1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
One thing we can do is to draw the right lessons learned from this long ago war.
We have an account of all that worked and not of what didn't work.
A direct consequence of the IB not having identified the rising of the TSP Second armored division, that Mrs. IG separated RAW for external intelligence.
Please also try to find the lessons learned in PC Lal's book and how he fixed them for 1971.
Same with the Indian Navy.
We have an account of all that worked and not of what didn't work.
A direct consequence of the IB not having identified the rising of the TSP Second armored division, that Mrs. IG separated RAW for external intelligence.
Please also try to find the lessons learned in PC Lal's book and how he fixed them for 1971.
Same with the Indian Navy.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Which of course reminds me of Kukke Suresh's excellent write up of Pete Wilson that seems not available anymore on BR, 404 and all. At the end of that article K. Suresh relates an anecdote that occurred after the 1971 war, at an IAF commander's conference presided over by PC Lal. Everyone was agog to tell all and sundry about the lessons learned. Finally Pete Wilson piped in with the story of the scientist and the flea. Everything here is a 404ramana wrote:One thing we can do is to draw the right lessons learned from this long ago war.
We have an account of all that worked and not of what didn't work.
A direct consequence of the IB not having identified the rising of the TSP Second armored division, that Mrs. IG separated RAW for external intelligence.
Please also try to find the lessons learned in PC Lal's book and how he fixed them for 1971.
Same with the Indian Navy.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... 7-687.html
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
I was not even born when this war took place. But by some memory, I do remember Asal Utar. Maybe it was the paton tank that so proudly was displayed to show the Baki infidelity.
Coming to this pages and reading up the stories is something I like to do. I have been through all of BRF's archives on 1965 and 1971 and re-read again (and again) and everytime I do that I feel how brave they must be and how much the current generation has still to achieve.
Breaking up bakistan remains unfinished.
Coming to this pages and reading up the stories is something I like to do. I have been through all of BRF's archives on 1965 and 1971 and re-read again (and again) and everytime I do that I feel how brave they must be and how much the current generation has still to achieve.
Breaking up bakistan remains unfinished.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
There used to be a song........woh patten tank banate hei aur duniya ko behkate hein .......
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
A complete daredevil of a pilot. I had the privilege of being in the same school as his sons and as kids watching their father thrill us school kids with his acrobatic flyovers over the school precisely during the 15 minute mid morning school recess, designed to entertain the school and his own sons. From 300 feet over the school he used to do a near vertical climb with after burner's at 100% ear shattering decibels and disappear into broken clouds thousands of feet above in a Mig 21. We had the privilege of near weekly aerial shows in the school....did not have to wait for Republic Dayvsunder wrote:
Which of course reminds me of Kukke Suresh's excellent write up of Pete Wilson
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Did not know Prof. Wilson flew Mig-21's, thought he was a Canberra pilot. For whatever it is worth, one of the people who wrote a comment on the "Four against One" article by Samir and Jagman is a Mark Wilson. It is obvious since he is talking of being a 14 year old boy and being terrified of the Kalaikunda raid and how he talks of Uncle Denis and Uncle Dicky and how he addresses Alfred Cooke, that this is Pete Wilson's son. You were in KGP?ldev wrote:A complete daredevil of a pilot. I had the privilege of being in the same school as his sons and as kids watching their father thrill us school kids with his acrobatic flyovers over the school precisely during the 15 minute mid morning school recess, designed to entertain the school and his own sons. From 300 feet over the school he used to do a near vertical climb with after burner's at 100% ear shattering decibels and disappear into broken clouds thousands of feet above in a Mig 21. We had the privilege of near weekly aerial shows in the school....did not have to wait for Republic Dayvsunder wrote:
Which of course reminds me of Kukke Suresh's excellent write up of Pete Wilson
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Mark is the oldest son, Ian and David are the middle and youngest brothers respectively. I was junior to David in school. The school acrobatic exploits happened years later, probably in the last year/two before Pete Wilson left the IAF. He was based in Lohegaon at that time.vsunder wrote:
For whatever it is worth, one of the people who wrote a comment on the "Four against One" article by Samir and Jagman is a Mark Wilson.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Sabre Killer Siblings
In 1965, the Keelor brothers and their Gnats wrote war history. The pilots are the only siblings to be awarded Vir Chakras for the same feat
Officers at Ambala Air Force Station were heading to the mess for a dining out—a formal farewell dinner for an officer who is getting posted out—when they got news that Pakistan had started shooting across the border. They would learn later that these were the opening shots of Operation Gland Slam, a bid to take over Akhnoor and the road to Kashmir. “Our squadrons were told to move to the front immediately,” said Air Marshal Denzil Keelor, 82. Then a 33-year-old squadron leader, Denzil commanded the Folland Gnats of Squadron 9.
The battle had begun badly. The Indian Army was not able to stop the Pakistani advance, which had reached Chhamb, Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Air Force sent Squadron 45’s de Havilland Vampires to support the Army. But, on the evening of September 1, a Pakistani squadron of F-86 Sabres, led by their flying ace Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui, shot down three Vampires. It was a huge blow to India. The Pakistani Air Force was exultant.
“Then, at 7.30am on September 3, our radars picked up a Pakistani air patrol at Chhamb. Squadron 23, which had moved to Pathankot, scrambled their Gnats,” said Denzil, alumnus of Lucknow’s La Martiniere. “They assembled two sections of four Gnats each, one led by Squadron Leader Johnny Green and the other by Trevor [Keelor].” Trevor was his brother, exactly a year younger.
Jimmy Goodman flew a decoy ahead of the Gnats. The Pakistani Sabres took the bait and rushed to intercept. Gnats are not so sensitive to radars, so they remained unseen till two Sabres got caught in the formation. Trevor got behind one and shot it down. “That was first blood,” said Denzil, grinning wide. “What a blow it was to Pakistan’s Air Force, which thought it was invincible. There was panic in their ranks even before our Gnats returned to base.”
Trevor became an instant hero, and a Vir Chakra was announced. At the first opportunity, Denzil called him up and said, “Well done, bro!”
The very next morning, one more Sabre was shot down far out on the eastern front. The kill was made by Flight Lieutenant Alfred Tyrone Cooke, another Lucknow boy and a schoolmate of the Keelors. Cooke had intercepted two Sabres over Kalaikunda and, after a fantastic dogfight, brought down one. “The other is a ‘probable’, meaning we are not sure if it was shot down or not,” said Denzil. Another Sabre down, another Vir Chakra announced.
Then, on September 19, Denzil was called to escort four Dassault Mystere fighter-bombers to Chawinda, near Sialkot. Two Army strike corps were engaged in a fierce ground battle here, while the Pakistani Air Force rained bombs on them. “It was late afternoon, around 4.30pm, when we took off in formation,” said Denzil. “Gnats behind Mysteres. We flew low, 100ft above ground, and I could see the battle on the ground through the smoke and the dust. We saw a huge column of tanks heading from the west to the east. It could only be the enemy. At the same time, we sighted four Sabres, targeting our ground forces. I called up [Flight Lieutenant Viney] Kapila and told him and buddy Mayadev to take on the two Sabres to the left, which were higher. Muna Rai and I tackled the lower flying ones.”
Soon, two simultaneous dogfights were on in the hazy sky. As the Sabres and Gnats engaged each other, Denzil noticed a dim burst of fire and thought more Pakistan aircraft had joined the fight. But, he quickly realised that this was anti-aircraft fire. “I was above the Sabres, and so had an advantage,” said Denzil.
Rai could not keep up with the air attack and was ordered to return to base. Through all the smoke, haze and fire, Denzil saw the Sabre in front of Kapila trailing black smoke before it turned sharply and hit the ground. “Kaps, you got him,” shouted Denzil over the radio, even as he tackled his own Sabres.
He got his chance when the Sabre below him rolled out and began turning left and right, searching for him. “He had lost sight of me,” said Denzil. “I took the chance, dived down and fired three bursts. The Sabre was leaking. Kapila joined me and tried shooting the craft, but his guns jammed and we headed back to base. Later, we learnt that the Sabre never made it to base, its pilot bailed out.”
Denzil’s adventures were not over. As he touched down, he realised that his left tyre had deflated, probably hit by anti-aircraft fire. He manoeuvred the Gnat to safety, but Kapila had to fly to Air Force Station Halwara to land. “That night, I learnt that Kapila and I were awarded the Vir Chakra. This time, Trevor called up and said, ‘Well done, bro’,” said Denzil.
The enormity of the day hit him only much later. “It is not like the movies,” he said. “There is so much happening that one does not have time to think of anything but the next action. Even when you land, the ground crew want to be briefed on how the engines and guns performed. And we know it is team work.”
Kapila’s buddy, Mayadev, was shot down and taken prisoner. He returned after a few months. “One does not exult in such an atmosphere,” said Denzil. He admits that once a few pegs are downed at the bar, inhibitions vaporise and tall tales are spun. Denzil’s tales, however, can never be as tall as his achievements. He has had an adventure-packed career, picking up a Kirti Chakra, a Param Vishisht Seva Medal, an Ati Vishisht Seva Medal and eight commendations, making him one of the most decorated officers of the IAF.
The Gnat fights of 1965 go down in history for several reasons. For the first time, three Vir Chakras were given for similar acts, gunning down Sabres. For the first time, two brothers got Vir Chakras for the same feat. And, La Martiniere, Lucknow, became the first school to have three alumni who were awarded Vir Chakras in the same war for the same feat.
So, on September 3, a grateful Indian Air Force will present the proud school with a Gnat, in a ceremony presided over by Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha himself.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Classic gun based dog fight maneuvers. I highlighted significant points.
- Spot the enemy plane first
- Be higher than enemy plane formation to be able to dive
- Be in the third quadrant of the enemy plane i.e. behind and above.
i had linked a USAF study of fighter plane combat from WWI to Vietnam and above three factors were crucial.
Another is own plane should be highly agile to turn and get into favorable quadrant.
Gnat was obviously had that factor.
A fifth factor is cannon vs machine gun lethality.
30 mm Aden Cannon had higher kill probability for the few shots that get fired in combat. one to three shells were enough.
Note how many guns got jammed in the fight
- Spot the enemy plane first
- Be higher than enemy plane formation to be able to dive
- Be in the third quadrant of the enemy plane i.e. behind and above.
i had linked a USAF study of fighter plane combat from WWI to Vietnam and above three factors were crucial.
Another is own plane should be highly agile to turn and get into favorable quadrant.
Gnat was obviously had that factor.
A fifth factor is cannon vs machine gun lethality.
30 mm Aden Cannon had higher kill probability for the few shots that get fired in combat. one to three shells were enough.
Note how many guns got jammed in the fight
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Vishnu Som's interview of Alfred Cooke who tangled with 4 Sabres, hit 3 and shot down 2
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/the-bu ... our/382549
The story on BR (linking again for completion)
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... cooke.html
Gun camera video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNXSWpSrwXM
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/the-bu ... our/382549
The story on BR (linking again for completion)
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... cooke.html
Gun camera video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNXSWpSrwXM
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Interesting facts coming out..(old news item)
http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/oct/10war1.htm
http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/oct/10war1.htm
A bigger failure with a strategic impact was to follow. We failed to assess the limits of Pakistan's stocks of ammunition in spite of knowledge of the fact that the USA normally supplied its clients with less than 30 days ammunition for arms supplied by them. Pakistan's military in 1965 was overwhelmingly equipped with American arms.
By the 22nd day of the war, it had practically run out of ammunition and would have collapsed in a couple of days if the war had continued. This would naturally have had far reaching consequences for sub-continental history.
But then this pales into insignificance when viewed in the context of our failure to assess our own stocks of ammunition during that war. From all known accounts it appears that the Chief of Army Staff was more than willing for an early cease-fire on the assumption that the Indian Army was running short of ammunition.
The truth was that the main depots, having moved the ammunition stocks forward were sending in returns of having run out of stocks! Post war accounting showed that less than 10% of (Indian)ammunition stocks had been used.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
http://indianexpress.com/article/explai ... te-in-war/
To be fair though, India had the upper hand during the war. It captured nearly four times more territory than Pakistan did, most of it high-value territory in Punjab and Kashmir. According to the US Library of Congress Country Studies, “a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan”. That would have happened had the then Army Chief, General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri, not miscalculated India’s ammunition stock and tank casualties, forcing the government to accept the ceasefire on September 22, 1965. - See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/explai ... c0Dka.dpuf
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
A blog entry and a narrative of the whole war by Col DJS Chahal
http://www.olivegreens.co.in/blog/the-1 ... t-unfolded
http://www.olivegreens.co.in/blog/the-1 ... t-unfolded
The outcome of the war cannot be only decided by the territorial gains made or by the degradation of the opponent’s war waging capacity, but it would accrue from the sustainability factor.
At the end of the war India had consumed only up to 14-20% of its ammunition stockpile, while Pakistan had consumed almost 80% of its ammunition stocks.
Pakistan had literally pumped in everything that it had in those three weeks of battle, and was expecting UN and the world community to broker a ceasefire.
In my opinion, Indian leadership should have either continued the operations further by another one week, or should have been more demanding and assertive at the negotiation table.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Recalling Battle of Gitian
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sunday ... 32316.html
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sunday ... 32316.html
IT wasn’t even a year old when 6 Dogra found itself in the thick of a bloody battle in 1965. The battalion was raised at Meerut Cantonment on October 1, 1964 by Lt Col SS Khokhar. Its other officers were Major BK Mehta (second-in-command), two Captains and 13 young subalterns. The battalion was inducted in Jammu and Kashmir in April, 1965 to be a part of 68 Infantry Brigade.
After anti-infiltration operations in Gulmarg, Tangmarg and Srinagar airfield areas in August, it was ordered to move to Hajipir Pass in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. We climbed up through heavy rain and reached on September 3, relieving 1 Para, which had captured the Pass. The road from Hajipir Pass to Poonch in the south follows a nullah that joins the Batar Nullah at Kahuta. Point 7720 is located 4 km south-east of the Pass; Point 8777 lies 2 km south of the Pass; and Gitian another 1 km ahead of Point 8777. Clearing the Hajipir Pass-Poonch Road meant clearing these areas of the enemy.
Point 7720 was defended by one company of the enemy with support weapons. Maj Mehta was to lead two companies in a silent attack to capture the peak. ‘A’ company, commanded by Maj HS Sachdev, was to assault and ‘C’ company was in the reserve.
At 4 am on September 9, as the company formed near the objective, a fierce battle ensued. Maj Sachdev was wounded but kept pushing on; the objective was captured by 7.30 am. 6 Dogra lost three soldiers. Maj Sachdev and late Sepoy Jarnail Singh would later be awarded the Sena Medal for bravery. Point 7720 was named “Dogra Hills”.
On September 11, a patrol led by Maj Mehta established the critical link at Kahuta Bridge with 3 Dogra, which was part of the brigade located at Poonch.
6 Dogra was now ordered to capture Gitian by attacking from the east. The battalion started the approach march from Hajipir Pass to Kahuta on September 15. ‘D’ company was left at Dogra Hills. The troops did not have any special clothing and it was cold at that height. To make matters worse, it drizzled through the night. The ammunition load was so heavy that most of us threw away our blankets and the heavy steel helmets. We reached Kahuta by first light on September 16. The battalion occupied the slopes around a school and the school building.
At night, we, the subalterns, planned to sleep in the school verandah. Maj Hazara Singh, quartermaster, advised us against it. We slept at different places. Around midnight, the enemy’s machine gun opened up from a nearby hill. Its target was the school and the verandah. The fire was returned. There was no casualty; the experience of a senior officer had saved the lives of seven or eight young officers, including the writer.
On September 17, we moved up the slopes leading to Gitian. 19 Punjab was there to provide us firm base for the attack. There was firing by the enemy from Gitian and also by 19 Punjab all day. I deployed two mortars and fired one bomb from each on the enemy location for “bedding in” and one more for ranging, which landed bang on target. I could not afford to fire more.
In the afternoon, Lt Col Khokhar, Maj Mehta and order group (‘O’ group) moved to the forward company location of 19 Punjab and it was decided that the troops would climb through the cliffs from where the enemy would least expect them. Suddenly, a rocket hit the stone on which Maj Mehta was sitting. He could barely move but refused to be evacuated and took part in the attack with the support of a stick.
H-hour – the scheduled time of an attack – was fixed at 2.30 am, September 19. But on the orders of the brigade commander, it was postponed to September 19/20 and then, 20th/21st.
Gitian consists of three features: Tree Hill, Hut Hill (including SAR) and Knoll. ‘B’ company was to capture Tree Hill’; ‘C’ was to seize Hut Hill; and ‘A’ was in reserve. Knoll was to be captured later. Maj Mehta was also part of the attack. It was a silent attack with mortars and artillery on standby. ‘B’ company was commanded by Maj Darshan Singh Lalli. Both ‘B’ and ‘C’ companies had one subaltern each — Zoru Chaudhary in ‘B’ and Kakkar in ‘C’.
The troops were 200 yards from the objective when the enemy opened heavy fire. It had also laid a minefield. The company suffered heavy casualties but pressed home the attack. There was close-quarter fight throughout the night. By first light on September 21, ‘B’ Company had captured Tree Hill, ‘C’ a part of Hut Hill. Maj Lalli was killed during the night. He had told the battalion commander, “I shall meet you at Tree Hill, alive or dead.”
At first light, the enemy launched a counter-attack at Tree Hill, which was repulsed by Zoru’s boys, supported by my mortar fire. Thereafter, another counter-attack was repulsed. All bombs of the 3-inch mortar had been used up, so I was ordered to join Zoru at Tree Hill. There were about 50 troops left. We decided to cover each spot of Tree Hill and reorganise the defence. There was heavy firing by the enemy from the uncaptured area of Hut Hill and Point 8777. At one point, when I was passing a message to the battalion commander, a bullet hit the radio operator sitting next to me. He was killed.
On the night of September 21/22, the enemy launched two counter-attacks on Tree Hill, which were repulsed. Hut Hill was cleared of the enemy by the night of September 21. By September 22, Knoll was also captured.
The next day — 3.30 am, September 23 — the UN-mediated ceasefire was announced. We had lost two officers, one JCO and 22 brave soldiers. The Pakistanis left behind 90 dead and carried away at least a hundred wounded.
6 Dogra was honoured with one Maha Vir Chakra and two Vir Chakras (posthumously). It stayed at Gitian till February 24, 1966 and vacated it under the Tashkent Agreement.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Karan Thapar twists a knife into Gen J N Chaudhary.. plugs BR
http://www.hindustantimes.com/karanthap ... aspx[quote]
First the question: Was 1965 “a decisive victory” as defence minister Manohar Parrikar has claimed? Or is the official history, commissioned by the ministry of defence and presented with a foreword by then defence secretary NN Vohra — and now available on Bharat Rakshak.com — correct in calling the war “a draw”?[/quote]
http://www.hindustantimes.com/karanthap ... aspx[quote]
First the question: Was 1965 “a decisive victory” as defence minister Manohar Parrikar has claimed? Or is the official history, commissioned by the ministry of defence and presented with a foreword by then defence secretary NN Vohra — and now available on Bharat Rakshak.com — correct in calling the war “a draw”?[/quote]
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Another witness to the KKD Battle. Nothing much new in this. He mostly quotes AM GCS Rajwar's article on KKD
http://www.thestatesman.com/news/featur ... 89687.html
http://www.thestatesman.com/news/featur ... 89687.html
While watching that dogfight over the IIT-Kharagpur campus, I remember how the Pakistan Sabre hit a mud hut in a village on the outskirts of Kalaikunda and killed a woman and a young boy. It disintegrated into pieces and I saw the beheaded body of the Pakistani pilot. The debris was scattered all over and I still recall a large aluminum piece of the aircraft I’d brought home as a souvenir.
Both Cooke and Wilson were rewarded with Vir Chakras and later Air Commodore Wilson was awarded the Param Vishistha Sewa Medal for serving in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.
Cooke, who migrated to Australia after his retirement from the IAF, visited India earlier this month and dedicated the Vir Chakra he received to the Bulls, the No. 14 Squadron he’d represented. He said at the ceremony, “I am overwhelmed to be here. Thank you for giving me this honour. I was just doing my job, defending my area and shooting down as many enemy fighters as I could. I was lucky to have survived. My Vir Chakra belongs to the squadron.”
Commodore commandant of the squadron at Ambala, Air Vice-Marshal Sunil J Nanodkar and Wing Commander Devashish Kukreti, who is Commanding Officer, accepted the medal from Cooke.
Read more at http://www.thestatesman.com/news/featur ... G1GFPCw.99
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city ... 939946.cms
A year after the war, we had boarded an 8-seater Otter-de-Havilland aircraft at Shillong from an advanced landing ground at a height of 5,600 feet. While taking off, the plane suddenly swerved to the right and hurled down the steep mountain slope and there was a loud thud. The plane crashed and caught fire. I cloud smell my burning skin. All of us jumped out fast. I was the last one to get out. Among my co-passengers was JHF Manekshaw, the brother of Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw. He was a Group Captain in the Air Force at that time and went on to become an Air Vice Marshal.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Shiv, Everyone faults Gen J.N. Chaudhri for the ammo stocks miscalculations. How did it happen? He could have wrong inputs.
Also what about PRC. I recall PRC made vague threats to India to dismantle structures on their side.
LBS gave a smart reply that they should dismantle those imaginary structures themselves since they are on their side of LAC.
Also what about PRC. I recall PRC made vague threats to India to dismantle structures on their side.
LBS gave a smart reply that they should dismantle those imaginary structures themselves since they are on their side of LAC.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
We have another thread in Strat forum called Inder Malhotra columns. Please read along side.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Ramana PC Lal has more positive than negative things to say about Gen Chaudhuri. He says that Gen Chaudhuri displayed "supremo syndrome" - an attitude that the Army Chief is the commander of all the armed forces - which was a leftover attitude from pre-independence India when this was true.ramana wrote:Shiv, Everyone faults Gen J.N. Chaudhri for the ammo stocks miscalculations. How did it happen? He could have wrong inputs.
Also what about PRC. I recall PRC made vague threats to India to dismantle structures on their side.
LBS gave a smart reply that they should dismantle those imaginary structures themselves since they are on their side of LAC.
ACM Lal says that it was Chaudhri's idea to open a new front and attack Lahore - an act that actually saved India and won the war. But Gen Chaudhuri could have done a lot more to combine forces with the air force and navy for joint operations. All these lessons were learned and applied in 1971 where the forces worked more or less as a team.
That said I don't know if you had a chance to read the free ebook on BR "Role of 35 inf Brigade"
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/cms/blog/ ... -book.html
This is not an easy read because it seems to be aimed at fellow army men who will understand the army formation numbering. But if you plough through it you find that the deficiencies in communication ran deep with left hand often not doing what right hand was doing. Maybe that is why Gen Chaudhuri was misinformed. I don't think the China event had a great role to play in the course of the war.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
I have some information from MO Mathai's banned in India book "Reminiscences of the Nehru age" which is downloadable from archive.org (I urge people to download and read it).pandyan wrote:Jagan saar, Shiv saar - It is not clear what happened after war...especially the role of SU and why they forced India to give back everything? Is there any article or authoritative source that talks about this in detail? Seems to me that India won the war and but did not get all the goodies and prizes a winner is supposed to get. pliss to provide pointers...
Mathai says that Shastri received adulation after the 1965 war as "man of steel" but he says that Shastri was actually "man of cheese". He says that Shastri spent the entire war in a bunker and it was only because of men like Gen Chaudhuri and AM Arjan Singh that the war came to a favourable conclusion. Mathai says that "Shastri succumbed to pressure" at Tashkent and agreed to everything that Kosygin demanded. Shastri then called Delhi to find out what the reaction would be like in India and a hostile reaction was expected. Mathai goes on to say that Shastri, like Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed "Knew when to die". Death stills most controversies.
Elsewhere - I read that Shastri had actually met Ayub Khan in Pakistan earlier and gave the latter the impression that he was a weak man. I I read this in the last few days - I need to locate the source.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
What I find interesting regards the 65 war was the stark contrast to 62. As much as 62 was a failure of higher command and political judgment, 65 was largely a success in this regard. What explain this stark difference from the same people? A myth that needs to be broken is Nehru was instrumental in the downsize of the the IA, resulting in the 62 defeat. While he may have taken some wrong decisions, the record shows the Army was funded quite well with its strength and formations on the rise from 1953 onwards. What the record also seems to indicate is that the IA was and to a large degree still is optimized for the plains. This is what explains the contrast between the 62 loss and the 65 win to me the most clearly. But most will be loathe to credit Nehru any credit for the win.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Shauryat, Nikhil Chakravarthy, a famous journalist in the know once wrote in ANI that JLN was very seized about 1962 and helped plan for rebuilding IA. In fact operational plan to cross IB in case of Pak attack was put in during his time.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
A recent newspaper article says that General Chowdhury might have got the ammunition stock numbers wrong because he was referring to the holding of forward ammunition depots. Depots which would have issued most of their ammunition to the formations and were left holding only 10%-20% of their stock level. India has much larger, and some humongous, ammunition depots in hinterland which would've fed ammunition to these forward bases. It seems we missed taking into account the holding of these larger ammunition stock.
Coming to General Chowdhury - people do ascribe lot of good qualities to him. First, he was decorated multiple times (mentioned in dispatches) for gallantry during actions in WW2. And most important of them all, he took over the IA post 1962 from General Thapar. He instilled a sense of pride back into the wounded IA and was instrumental in managing the expansion of IA in 1962-65 period. All of which allowed India to stand good in 1965.
Coming to General Chowdhury - people do ascribe lot of good qualities to him. First, he was decorated multiple times (mentioned in dispatches) for gallantry during actions in WW2. And most important of them all, he took over the IA post 1962 from General Thapar. He instilled a sense of pride back into the wounded IA and was instrumental in managing the expansion of IA in 1962-65 period. All of which allowed India to stand good in 1965.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
This exact point is echoed by PC Lal with ref to Gen Chaudhurirohitvats wrote: He instilled a sense of pride back into the wounded IA and was instrumental in managing the expansion of IA in 1962-65 period. All of which allowed India to stand good in 1965.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
What this means is that the oft repeated myth that Pakistan can fight war for only 15 days and India for only 20 days is rubbish. It may be true for Pakistan, but not India.rohitvats wrote:A recent newspaper article says that General Chowdhury might have got the ammunition stock numbers wrong because he was referring to the holding of forward ammunition depots. Depots which would have issued most of their ammunition to the formations and were left holding only 10%-20% of their stock level. India has much larger, and some humongous, ammunition depots in hinterland which would've fed ammunition to these forward bases. It seems we missed taking into account the holding of these larger ammunition stock.
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Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Shouldn't he have know otherwise? Who is really responsible for this lapse, him or one of his subordinates? Was any public action taken?rohitvats wrote:A recent newspaper article says that General Chowdhury might have got the ammunition stock numbers wrong because he was referring to the holding of forward ammunition depots.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Not many people know that there was no Army representative accompanying Shastri to Tashkent for negotiating with FM Ayub Khan. This may have been a disadvantage for India negotiating with a Paki General. Maybe this was why Haji Pir was given away.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
In one of my posts on the Railway thread I mentioned the small "village" of Madukkarai and a cryptic sentence that followed stated: check it's connection with the Madras Regiment. Since this is the 1965 war thread, here is the story of 17 Madras Regiment and Madukkarai and beyond in that war:
http://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/IND ... sthan.html
http://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/IND ... sthan.html
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
This sums up a lot of the army action in 1965.vsunder wrote:In one of my posts on the Railway thread I mentioned the small "village" of Madukkarai and a cryptic sentence that followed stated: check it's connection with the Madras Regiment. Since this is the 1965 war thread, here is the story of 17 Madras Regiment and Madukkarai and beyond in that war:
http://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/IND ... sthan.html
When the unit moved into the battle zone, they had no air, anti-aircraft, tank or artillery cover.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
An indirect corollary is that 'balancing' and other such ulta pulta ideas do not help at all to operational readiness on ground or ammo stock levels. In other words, huge amount of ammo stock increase is needed and domestic/MakeInIndia production will only help. There is some good progress made considering completion of trials of Dhanush guns for example. Another link. Point is that overall ammo stock needs to be increased by many times, AND viewpoint needs to improve here when indigenous weapons are involved. If we can have our own logistics we can have any way we want and not exactly how it has been earlier.shiv wrote:What this means is that the oft repeated myth that Pakistan can fight war for only 15 days and India for only 20 days is rubbish. It may be true for Pakistan, but not India.rohitvats wrote:A recent newspaper article says that General Chowdhury might have got the ammunition stock numbers wrong because he was referring to the holding of forward ammunition depots. Depots which would have issued most of their ammunition to the formations and were left holding only 10%-20% of their stock level. India has much larger, and some humongous, ammunition depots in hinterland which would've fed ammunition to these forward bases. It seems we missed taking into account the holding of these larger ammunition stock.
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Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
India can fight a war for 20-30 days only if it has to fight both the evil entities, Pakis and chinese. India needs to stock up and ramp up indigenous production rate so it has assured supplies for at least 90 days.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Incidentally you will see all the protaganists of the Kala Sandhu story in teh above video - the Station Commander, Trevor Keelor, Pathania, Kala Sandhu etc.
An account of the combat by someone who was there appears here http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... shwar.html
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Paul wrote:Not many people know that there was no Army representative accompanying Shastri to Tashkent for negotiating with FM Ayub Khan. This may have been a disadvantage for India negotiating with a Paki General. Maybe this was why Haji Pir was given away.
Paul, Gen Kumaramangalam was included.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 6#p1412146
CS Jha came over and whispered something in his ear.
Soon after Haji Pir was given up.Thanks to the round-the-clock transport arrangements our hosts had made for us, I went to Shastri's villa, where one could smell that something was cooking. The core of the Indian delegation — Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan, Swaran Singh and three top officials, the prime minister's secretary, L.K. Jha, Foreign Secretary C.S. Jha and Home Secretary L.P. Singh — was in conference with the PM. The rest of the large delegation, including the only military representative, Lieutenant General (later general and army chief) P.P. Kumaramangalam and the external affairs ministry's officer on special duty, K. Shankar Bajpai, were patiently waiting in the anteroom.
At one stage, C. S. Jha came out and whispered a question to the general. On hearing his reply, the foreign secretary muttered: "In that case we can perhaps sign it". "Sir, sign what?" asked Bajpai. "I will tell you later," replied Jha while returning to the PM's chamber.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Jagan wrote:
An account of the combat by someone who was there appears here http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... shwar.html
PC Lal points out this in his autobiography as the lack of army-air-force coordination in 1965. The army chief never shared what the army was doing with the AF and consequently the air force could not be deployed as effectively as it would have been with better information sharing. This was corrected in 1971.We landed at Pathankot, at sunset and while taxiing to the dispersal I was greeted by dejected and sad looking faces of course mates & others standing alongside the taxiway. It was only when we all walked out to the Technical Area, that we learnt of the four Vampires that had been shot down on their attempt to neutralise the large scale Pak Army’s thrust towards Akhnoor.
We were unaware of this major Pak operation and the consequence of Indian Army’s SOS to the IAF for air support that resulted in the rather misguided deployment of the ineffective Vampires from Pune. This , if I may call it, was a foolish endeavour, as it resulted in the loss of four Vampires and three pilots (one bailed out).
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Shiv, AVM Tiwary in book linked by you also blames JN Chaudhri and quotes D.K. Palit
In a round about way Kargil also same happened.
In a round about way Kargil also same happened.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Absolutely. It did happen again in Kargil.ramana wrote: In a round about way Kargil also same happened.
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
Not sure if this was posted before. Battle of Asal Uttar.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e32IFuu7pEA
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e32IFuu7pEA
Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary
xpost from Paki thread
The 1965 War: Why India Quit When it was Winning
The 1965 War: Why India Quit When it was Winning
Shastri was a man of steel during war but became soft in peace, an old Indian malaise. The late Kuldip Nayyar writes that in 1962 when China attacked India, the Shah of Iran sent Nehru a copy of a letter he had written to Ayub Khan, suggesting that he send his soldiers to fight alongside Indian forces against the “red menace”.
“At the end of hostilities, Shastri recalled the Shah’s letter and said that had the Pakistani soldiers fought alongside us and ‘shed their blood with Indian soldiers’, it would have been difficult to say ‘No’ to Pakistan even if it had asked for Kashmir (Agar wo Kashmir bhimangte to nakarnamushkilhota).
Chavan writes in his war diary that Chaudhuri would frequently lapse into depression. Each time the Indian army suffered a setback, the general would walk into the Defence Minister’s room, and Chavan had to give him a pep talk.
Pradhan writes,
“On 20 September, when the Prime Minister asked Chaudhuri whether India could expect to gain if the war continued for a few days more, he informed the PM that the army was coming to an end of its ammunition holdings and could not sustain fighting for much longer. Chaudhuri advised acceptance of the ceasefire proposal. It was later discovered in overall terms only 14-20 per cent of the Indian Army’s ammunition stock had been used up.At the moment of our greatest advantage the army chief’s non-comprehension of the intricacies of the long-range logistics deprived India of a decisive victory.”
In contrast, Pakistan had expended 80 per cent of its ammo.
Chaudhuri was also criticised for his lack of daring. When the Pakistani cities of Sialkot and Lahore could have been easily taken after the dash and bravery shown by Indian troops, Chaudhuri told Shastri: “We must move with the caution and wisdom of an elephant. We will take them in God’s good time.”
In fact, when the Pakistan Army attacked in the Khem Kharan sector, Chaudhuri ordered the Army Commander Harbaksh Singh to withdraw to a safer position. The commander refused, and what followed was the Battle of Assal Uttar, the greatest tank battle since Kursk in 1943.
The Indian counter attack on the night of 10 September was so ferocious that by the morning they had knocked out 70 Pakistani tanks. But what the Battle of Assal Uttar will be memorable for are the 25 enemy tanks found abandoned with their engines running and wireless sets on.It was the perfect metaphor for the plight of the Pakistan Army.