INS Vikrant: News and Discussion

[sohamn]

There are 4 catapults on each american carrier. 1 and 2 (front) normally launch fighters and 3 and 4 will launch AEW birds and other heavier loads.

Would it not be possible to have CATS/EMALS for 3 and 4 (middle) and have a regular angled deck as well(STO-CAT-OBAR)? That way, you can launch with both methods. Why both? That way the NLCA, mig029K and possibly a EMAL enabled and tested aircraft like F35C can be launched and there is no constraint in operating all types.

IMO, it should be possible no? Advantages are clear, no dependence on any one type of fighter. What would be its disavantages? Why hasn't it been done?

I believe LCA Navy will have the nose landing gear equipped to handle catapults. And since Mig-29K is a stop gap solution, I don't think there is a need to have both STOBAR and CATOBAR configuration in one ship. It would certainly be a technological marvel but would be an expensive engineering solution that will add little value. in IAC II, IN will not operate Mig29k, it will be LCA navy along with either Rafale or Lighntning ( B / C models )

[amit]

There are 4 catapults on each american carrier. 1 and 2 (front) normally launch fighters and 3 and 4 will launch AEW birds and other heavier loads.

Would it not be possible to have CATS/EMALS for 3 and 4 (middle) and have a regular angled deck as well(STO-CAT-OBAR)? That way, you can launch with both methods. Why both? That way the NLCA, mig029K and possibly a EMAL enabled and tested aircraft like F35C can be launched and there is no constraint in operating all types.

IMO, it should be possible no? Advantages are clear, no dependence on any one type of fighter. What would be its disavantages? Why hasn't it been done? QE class could have easily gone with this type. I guess they didn't want to try EMALS for their ship as it wasn't ready and deployed yet.

Should we make a new thread for the new follow on carrier and track all news and discussions there?

Cybaru,

This biggest disadvantage of a STOBAR configuration with an angled deck is lack of parking space for aircraft. The angled ramp for a 65K aircraft carrier would be around 100-120 meters of the 300 meters total length of the ship. In other words 1/3 rd the length of the ship. That portion is lost for parking aircraft on the deck. A catapult, on the other hand is around 90 meters in length (taking the Nimitz class as standard). You can park aircraft in the area where the catapults are, even when they are in use.

The difference is pretty obvious. The QE, despite being 65K will carry 40 aircraft, a mix of F35s and helis. The French CDG, which is CATOBAR, also can carry 40 aircraft including heavies like the Hawkeye, despite being only 40K.

How do you think the Nimitz class carries 90 aircraft standard and in a pinch 100? They do not have enough parking space for all these planes in the hanger. Most of them are parked on the deck. Regarding the Vishal, I'm not too sure why they have come up with a 40 aircraft load limit? It should be able to carry much more given it will be a 65K flattop. I have a feeling it is deliberate dhoti shivering in order to ensure that TFTA navies like the Chinese don't get too alarmed. The Forrestal-class aircraft carrier of US, despite being around 60K could carry up to 90 aircraft.

Finally it's relatively easy to convert a STOBAR aircraft to a catapult shot aircraft. All that needs to be done is to strengthen the front wheel chassis and the frame to withstand the shotgun like force of the launch. I don't think that involves any major aerodynamic changes in the frame. If the Tejas Navy version comes through as a viable aircraft for carriers, it should be relatively easy (that is in comparison to the number of technological challenges that have been/will be overcome) to make it CATOBAR ready.

And as Sohamn just wrote, for MiG29s, they are stopgap and will only fly from the Vick and Vikrant. However, they are sufficient to take care of Pakistan. Vishal (and its follow-on), along with its air complement are to serve our global ambitions.

[amit]

Do not know what to say. Sore losers?

Does India Need a Yet Another Aircraft Carrier?

They should not have sold the Vikram in that case.

NRao ji,

This goes to show that very few writers have a strategic long term vision as far as India is concerned. We (meaning the nation) are partly to blame for this. We are so obsessed with Pakistan that folks who watch us think that we will never outgrow Pakistan.

It's for this reason I think that when discussing strategic issues as well as military trajectory it's necessary to keep an economic perspective in mind.

For example, today Pakistan's economy is around 11 per cent of the Indian economy. By 2030 when Vishal is expected to enter services (even Sputnik agrees to this) Indian economy would be around $6-7 trillion. Even accounting for steady growth of the Paki GDP, it would still be around or less than 5 per cent of the Indian GDP. To give a more interesting perspective, let's assume at that period our defence spending still remains it the region of 2.5 per cent of our GDP. Now that 2.5 per cent would represent half of the Pakistani GDP! Even with help from the 3.5 friends (most unlikely) there's no way the Jernails and other assorted terrorists of Pakiland will be able to hurt India. Even the pinpricks would start to feel like tickles with feathers.

And yet, the Sputnik folks (and sad to say some folks on this forum too) still think that Pakistan would be our major existential threat and that we should have no ambitions outside the Indian Ocean.

In order to become a big global power, it's not only necessary to have the economic heft. You also need to have the desire or ambition to act like a global power. Otherwise you become like Japan post World War. I think the idea of Vishal with nuclear power, EMAL, Haweye, possibly F-35s etc represents the Navy's desire to become a global blue water force.

I would like to see India more like the US is today in the later part of this century (but of course in a more Dharmic Avatar). For that we would need to have self belief. Dhoti shivering is a nice joke, let's not internalise it.

JMT

[Bade]

No one has answered my question from a long time ago. Two or more Vikrants can still have the same effect of having one Vishal in terms of air-wing carrying capacity to a theatre of war, or even just for muscle flexing show and tell around the world. There is no fundamental reason why a Carrier group with all support ships cannot have two carriers in tandem in the same theatre during real life operations.

It would make sense to have a Vishal not just by itself, but when we can make 2 to 3 of it in parallel and see such a need. Right now making copies of Vikrant with minor improvements will go a long way in projecting power. Even a catapult version of Vikrant will add more parking space to carry 40-50 planes. Two such beasts will make a formidable statement itself.

I will bet the Vishal will morph into a 65k+ carrier and will take 10-15 years to build, right when we are ready to build at least two of these class.

[amit]

No one has answered my question from a long time ago. Two or more Vikrants can still have the same effect of having one Vishal in terms of air-wing carrying capacity to a theatre of war, or even just for muscle flexing show and tell around the world. There is no fundamental reason why a Carrier group with all support ships cannot have two carriers in tandem in the same theatre during real life operations.

It would make sense to have a Vishal not just by itself, but when we can make 2 to 3 of it in parallel and see such a need. Right now making copies of Vikrant with minor improvements will go a long way in projecting power. Even a catapult version of Vikrant will add more parking space to carry 40-50 planes. Two such beasts will make a formidable statement itself.

I will bet the Vishal will morph into a 65k+ carrier and will take 10-15 years to build, right when we are ready to build at least two of these class.

Bade Mian,

Frankly I wouldn't also mind seeing another Vikrant being built in the interim.

However, I think there may be two major reasons why the Navy may not go that path.

1) Budgetary constraints. One Vikrant can build, roughly speaking, 3-3.5 P-15A destroyers. And destroyers are more flexible in terms of deployability.

2) (I think this is more important point) The Navy is worried about the air complement for a Vikrant v2. It's pretty obvious from all the sound bytes coming out that the Navy is very unhappy with MiG29K as a naval fighter on account of things like unreliable engines and relatively low stores carrying capacity. Investing in another Vikrant class would require investing in more MiG29K something, which I feel, the Navy is unwilling to do.

Regarding Vishal I'm quite sure that it's not going to be just a one-off like Vikrant. There will be more follow on boats.

Also as I have written before, IMO, Vikrant and Vicky will take care of India's needs over the next 15 years or so. For Pakistan specific threats, any one of them or even a couple of P15A, and P-17A will be sufficient.

And if a Chinese CBG comes sailing through the Malacca Straits any time over the next 15 years, it will meet a joint taskforce comprising Vicky and Vikrant and assorted support ships. That should be more than enough as deterrence, coupled with MKIs armed with Bhramos taking off from the Andamans and P-8i flying overhead.

[Cybaru]

Amit,

Thanks for your informative post and interesting points.

Sure you can park aircraft on the deck, but they are a real pain and have to be moved before the landings can start happening. You can launch from all 4 with aircrafts parked, but don't you have to clear the runway from the rear side and move all the aircraft towards front cat 1/2 area so that landing can proceed?

How many can the QE carry up top? What about vikramaditya?

Found this interesting image based reasoning guide to where QE effed up! I did a cursory read and will have to go back and read. The author freely digs in.. This link makes for a very interesting read. If you have time, please read: http://grandlogistics.blogspot.com/2009 ... riers.html

[Bade]

Amit, I think you have answered why the Navy is shy of heeding the feelers sent out by CSL. With both the N-LCA and AMCA which is even far into the future, they have few options to plan for as you have rightly surmised. Only if we had the N-LCAs in large numbers by now to fill in on a second Vikrant, a case could have been made.

[amit]

Amit,

Thanks for your informative post and interesting points.

Sure you can park aircraft on the deck, but they are a real pain and have to be moved before the landings can start happening. You can launch from all 4 with aircrafts parked, but don't you have to clear the runway from the rear side and move all the aircraft towards front cat 1/2 area so that landing can proceed?

How many can the QE carry up top? What about vikramaditya?

Found this interesting image based reasoning guide to where QE effed up! I did a cursory read and will have to go back and read. The author freely digs in..
http://grandlogistics.blogspot.com/2009 ... riers.html

Cybaru your welcome! Since none of us are experts we must learn from each other's efforts to dig up facts.

Regarding the landing and takeoff with so many aircraft parked on the deck, I think it's a major feat of deck space management and I believe they have specialist teams on each aircraft carrier tasked to do the job.

If you look at this random top view shot of a US aircraft carrier:



You'll note that that the landing area is kept open and in the front one of the cats is partially free with just two aircraft on it. I would think (pure guess work here) in case launches were needed the first aircraft on the cat would go up first and then the one behind it. After that all the aircraft positioned on the left side would go up one by one. Once they are all up then both cats would be opened up and then aircraft from other parts of the deck and from the hanger (via the front lifts) would come up and be launched one after the other.

The many pictures that I've trawled the net seems to show that the carriers usually concentrate most of their planes on front part of the ship while keeping the diagonally positioned arrestor aided runway free.

[amit]

Amit, I think you have answered why the Navy is shy of heeding the feelers sent out by CSL. With both the N-LCA and AMCA which is even far into the future, they have few options to plan for as you have rightly surmised. Only if we had the N-LCAs in large numbers by now to fill in on a second Vikrant, a case could have been made.

Totally agree Bade Mian. Considering how TFTA looking Vikrant has turned out to be, what sight is be for us Jingoes to see a pair of them sailing over the high seas with a group of P-15A, P-17A and P28s!

[Cybaru]

Yeah, I have been looking as well. It seems that if the deck is crowded they have no more than two open runways and a landing area is clear.

Found this interesting piece http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.c ... bmXKPnpJvY

DK Brown's "Design and Construction of British Warships 1939-45" is basically a repackage of the RN Naval Construction Dept's Official History.

According to this, for Indomitable "deck parking for 20 aircraft was arranged" and for Implacable, "arrangements were made on on the flight deck for a park for 24 aircraft".

The Indomitable figure applies to the basic Illustrious types, since their flight decks were the same length (eventually, after round-down removal).

Checking against historics seems to work - so for "standard size" (Albacore / Corsair / Hellcat / Barracuda / Avenger etc):

Illustrious: hangar 33, deck 20 = 53 - actuals around this figure, max I think 56 or 57
Indomitable: hangar 45, deck 20 = 65 - max actual was 50 operational and ~12 spares, Op MERIDIAN
Implacable: hangar 48, deck 24 = 72 - max actual was 81, but this included 48 Seafire IIIs which are only 3/4 size, so translates into 69 standard a/c

As noted above, the USN did deck parking right from the early days - details are in Polmar's 2-volume book (the first one).

The RN didn't start until 1942, when you saw the Illustrious-class toting 6-10 non-folding Sea Hurricanes or Seafires on outriggers, as they would not fit the lifts. Later the outriggers went and full-on parking was used.

Advantages? More birds, more combat power.

Disadvantages? The birds on the roof are getting regular salt showers, which isn't good for their health. They need to be shuffled from one end of the deck to the other when flight ops are happening. This requires more bods to do the shuffling. These bods need to be trained to do the job. They also need to be fed, watered, and have somewhere to sleep. If your ship was not designed to accommodate these bods - as the RN carriers were not - then there is a difficulty. Not surprising it took the RN a few years to get the drill sorted (along with a basic shortage of aircraft to make any deck parks necessary!)

It seems that 320+ meters plus and 75-82 meters deck area width is what the american carriers aim for with speeds in excess of 32 knots.

[amit]

Cybaru,

If you look at this picture:



If my counting is not wrong as many as 43 planes including heavies like the Hawkeye and other transport aircraft are parked on top. This is addition to those that are parked in the hanger. Contrast that with the QE carrier's air wing of 35 F-35s and 4 early warning helos.

Note: Even in this very crowded configuration, they have one cat in the mid deck free launch and the second cat only has a helo blocking it. I think these are for emergency launches in case of unexpected threats.

[Singha]

the E2 seems like a masterpiece of compact pkging...barely larger than hornets footprint.

[amit]

the E2 seems like a masterpiece of compact pkging...barely larger than hornets footprint.

And yet it still carries a crew of four specialists with their equipment plus two pilots. We need these or their follow-ons on the Vishal! One can do the job of more than four helos.

[Cybaru]

That's 15 aircraft that need shuffling before ops can start!

Well if Vishal crosses 300+ meters in length and reaches 70+ meters in width then it will carry a pretty large load.

[Singha]

so it seems the 300+m heavies have critical advantages in speed, deck layout and esp not having the fwd catapults/takeoff run interfere with the landing strip and rear catapult operations...the achilles heel of the CDG/Kuz/vikrant sized ships

no wonder the americans gamed this properly and have never looked back at mid sized carriers even for areas like mediterranean and gulf where smaller carriers would need less support and be more agile.

we need to learn all this from the zen master and not goof up......we have only 1 chance to get this right.

[Cybaru]

Seemingly the link I posted above states this about the two island config "the turbulent wake from the forward island affects both deck operations and flying operations as aircraft must pass behind the island as they approach to land on the carrier."

[hnair]

I think we need to look at the differences of mission objectives, as the carrier goes up in size

1) upto 20,000t: Heli-cruisers for ASW + limited Sea-control
2) 20,000 - 45,000t: Amphibious assault + Sea-control + fleet defense
3) 45,000 - 65,000t: Amphibious assault + Sea-control + Fleet defense + limited Air support on land (nothing heavy )
4) > 65,000t: Floating airbase for full-spectrum air operations (land-attack, CAP, CAS, Fleet-defense to base repair) around the globe.

Vikrant evolved from 20,000 to 45,000, over two decades. IIRC, the original intention was basic sea-control + amphibous assault + fleet defence. Hence the concept that was interesting to IN (as per news articles of that era in 80s and early 90s) was the Sea-Control Ship concept. Even the mighty Khan was brooding over a sea-control ship concept.

#1 to #3 needs only a STOBAR system to survive. But #4 needs CATOBAR and depending on the tempo of ops during Day 1, can go upto khan's preferred 4 CATs/carrier. Add a blast deflector to a #4 and all of Amit-saar's real-estate management issues gets sorted out too, incase of a surge in air-arm

Though tad above 65K, UKistan has no need for #4, for now. UKistan's #3s will pant their tongue out between yellow snaggle tooth and go wagging its fluffy tail in Khan's magnificent fleet of #4's wake. They upgraded from#2s to #3s because they felt basic air support capabilities are needed for a Falklands situation in future. If situation demands and khan gets a succession of non-WASP prajjidentz who dont authorize newer iOS10 upgraded Tridents or if a powerful adversary like SA might start making noises about some Seal-loo island near antartica, they will have a "substantial refit" of a CAT and transition their #3s to #4s. They will find "budget" at that time for a CATOBAR upgrade all right, even if it means fish-netting and letting the frumpy queen out for Saudi pervs

So if Vishal goes over 65,000 and even more importantly, gets a few CATs, you are signalling everyone that you are going to do full-scale land attack in far shores. Question is what are our targets, other than Hainan for a full-fledged attack carrier? What do we do after we attack and all objectives of land-attack are met? Air-arms cannot do a Dresden out of Pearl River Delta for sure, unless we talk about big booms. If it is big-booms that gets job done, we dont need these carriers.....anyways. An attack carrier for baki problem is like having a cricket bat for mosquitos. Will get the job done, but why? But then, at some point we would have to attack. Hence these deliberations early on, for a concept that works in swing roles. There will be evolution, like VIkrant's

There is merit in ordering more Vikrants, because our #3 requirements are immediate around IOR and one is not enough. But then there are questions about the CSL yard's management, if the gates cant be opened due to lack of attention to detail. Grapevine birathers claim the Vikrant class, if more gets build, will have bidders from both Kattupalli and Pipavav. However CSL too are nimble and has been known to move with remarkable speed.

[Singha]

I do not agree with your 2nd last para. the heavies might be capable of some land attack (at far less of a sortie rate and tempo than a troop of land based F16/F15 mind you) but you cannot neglect their other role which is comprehensive air defence of vital areas and protection to subamarine fleet from air threats.

the PLAAF+PLANAF once they mass together for attack can put a combined 200 flankers/J10 into the air with supersonic ASMs..plus the H6 bombers with long range and fairly high subsonic speed.

since our submarines would be the only ones playing the South china sea in the event of a conflict, how are you going to keep this lot + LRMP birds off their backs and not make it a suicide mission?

just as the great khan plans you need strong carrier support standing off in deep water beyond the 2nd island chain and making life difficult for anything flying over the area and able to repel threats to itself.

a 65000t #3 is not going to hack it for such threat density and workloads. a couple of #4 operating together is the bare minimum + loads of AAW destroyers.

PLAN subs are going to all over our backsides in the event of a fight....targeting shipping lanes, naval assets, coastal industries......we need to pay them back in kind if they escalate to that level.

#4 presents the options that #3 falls short in. its better to have a big stick given life of these platforms is 60 years. in 60 years none can predict whether TSP will be a prosperous caliphate with swiss per capita income or more likely a asian version of chad and mali.

[Cybaru]

So this is what I think may happen.

If we do go with CATS/EMALS, we will end up with conventional propulsion. There will be some retarded DTTI or some such crap and there will be too many firangs on the boat to put our crown jewels in the vicinity. It will end up with 4 LM2500 and everyone can go up and down all over to the boat to enable whatever is needed.

If the CATS/EMALS talk fail, we will end up with 75K ton boat and we may play with nuclear propulsion with probability of rafales for next tranche versus Mig29K.

[hnair]

Singha, did not understand "I do not agree with your 2nd last para"

You said

the heavies might be capable of some land attack (at far less of a sortie rate and tempo than a troop of land based F16/F15 mind you) but you cannot neglect their other role which is comprehensive air defence of vital areas and protection to subamarine fleet from air threats.

I said:

3) 45,000 - 65,000t: Amphibious assault + Sea-control + Fleet defense + limited Air support on land (nothing heavy )

Arent we talking of similar stuff?

Right now, our justification for #4 is not there. A pair of #3 carriers at So-Chi-Sea can do CAP for LRMP hunting, a string of ASW helos on station and keeping a large area "Bastion" for our subs

We cant plan like the great Khan for a beefy carrier with full land-attack capabilities, if we dont have countries to subdue. But it might change. Even if Bakis have 1/10th military/tech competence of the yahoodi-birathers, they are too next-door to waste time on a full carrier

later added: Queenie carrier is a good swing design for later refits

[hnair]

btw, grapevine says Kattupalli might change owner soon, a la Pipavav,
(due to the lack of orders needing deep pockets to maintain the world-class facilities of both places)

[amit]

Right now, our justification for #4 is not there. A pair of #3 carriers at So-Chi-Sea can do CAP for LRMP hunting, a string of ASW helos on station and keeping a large area "Bastion" for our subs

We cant plan like the great Khan for a beefy carrier with full land-attack capabilities, if we dont have countries to subdue. But it might change. Even if Bakis have 1/10th military/tech competence of the yahoodi-birathers, they are too next-door to waste time on a full carrier

later added: Queenie carrier is a good swing design for later refits

Hnair Sir,

You missed one other major role that #4 has and let's not underestimate its potential. Shock and Awe.

Imagine, 15-20 years from now in another flare up in the South China Sea, a #4 equipped Vishal makes a goodwill port of call to The Philippines. Or for the matter a Vishal CBG sails into some Japanese port on a goodwill plus R&R stop.

This sends strong signals that other countries - our potential allies - note and jot down for future reference. Wannabe rivals or enemies also note it down just as diligently.

We have to remember, that apart from some occasional saturation bombing to keep the piglets in check in the part of the globe which is sliding down a Jinn-created wormhole into the 7th century AD directly into the lap of PUBH, US carriers haven't seen any real fighting after the dishum dishum with Japan during WW2. And yet the US maintains a 11 CBG danda to flaunt when it feels the need.

Also Vishal will come post 2030 and will be around for at least 60 years. Which means it will be in service well into the later part of this century. The fakir sahebs of our mystic land will become very rich by then and will probably be arguing with the Dragon wannabes about global resources. You really don't know, we may feel the need to subjugate some African tinpot dictator in say 2050 or so?

It's always better to have the danda all oiled and read in the corner instead of having to go into the woods to chop up a piece of wood to create one once we realise we need to use it.

Bottomline, if we can afford it we should go for it. Super carrier with at least 70-80 aircraft. This is capacity building for the later part of this century. For now the two Vs will do us fine.

[amit]

btw, grapevine says Kattupalli might change owner soon, a la Pipavav,
(due to the lack of orders needing deep pockets to maintain the world-class facilities of both places)

That would be a shame. L&T should be allowed to go big time into ship building. I hope the submarine building stuff goes to them.

[Singha]

if cats/emals talks fail, I hope we do not regress into getting ukrainian/russian steam turbines. we should go for LM2500/nuclear whatever is affordable and safe.

#3 has too limited of a airwing and sortie rate for fleet air defence against high density threats. even the great khan planned to mass 4 carriers to face off against the backfire threat in the GIUK gap and beyond toward norway. same for north of japan - 4 carriers together. the enemy needs to succeed once and slip in couple of heavy ASMs ... you being on defence need to succeed all the time.

reading the below we need to think deep and get it right like apple does for the iphone every nut and bolt, every ladder needs design thought to optimize things .....

its a myth that carriers can sustain very high sortie rates with limited ac. even with khan style air wings they have problems...so we need to go big or go home.
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin ... wer-potent

On 20 July 1997, as part of Joint Fleet Exercise 97-2, the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) with Commander, Carrier Group Seven, and Carrier Air Wing Nine (CVW-9) embarked began a simulated high intensity strike campaign. Four days later, they had generated 771 strike sorties and had put 1,336 bombs on target.

In the post-Vietnam era, no other carrier and air wing have generated as much firepower in 98 hours.

The surge, as it has come to be known, incorporated all facets of littoral strike warfare—from weapons buildup in the magazines to ordnance delivery.

Carrier Air Wing Nine flew 975 fixed-wing sorties during the four day surge. Figure 1 summarizes the surge by sortie type and day. Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) defined the terms:

A strike sortie is one in which the aircraft penetrates hostile territory carrying ordnance; releases ordnance that enters hostile territory; or conducts electronic attack or offensive counterair operations as part of a strike package in which other strike aircraft satisfy the first criteria. Air interdiction, close air support, and suppression of enemy defenses are examples of strike missions.

A strike support sortie is one in which the aircraft performs some function critical to the successful completion of a strike sortie. Tanking, electronic support measures, and combat search and rescue are examples of strike support missions.

Other sorties include such missions as airborne early warning, defensive counterair, and functional check (maintenance test) flights.

Forty-two times during the evolution, aircraft that launched on strike missions did not meet the criteria for strike sorties. Figure 1 depicts these as sorties disqualified from strike.

Figure 2 is a composite of several counts. Note that almost 80% of the sorties flown were strike sorties; strike support accounted for another 10%. In turn, F/A-18s flew nearly 80% of the strike sorties. Almost all the targets were within 200 nautical miles of the carrier. These distances, which are not indicative of the maximum striking range of the aircraft, were driven by the location of the carrier operating area in relation to the target ranges. We show the maximum operational strike range that the strike-fighters could have reached, based on typical operational employment and time airborne. Weather in the target areas frequently forced strikes to divert to secondary targets, exercising the full range of command and control. Almost all strike-fighter sorties carried two 500pound or two 1,000-pound bombs (22% were live Mk 82 or Mk 83 bombs that required fuzing—see Figure 2) plus air-to-air weapons. Of the 771 strike sorties, 727 were loaded with bombs; 44 were EA6B electronic support sorties.

Only a portion of the medium range interdiction strikes required aerial refueling; U.S. Air Force KC-135s and U.S. Marine Corps KC-130s provided most of this support. Carrier Air Wing Nine S-3s conducted recovery tanking and supplied more than one-third of the total fuel transferred to air wing aircraft.

The exercise was not an isolated event. It was preceded by six days of an intense, event-driven scenario in which the entire Nimitz battle group conducted offensive and defensive operations. During these six days, the Nimitz and CVW-9 generated about 700 fixed-wing sorties.

Following this, operations paused for 16 hours during which the ship's company and the air wing got ready for the surge:

The Air Department prepared the flight deck for high-intensity flight operations by inspecting and conducting routine maintenance on catapult and arresting gear; repainting markings on the flight deck; moving some non-mission-capable aircraft and unneeded equipment from the flight deck to the hangar bay; and configuring the flight deck for the first surge launch.

The carrier conducted an underway replenishment so that aviation fuel stores were at maximum operational capacity.

Ordnance crews built up bombs, loaded aircraft for the first two launches, and staged weapons in the bomb farm adjacent to the island.

Maintenance personnel worked through the night to repair aircraft, resulting in a mission-capable rate of almost 80%.

Strike leaders planned the initial strikes while air crews rested.

When operations began, the air crews were ready; the aircraft were groomed; and the ordnance was staged. The cost? Flight-deck and maintenance personnel began the surge after six days of nonstop, intense activity—they were tired.

Personnel augmentation proved critical. During previous high-intensity flight operations, people were the limiting factor in generating sorties. For this evolution, 257 active-duty and reserve personnel augmented the ship's company and air wing.

The number of augmentees was artificially high. Some augmentation was required to achieve the carrier and air wing deployment manning levels. Exercise planners, cognizant of past fleet experiences, intentionally requested a higher number of augmentees than they thought necessary. Although the surge placed heavy demands on many personnel groups, some groups—such as ship's laundry, counseling, and engineering—faced normal or below normal workloads.

Most flight-deck personnel groups—aircraft directors, plane handlers, chockmen, fueling personnel, and plane captains—were augmented and generally were able to maintain regular work schedules. The catapult and arresting gear crews—manned well below billets authorized—declined augmentation because they were reluctant to share the responsibility inherent in their jobs with individuals unknown to them.

An Operational Strike Planning Cell was created from augmentees to allow the air crews to focus on flying. By lowering the time air crews spent on mission planning, the planning cell may have enabled the air wing to achieve greater pilot utilization rates.

In all cases, establishing trust between the augmentees and resident personnel was critical to improved performance. Where fleet-wide practices were in place—such as the aviation community's acceptance of NSAWC procedures—integration of the augmentees was easy. Where such procedures were absent, full utilization of augmentees was delayed.

In general, augmenting leadership positions (commanding officers of the carrier, the air wing, and the squadrons; the handler; and the air wing maintenance officer) is problematic. Instead, individuals in positions of authority might delegate to resident personnel, who would receive augmentation to help them.

Fifty-eight scheduled fixed-wing sorties were canceled during the surge; maintenance and supply were responsible for 49 of these. Typically, sorties were canceled because there were no mission-capable aircraft available. Observed mission-capable rates were consistent with rates reported by other deployed air wings except for the F-14A. The F14A mission capable rate during the surge was substantially lower than rates for recently deployed F-14As. Maintenance turnaround times can drive mission-capable rates.

The biggest contributor to organizational level turnaround time was time awaiting maintenance. More organizational-level maintenance personnel might have increased mission-capable rates, particularly for the F-14As. The biggest contributor to intermediate-level turnaround time was time awaiting parts, which indicates that the inventory of repair parts was insufficient to keep up with demand.

Data indicate a low cannibalization rate across all squadrons. We did observe the F/A-18 squadrons cannibalizing critical pieces of gear that had inadequate logistic support—video recorders and APG-73 radar receivers, for example. The low cannibalization rate may have been an artifact of the short logistics chain.

Analysis indicates that the carrier and air wing had the potential to generate additional strike sorties. Under the surge master air attack plan, they might have made up some of the canceled sorties had they relied more extensively on using spare aircraft from sister squadrons. The cost for this would have been higher air crew tasking and increased workloads for the maintenance and servicing crews. Analysis indicates that they had the reserve capacities to pay these costs.

Indeed, the Nimitz and CVW-9 had excess capacity resident within their F/A-18 air crews and airframes. Free of other constraints, the air wing could have generated more than 150 additional F/A-18 sorties. Achieving that potential would have required a few more strikefighter pilots; more important, it would have required that the flight-deck crews ready 20% more aircraft—a task that would have called for additional ordnance crews, a different flight-deck loading and configuration, and the buildup and transfer of additional ordnance to the flight deck. Under a more demanding scenario, the turnaround processes would have been the most constraining factor. In hindsight; the Nimitz's flight deck probably had the capacity to process at most an additional 50 to 100 strike sorties over the four-day surge.

A carrier and her air wing can maintain high-tempo operations for just so long. Eventually, scheduled ship maintenance must be performed that could disrupt and in some cases halt flight operations. Weekly preventive maintenance and servicing activities would have allowed the carrier and the air wing to operate for, at most, three additional days before the conduct of scheduled maintenance would have affected flight operations. The air wing will eventually deplete the carrier's magazines and supply of JP-5 fuel. Based on the rates of consumption of ordnance and fuel, these would have been depleted in about one more day.

The most difficult constraint to measure is that imposed by fatigue. Although no evidence of general fatigue was present among air crews, other groups were undermanned, and fatigue was evident by the final day. Based on these factors, the Nimitz and CVW-9 could have sustained the surge operating tempo for another 12 to 24 hours.

Some additional lessons emerged:

By sharing aircraft, air crews, maintenance personnel, and ordnance loading crews, the air wing's three F/A-18 squadrons could have flown more strike sorties.

Under the surge operating tempo, flight-deck crews found they could manage routinely 27 to 29 aircraft on the flight deck. When the number climbed to more than 32, readying aircraft for launch became more challenging. Operators recommended that in future high-intensity operations the number of aircraft on the flight deck be held to less than 30. Continuous flight operations actually were easier to support than were start-and-stop operations.

Moving weapons from the hangar deck to the flight deck proved to be the most difficult step in loading ordnance.

Aircraft utilization rates observed during the surge greatly exceeded the Navy's planning factors. The Navy might consider modifying its planning factors to reflect the dependence on the operational environment and the advances in modern aircraft reliability.

A 1+00 cycle was included in the air plan on several occasions. This cycle proved exceptionally challenging, nearly forcing the flight deck into flex mode, and it significantly increased the fatigue of flight-deck personnel. Operators felt the cycle was too short and that the cycle time should have been at least 1+15. On the other hand, to be independent of tanking, F/A-18Cs must operate on cycles of 1+20 or shorter. Therefore, unless external tankers are available, the cycle time must be between 1+15 and 1+20 at operating tempos comparable to that of surge.

----
^^ these are the turnaround times between launch and recovery mode I think. in another article nimitz handily beat the george washington ... the atlantic and pacific fleets have some procedure diffs I could get.

[amit]

So this is what I think may happen.

If we do go with CATS/EMALS, we will end up with conventional propulsion. There will be some retarded DTTI or some such crap and there will be too many firangs on the boat to put our crown jewels in the vicinity. It will end up with 4 LM2500 and everyone can go up and down all over to the boat to enable whatever is needed.

If the CATS/EMALS talk fail, we will end up with 75K ton boat and we may play with nuclear propulsion with probability of rafales for next tranche versus Mig29K.

Frankly I don't think DTTI will apply to EMALS because, like the LM2500 it will be a one-time buy with regular servicing contract.

I feel if US does share EMALS it might just wink wink, nod nod regarding nuclear propulsion. You gotta think as to why US offered this cooperation in the first place - caveat: it's still possible that the retards and jihadis in SD might torpedo this. I think the US or at least its military have understood two things.

1) Sometime in this century there will be an inevitable military confrontation with China - most probably with respect to open use of sea lanes.

2) None of the US' traditional allies post WW2 have the stomach to actively side with Unkil in such a confrontation.

It's because of this the US (again I think it's military and not necessarily SD) has come to the conclusion that it needs new allies because for the first time since WW2 it will be facing an adversary which would bigger than itself both in terms of population and GDP.

India fits the bill as a future ally. From the Indian POV, it's also obvious that at some point of time during this century we will have a major military confrontation with China. And let's face it we may not have the wherewithal to face the Dragon alone.

Hence the enemy's enemy is your friend adage applies. Actually both the US and India are status quoist powers while China is a revisionist. Combination of the US and India plus maybe a resurgent Japan might just keep the Chinese revisionist tendencies in check. IMO you just need to do that over a few decades, after that the CCP will collapse and China will lapse back to its civilisational ethos, which hopefully will be a more benign version of the in your face Nationalist attitude cultivated by CCP.

JMT

[amit]

Singha,

I was watching one of those NatGeo programmes on the Nimitz. The ships even have a engine repair, overhaul and maintenance wing. They can bloody well take out a F15 engine, open it up, fix it, put it back together and then do hot bench testing to ensure the repair worked.

That's just like a regular military airbase on land. That's the target we need to aim for. You can't have 100 planes and not the means to do 100 per cent servicing of those planes.

It's going to be a hard road but we need to walk it.

[Singha]

the C2 "cods" thing fly engines in and out as needed also.

the hot bench testing is nice...pointing out the exhaust over the side and turning it
on.

[Singha]

this is supposedly the airwing of a theoritical PA2/QE2-CTOL carrier - 36 large fighters, 3 E2, 4 jammers, 8x10t helis, 1-2 COD..reducing the helis to 4 and deleting the CODs might open room for another 6 fighter for total fighters=42, total airwing = 50

1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F/A-18F Super Hornets
1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F-35C Lightnings
1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F/A-18C Hornets or 12 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV) X-47, Sea Ghost, Avenger etc.
1 early warning squadron (VAW) of 3 E-2Cs Hawkeyes
1 electronic warfare squadron (VAW) of 4 E/A-18G Growlers
One Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of 4 MH-60S Seahawks
One Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of 4 MH-60R Seahawks
1 detachment of C-2A Greyhound aircraft for Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD)

[NRao]

The ships even have a engine repair, overhaul and maintenance wing.

That is what I had said long back.

Now add to that story the ability to deliver an engine - now a days via a Greyhounds.

So, what does India need? In 2040+. Build that now.

Buying another Vikrant to keep costs affordable and floating another boat make absolutely no sense.

[brar_w]

Most engine modules do not require the Greyhounds. Even the larger F-135 module can fit into a V-22 that can also double up as an IFR asset through a RO/RO kit.

[srai]

...

So, what does India need? In 2040+. Build that now.

Buying another Vikrant to keep costs affordable and floating another boat make absolutely no sense.

The goal should be to build one aircraft carrier every decade. That would mean 4 carriers in operation by 2040 with Vikramaditya close to retirement. At that rate, the fleet will stabilize at 4 to 5 aircraft carriers with oldest one being retired at 40-years of age. Between 2020-2030, the only option at the moment is the second Vikrant class. Larger CATS/EMALS design (and possibly nuclear powered) is unlikely before 2030.

[Cybaru]

So this is what I think may happen.

If we do go with CATS/EMALS, we will end up with conventional propulsion. There will be some retarded DTTI or some such crap and there will be too many firangs on the boat to put our crown jewels in the vicinity. It will end up with 4 LM2500 and everyone can go up and down all over to the boat to enable whatever is needed.

If the CATS/EMALS talk fail, we will end up with 75K ton boat and we may play with nuclear propulsion with probability of rafales for next tranche versus Mig29K.

Frankly I don't think DTTI will apply to EMALS because, like the LM2500 it will be a one-time buy with regular servicing contract.

I feel if US does share EMALS it might just wink wink, nod nod regarding nuclear propulsion. You gotta think as to why US offered this cooperation in the first place - caveat: it's still possible that the retards and jihadis in SD might torpedo this. I think the US or at least its military have understood two things.

1) Sometime in this century there will be an inevitable military confrontation with China - most probably with respect to open use of sea lanes.

2) None of the US' traditional allies post WW2 have the stomach to actively side with Unkil in such a confrontation.

It's because of this the US (again I think it's military and not necessarily SD) has come to the conclusion that it needs new allies because for the first time since WW2 it will be facing an adversary which would bigger than itself both in terms of population and GDP.

India fits the bill as a future ally. From the Indian POV, it's also obvious that at some point of time during this century we will have a major military confrontation with China. And let's face it we may not have the wherewithal to face the Dragon alone.

Hence the enemy's enemy is your friend adage applies. Actually both the US and India are status quoist powers while China is a revisionist. Combination of the US and India plus maybe a resurgent Japan might just keep the Chinese revisionist tendencies in check. IMO you just need to do that over a few decades, after that the CCP will collapse and China will lapse back to its civilisational ethos, which hopefully will be a more benign version of the in your face Nationalist attitude cultivated by CCP.

JMT

I think the Americans would love us to put nuke on our boat. They will spend 2 years on the same boat installing EMALS/CATS and will get a peak at our technology and see where we are. Separately, I also think adding two different new techs on the same boat is recipe for delay. We push for conventional boat with CATS/EMALS and in the next version go nuke/EMALS if that happens depending upon the environment.

There is no such thing as allies and that is how khan operates. Allies get to see bare minimum and khan always keeps the aces up its sleeve. Amir khan probably wants a shield against china. Something to absorb damage or keep the chinis busy.

[Cybaru]

this is supposedly the airwing of a theoritical PA2/QE2-CTOL carrier - 36 large fighters, 3 E2, 4 jammers, 8x10t helis, 1-2 COD..reducing the helis to 4 and deleting the CODs might open room for another 6 fighter for total fighters=42, total airwing = 50

1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F/A-18F Super Hornets
1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F-35C Lightnings
1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F/A-18C Hornets or 12 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV) X-47, Sea Ghost, Avenger etc.
1 early warning squadron (VAW) of 3 E-2Cs Hawkeyes
1 electronic warfare squadron (VAW) of 4 E/A-18G Growlers
One Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of 4 MH-60S Seahawks
One Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of 4 MH-60R Seahawks
1 detachment of C-2A Greyhound aircraft for Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD)

If they grow length by 30 meters, according to one persons calculation on the net (link above), you can add an extra 18 aircraft. 6 in hangar and 12 more on deck, plus fuel and engine block to go over 30 knots. So 315+ meters seems like the magic number for 68/70 aircraft.

[NRao]

The goal should be to build one aircraft carrier every decade. That would mean 4 carriers in operation by 2040 with Vikramaditya close to retirement. At that rate, the fleet will stabilize at 4 to 5 aircraft carriers with oldest one being retired at 40-years of age. Between 2020-2030, the only option at the moment is the second Vikrant class. Larger CATS/EMALS design (and possibly nuclear powered) is unlikely before 2030.

What is the purpose for these 4 carriers? Just so that IN can say we have 4 carriers?

The argument for the Vicky was made some 15 years ago and it really does not apply any more, but ..................................................

So, in 2030 what is going to be the party line?

I fully understand the expense portion. But, what I still do not get is what is the NEED. Why a carrier at all? Once that purpose or need is ided, then one can id the carrier's size, etc.

Even F-35B vs. F-35C. Which one and why? Outside of fly pasts, some gymnastics, etc.

[srai]

The goal should be to build one aircraft carrier every decade. That would mean 4 carriers in operation by 2040 with Vikramaditya close to retirement. At that rate, the fleet will stabilize at 4 to 5 aircraft carriers with oldest one being retired at 40-years of age. Between 2020-2030, the only option at the moment is the second Vikrant class. Larger CATS/EMALS design (and possibly nuclear powered) is unlikely before 2030.

What is the purpose for these 4 carriers? Just so that IN can say we have 4 carriers?

The argument for the Vicky was made some 15 years ago and it really does not apply any more, but ..................................................

So, in 2030 what is going to be the party line?

I fully understand the expense portion. But, what I still do not get is what is the NEED. Why a carrier at all? Once that purpose or need is ided, then one can id the carrier's size, etc.

Even F-35B vs. F-35C. Which one and why? Outside of fly pasts, some gymnastics, etc.

^^^

Project 71 Air Defence Ship (ADS) -> Vikrant

Minimum requirement is 3 aircraft carriers--one each for WNC and ENC and the third as a reserve/training/refit. These should be Vikrant-1, Vikrant-2 and Vikramditya.

Future, or post 2030, is something the IN is figuring out now. Based on the larger size that is being talked about future carriers will likely be more for power projection roles with better offensive capability.

[NRao]

1) so, we really do not know. We are going by what was thought through some 15 years ago. If that is true (ITIT) THEN it really will not apply.

2) "Vikrant" Class includes Vishal. Please remember that. Just to make things clear.

3) Finally, this east-west will never do. "East" today for India needs to mean all the way to Guam and up north to Vladivostok. IOR should be a given. I think the issue is more political, India needs to tell 'hood nations what is acceptable and what is not. Draw that line and follow through

[srai]

^^^

Looking even further, if "East" means all-the-way to the US West Coast and "West" means all-the-way to the US East coast then the IN would cover all the oceans

[NRao]

Well, my understanding is that it I'd a committee that is trying to contain China.

So, technically, yes, IN will be in every sea. That has been the idea since the days of Mr. Gates.

[svinayak]

^^^

Looking even further, if "East" means all-the-way to the US West Coast and "West" means all-the-way to the US East coast then the IN would cover all the oceans

Three CVG group for attack formation

One in Pacific East Asia - TO attack PLAN navy
One in South China Sea
One in IOR to protect the home base

[NRao]

One to pulverize Pakistan.

The rest to deter. Collectively.