Deterrence

[member_28502]

for US its not TSP alone its TSP+Lizard, because Lizard will stop us from massive retalliation, either through fake International community or by second front

[shiv]

for US its not TSP alone its TSP+Lizard, because Lizard will stop us from massive retalliation, either through fake International community or by second front

That should give us plenty of time to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was a a nuke attack and send lots of faxes, white papers and dossiers to all capitals from Addis Ababa to Zagreb

[ShauryaT]

Shiv ji: I will elaborate on my thoughts later for the time being, placing all the view points in the thread.

Those Indians who shelter behind India's Massive Retaliation doctrine fail to understand that MR was found to have failed during the cold war too - as evidenced by the US' loss in Vietnam and the USSR's loss in The important idea, to understand, is that the use of a small and limited tactical use by Pakistan has to be deterred by a credible response. Will India destroy all Pakistan's cities and cause five million casualties in response to losing, say, 12 tanks? This issue needs to be discussed, and since the earlier BJP government issued the nuclear doctrine, it has the full authority to 'revisit' it.

Need to revisit India’s nuclear doctrine as a lot has changed since 2003 -- By Admiral Raja Menon

[shiv]

Those Indians who shelter behind India's Massive Retaliation doctrine fail to understand that MR was found to have failed during the cold war too - as evidenced by the US' loss in Vietnam and the USSR's loss in The important idea, to understand, is that the use of a small and limited tactical use by Pakistan has to be deterred by a credible response. Will India destroy all Pakistan's cities and cause five million casualties in response to losing, say, 12 tanks? This issue needs to be discussed, and since the earlier BJP government issued the nuclear doctrine, it has the full authority to 'revisit' it.

Need to revisit India’s nuclear doctrine as a lot has changed since 2003 -- By Admiral Raja Menon

Shaurya with respect to Adm Raja Menon - I think he has lost it.
Massive retaliation is
1. A response to nuclear attack, not conventional war. Vietnam and USSR are not examples
2. The threat of massive retaliation is to deter someone. That is, anyone who wants to conduct a nuke attack needs to worry whether India is simply bluffing or whether it will really carry out the threat. The deterrent is the threat. No one really knows whether it will actually take place that way. Raja Menon himself is making that deterrent weaker by shivering in his <insert garment here> and asking "Eek are we really going to do that?" I don't like saying this of Adm Raja Menon - but I must ask,"Is he dumb or what?" The only signal you can send to a nation that wants to nuke us is "We will nuke the shit out of you". Anything less than that is inviting a nuclear attack. "Please nuke us. We may let you get away with it"

"Of bloody well course we are going to do that", would be the answer the man needs to be given.

[ramana]

There are two types of regimes in modern state system: democratically elected by the will of people and totalitarian regimes of various shades(NoKo, PRC, TSP and so on)

Democratic regimes are deterred when their people are at risk. IOW rational people will force their leaders to climb down if they get targeted. Counter value targeting.

Totalitarian regimes on other hand dont worry about their people, recall Mao's f*rts about China will have the largest remanent population after an exchange? These regimes need to be targeted specifically. Counter value targets.
The massive retaliation India alks about is a mix of these two to ensure total annihilation.
This is backed by their weapons tests which have a mix of yields to accuracy of their delivery vehicles. The dilemma for the chatterati and TSP is if a nuke strike on TSP territory on an Indian conventional attack force responding to TSP terrorism would constitute a breach of NFU and thus invoke retaliation?
Shyam Saran and others are saying yes and the response will be massive retaliation. The reason is eventually tit for tat phatakas will lead to all out nuke war so keep it at that level. Sort of eet ka jawab pathar.The ref to NATO studies etc is to support this. In other words so called escalation control is bokwas. This is the political strategy perspective.

Raja Menon and others are saying its not credible to respond to a puny phataka on a Cold Start column with a massive retaliation. In other words they prefer escalator ladder. The reasoning is battle field array of weapons to provide gradual escalation. Sort of pathar ka jawab pathar type of response. This is a soldier's perspective.
Now TSP is wanting to use the puny nuke to stop a Cold Start response to terrorism. Here they make two arguments: Use of a nuke to stop an Indian attack is for whatever is the causis belli, should not violate the NFU, the second argument is India cannot use massive retaliation as that would make India also the victim of fallout due to prevailing winds etc an as such its not credible.
There is an underlying a hope that Western intervention to constraint India after the strike to prevent N person nuke game. Refer Karl Inderfurth game where they wanted to nuke India to prevent spread to China etc.
Now iff India uses massive retaliation, then there is nothing to strike India for!
So think for yourself. The gradual escalation thing wont help India and will make it subject to additional strikes from West and is being proposed by people who see it as a 2 person game which it is not.

[ShauryaT]

The only signal you can send to a nation that wants to nuke us is "We will nuke the shit out of you". Anything less than that is inviting a nuclear attack. "Please nuke us. We may let you get away with it"

"Of bloody well course we are going to do that", would be the answer the man needs to be given.

And followed through with or the follow through is optional? Asking to clarify. Leave alone the nuances of what massive means, 50,000 or 5,000,000 but a massive retaliatory nuclear strike is assured? Or are you saying, no ambiguities on the message of the doctrine to preserve deterrence, but how we act should consider scenarios and objectives?

Even a sensible policy cannot be allowed to become a millstone around our neck - is this what you are implying?

[shiv]

And followed through with or the follow through is optional? Asking to clarify. Leave alone the nuances of what massive means, 50,000 or 5,000,000 but a massive retaliatory nuclear strike is assured? Or are you saying, no ambiguities on the message of the doctrine to preserve deterrence, but how we act should consider scenarios and objectives?

Even a sensible policy cannot be allowed to become a millstone around our neck - is this what you are implying?

Shaurya in order to "deter" one has to present a robust threat of retaliation, not one that the starter of nuclear war can feel that he can live with.

It is theoretically possible that a single nuclear attack on Paki territory that takes out 14 Indian tanks might possibly be met with by a lesser response. But if such a policy must exist it must remain entirely secret and not a published "open document". It is possible to game out, in private, lesser responses, but stating them out in the open is an open invitation for a nuclear strike that invites a lesser response. In fact, as I see it, openly discussing the idea of a lesser response to a small strike is itself an indicator that Indians are willing to contemplate a nuclear strike on their own forces without retaliation. I don't think such a policy can be good for armed forces morale.

In fact - it is easy to envisage a situation in which an army unit is nuked and India fails to retaliate, after which other fighting units realize that they too can ne nuked with no response from India's nuclear button controllers. It could then set the stage for a loss of morale and retreat by some units - say Indian forces retreat and Amritsar comes under threat of Paki occupation. What then? Are we still going to be philosophical about how many innocent Pakis may die? Does that imply that indian soldiers who died were not innocent? Shaurya I need to hear some serious answers from you if you are in any way supporting weak responses to a nuclear attack

The idea of a lesser response is, I repeat, too stupid to bear contemplation and while I can condemn Ajai Shukla with no remorse I am doubly horrified that Raja Menon does not seem to understand what "deterrence" means. He may be an older generation who has never had the possibility of using nukes in his time as younger generals and admirals do and seems to not have grasped the idea of deterrence. Deterrence of nuclear war cannot be achieved by a soft stance. Deterrence ends the minute nuclear war starts. Deterrence is aimed at scaring the other party into not nuking us. If we don't want to scare them we can't deter them. Is that not obvious?

You have a question in the above post

Even a sensible policy cannot be allowed to become a millstone around our neck - is this what you are implying?

Could you please remind me what "sensible policy" has been mooted that is a millstone? If you are suggesting that a nuclear doctrine that promises a mild response to a mild attack is a sensible policy, I vehemently disagree and feel it needs to the discarded without any further delay.

if you are suggesting that the "sensible policy" is "further discussion" about the nuclear doctrine - I have never stated or implied that discussion is a millstone. I welcome discussion so that I can soundly rip up and throw away concepts and ideas that I consider phenomenally stupid. Discussion by us is harmless. Public discussion about weak responses at the highest levels is IMO dangerous

[ramana]

Also Shuklaji has set up a strawman for the readers. Pakistan are not going to use a nook to knock out 14 tanks. They have those ghost buster antitank rockets.

[JE Menon]

>>Need to revisit India’s nuclear doctrine as a lot has changed since 2003

What's happening with these people? We seem to be veering between lunatics on the one hand and "delusionists" on the other. The article would have been more accurately titled, if it was:

"Need to write another article as I haven't written one since "insert date"!

The only thing in there that is not a restatement of past occurrences is the 75 words or so in the last two paragraphs. And those two are primarily nonsense.

Deterrence works, until it doesn't. That's all. When it doesn't, all bets are off. That's our position. I'm not sure what Admiral Menon is talking about. I suspect he isn't either.

And they all seem to be acting on the assumption that it is only Pakistan we are deterring here.

[ramana]

JEM, There is cognitive dissonance at work. They want to prevent all wars including terrorism. However MND is for core deterrence. Also India does not have the luxury of US-FSU proxy wars in other states which were used to dissipate the angst.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv ji: A few things from above.

No question that deterrence works based on fears. A disproportionate response to a nuclear attack should remain a distinct and credible possibility. The morality question remains not because of what others may think of it but what we ourselves do, for the consequences of such an action will live in our consciousness and also bring up the question of objectives, where massive retaliation may not always serve us best. I am not arguing for a lesser or no response, I am questioning if MR is the only response. The following quote should leave no doubt in anyone's mind.

The vice chief of
army staff until September 2001, Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi removed all
doubts about what the Indian military understood by way of “minimum deterrence”:
No first use, but should Pakistan initiate nuclear weapons use then “massive
retaliation . . . irrespective of the type or yield of the nuclear weapon used by
our adversary.” He amplified that Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons on Indian
forces on its own territory would beget the same massive retaliation response.

Yet, doubts persists. See below.

The following is from Karnad's book.

However loudly the doctrine of massive retaliation is proclaimed,
it is possible that when faced with going maximal in response to, say,
Pakistan’s nuclear tactical bombing of an Indian tank squadron inside its territory
where the loss of life is perceived to be small, the Indian Prime Minister will, to
start with, only approve a tit-for-tat strike on Pakistani forces. After 2004, when
the Congress Party coalition government assumed power, the political thinking
may have veered in this direction. “Whether we will actually retaliate in a
massive way [to tactical use of nuclear weapons by the enemy on its own side
of the border] . . . is not very clear. . . . I’m not sure that such action will be
approved,” said Air Marshal Ajit Bhavnani, former commander-in-chief (CINC),
Strategic Forces Command. Equally, Air Marshal Vinod Patney, ex-CINC,
Western Air Command of the Indian Air Force, said India will have to remove
any doubts that putative adversaries may entertain that “even if one-odd
[nuclear] weapon is fired there is no likelihood of a riposte because [of the belief
that] in case of a riposte the end of the war will signify a much worse status quo
[for India] rather than the mere absorption of first strike.” The Indian response,
he continued, need not be total but has nevertheless “to be hard-hitting . . . even
if the incoming strike misses or they say sorry, we made a mistake! Whatever
the case might be, we have to respond otherwise our credibility will suffer terribly.”

Understand your surprise with Adm. Menon, do not think he has somehow forgotten what deterrence is. His authoritative book ‘A Nuclear Strategy for India’ in the mid 90's was one of my first reads on the topic. Most of the military men's statements I have read, seem to not like the concept of NFU. A concept that was proclaimed without consultation of the military. MR is a corollary to the same and hence cannot be delinked. I view Adm. Menon's views in that context.

Waiting for a first strike, knowing fully well it is coming is foolishness. A unilateral moral grandstanding posture and doctrine that restricts flexible use of force to further our national interests is inherently limiting. The politicians themselves have laid this doctrine and it is the doctrine that precludes the use of force to further political objectives. To me, these self enforced limitations that prohibit the use of power, including nuclear are self goals. To make our own rules in a world where no one else takes cognizance of such rules is delusional. What is unusual in the ind-pak scenario is the side with the conventional strength is talking of massive retaliation. My preference is to not have NFU and its subsequent corollary of MR and let the politicians and IAS/MEA babus learn to play the game of power and combine hard and soft power to further our national interests.

What I dread are papers like these which seek to make the Indian nation a napoonsak in this game of power.

[ramana]

Not to mention he was part of the original five who created the MND in the mid 80s!

I really think there is a rethink on how to go from core deterrence to expanded deterrence.

I think MR is the only way with TSP. Anything different leads to instability which means a nuke strike on India.

[shiv]

Understand your surprise with Adm. Menon, do not think he has somehow forgotten what deterrence is. His authoritative book ‘A Nuclear Strategy for India’ in the mid 90's was one of my first reads on the topic. Most of the military men's statements I have read, seem to not like the concept of NFU. A concept that was proclaimed without consultation of the military. MR is a corollary to the same and hence cannot be delinked. I view Adm. Menon's views in that context.

Waiting for a first strike, knowing fully well it is coming is foolishness. A unilateral moral grandstanding posture and doctrine that restricts flexible use of force to further our national interests is inherently limiting. The politicians themselves have laid this doctrine and it is the doctrine that precludes the use of force to further political objectives. To me, these self enforced limitations that prohibit the use of power, including nuclear are self goals. To make our own rules in a world where no one else takes cognizance of such rules is delusional. What is unusual in the ind-pak scenario is the side with the conventional strength is talking of massive retaliation. My preference is to not have NFU and its subsequent corollary of MR and let the politicians and IAS/MEA babus learn to play the game of power and combine hard and soft power to further our national interests.

What I dread are papers like these which seek to make the Indian nation a napoonsak in this game of power.

Shaurya the idea that the nuclear doctrine was laid down by politicians without consulting the armed forces is an unprovable proposition that can only serve to position an argument in favour of a particular viewpoint. I would call our armed forces as being napunsak themselves if they have allowed themselves to function for decades with a doctrine they did not agree with or like.

If you look back at our discussion on this issue - you will see that we are arguing about untestable hypotheses based on unprovable assumptions. The unprovable assumption is that the NFU doctrine was created by politicos and babus over the heads of the military. The untestable hypothesis is that India will find it morally repugnant to respond to a tactical nuke with a massive response. What we are doing is having a sinuous discussion based on rhetoric. My biggest objection to Bharat Kanad is his needless rhetoric combined with an ability to gloss over technical and logical errors he makes. Karnad has never answered his critics while those whom he is critical of are always held answerable to him.

It is possible to approach this issue logically, based on known examples.

For the person who is tasked with actually fighting a war, nothing can be more attractive than nuclear weapons. For an advancing army - defences can simply be demolished with one nuclear bomb. For the air force, troublesome resistance from an opposing air force can simply be neutralized by dropping a nuke on each of 3 or 4 airfields - a job that can be done in a handful of sorties rather than risking dozens of pilots and conventionally armed aircraft on the same task.

So nuclear weapons were originally considered an ideal warfighting weapon. In fact, the US, in the late 1940s assumed that all future wars would be fought with nuclear weapons alone. It was felt that long range bombers armed with nukes would simply go and finish off an adversary before he could do much. This then led to the myth that nuclear weapons could deter all forms of war and aggression - a myth that till does the rounds both on BRF and among "half baked thinkers" and writers of media articles. It is those latter people who call 26/11 or the parliament attack a failure of deterrence. They assume that nuclear weapons can deter conventional conflict. But I digress.

The minute the USSR acquired nukes, the morality of using nukes hit home. It then became apparent that nukes were very destructive and could not be used lightly. Possibly due to echandee reasons the US never changed its FU policy, but the US has been deterred from using nuclear weapons in at least two wars between 1950 and 2010 due to moral reasons.

Wars are fought by at least two sides. Let alone attack, nuclear weapons can be useful for defence as well. Attacking forces can be decimated by nuclear weapons, but using nuclear weapons on attacking forces within one's own territory leaves one's own territory contaminated. This is what Europe faced when tactical nuclear weapons were designed to stop a Soviet attack. This is why "neutron bombs" were designed - with the idea that attacking forces could be destroyed with little fallout. Not only was this a false assumption, it also failed to take into account the escalation factor that nuking a Soviet attack could result in European and US cities being nuked in retaliation.

Russia in recent years has openly stated its intent to use nuclear weapons if attacked simply because their conventional forces may not be able to hold back an attacker. This is exactly what Pakistan states. Russia is saying "You attack us with conventional forces and we may nuke you if we are overwhelmed". Pakistan is saying pretty much the same thing. But this is where things get murky.

What if Pakistan attacks first (major terrorist attack) or major thrust in J&K. India responds with a counter thrust in Punjab. Pakistan then nukes our forces in Pakjab. Do we then nuke Pakistani forces inside Kashmir?

These are hypothetical questions of the sort that Ajai Shukla and Bharat Karnad are asking. They are untestable, but these questions can be approached logically, taking into account war gaming scenarios done in the cold war. Cold war scenarios were gamed with an almost unlimited number of nuclear weapons. In every case one tactical nuclear attack received a similar tactical response until the damage became so extensive that the scenario inevitably spread to nuclear war with destruction of population centers of NATO and the USSR - ie massive "world destroying" conflict. the conclusions reached by those gamers was that tactical nuclear war inevitably escalated to an all out exchange.

The India-Pakistan or India-China scenario is complicated by the fact that India has a limited number of warheads - let me assume 90 weapons for convenience. if india sets about fighting a tactical war where Paki/chinese air bases and tank formations are destroyed, when the inevitable escalation comes India will not have enough nukes to hit Chinese and Pakistani cities. Planning for this eventuality is unavoidable if we are talking about forming our own conclusions about our own situation. China and its proxy Pakistan may well have enough spare nukes to punish India. Let me digress briefly here - there are serious moral issues here - raised by the "doubters" - issues which doubters like Bharat Karnad and Ajai Shukla will never make themselves available to answer.

If India is expected to be worried about the moral implications of nuking millions of "innocent" Pakistani civilians in exchange for 14 tanks, I have a few questions about morality to be answered by these faux moral doubting Thomases.

If it is immoral to implicate Pakistani civilians by painting them as guilty and nuking them, is it then the case that it is alright to consider the attacking Pakistani army as being guilty and to nuke them alone? If the Pakistani army alone is guilty in attacking Indian forces with a nuclear weapon, what about the Indian armed forces who have just been nuked? Are they "guilty"? if they are not guilty is the case being made that the Indian armed forces are there simply to accept being killed by a Pakistani nuke while the Pakistani population are innocent and need immunity and special status in protection from Indian nuclear attack? Are members of the Indian armed forces not considered citizens - but as cannon fodder? What if one Indian civilian is killed in the attack - is it still OK to waffle Karnad-Shukla-Menon style?

Even if we assume that the Indian armed forces are cannon fodder, how can we prevent a Pakistani nuclear attack that kills Indian civilians. If an escalatory attack kills Indian civilians do we still consider Pakistani civilian life more precious and worth preserving than Indian civilians and soldiers lives simply because we believe we are going to kill more Pakis than the few whom they have killed.

Karnad's, Shukla's and Adm Menon's arguments are specious nonsense deserving of the highest contempt and the harshest condemnation - and a firm conclusion that these people are unable to think this issue through to its logical end point. But let me return to my final comments from the morality digression.

• India has a limited number of nuclear weapons
• India is at risk of serious damage in nuclear war with two nuclear armed adversaries on our borders
• India needs to send out the strongest possible signal that nuclear war started by anyone will result in the most horrific damage to Pakistan and/or China (and others in future)
• The only way in which India can punish adversary nations in the harshest possible way is to preserve all our nuclear weapons for attacks on population and economic centers. Frittering away numbers in a tactical war will leave us with very little to punish them they way they will need to be punished.
• Morality and sensitivity in our response can have no role in a situation where Indians have been at the receiving end of a nuclear attack. This is something that doubters have to understand because their doubts are invalidated in a situation where they demand Indian morality in response to the immorality of a nuclear attack on Indians.

I will make a separate post about the value of NFU/FU

[A_Gupta]

Morality and sensitivity in our response can have no role in a situation where Indians have been at the receiving end of a nuclear attack. This is something that doubters have to understand because their doubts are invalidated in a situation where they demand Indian morality in response to the immorality of a nuclear attack on Indians.

I'm going to steal that.

[Pratyush]

In other words, the self judgement of our actions has to end. Else we would be deterred in our retaliation when attacked by nukes.

I can live with this. I guess this is what MR is saying as well. But the doubters are thinking about the aftermath of Indian retaliation and judging the consequences of actions not yet under taken.

IOW, they are dettering themselves and in so doing, are seeking to invalidate the doctrine of the massive retaliation.

[shiv]

Let me start by stating a fundamental truth. It is profoundly stupid to speak of morality when we talk of fighting a nuclear war. Morality is a two person game. if we are moral and someone else is immoral, we stand to lose everything in nuclear war. So someone else's immorality becomes our problem if someone nukes us.

And worse, we have no business speaking of morality if we start the nuclear war by being the first to use a nuke against someone else.

"First Use" is when we reserve the right to start a nuclear exchange by using a nuclear weapon. How would India use a nuclear weapon if we declared that "First use" by India is allowed as per our doctrine.

If we start using nukes in a tactical war against tank formations and air bases, we may use up a huge percentage of our own nukes and still be faced with an inevitable escalation. And when escalation occurs we may not have enough to do the kind of damage to an adversary that is required to stop him. It could be argued that nuking his population centers won't stop his army. But if tactical nukes don't stop his army, we have to nuke his population centers and the more damage we can do the better. Not having enough nukes left because we frittered them away in an ill advised first use policy would be an error.

Based on the above logic we can argue that we should allow ourselves the freedom of first use, but let first use be directly on population centers so that we can inflict maximum pain on the adversary. That may not stop his army but it will seriously cripple the life and economy of his nation, indirectly crippling his army's actions after a time lag. Here the onus of first use depends on our mood. If we feel we are winning, we may not resort to nukes. If we feel we are losing, we may resort to using nukes.

If the above assumptions about first use are accepted then we can talk about two separate circumstances where we could resort to "First use" of nuclear weapons
1. We are attacking someone and feel we need to use nukes on them to achieve breakthroughs, or to achieve objectives quickly
2. Someone is attacking us and we cannot stop them - so we use nukes to thwart their attack

But recall that our nuclear weapons numbers are not conducive to frittering away on tactical warfighting. that means if we resort to first use and start nuclear war we will, sooner or later, have to resort to nuking population centers, unless the other nation simply capitulates and withers under our attack. If the other side is nuclear armed, they will likely hit our population centers with their nuclear weapons before capitulation. So we cannot escape nuclear devastation if we "reserve the right" to "first use".

Even at a time when the US had thousands of bombs and the USSR had fewer bombs, the US could not guarantee that they would be able to destroy all Soviet nuclear weapons and launchers, and therefore could not guarantee safety of the US from nuclear retaliation. The US which has barked loudly about first use has, over the decades, tucked its nuclear tail between its legs and is now a de facto "No First Use" power.

It is highly unlikely that India with its more limited numbers of nuclear weapons will be able to de-nuke Pakistan or China in a first strike. That essentially ensures that we will face nuclear devastation if we start nuclear war by "first use". This makes first use of nuclear weapons by us into a guarantee that India will get nuked back in return. The only way of avoiding nuclear retaliation on India is to resort to "No First Use"

No First Use means that we will not use nukes first on anyone. That means someone else can nuke the crap out of us first if they decide to do that. How can we reduce that possibility? The only way is to promise to rain nuclear devastation on anyone who uses a nuclear device against us. No first use (NFU) is useless without massive retaliation. But anyone who has doubts about massive retaliation should also understand that "First use" is not a solution. First use only guarantees that we will get nuked. A policy of NFU+ massive retaliation could_possibly_deter an adversary and prevent nuclear conflict.

The last question is "Ok let us have a policy of NFU, but why declare it? Why not leave the issue ambiguous? Or why not copy the US and threaten FU but be a de facto NFU state? Why spell out the doctrine as NFU. Why not threaten nuclear retaliation and yet leave the NFU promise aside?"

The best argument I have heard yet against this is from Shyam Saran's article posted earlier. FU requires a completely different type of planning and preparation and command chain, and it is not possible to simply switch from NFU to FU as a matter of just saying it. In fact this was something that I had neither realized nor thought about.

[Pratyush]

Shiv ji,
I am ok with a FU as well, as a nuke posture. I can live with a MR as well. The only thing I cannot live with is once we have been hit with nuke. We start indulging a morality play, regarding the consequences of nuke retaliation.

My position is that simple and that absolute. Once nukes have flown, then the enemy's civilisational continuity comes to an end. No discssion no debate. This has to be communicated to all and sundry.

How many nukes are needed to make it happen is a question better left for the strategists to compute. But my position is clear as the day.

I have said it before and will say it again. A failure to do so will leave us open to continued nuke blackmail. By the tsp and its backers.

TSP may not care it it gets wiped out. But it will have to care about the rest of Islamic world. As it considers it self as the sword arm of Islam. It may come across as an absolutist and irrational position. But when the pakis talk about killing 12 to 20 millions Indians. We have no counter point. They are seeking to creat a perception in our mind of calculated insanity. We can only break it by playing the same game, but only at a greater scale. A scale of Tandav, if you will, by a god whoses name sake you are.

[shiv]

TSP may not care it it gets wiped out.

I have thought about this - I cannot claim to know but it is clear that there are some happy, wealthy and powerful people living in Pakistan who make policy for the Paki armed forces and who lead comfortable lives. That comfortable life requires a functioning urban set up - food and fuel to be transported from farms or other sources, communication lines, news media, water supply, electric supply, power lines etc.

Any nuclear attack should be aimed to disrupt normal life for the wealthiest elite as well as millions of others in every city in Pakistan. After such an attack those who matter in Pakistan are not going to be happy - if they are alive. So there will be no getting away by saying "We don't care what happens to Pakistan". I don't think there is any doubt about that.

[ShauryaT]

Shaurya the idea that the nuclear doctrine was laid down by politicians without consulting the armed forces is an unprovable proposition that can only serve to position an argument in favour of a particular viewpoint.

Shiv ji: I can only bring in my biases and hopefully some credible references and leave the rest of the judgment to you. The below by Adm. Arun Prakash.

Equally unfathomable was the logic and timing of Pokhran II, as well as
some of the actions that followed this defining event. Having voluntarily and
gratuitously declared (without consulting a single military person), a
“moratorium on testing” and offered a “no first use” guarantee within days
of the 1998 tests, the Indian Nuclear Doctrine then bravely threatens to
inflict “unacceptable damage” on the originator of a first strike.

STRATEGIC POLICY MAKING AND THE INDIAN SYSTEM By Admiral Arun Prakash

Karnad's, Shukla's and Adm Menon's arguments are specious nonsense deserving of the highest contempt and the harshest condemnation - and a firm conclusion that these people are unable to think this issue through to its logical end point.

The reason I dug out the reference of the ex-SFC commander is to state the point that the issue of validity of MR for all situations exists. This 14 tank scenario is not of Ajai Shukla, he is reading other people's materials without attributing credit. You can bash the various personalities but not deny the the validity of the question in public or private.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv Wrote:

But anyone who has doubts about massive retaliation should also understand that "First use" is not a solution. First use only guarantees that we will get nuked. A policy of NFU+ massive retaliation could_possibly_deter an adversary and prevent nuclear conflict.

Why would you wait for a first strike, if you know fully well that a strike is imminent? I mean we do live in an age of sensors, surveillances and intruded communications.

[Virupaksha]

Shiv Wrote:

But anyone who has doubts about massive retaliation should also understand that "First use" is not a solution. First use only guarantees that we will get nuked. A policy of NFU+ massive retaliation could_possibly_deter an adversary and prevent nuclear conflict.

Why would you wait for a first strike, if you know fully well that a strike is imminent? I mean we do live in an age of sensors, surveillances and intruded communications.

and also the needed time for human intervention and requisite clearences and prepping our own attack. During early coldwar, it was in months. Even today I expect days to weeks. The peace time locations would be different from attack locations.

but as they say, NFU is for deterrence. If we feel it is failing, I wouldnt mind an Indian govt going back on its word and a massive retaliation configuration works pretty well with FU or NFU.

A FU posture doesnt guarentee FU, the other can always surprise you. One needs massive retaliation configuration for plugging that gap in FU as well.

I feel this FU and NFU debate is for arm chair experts onlee. Infact by my numbers from behind, a FU posture actually is much more costly. It requires as I already said the massive retaliation configuration which will be mainly static targets + first attack config for the movable targets (including but not excluding the others nukes). whereas NFU eliminates or rather reduces the movable targets.

So FU poses a burden of tracking the others nukes during peace time whereas NFU doesnt.

So India adopting a NFU posture is cheaper for India.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv Wrote:

But anyone who has doubts about massive retaliation should also understand that "First use" is not a solution. First use only guarantees that we will get nuked. A policy of NFU+ massive retaliation could_possibly_deter an adversary and prevent nuclear conflict.

The threat of first use can also serve our national interests.

Adm. Arun Prakash again.

NFU is “incompatible” with the Indian government’s position that nuclear weapons are
political instruments, and not meant for war-fighting. “As political instruments,
the best use of our nuclear weaponry would be to persuade, compel, or coerce a
recalcitrant adversary, without having to use force, to either comply with our
wishes, or desist from pursuing a particular course of action inimical to our interests,”
he explained. “However, in order to obtain such compliance, the threat of
use of nuclear weapons, no matter how subtle, subliminal, or understated, has to
be held out.

By forswearing ‘first use’, we obviously cannot hold out such a
threat. Therefore, we are denying ourselves the advantage of using nuclear weapons
as political instruments and relegating them exclusively to the ‘second
strike’ role of uncertain efficacy. The self-imposed condition of NFU thus obviously
undermines our deterrence, for some illusory moral advantage of very
dubious value.” Prakash also wondered “what would be the NFU policy worth,
if we were faced with incontrovertible evidence that an adversary was on
the verge of launching a decapitating-disarming nuclear first strike against
India?”

[ShauryaT]

Shiv Wrote:

The best argument I have heard yet against this is from Shyam Saran's article posted earlier. FU requires a completely different type of planning and preparation and command chain, and it is not possible to simply switch from NFU to FU as a matter of just saying it. In fact this was something that I had neither realized nor thought about.

NFU policy also imposes additional costs by way of dispersion and pre-location of weapons.

[ShauryaT]

and also the needed time for human intervention and requisite clearences and prepping our own attack. During early coldwar, it was in months. Even today I expect days to weeks.

As per reports, SFC has this reaction time down to xx minutes and they are not yet satisfied.

but as they say, NFU is for deterrence. If we feel it is failing, I wouldnt mind an Indian govt going back on its word

And precisely why no one (including some of our own) believe it. All it does is make us look not credible.

[shiv]

The threat of first use can also serve our national interests.

Adm. Arun Prakash again.

NFU is “incompatible” with the Indian government’s position that nuclear weapons are
political instruments, and not meant for war-fighting. “As political instruments,
the best use of our nuclear weaponry would be to persuade, compel, or coerce a
recalcitrant adversary, without having to use force, to either comply with our
wishes, or desist from pursuing a particular course of action inimical to our interests,”
he explained. “However, in order to obtain such compliance, the threat of
use of nuclear weapons, no matter how subtle, subliminal, or understated, has to
be held out.

The above paragraph is 100% correct but does not mean that first use is going to help. It only means the following (in my words) "India's political class do not believe in actually using nuclear weapons. if they are unwilling to use them they cannot be a threat to anyone. We must be ready to use them." This statement is true whether we are talking about First Strike or NFU+Massive retaliation

However I have some comments on the second quote of yours.

This first sentence is not a direct quote of Adm Prakash - but possibly someone quoting him. I suspect it must be Bharat Karnad. Only the last sentence refers to what Adm Prakash "wonders" - I will come to that later but I will now concentrate on the first sentence of the quote i.e.

By forswearing ‘first use’, we obviously cannot hold out such a
threat. Therefore, we are denying ourselves the advantage of using nuclear weapons
as political instruments and relegating them exclusively to the ‘second
strike’ role of uncertain efficacy. The self-imposed condition of NFU thus obviously
undermines our deterrence, for some illusory moral advantage of very
dubious value.

Once again it is important for me to point out that talking about "First Use" is easy. Pakistan has been threatening first use. So have China, Russia and the US. To the author of the above paragraph - those threats of first use seem more credible, for some unexplained reason. What is not explained is why these nations have not resorted to their much advertised first use. I put it to you that the reason is that "first use" only confers a temporary advantage - but all nuclear nations are prepared for a decapitating strike and all nuclear nations are ready with a second strike policy which will ensure punishing retaliation on the "first user" of nuclear weapons.

I do agree that a threat of "first use" has possibly deterred direct conventional conflict between the US and the USSR during and after the cold war. But it has not deterred conflict between Russia and China or Pakistan and India. The threat of "first use" has possibly opened up a space for "non state actors" to be used in proxy wars so that conflict cannot be directly blamed on nuclear armed nation states and those states can escape the threat of "first use". If you go past the US's rhetoric you find that its worst enemy, bin Laden was hiding in the house of its friend, Pakistan. The US could do nothing despite a massive attack on its own territory. The US gets into a big bind even when US soldiers come into direct conflict with Pakistanis. The US' talks of first strike is clearly rhetoric. The US is now using robots to do the fighting.

Another point that is missed by shouting too loudly about 'First use! First use!" is the following question, which is an exact counterpart of the 14 tank query. Suppose Pakistan occupies a huge chunk of Rajasthan - all the way to Jaisalmer or beyond, in a thrust of the type that nearly worked at Longewala in 1971, are we going to conduct a tactical strike on Pakistani forces in India. This "first use" is likely to spark off a Pakistani nuclear attack on India. Or would India respond to the Pakistani occupation of parts of Rajasthan by a massive decapitating "first strike"? Pakistan, like China has dispersed and protected its assets and is ready for a retaliatory strike - so what would our first strike achieve that could not be achieved by a retaliatory strike? Apply the same question to the Chinese occupying Arunachal Pradesh.

I put it to you that in every case India would rather build up its conventional forces to try and thwart such an eventuality rather than starting a nuclear exchange. This is what the US is doing. It is exactly what China is doing. That is what Israel has been doing. The only countries who are threatening nuclear attack at short notice in response to a losing position in conventional war are Pakistan, North Korea and Russia.

Let me now address the quote from Arun Prakash (is that by Karnad?)

Prakash also wondered “what would be the NFU policy worth,
if we were faced with incontrovertible evidence that an adversary was on
the verge of launching a decapitating-disarming nuclear first strike against
India?”

The value of the NFU policy would not change if we were faced with any sort of nuclear first strike, either tactical that takes out 14 tanks or "massive decapitating disarming" because what Adm Prakash has asked above is a classic deterrence dilemma.

If there is "incontrovertible evidence" of an impending strike, then technically "deterrence" is still working until that strike actually occurs. Our NFU policy is not to use nukes until deterrence fails and a nuclear strike occurs. After deterrence fails NFU kicks in and we are supposed to use our nukes.

I am guessing that what Admiral Prakash is talking about is that the NFU policy is totally worthless unless our politicians are serious about using nuclear weapons. If a first strike occurs and retaliation is not ordered then NFU is worth nothing. But a political class that fails to invoke massive retaliation after a first strike on India is unlikely to use our nuclear weapons in a first strike on someone else. And they are certainly unlikely to respond if 14 tanks are destroyed.

As has been clearly stated the NFU policy can work only under the following conditions:
1. Our nuclear forces and command and control enjoy robust immunity against a decapitating first strike, retaining second or third strike capability
2. Our political class understand that nuclear weapons and the accompanying deaths and suffering necessarily have to be imposed on a nation attacking India with nukes
3. Our conventional forces are strong enough to resist all conventional attacks on Indian territorial integrity.

All of the above need to be ensured if NFU is to work.

NFU fails if any of the above are failing. But a "first use" policy will be equally useless if the political class are unwilling or if we lose a whole chunk of territory to someone in conventional conflict.

I think this whole debate is being muddied by jargon that few people seem to understand - with expressions like "Deterrence, Nuclear Doctrine, FU, NFU, First Strike. Second Strike, Massive retaliation, Tactical Strike/Counter force. Startegic strike/counter value, command and contriol etc.

FU cannot make things better of we have a weak political class. A political class that cannot envisage massive retaliation as part of NFU is hardly going to cheerfully agree to FU. Debaiting the merits and demerits of FU vs NFU is a pointless exercise.

By mixing up political lethargy and somnolence with technical questions like Fission weapon, thermonuclear weapon, kiloton, megaton, FU, NFU, deterrence etc the debate just becomes an utter mess where no one understands that real issue. If there is political unwillingness to use the nuclear weapons that we have, nothing else matters. All nuclear weapons are of no use.

I must end by blaming Bharat Karnad is being a primary example of a person who has mixed up political unwillingness with technical issues and muddying the debate rather than clarifying it.

[shiv]

Shiv Wrote:

But anyone who has doubts about massive retaliation should also understand that "First use" is not a solution. First use only guarantees that we will get nuked. A policy of NFU+ massive retaliation could_possibly_deter an adversary and prevent nuclear conflict.

Why would you wait for a first strike, if you know fully well that a strike is imminent? I mean we do live in an age of sensors, surveillances and intruded communications.

Shaurya, this is a rhetorical argument that is good only for time pass. I will explain.

If you look at the question honestly, China and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons and Pakistan at least has openly threatened the use of nuclear weapons on India. Both have a first use policy against india. So even today, at this very moment, we are "waiting for a first strike"

Do you have a better alternative than waiting as we are doing right now. In a later post you have quoted Adm Prakash as saying "What if we have incontrovertible evidence of an impending first strike". may I ask you Shaurya in the same rhetorical vein that we seem to be going on with this debate:

What is it that makes you feel that a nuclear strike against India is not impending at this very moment and that we need to wait for some special auspicious signs that the weapons possessed by Pakistan and China, already earmarked for India are going to become "more threatening"?

You see, if we had the guts we should be destroying Pakistani and Chinese weapons now, today, (in fact yesterday) even before they reach a stage of "impending launch". It is dishonest rhetoric to claim that those weapons are not ready and threatening now but will become so at some special future date. Honesty in one's thought processes should indicate that a decapitating first strike on China and Pakistan are not politically or militarily feasible today (or yesterday) which were the best days to conduct such a strike.

In fact there are other methods to deal with those threatening weapons (setting aside a first strike today or at some later date). Confidence building and keeping weapons away from a hair trigger alert is one such method.

[shiv]

but as they say, NFU is for deterrence. If we feel it is failing, I wouldnt mind an Indian govt going back on its word and a massive retaliation configuration works pretty well with FU or NFU.

If there is political unwillingness to actually use the weapons we have, neither FU or NFU are of much use.

But if the problem is political unwillingness, we are simply wasting our ime discussing FU/NFU or kiloton-megaton as Bharat Karnad is wont to do.

[member_20317]

Ref : shiv Post subject: Re: DeterrenceUnread post Posted: 27 Apr 2014 15:36

Re. Capability of Pakis to sacrifice their people

Replied to in OT thread since replying here could bring the rednecks onto this thread.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 5#p1637215

……………………

Re. NFU.

I am mostly convinced about your arguments. However there is at least one thing I need explained.

As it is, the NFU is mostly theoretical, in the sense that it is not like a ‘sovereign guaranteed debt’ carrying a ‘going concern presumption’, that a country must feel like making good on. Essentially also the reason why nobody actually wants to believe in the other man’s NFU policy. The Haves would rather have more nukes or at least the most nukes. OTOH the Have-nots would rather have everybody Nuke Nude because they have experienced a revelation of morality.

Additionally NFU cannot be demonstrated unless the idea is balanced by the promise of a retaliation (MR or otherwise). FU against Have-nots cannot be justified from a policy writing perspective. That leaves out only the NFU against Haves as a subject matter of demonstration. This brings us to the same fear vs. opportunity conundrum.

Now in such a situation how would a newly Haves country like India, behave. I believe the newly Haves would rationally try to tie up their posturing with their ability to deliver on the promise. Remember the Indian NFU belonged to a period when India had 20 Agni-2s all rumored to parked in Assam or carried around in modified rail wagons. In 2014 and beyond the situation in terms of delivery systems available can be expected to have drastically changed. There have been talks of planned 400 weapon inventory for long. The wish list could be at least 200 on land based BMs, about 100 on sea based deterrent and 100 on Sukhois. In such a scenario the MR is not exactly a promise it is a majboori in terms of policy. What would you otherwise do with all these weapons. You need only a fraction to put a full stop to Pakis.

Given the worldwide traditions in such matters, India probably already has reached quite a few of these milestones or is likely to, pretty soon. Further remember we had MR written on the policy in a situation when we had 20 Agnis to deliver the big buses. Now there cannot be More Massive Retaliation or a Most/Mostest Massive Retaliation. In such a situation the only logical thing to do is to promise something else.

Something that gets more flexibility to the politicians. Now we know that US/Russia do not threaten a country like Pakistan/Noko with MR. The MR policy by the US/Rus does not make sense. Even if Pakis/Noko like smaller countries deliver all their nukes the response from the bigger countries cannot scale at all to match. There is not much to destruct in Pakistan/Noko. But despite this apparent balance of approaches - the big arsenal delivery threat of small country balancing a small arsenal delivery promise of a big country, we have had 9/11 and WOT etc like bad blood.

So we could say that there is not much that nukes are really useful for in terms of war fighting, except posturing. That is perhaps how Amerikhans and Russians see it and perhaps that is also how our establishment also sees it today.

Equally likely these countries have not yet divorce themselves from the Graduated response hypothesis and their apparent reluctance is actuated by at least a capacity (even if not the will) to test the limits of the ‘other’. At the least we can be sure of a politician’s desire for holding an option. It is lucrative for the politicians – makes them feel like the gods of Olympia holding their thunder. This desire would be enough of an impetus to revise the policy.

The take away for us Aam Gangudin, as applied towards our inventory is that we should have enough but with a will to use it when the opportunity presents itself and/or we most need it.

My hunch is that by reopening these matters the Indian establishment wants to create a background for something – I don’t know what. But one thing is sure, they do have all the points and all the paths, on the CPM/PERT chart covered.

[shiv]

So we could say that there is not much that nukes are really useful for in terms of war fighting, except posturing. That is perhaps how Amerikhans and Russians see it and perhaps that is also how our establishment also sees it today.

Equally likely these countries have not yet divorce themselves from the Graduated response hypothesis and their apparent reluctance is actuated by at least a capacity (even if not the will) to test the limits of the ‘other’. At the least we can be sure of a politician’s desire for holding an option. It is lucrative for the politicians – makes them feel like the gods of Olympia holding their thunder. This desire would be enough of an impetus to revise the policy.

Good observation.

Despite the creation of an artifcial "caste system" of nuclear powers where the old haves call themselves wise and experienced and people among the newer haves accept the caste system and say "Oh those old haves are "mature" we are not mature" the fact remains that for the politicians the same dynamics apply. They all know damn well that nukes are not going to allow nuclear warfighting without permanently damaging their own political power, but at the same time they retain that "Mine is bigger" feeling by retaining nuclear arsenals.

[ShauryaT]

This first sentence is not a direct quote of Adm Prakash - but possibly someone quoting him. I suspect it must be Bharat Karnad. Only the last sentence refers to what Adm Prakash "wonders" - I will come to that later but I will now concentrate on the first sentence of the quote i.e.

By forswearing ‘first use’, we obviously cannot hold out such a
threat. Therefore, we are denying ourselves the advantage of using nuclear weapons
as political instruments and relegating them exclusively to the ‘second
strike’ role of uncertain efficacy. The self-imposed condition of NFU thus obviously
undermines our deterrence, for some illusory moral advantage of very
dubious value.

No, the substantive parts of both the quotes in my post is one big passage in Karnad's book, attributed to Adm. Arun Prakash over an email. IOW: Karnad is not inserting his words in the middle to make it appear as if coming from the Admiral. I can email a copy to you if you like.

I put it to you that in every case India would rather build up its conventional forces to try and thwart such an eventuality rather than starting a nuclear exchange. This is what the US is doing. It is exactly what China is doing. That is what Israel has been doing. The only countries who are threatening nuclear attack at short notice in response to a losing position in conventional war are Pakistan, North Korea and Russia.

And no one is proposing that a change in doctrine is to use nuclear weapons as just another war fighting tool as a replacement for conventional forces for India.

Let me now address the quote from Arun Prakash (is that by Karnad?)

Prakash also wondered “what would be the NFU policy worth,
if we were faced with incontrovertible evidence that an adversary was on
the verge of launching a decapitating-disarming nuclear first strike against
India?”

In Karnad's book, yes, but quote is by the Admiral.

The value of the NFU policy would not change if we were faced with any sort of nuclear first strike, either tactical that takes out 14 tanks or "massive decapitating disarming" because what Adm Prakash has asked above is a classic deterrence dilemma.

If there is "incontrovertible evidence" of an impending strike, then technically "deterrence" is still working until that strike actually occurs. Our NFU policy is not to use nukes until deterrence fails and a nuclear strike occurs. After deterrence fails NFU kicks in and we are supposed to use our nukes.

I am guessing that what Admiral Prakash is talking about is that the NFU policy is totally worthless unless our politicians are serious about using nuclear weapons.

Most military men would give NFU a go by and NOT wait for a strike. I can quote the few I know, if you like. What many like in the current doctrine is its large degree of automaticity. Whereby although subject to a political decision, the choices are narrow, quick and the scenarios gamed are also narrow and adhere by and large to the stated doctrine.

I must end by blaming Bharat Karnad is being a primary example of a person who has mixed up political unwillingness with technical issues and muddying the debate rather than clarifying it.

Blaming the messenger will not take away from the message that NFU and MR as the only doctrinal choices would not account for some realistic scenarios, objectives and goals in the event deterrence fails, or is about to fail or indeed to deter. Political unwillingness should not stop us from calling out, what would serve Indian interests, as we see it.

[ShauryaT]

What is it that makes you feel that a nuclear strike against India is not impending at this very moment and that we need to wait for some special auspicious signs that the weapons possessed by Pakistan and China, already earmarked for India are going to become "more threatening"?

Shiv ji: I am not big into rhetoric and the above was not what I or the quote by Adm. Prakash were referring to. The statements were well qualified, you chose to read it differently turing it into rhetoric.

In fact there are other methods to deal with those threatening weapons (setting aside a first strike today or at some later date). Confidence building and keeping weapons away from a hair trigger alert is one such method.

A concept by and large junked by our military and SFC, where some of our weapons are kept in mated conditions and others in near mated, co-locations with procedures to mate them in hours. This concept will be further junked as we deploy our third triad. There are specific threat levels, 4 IIRC, where SFC will effectively go to the hair trigger status. CBM's should be a two way street.

Also, suggest that the effective strength of the Indian arsenal we should work with is 200+. The around 100 numbers are over a decade old.

Anyways to move on, what are your thoughts on the IPCS paper?

[Karan M]

If there is incontrovertible evidence that a certain nation is preparing a WMD strike on India and the targets are sufficiently dispersed and located deep within enemy territory only that a nuclear, BM strike by India can take those out...well our current NFU posture obviates that possibility.

Basically, our NFU posture has severe limitations when considering the wide gamut of scenarios that may come up in the future or may even come up in the short term.

Next, this business of tactical weapons are worthless & strategic war is imminent/unstoppable is similar balderdash as it ignores the many steps between & also the costs plus the time afforded to decision makers.

If an Indian conventional army unit is attacked within Pak with tactical weapons & India retaliates with tactical weapons on PA units, there is still time involved for both sides to deescalate before Mumbai and Karachi both get taken out. Similarly, ego issues on both sides for key decision makers are lessened (can declare a limited win and de-escalate as versus being the loser of losers) plus political freedom available is much higher as a relatively small number of units are involved. Otherwise, if a single metropolis on either side gets hit, all gloves are off. Then it becomes who hits out first and wins. That's our current issue.

In a crowded Indo-Pak theater, lack of tactical weapons on our side limits our deployment and employment options. Its all or nothing.

This is further complicated by the fact that Indo-Pak deterrence is actually Indo-Pak-PRC-US deterrence which then ropes in P-5, UnSC, and even Russia. Our limited inventory of nukes actually counts against us in this respect.

So first shackle yourself with NFU, then claim "all out war if I am hit", and then don't have the inventory to wage all out war.

IMO, NFU needs to be junked & replaced with a better doctrine.

Doctrines evolve and must and should evolve.

A lot of people debating the issue even in our strategic circles seem to be stuck in "log kya kahenge" mindset unable to understand that they are actually representing the interests of a billion plus Indians. We lose tens of thousands of crores in scams without a murmur and yet, there are those who will bellyache about the costs involved in protecting India through the next many decades which will result in far more wealth.

Ancient India, a superpower, got attacked by more aggressive, barbaric cultures and in economic terms by the end of colonalization, their GDP to ours was 30X, now its 85X. And they sit on the high table call themselves civilized, and we are "third world".

We will remain third world, until and unless we constantly revisit our policies ruthlessly and do what is necessary.

ABV era policies were an important first step, but not the only step. Our strategic culture needs to become more ruthless and more pragmatic. Shackling ourselves will not work. 60 years of zero deterrence should not be replaced with another 60 odd years of half baked deterrence.

[member_28502]

This massive retaliation is something like Popeye arm biceps are due to Spinach!

If it really comes down to massive retaliation, that is TSP some how manages to nuke Indian assets in TSP territory or Indian, then according to current doctrine we resort to MR. So far so good
In the conservative estimate lets say we launch 30 200KT maal, out of which 50% explode (15)
out of the exploded 15 50% hit the intended target at the right altitude. Now the fall out where will the residual fall out travel to?

In monsoon June through September the winds are from south west to North north east so not a good idea for MR as the fall out will reach India

SO we ha to wait for the winds to blow towards Afghan and POK landscape .

This was the theory proposed by Tim Hoyt a friend of India 16 years ago on this forum

[shiv]

Most military men would give NFU a go by and NOT wait for a strike. I can quote the few I know, if you like. What many like in the current doctrine is its large degree of automaticity. Whereby although subject to a political decision, the choices are narrow, quick and the scenarios gamed are also narrow and adhere by and large to the stated doctrine.

Shaurya, most military men would like any weapon that simply blows away the opposition. Nuclear weapons are exactly that type of weapon. In fact long before nuclear weapons were invented, chemical weapons briefly served the role of simply wiping out the opposition. So it is not as if militaries do not know the effect of a weapon of mass destruction. However military men and others also know that such weapons bring costs to the user that are unacceptable in the larger goal of prevailing in conflict.

The argument made that India is attaching some extra moral standard by NFU+retaliation is a fake one. Militaries all over the world strive to reduce the risk of usage of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons because the consequences to the user and victim are unacceptable.

But what started me off on this particular discussion was the double standard that has been brought out using contradictory quotes and arguments. Let me recap so we don't lose the plot

The first is a morality argument that asks if India would really nuke and kill millions of Pakistanis in exchange for 14 tanks destroyed. The second argument is that India should not have any misplaced morality when it comes to NFU - here is a quote that you attribute to Adm Arun Prakash: "The self-imposed condition of NFU thus obviously undermines our deterrence, for some illusory moral advantage of very dubious value."

I am sure you can see the ridiculous double standard here. When it comes to a retaliatory strike it is being asked if it is acceptable to kill millions in exchange for a few tanks. But NFU is being accused of promoting illusory morality. I have been pointing this contradiction out from the outset. Ajai Shukla, Adm Menon, Adm Prakash and bharat karnad have all been quoted in this discussion. Taken together the meaning of the quotes used is quite laughable:
1. NFU+Massive retaliation is immoral
2. First strike is not immoral

What sort of nonsensical contradictory argument is this? It is complete nonsense even if the people who have made these paradoxical mixed-up statements are well known and senior professionals and analysts. Are you sure that you are not mixed up Shaurya?

Blaming the messenger will not take away from the message that NFU and MR as the only doctrinal choices would not account for some realistic scenarios, objectives and goals in the event deterrence fails, or is about to fail or indeed to deter. Political unwillingness should not stop us from calling out, what would serve Indian interests, as we see it.

Note that I am blaming Ajai Shukla, Admirals Menon and Prakash and Karnad because I do not want to blame you. Ajai Shukla and Adm Menon have asked (in quotes posted by you) if India will respond massively and kill millions in response to a minor nuclear attack that takes out 14 tanks. Admiral Prakash, quoted by Karnad has said that NFU is "illlusory morality" It could be you who is muddling up things by bringing out contradictory arguments. There is a clear contradiction in arguing that massive retaliation to a minor strike is immoral but first strike is not immoral. These are the arguments that have been presented by you in quotations from the people named.

[shiv]

It now occurs to me that in the articles and quotes that have been discussed in the last few pages - two completely different Indian viewpoints about nuclear weapons have been brought out.

The first is from Ajai Shukla and Adm Raja Menon. The views that these people have expressed are in the form of a rhetorical question. They ask "Would a nuclear attack on Pakistani territory that destroys 14 Indian tanks attract a massive Indian retaliation that kills millions of Pakistanis?"

Unfortunately neither of them states if they are asking a morality question or whether they are simply insinuating that Indian politicians will not be able to follow up the massive retaliation promise. It would have been better if they did not leave this hanging in the air. If they are asking a morality question it is easy to answer. if they are accusing Indian politicians of not having the guts to pursue a policy of massive retaliation - that is much more serious.

It is possible that both Ajai Shukla and Adm Menon are stating a peacenik/dove viewpoint that seeks to move away from the use of nuclear weapons. But that is not clear to me from the articles.

A completely different viewpoint is expressed by Adm Arun Prakash as taken from quotes in Bharat Karnad's book (posted by Shaurya). Admiral Prakash is a hawk and seems to believe that one must be ready to use nuclear weapons in a first strike and not be tied down by the "illusory morality" of NFU.

So far I have been stressing my view on these issues. My view is that anyone who has nuclear weapons has already flushed morality down the toilet and has no business making any moral argument. Having nuclear weapons and then talking morality is like a rapist worrying about the trauma he is causing to his victim. The only discussion needed is how best to use those nuclear weapons for deterrence, and if necessary offence, in a manner that results in the least damage to us and the maximum damage to an adversary. I do not believe that India can escape lightly in nuclear war. We will lose dozens of cities and millions of people. But we must ensure that the attacker gets at least as much if not more.

There is nothing to discuss about morality in all this.

[Anand K]

The keystone of the MR approach is apparently the belief that things can't be contained at tactical level in India-Pak-China situation and escalation WILL be rapid. This already assumes (high degree of) irrationality OR desperation on one side or both side in the India-Pak case.

Also SS was quoting the US-USSR case where tactical weapon exchange would still leave enough forces and will to continue the war - after all home countries are untouched thousands of miles away and both have nearly unlimited resources (as against India-Pak case). So the war could continue even after an exchange or two in Fulda Gap which decimates a few divisions from both sides.
Assume Indian MR policy is not in the picture at all, it was just vaporware. Assume we invaded them for good reason and they nuked our Strike Corps and we nuked their flanking XXXI Corps. Now, in the India-Pak case a loss of a strike corps from each side would significantly dent the warfighting potential of both - TSP more but India would reel from loss of armor too. And we are the attacker who needs the momentum. Also, the most obvious sector(s) of operations where the exchange took place will be no-go zones for days. To stage an alternate strike in another viable and useful area(s) of N. Punjab/S. Punjab/Sindh would take some time too given the infrastructure and logistics capabilities or lack thereof AND to get over the shock of getting nuked.

Now SS says an escalation from this equal-equal case WILL occur in India-Pak. So who will take the escalating step? Pakistan which now has the strategic advantage of denting an Indian invasion (aimed at dismembering TSP whatever) AND moral grandstanding of "We were forced to use small nukes in our own land to protect the nation" AND now has 3.5 riding to protect them OR India which needs to punish Pakistan for whatever original reason we came to war for? Also consider the mood in both countries ans rest of world as the news of the exchange spreads throughout the world in mere seconds. Also take into consideration Aam Abdul versus Aam Admi with regard to quam, jung, shahadat and Jannat. So which of these two will have to up the nuclear game now? I'm going on a limb and saying India would be the one who will up the game to the next level OR let it drop and skulk back gaining nothing ultimately - not because we are less "martial" but because we have a lot more to lose and see no desirable end.

So is this tactical deadlock/assured escalation from our side really why something like a uncompromising massive response is espoused, at least in public? Despite penny pinching and morality and all that? Or is it simply because as many here said, "Even if they used a small nuke then it's South Asian Giant 'Shroom Cloud reckoning time!", everything else be damned?

Jm2c

[shiv]

Now SS says an escalation from this equal-equal case WILL occur in India-Pak. So who will take the escalating step? Pakistan which now has the strategic advantage of denting an Indian invasion (aimed at dismembering TSP whatever) AND moral grandstanding of "We were forced to use small nukes in our own land to protect the nation" AND now has 3.5 riding to protect them OR India which needs to punish Pakistan for whatever original reason we came to war for?

This post and some further thought on the matter gave me a new aha moment.

I made an earlier post saying that Ajai Shukla and Adm Raj Menon were asking if millions of Pakis would really be killed in exchange for a few tanks. I felt that these views were possibly the exact opposite of those of Adm Arun Prakash, who, I felt was advocating greater freedom to use nukes unrestricted by the NFU clause.

It now occurs to me that all these people might have been saying the exact same thing in their own way.

They are all saying: "The Indian political class is not going to use nukes - so we are nook nude." We have no deterrent simply because the Indian nuclear doctrine simply seeks to postpone the use of nukes by hiding behind NFU and if the need for retaliation arises the political class (the PM of the day) will back out and not respond to an attack that is not massive - such as the loss of 14 tanks.

If this reading is correct - it does mean that the entire "Nuclear doctrine" issue in India needs to be looked at again. If the political class is unwilling maybe we can throw away the doctrine and sign CTBT and FMCT?

[Anand K]

^^
A perveretd form of Lord Shiva with the Halahala eh? Some churning brought out a world-ender and you can't spit it out or can't swallow it either. Walk around with a blue throat for everyone to see.

To reiterate I think maybe the GoI see the tactical exchange thing as a cul de sac in the Indian context and that is why the MR is espoused - and soon to be adopted publicly. Hey, we lied through our teeth about all things nuclear till we tested them right? So I guess we'll continue to do that for the unforseen future and hope (futilely?) sense dawns in TSP.

Anyway I don't think we would NOT respond punishingly (nuke/conv) to a tactical first strike though.

[Johann]

- The decision to use nuclear weapons will most likely be a political decision whether or not NFU is in place. The consequences are so enormous that it has to be the political leadership that makes the call rather than the military leadership. The only exception is if the political leadership is itself decapitated or its communications cut off.

- If you follow the chain of developments, the Pakistanis publish their list of 'red lines' but after Kargil and Parakram, the Indian army in particular looks at ways to take the war to Pakistani territory without crossing red lines. The Pakistanis freak out and start talking about introducing tactical weapons in the hope of deterring Cold Start operations. In response there are now voices from the Indian establishment calling for the elimination of the NFU guarantee.

The whole point of Cold Start was to give freedom of action and add the option of crossing the International Border *without* having to deal with a nuclear exchange. The doctrinal escalation if sustained and actually implemented means once again that crossing the IB in force, even in a shallow incursion could result in a nuclear exchange. Any such operation would have to be approved by a political figure, and the burden of such a decision has not in any way decreased - if anything its increased.

But I would imagine that this gravity has to weigh on a Pakistani COAS's mind as well when it comes to their willingness to use spectacular attacks that would compel an Indian PM to consider the option.

[shiv]

- If you follow the chain of developments, the Pakistanis publish their list of 'red lines' but after Kargil and Parakram, the Indian army in particular looks at ways to take the war to Pakistani territory without crossing red lines.

<snip>

The whole point of Cold Start was to give freedom of action and add the option of crossing the International Border *without* having to deal with a nuclear exchange.

Wrong on two counts
1. Pakistan has never published or openly stated any red line. There are no Pakistan red lines that India can avoid crossing - those red lines that have been spoken of by commentators and "experts" are purely speculative

2. The Indian armed forces have denied the existence of a "Cold Start" doctrine. Be that as it may - what is known as "Cold Start" was an effort to retaliate on Pakistan before Pakistan defences got a chance to ready themselves as occurs when the lumbering Indian army starts mobilizing for war with agonizing slowness. "Cold Start" such as exists is to take place despite the possibility of a nuclear attack - with Indian forces stated as being prepared for conflict in an NBC war environment.

"Cold start" as named by observers was never ever a move to "avoid nuclear attack by Pakistan". Cold Start could never be a deterrent, in fact it could be an aggravating factor - but it was designed to put extreme pressure on the Pakistan army and get them to stay on 24x7x365 alert against Indian attack. They responded by saying that they would use tactical nukes.