Sanjay M wrote:
This is tantamount to saying that 1962 was our victory. I don't agree.
What?? It is tantamount only to saying that your fears of a large Chinese force cutting off the NE has not yet been established as anything other than your fears. To recap - you said Chinese forces could cut-off the NE and so we needed a tactical nuclear strike ability to prevent it. You provided the instance of the 1962 war to back up your assertion. I responded by saying that the 1962 war cannot possibly serve as proof of this assertion because the Chinese forces in 1962 could not sustain themselves logistically and so opted to withdraw. Where did this become my assertion that 1962 was our victory? It was a case of excellent war termination by the Chinese.
As per our own 1971 advance into Bangladesh just below, or even WW2 fighting against Japanese in the NorthEast, you just go around the hard-points, and envelope.
Ah, but then, it does not remain a case of cutting off the NE at the Siliguri corridor as you had implied in your previous post anymore, now does it? Particularly since cutting it off from all sides as in the examples you quoted requires a large force (whose build-up can be identified) and the OPFor fighting dispersed instead of concentrated (which allows time for reserves to be brought up).
They seem to be maintaining their territorial claims despite the hostile terrain and the border "agreements". Also, what recent arrangement were they making with Bhutan? Apparently, they are alive to but not fazed by our 2 corps in the region.
As are we - maintaining our territorial claims despite hostile terrain. Apparently we are alive to their famed 2 Arty Div, but not fazed by it. So how does either of these realities translate to Chinese plans to invade and occupy the NE, anymore than it translates to Indian plans to free Tibet?
And please tell me more about the recent arrangement with Bhutan. I am unaware of it and would appreciate a link.
I didn't see that Pakistan retreated from us under military duress at Kargil, but rather under political duress.
And one appeared magically without the other? Besides, I am going by the (unpublished) remarks of a Flag officer who served in Kargil who stated that Pakistani positions in Kargil were untenable logistically. In that they would have starved themselves to death or run out of ammo soon enough anyway. Not a successful strategy for cutting of anything, except your own nose.
Dug-in positions were available at Kargil too, but they were not manned.
Now we're on the same page. This was the question I raised a while back on this thread regarding our forward posts in the NE. Do you know the answer?
Our forces would still face tough odds against the conventional force superiority the Chinese could bring to bear there.
Sorry, you lost me again. What is this superior force and how would it brought to bear there? I am looking for an open source Orbat here, not the generally accepted premise that the PLA being much larger can sacrifice more people. That last bit may be true, but the questions remain. Why would they? What would be their objectives? How would they go about it? These would make for a valuable discussion.