaining political and military initiative by controlling the decision making and response cycle of the opponent as well as concerned international opinion."

Comment: How? Amplification is essential.

"While full development of integrated battle groups envisaged by the doctrine would require additional purchases of combat systems as well as a significant restructuring of the command apparatus of the Indian military, some fundamental elements of the army components of the battle groups can be put together rapidly and easily through a redeployment of existing army assets. Furthermore, the Cold Start Doctrine is a conceptual move that makes Indian response to external provocation and nuclear blackmail less predictable and more flexible than the currently employed doctrine of massive attack, and opens up the possibility of intense but limited and controllable conflicts. In particular, it poses a significant challenge to the Pakistani strategy of state sponsored terrorism combined with nuclear blackmail."

Comment: Good point but how?

"The preceding discussion indicates that the Cold Start doctrine is conceptually sound and may be implementable with existing resources and planned purchases. However, there are significant blocks to its formal acceptance outside the Indian Army.
The most important block is that of political acceptance. Independent India fights its wars with very close political oversight and control. A doctrine that calls for rapid response and initiation of intense combat operations raises the possibility that political controls may become less effective, and that the combat commanders would have far greater latitude for independent initiative than would be deemed acceptable. Cold Start would be a non-starter without civilian institutions that can develop the political framework and objectives to support a rapid response doctrine, and without a politico-military command structure that can withstand the increased decision making tempo generated by the intense combat operations."

Comment: Maybe.

"The Integrated Defense Headquarters and the Chief of Defense Staff are seen by the army as institutions that would help implement the politico-military framework for supporting this assertive doctrine. However, there are inter-service realities that the Army has to address, before it can hope to have acceptance for the Cold Start Doctrine. The primary doctrinal block; one that surfaced most famously during Exercise Bhramastra and the Kargil War of 1999, is the issue of joint warfare between the army and the air force. The two services have a very different doctrinal view of how joint operations should be conducted. In essence, the army believes that the modern wars are best fought under a unified command, where one commander controls unified formations from all three services. The air force, on the other hand, believes that the different services should coordinate their plans but fight the war separately, in order to achieve integrated political and military objectives."

Comment: Valid. But now we don't have Patney.

"In the Indian Air Force's view, assigning air force units by geographic command would cause a gross underutilization of air power. In comparison to army formations that have to be assigned a clearly defined and relatively limited operational area, an air force squadron or wing can operate over hundreds or thousands of kilometers; it can be redeployed in hours or days if required. Likewise, strike targets are defined very differently for the air force, and limiting a squadron of multi-role combat aircraft for close air support or air cover places artificial and unacceptable constraints on employment of air power. It follows from this doctrinal outlook that the Indian Air Force will likely be opposed to "integrated battle groups" and the command structure for conducting integrated operations as envisaged by the army.
The army, as the proponent of Cold Start, bears the primary responsibility for winning formal acceptance for the doctrine. If the army chooses to make this issue a technical one and focuses on replicating war-fighting manuals from other countries, then this initiative will not only fail to win political approval, but will also degenerate into a messy inter-service turf battle. Recognizing the reality of modern warfare would involve significant compromises in the role of the army- for example; a unified Cold Start Doctrine can and should include an "Air Power Only" option that involves exclusive employment of air power assets for punitive operations. The ability of the army to accommodate political realities and opposing doctrinal views will therefore determine whether the Cold Start Doctrine gets accepted or gets put in Cold Storage."

Comment: On the whole, very illuminating summary.

YIP,

Summarise if you will the Pak reaction and the way they will negate the concept. That will be ideal. Could you also amplify the nuclear threshold stuff that prompts this concept, or if it doesn't then why not?

I agree it is not a deterrent in classical sense. However if properly implemented it will soon be ?

Advantages of advanced targetting (color coded):

(1) grants services the autonomy to take a decision on when to take action and what action must be taken. we need to minimise the time between dec-13 and the subsequent reaction to it.
(2) makes services more accountable. A review of preparedness would be in terms of "avg time to take out red target" or "avg time to initiate a yellow target operation", etc.
(3) re. the toothpaste factory analogy - it just depends on your target selection - if u select a parking lot as a target it can be emptied out ? but if u pick army HQ/datacenter/nuke-reactor its not easy ? plus major movements in these target areas can be used as intelligence triggers ? Besides, not *all* targets need to be declared. Also yellow threshold can result in red target with civilian approval.
(4) gives a better cost-benefit analysis to paki cmdrs while inflicting one of their thousand cuts.
(5) might end up being cheaper for us ?

JMT..

ARMORED WARFARE: New Brigades Increase Combat Power

June 23, 2004: The Army is converting its current Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to the new “Units of Action” (UA). Here is a comparison of the combat power of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) used during the 2003 Iraq campaign, to the Heavy UA. The UA is still evolving and can be expected to change further as the 3rd Infantry Division rotates its units through the National Training Center and its forthcoming deployment back to Iraq.

At first glance, the UA’s appear slightly more robust. The table below shows the number of major combat vehicles in each unit:

Equipment BCT
(2Tank/1MECH) UA Brigade Change
M1A1/A2 88 58 -30
M2A2/A3 44 58 +14
M3A2 0 36 +36
M109A6 18 16 -2
Total 164 182 +18

The BCT of two Tank battalions and one Mech infantry battalion, can, alternatively, contain two Mech infantry battalions and one Tank battalion.

Using TacOps’ wargame to compute combat power for these major systems; the BCT scores 17710 to the UA’s score of 17282. The difference is a mere two percent.

What are the ramifications of this change in organization?

On the positive side, it finally forms Combined Arms Battalions (CAB) with two armor and two mechanized infantry companies (an innovation long practiced in Armored Cavalry Squadrons) together with an assigned engineer company.

It has a robust reconnaissance capability, unfortunately without tanks, but does add UAV and NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) reconnaissance units. The UA has eight to 12 UAV’s: 4 in the artillery battalion, 4 in the Recon Squadron, and perhaps 4 in the MI (Military Intelligence) Company.

On the down side, with only two CABs, commanders will have difficulty constituting a reserve. Enhanced information flow and a common operating picture may provide a more nimble organization and allow information to be the reserve much like artillery’s ammunition is its reserve. The recon squadron can be used as a reserve, if needed.

Two assigned artillery batteries prevent each battalion from having a dedicated battery, and there are no long-range fires to support the recon squadron or provide counter-fire support. The commander cannot weight the main effort. The recon squadron will be heavily dependent upon its 6 120mm mortars.

The UA appears to lack air defense and aviation support.

The recon squadron may be handicapped in complex terrain without engineer support.

With four UAs instead of three BCTs, the Division has more combat units as shown below. This provides the division the ability to cover more ground, increases reconnaissance capability, and more flexibility, at a cost of slightly less artillery.

Company/Battery Troop OIF Division UA Division Change
Maneuver Companies 27 32 +5
Cavalry Troops 3 9 +6
Field Artillery Batteries 9 8 -1
Total 39 49 +10

It is difficult to game out these organizations. Part of this is because in a wargame, the player has perfect knowledge and situational awareness of what his units are doing and what they face, thereby actually simulating the modern digital environment, has a shorter decision cycle, and partly because in simulations it is still mostly a force on force battle. On the negative side, since the player controls every unit, he is more pressed than an actual commander who has subordinates and a staff to assist in decision making, but the ability to pause and save the game allows him time to think about what to do in a given situation.

My study with TacOps and other simulations indicates the UA needs an MLRS Battery for long range and counter-battery fires, plus an additional cannon battery and an engineer company for the reconnaissance squadron.

It will be interesting to see what results from NTC rotations will show. Will they be highly effective or will my informal evaluation be more on the mark? And, how will these brigades fare in the Stability and Support Operations now on going in Iraq? -- Michael K. Robel

War with Pakistan is based on some of the following constraints: -

• Inordinately lengthy Mobilisation.
• Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.
• Delays caused by DCBs and Canals.
• International Intervention.
• Strategic Policy regarding Pakistan.
• Intervention of China.
• Military Readiness.
• Effect on Tactics because of the CI environment.
• The Internal Security Environment.
• Serviceability of Equipment.
• Weapon Mix.
• Joint Defence Concept.
• Poor Intelligence.

How should we approach Paksitan?

Admins: It is requested that you may start a new thread with this since there is a danger of the issues of the actual Cold Start and this getting blurred and off track.

Have reclassified the issues from RayC and generally put down what is obvious from the various discussions to date. I would see three levels of thinking: Strategic (geopolitical), Sub-strategic (politico-military) and Tactical/Operationally Strategic (military execution). In the light of which, the following apply:

Strategic
• Strategic Policy regarding Pakistan.
Kashmir is not negotiable, unless you want to give us POK
• Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.
Assume that atleast one-two warheads can be launched against an Indian
city somehow if Pakistan’s (RAPE) integrity/survival is at threat
• Intervention of China.
Geopolitical balance (bigger fish to fry?/agreement that TSP should be
taken off Indo-China agenda)
Climate/season (winter is a good time)
• International Intervention.
Geopolitical balance (USA, China)
Current situation in war on terror (Osama arrest/death) US indifference

Strategically, we must conclude that a window exists where action can be taken against TSP that will remain limited and not i. Escalate into nuclear, ii. Not invite direct interference from the USA and/or China. This will be within 8 hrs of a provocation and must conclude within 1 week

Sub-strategic
• Poor Intelligence.
Strategic, tactical, CI: understand options for taking punitive strike, clearly not all conditions will be favourable, but as long as there is sufficient for ‘threshold conditions’ then intelligence should be able to provide a ‘go’ and also ‘where go would be most effective’
• Military Readiness.
Cold start Battle Groups, as discussed before
• Inordinately lengthy Mobilisation.
Same as above
• Serviceability of Equipment.
What is the threshold level that can be cost effectively maintained, multipliers, including impact of joint warfare with navy/strategic air
• Weapon Mix.
Calling rudra singha!
• Joint Defence Concept.
I would suggest this needs to be strongly offensive

How much action can be taken where such that an arm/leg is broken but redlines do not need to be crossed. Largely a political issue with strong military backing

Tactical/Operational Strategy
• Delays caused by DCBs and Canals.
New ‘von Schlieffen Plan’ required, will have air mobile dimension, but intent would not be to capture, merely to damage beyond repair
• Effect on Tactics because of the CI environment.
Understanding the situation and working around it, taking the opportunity for ‘cleaning up’ known trouble makers?
• The Internal Security Environment.
As above

Seems a bit like stating the obvious, but its worth stratifying the issues.

Sir,

This modification is radical ... for the Americans but the British and Canadians have been doing this for a very long time. Essentially, there is a push downwards from brgiade to battalion as the main combat echelon. I don't know if I can agree with LCol Robel about adding an engr coy to the recee sqn. Any obstacle requiring engr assets would most likely be watched and most likely hiding something very nasty.

The battalion level requirements are spelled out in

FM 3-90.2 - The Tank and Mech Inf Bn TF

Second site

FM 3-90.2 - The Tank and Mech Inf Bn TF

(Gentlemen in India, could you please test the two above links and see if you can access them?)

B-GL-321-4 - The BG in Ops