I was wrong then.CPrakash wrote: There were no Gnats at KKD.
The conversation we had was not detailed enough and I do not recall it correctly because it took place quite some time ago.
Cope India 2005 - Kalaikunda AFS - Part II
which would naturally translate to a great deal of A2A effectiveness for our Tejas too..its size and high T/W ratio would make a very nifty WVR combat fighter..if only the project moves faster..Samir wrote:Yeah, I don't doubt it. And I don't doubt that picking up the Su-30 visually is easy either. What a beast that thing is.
40 years on, the Gnat's small size is still worth thinking about when you consider its effectiveness as an A2A creature (and its insane thrust-weight ratio).
v should start a signature campain or sumthin-
Vijay Hirani
- BRFite -Trainee
- Posts: 17
- Joined: 17 Apr 2005 01:23
Aren't the newer versions of the MIG-29 going to have engines which are going to reduce the smoke emissions?The Folland Gnat was indeed a great little fighter.I remember an admiring article about it in an international journal,where they were comparing the philosphy about the design behind the Gnat and the new F-16.The Gnat at that time was in its "Ajeet" avatar,doing yeoman service for the IAF.The F-16's design according to the writer had been compromised by turning it into a multi-role aircraft,increasing the load and reducing its interceptor capabilities for which it had been designed in the first place.This makes me wonder about the LCA too,which is being tarted up to deliver a huge assortment of armament that normally is caried by heavier fighters.It will also reduce the aircraft's stealth characteristics.We are going to face a numbers problem when the MIG-21s, even in their Bison upgrade are retired.We will have to have very large numbers of LCAs to replace the MIG-21s.If we keep on increasing the complexity of the LCA,then when it does eventually appear in fighting colours,it might become too obsolete for future wars!
... actually, its a part of the new Committee recommendations, which increases the rank, (hence pay, and standard of living) while preserving the ratio of the nature of the task to the age of the pilot - hence, the same guy does the same job at the same age, but is better paid.Samir wrote: 2. The IAF has revised its rank structure and there are tons more Wing Commanders now. I met one squadron which besides its CO had 3-4 other Wing Commanders.
I wouldn't really be surprised if it happens. Already Transport COs are Gp Capts. And the recce sqn CO too.Surya wrote:Ved
Does it imply at some point Squadron COs will be Group Captains rather than Wg Cdrs?
Surya
The Army had Lt Cols as COs till the 80s after which the CO was upgraded to A full colonel. The Air Force had atleast retained the Lt Col level Officer as the CO till now.. I guess it is only inevitable?
Yeah, I agree, its bound to happen down the line. Imagine a W/C at 13 years, as opposed to the old 16 years or so (its not time bound, but as a rough estimate). If he get his next rank in 4-5 years (not impossible) he could be CO as he gets his G/C rank.
I'm willing to bet good money that some current COs will get their G/C ranks before they handover next year.
I'm willing to bet good money that some current COs will get their G/C ranks before they handover next year.
Was this Cope India 2005 or 2006? All the pics on www.af.mil say 2006.
KALAIKUNDA AIR STATION, India (AFPN) -- Capt. Kevin Jones gives a cockpit tour to Indian Air Force airmen during Cope India 2006. Currently, the U.S aircraft have flown 113 sorties with the Indian air force.
Cross-posting.
EDITORIAL: Cope India 2005 — lessons for us
At Cope India 2005, the recently held two-week India-US joint air exercise, Indian pilots flying the Sukhoi-30 MKIs are reported to have outperformed the United States F-16s. Indian pilots not only came out the winners in various visible-range encounters, dogfights as they are called, but also responded to target assignments by AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) much faster than the US pilots.
One USAF (United States Air Force) controller working aboard an AWACS plane was quoted by the media as saying that “he was impressed by the speed in which Indian pilots responded to target assignments given them by AWACS”. The AWACS were being operated by the Americans but were “acting as a neutral party, feeding target assignments to both Indian and American pilots during the exercise”. Given that the Indian pilots were using the American AWACS capability for the first time, this must be billed as impressive performance.
Jasjit Singh, a former air commodore and currently director of the Centre for Air Power Studies in New Delhi told a US newspaper that first reported the outcome of Cope India 2005: “Since the Cold War, there has been the general assumption that India is a Third World country with Soviet technology, and wherever the Soviet-supported equipment went, it didn’t perform well. That myth has been broken.” Another Indian air force officer, a former vice chief of air staff, Air Marshal Vinod Patney said that the Sukhoi is a better plane than the F-16. “But we’re not talking about a single aircraft. We’re talking about the overall infrastructure, the command and control systems, the radar on the ground and in the air, the technical crew on the ground, and how do you maximise that infrastructure. This is where the learning curve takes place.”
This report should definitely interest Pakistan, especially the Pakistan Air Force whose primary threat so far comes from the IAF. There are two important aspects of the outcome of the US-India joint air war-game: the Indian pilots outperformed the US pilots and the exercises gave them the opportunity to see the performance of American technology in war conditions. The latter factor, it should be clear to us, would be of great importance to the IAF in case of a conflict with Pakistan with the latter relying heavily on US technology as its mainstay.
As for the performance of Indian pilots, one US officer said that the Indians planned the war game in such a way as to deny the American pilots their advanced BVR (beyond visual range) capabilities. That may be so, but it is still important to flag that the Indians performed better in dogfights. One US pilot conceded that Su-30 MKI is a much more manoeuvrable machine and that makes a difference. This is important information for Pakistan, which is relying mainly on F-16s. But even more interesting, and perhaps worrisome for Pakistan, is the fact that in an earlier joint exercise, Indian pilots were reported to have done well even with MiG 21 Fishbeds and MiG 27 Floggers, presumably much lesser in capability vis-à-vis both Su-30 MKIs and F-16s and F15s.
Writing of the recent exercise, one US newspaper wrote: “If it turns out the US Air Force did, in fact, get their clocks cleaned, it will have been the second time. In Cope India 2004, an air combat exercise that took place near the Indian city of Gwalior, US F-15s were eliminated in multiple exercises against Indian late-model MiG 21 Fishbeds as fighter escorts and MiG 27 Floggers.”
Are there lessons in these outcomes for Pakistan? Quite a few. First, the IAF is not merely enhancing its technological capability but also focusing on the training of its human resource. In other words, it is trying to create a lethal combination. Second, it is learning about US equipment and platforms, presumably taking home the lessons and incorporating them in its training as well as making use of them in equipment acquisition. Third, the IAF is learning to make full use of AWACS system, which is a force-multiplier system. Fourth, as Air Marshal Patney said correctly, the winning combination comes with a holistic approach to combat and involves, in the case of air combat, the entire infrastructure, from the ground staff to the men flying the machines. Finally, this means the PAF is facing an adversary quick on the uptake and getting first-rate opportunities to learn.
How do we respond?
First the obvious: we need to take the same holistic approach. We do not know if we have institutions like Air Power Studies in Pakistan. The air force definitely looks into professional issues but we also need to have outside-the-air-force input. Two, we need to study reports of the performance of various platforms carefully for reasons of acquisitions. Three, since we will always have the problem of asymmetry in quantitative terms, there is even more reason for us to focus on quality both for the equipment and the human resource. The PAF pilots have a great reputation but we cannot rest on our laurels. Four, critics who are not convinced that PAF needs expensive aircraft need to revisit the issue in light of the constantly improving capabilities of IAF. They also need to realise that air power is also essential for ground-support missions. Five, we also need to appreciate the force-multiplier effect an early warning system has on the performance of an air force – even ground forces – and which the critics do not seem to realise. Finally, it is absurd to argue that we do not need advanced military systems because there is no threat now. Threat perception is a function of other states’ capabilities, not their intentions. Moreover, to say that with nuclear capability we do not need to boost our conventional capability ignores two important factors, one empirical, the other conceptual: with every increase in expenditure on nuclear forces, nuclear-weapon states have seen a corresponding increase in expenditure in conventional capability; nuclear capability requires that states should increase the nuclear threshold to avoid escalation to the nuclear level. That is possible only by enhancing the conventional capability.
Pakistan not only needs a strong air force, it also requires a strong navy. It is time that we looked at the two neglected forces. *
EDITORIAL: Cope India 2005 — lessons for us
At Cope India 2005, the recently held two-week India-US joint air exercise, Indian pilots flying the Sukhoi-30 MKIs are reported to have outperformed the United States F-16s. Indian pilots not only came out the winners in various visible-range encounters, dogfights as they are called, but also responded to target assignments by AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) much faster than the US pilots.
One USAF (United States Air Force) controller working aboard an AWACS plane was quoted by the media as saying that “he was impressed by the speed in which Indian pilots responded to target assignments given them by AWACS”. The AWACS were being operated by the Americans but were “acting as a neutral party, feeding target assignments to both Indian and American pilots during the exercise”. Given that the Indian pilots were using the American AWACS capability for the first time, this must be billed as impressive performance.
Jasjit Singh, a former air commodore and currently director of the Centre for Air Power Studies in New Delhi told a US newspaper that first reported the outcome of Cope India 2005: “Since the Cold War, there has been the general assumption that India is a Third World country with Soviet technology, and wherever the Soviet-supported equipment went, it didn’t perform well. That myth has been broken.” Another Indian air force officer, a former vice chief of air staff, Air Marshal Vinod Patney said that the Sukhoi is a better plane than the F-16. “But we’re not talking about a single aircraft. We’re talking about the overall infrastructure, the command and control systems, the radar on the ground and in the air, the technical crew on the ground, and how do you maximise that infrastructure. This is where the learning curve takes place.”
This report should definitely interest Pakistan, especially the Pakistan Air Force whose primary threat so far comes from the IAF. There are two important aspects of the outcome of the US-India joint air war-game: the Indian pilots outperformed the US pilots and the exercises gave them the opportunity to see the performance of American technology in war conditions. The latter factor, it should be clear to us, would be of great importance to the IAF in case of a conflict with Pakistan with the latter relying heavily on US technology as its mainstay.
As for the performance of Indian pilots, one US officer said that the Indians planned the war game in such a way as to deny the American pilots their advanced BVR (beyond visual range) capabilities. That may be so, but it is still important to flag that the Indians performed better in dogfights. One US pilot conceded that Su-30 MKI is a much more manoeuvrable machine and that makes a difference. This is important information for Pakistan, which is relying mainly on F-16s. But even more interesting, and perhaps worrisome for Pakistan, is the fact that in an earlier joint exercise, Indian pilots were reported to have done well even with MiG 21 Fishbeds and MiG 27 Floggers, presumably much lesser in capability vis-à-vis both Su-30 MKIs and F-16s and F15s.
Writing of the recent exercise, one US newspaper wrote: “If it turns out the US Air Force did, in fact, get their clocks cleaned, it will have been the second time. In Cope India 2004, an air combat exercise that took place near the Indian city of Gwalior, US F-15s were eliminated in multiple exercises against Indian late-model MiG 21 Fishbeds as fighter escorts and MiG 27 Floggers.”
Are there lessons in these outcomes for Pakistan? Quite a few. First, the IAF is not merely enhancing its technological capability but also focusing on the training of its human resource. In other words, it is trying to create a lethal combination. Second, it is learning about US equipment and platforms, presumably taking home the lessons and incorporating them in its training as well as making use of them in equipment acquisition. Third, the IAF is learning to make full use of AWACS system, which is a force-multiplier system. Fourth, as Air Marshal Patney said correctly, the winning combination comes with a holistic approach to combat and involves, in the case of air combat, the entire infrastructure, from the ground staff to the men flying the machines. Finally, this means the PAF is facing an adversary quick on the uptake and getting first-rate opportunities to learn.
How do we respond?
First the obvious: we need to take the same holistic approach. We do not know if we have institutions like Air Power Studies in Pakistan. The air force definitely looks into professional issues but we also need to have outside-the-air-force input. Two, we need to study reports of the performance of various platforms carefully for reasons of acquisitions. Three, since we will always have the problem of asymmetry in quantitative terms, there is even more reason for us to focus on quality both for the equipment and the human resource. The PAF pilots have a great reputation but we cannot rest on our laurels. Four, critics who are not convinced that PAF needs expensive aircraft need to revisit the issue in light of the constantly improving capabilities of IAF. They also need to realise that air power is also essential for ground-support missions. Five, we also need to appreciate the force-multiplier effect an early warning system has on the performance of an air force – even ground forces – and which the critics do not seem to realise. Finally, it is absurd to argue that we do not need advanced military systems because there is no threat now. Threat perception is a function of other states’ capabilities, not their intentions. Moreover, to say that with nuclear capability we do not need to boost our conventional capability ignores two important factors, one empirical, the other conceptual: with every increase in expenditure on nuclear forces, nuclear-weapon states have seen a corresponding increase in expenditure in conventional capability; nuclear capability requires that states should increase the nuclear threshold to avoid escalation to the nuclear level. That is possible only by enhancing the conventional capability.
Pakistan not only needs a strong air force, it also requires a strong navy. It is time that we looked at the two neglected forces. *
-
Mort Walker
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 10238
- Joined: 31 May 2004 11:31
- Location: The rings around Uranus.
Here is a sneak preview of some of Sanjay Simha's COPE India photos.
The real hi-res ones will not appear until I get all 90MB of them across to Jagan so he can decide where to put them
You need to rotate the pdf 90 deg counterclockwise unless you want a crick in your neck.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/Cope/cope-sanjay.pdf
The real hi-res ones will not appear until I get all 90MB of them across to Jagan so he can decide where to put them
You need to rotate the pdf 90 deg counterclockwise unless you want a crick in your neck.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/Cope/cope-sanjay.pdf
-
ashmaharaj
Nice pics !!shiv wrote:Here is a sneak preview of some of Sanjay Simha's COPE India photos.
The real hi-res ones will not appear until I get all 90MB of them across to Jagan so he can decide where to put them
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/Cope/cope-sanjay.pdf
AFter the mandatory water marking is done, is it possible to split into 2-zip files and upload to rapidshare !!
Let me save you some trips to the chiropractor.
Here's the pdf that Shiv posted, with pages rotated 90 deg counterclockwise.
http://rapidshare.de/files/8640118/cope-sanjay.pdf.html
Shiv: Thanks for the upload. Pics are great.
Cheers,
Ashwin.
Here's the pdf that Shiv posted, with pages rotated 90 deg counterclockwise.
http://rapidshare.de/files/8640118/cope-sanjay.pdf.html
Shiv: Thanks for the upload. Pics are great.
Cheers,
Ashwin.
Thanks AshwinAshwin B wrote:Let me save you some trips to the chiropractor.
Here's the pdf that Shiv posted, with pages rotated 90 deg counterclockwise.
http://rapidshare.de/files/8640118/cope-sanjay.pdf.html
Shiv: Thanks for the upload. Pics are great.
Cheers,
Ashwin.
A little birdie tells me that jagan may be quite busy this month so I will do the watermarking and upload all as soon as possible.
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George J
So till now we have seen the EL/M-8222 on the:
1) Mig-21Bison (CI06)>>Sanjay Simha
2) Mig-27 (CI05)>>Vayu Sena Tripod
3) Su-30K (CI05)>>Vayu Sena Tripod
4) Su-30MKI (Sindex04)>>Vid Capture, 21st Second of the Sindex video
Whats left? M2K and Jags.
Remora and Atlis: M2K only see BR pics
Have we seen Litening LDP??
1) Mig-21Bison (CI06)>>Sanjay Simha
2) Mig-27 (CI05)>>Vayu Sena Tripod
3) Su-30K (CI05)>>Vayu Sena Tripod
4) Su-30MKI (Sindex04)>>Vid Capture, 21st Second of the Sindex video
Whats left? M2K and Jags.
Remora and Atlis: M2K only see BR pics
Have we seen Litening LDP??