International Naval News & Discussion

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 27 Mar 2016 00:09

TSJones wrote:don't be soothed too much. with their nuke subs, sea tomahawks, f-35b's, carriers, prospective purchase of p-8's, etc., they'll still have a very powerful navy....the only thing they are short of are space based assets which have been covered by treaty with the US for decades going back prior to the falkland war with argentina.

Where are the carriers? Any new nuke subs? P8s.. sure. But even we *have* P8s *today*. Looking 20 years into the future, they would be much weaker than they are today. And even more so if it were not for American largesse.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 27 Mar 2016 00:36

Where are the carriers?

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/the-equipme ... ft-carrier

They'll most likely get both, with F-35B air-wings..The carriers will be significantly more capable than British carriers of the past, and although not as good as the more expensive EMALS equipped option they had briefly considered, but the current approach probably ensures 2 carriers while the more expensive option would have meant just one. 2 carriers serve their national security interests vis-a-vis NATO much better.

Any new nuke subs?

HMS Artful, the third astute was completed last year iirc, and they plan 4 more. They'll also most likely get a new Ballistic Missile submarine with it again sharing the USN's Trident upgrade roadmap over the next decades.

I agree however they are much smaller than in the past but that is largely due to the reduced threat to NATO and the unlikely event that the UK has defense needs against a near peer outside of NATO. India is an emerging power with huge national security threats from two of its neighbors while the UK doesn't really have that as a problem. The UK is the only western european country that has managed to meet the NATO standard of 2% GDP defense spending.

member_22733 · Post by **member_22733** » 27 Mar 2016 21:03

sudeepj wrote:
TSJones wrote:don't be soothed too much. with their nuke subs, sea tomahawks, f-35b's, carriers, prospective purchase of p-8's, etc., they'll still have a very powerful navy....the only thing they are short of are space based assets which have been covered by treaty with the US for decades going back prior to the falkland war with argentina.
Where are the carriers? Any new nuke subs? P8s.. sure. But even we *have* P8s *today*. Looking 20 years into the future, they would be much weaker than they are today. And even more so if it were not for American largesse.

I failed in switching entirely to lurk mode.

Britshitland is riding into oblivion, it will be accelerated when its Massa, unkil, turns Hispanic. Another 30 more years they will be far behind us (and deservedly so) due to reduction in Unkils power projection capabilities and internal political strife that *will* be hitting it in the next 20 odd years. Matter of when, not if. Surely within the lifetime of many out here.

We should, in the meanwhile, leave no stone unturned in getting the loot back and extract whatever we can from that god-forsaken shithole.

Since this is the naval thread: Vacating Chagos (know by britshits as Diego-Garcia) and redeeming the appalling human rights record of the Britshits needs to happen at the end of the ride to oblivion. Anyone who defends the illegal, inhumane occupation of Chagos is a vile, disgusting excuse of a human being.

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 28 Mar 2016 04:11

Where are the carriers today? Can the Royal Navy mount an expeditionary force *today* without the US providing air cover? There is many a slip between the cup and the lip, and with an aging population without the desire for empire or armed conflict, (and without the oil) the 'glide path' of Royal Navy power is IMHO that of a gradual decline. No doubt they are among the powerful navies of the world, the French, Indian, Russian, Chinese, Japanese today.. But the days of blatant interference in other countries, for instance by playing host to any and all kinds of insurgent 'fronts' are coming to an end.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 28 Mar 2016 04:21

Where are the carriers today?

Granted that the first one won't be operational for a few more years but that really doesn't take away the fact that they are getting these carriers and the associated air-wing. They have pilots training in the US, on their and USMC's F-35's and are writing tactics and helping clear the QE envelope for the F-35B.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suh_GMng158

Can the Royal Navy mount an expeditionary force *today* without the US providing air cover?

No, because the Royal Navy does not really have a threat where it would have to prepare itself to mount an expeditionary force without other allies. Once they get the two QE class carriers, and those are paired with the rest of their force (New nuclear submarines and other ships) they would most definitely have this capability if it is ever required (which looks unlikely).

There is many a slip between the cup and the lip

I guess they could always cancel these, sell them outright -

The images above are of the first QE carrier. The ones below are of the second Prince of Whales (with the QE in the background):

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-la ... -installed

and with an aging population without the desire for empire or armed conflict, (and without the oil) the 'glide path' of Royal Navy power is IMHO that of a gradual decline.

There is no argument on this point, but the RN of today is supporting the national security needs which are NATO or coalition centric with plenty of teeth planned for the future such as 2-carriers, 7 nuclear submarines, a new SSBN armed with the D5, and a supporting infrastructure for contingencies. Is it the same RN of the cold war, or that of the empire of yesteryear? NO, but it is still a very capable force and is planning to have plenty of resources to deal with some if its relevant national security needs both in Europe and elsewhere.

But the days of blatant interference in other countries, for instance by playing host to any and all kinds of insurgent 'fronts' are coming to an end.

No argument against that. I would agree.

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 28 Mar 2016 06:57

I am willing to bet that at least one of them is going to be mothballed sooner rather than later. Just going by the trajectory of UK. Lets have this discussion again in 10 or 15 years.

TSJones · Post by **TSJones** » 28 Mar 2016 09:05

the US Navy plans on more automation with the development of undersea drones that can stay active for months at a time.....up to 11,000 feet deep....

http://www.cnn.com/videos/tech/2016/03/ ... echnology/

the US will continue to automate in every endeavor. and the Briteesh will ride along.....and occasionally slap down some serious money ala f-35b......

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 28 Mar 2016 09:08

UK has a nominal GDP of US$ 2.9 trillion as of 2015 and India has a GDP of US$2.05 trillion as of 2015 (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_c ... _(nominal))

As per NATO figures I checked, UK is one of the few partners in NATO with >2% of nominal GDP spent of defence consistently. 2015 nos. here http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/ ... pdf#page=2

India on the other hand is consistently below 2% of nominal GDP in spending on Defence. If I am not wrong, we are close to 1.75%.

UK military size is smaller so their Pensions and Salaries bill is smaller and their Cap Ex is definitely bigger than ours consistently.

UK has consistently taken part in military deployments away from home (backed by US might for sure) and has a history of engaging in warfare. India does neither. We do take part in UN missions.

UK has a mil- industrial complex we hope to achieve. And then they have rest of NATO alliance partners as alternate expertise providers.

The only place we will be able to beat them is body count. By miles.

You may hang me for saying this but if I were to leave aside my jingo banners, we are in no position to match UK or even catch up. They are far better placed today than we are and they have a greater will to use the military than we have. We have miles to go before we think of Chagos etc. From what little I know, it is one of their most important bases and if we ever threaten this base we will face the navies of the entire western world against us.

Let us worry about Pakistan now, UK and the rest maybe diminishing but as yet are in another orbital plane.

member_22733 · Post by **member_22733** » 28 Mar 2016 10:05

No one is delusional enough to suggest to go take on britshits today.

Catching up and eclipsing in inevitable. Economic growth rate and our security situation makes it that we will have to surpass poodle-land.

If we dont, we will be slaves again (not to brishits, but to unkil and cheen).

Our true freedom will come at a cost of maintaining a navy that surpasses poodle-land by size and capability, The only thing preventing us from doing so is political will and self-respect. Lack of both has plagued us for centuries.

I say that with absolutely no jingo hat on, only being realistic. If we dont have the political will or the vision, then we dont deserve our freedom.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 28 Mar 2016 10:53

Our political will for a military conflict is not related to our political will for freedom. My analysis was from a perspective of taking on Brishits away from our borders - say close to Chagos. We will willingly taken on an agressor stepping inside our boundaries but the same will does not exist in crossing internationally acclaimed boundaries. Within the confines of projected growth in economic might vis-a-vis growth in military might 15 years from now, investments of today will be reflected 15 years hence.

It is UK which is investing more today. It is UK which is far more militarily disposed - historically or contemporary expeditionary battles.

I do not foresee any substantial difference in actual military strengths 15 years hence in comparison to today's status. Our respect for the Britishits may have fallen lower but our capabilities will not have seen a sea change or enough change in that time period. However, beyond 15 years, it is anybodies call as to which way the dice will roll. We are doing nothing today that will put us ahead of them 15 years hence. We are merely catching up on existing technologies.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 28 Mar 2016 11:59

http://www.menafn.com/1094670700/Austra ... tion[quote] Australia weighs regional ties in drawn-out submarine acquisition
Join our daily free Newsletter MENAFN - Asia Times - 27/03/2016

While Canberra has not disclosed its exact requirements the new submarines will be expected to match the range and durability of its Collins-class boats which are capable of patrolling waters stretching from the South China Sea to the Southern Ocean circling Antarctica. Based on Australia's lack of a nuclear energy program the new model will use diesel-electric propulsion like its predecessor.

It is also likely to feature upgraded capabilities.

'It will have better senses — be much more capable in terms of collecting information about the environment around it and knowing what is going on — better weapons and better communications systems so it will plug into a more networked model' Andrew Davies an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute told Asia Times.

Strategic concerns have dominated speculation about the final pick. In its 2016 Defense White Paper released last month Canberra outlined an ambitious upgrade of its military that analysts saw as a response to China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea where it is entangled in territorial disputes with a host of Southeast Asian countries. Australia is a close defense ally of the United States which patrols the waters in an ostensible defense of freedom of navigation but conducts more trade with China than any other country.

Closer Japan-Aussie ties?

With its choice of submarine partner Canberra is faced with the option of forging closer military ties with Tokyo at the risk of upsetting Beijing.

'The Japanese basically present their case as offering a geo-strategic benefit to Australia and deepening the relationship between US allies in the region' Davies said. 'Whereas the Europeans try to run the opposite argument and that is that by selecting one of them we'll be defusing the tensions between us and China by just entering into commercial partnership with the suppliers on the other side of the world.'

Davies said there were two schools of thought in Australia about the benefits of cozying up to Japan in the area of defense.

'It would basically tighten the net on China a little. Everybody recognizes that — it's whether you think it's a good thing or a bad thing is where the schism is.'

Graeme Dunk manager of Australian Business Defence Industry said choosing Japan would inevitably anger Beijing which also protested Canberra's most recent defense white paper over its 'negative' portrayal of tensions in the South China Sea.

'I can't think that if Australia chooses to go with Japan that China's going to be too happy about it' said Dunk. 'China will make some noises about it. They make noises about most things.'

Previous Prime Minister Tony Abbot whose center-right Liberal Party remains in government was widely speculated to have favored Japan having cultivated a close relationship with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Japanese Navy submarine Soryu during launch ceremony at Mitsubishi shipyard

Earlier this month the ABC the national broadcaster reported that the Abbot government had decided in 2014 to have the submarines made off-shore without specifying Japan as the preferred supplier. In the midst of a leadership challenge the following February Abbot announced an open tender to explore the option of construction in South Australia where the Collins-class submarines were built.

'There was the possibility of a leadership challenge at that time and in order to shore up the support of MPs in South Australia we suddenly had this competitive evaluation process to make them feel a bit happier about what was going on' said Dunk. 'And I think if the leadership issue hadn't been in there in the background we wouldn't be in this position. We probably would have just gone ahead and brought them from Japan.'

Indecision and flip-flopping has plagued the Future Submarine Programme since it was first announced in 2007 by the incoming Labor Party government led by former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. Rudd's 2009 Defense White Paper proposed 12 new advanced submarines with follow-up plans announcing construction to begin in 2016. By 2011 the government had shelved the proposed timeline with the exception of the 'Initial Design Phase' which was due to be completed in 2011-2012 but never was.

The current government of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced at the start of the month that the new submarines were not expected to go into service until 2030-33 with the current Collins-class boats to have their lifespan extended.

John Power is a journalist who has reported on North and South Korea since 2010. His work has appeared in outlets including The Daily Mail The Christian Science Monitor Mashable NK News Asian Geographic The Diplomat The Korea Herald and Narratively among others. He is currently based in Melbourne Australia.
[/quote]

Oz can actually play a deft hand by buying both Japanese and EU subs! The requirement is huge,12 or even more.All need not be giant Soryus.half could be more affordable German or French bots.Many navies operate sev. classes of diesel boats. The French and Germans have been teasing the 'roos about the untested Japanese batteries proposed for the subs. In fact Oz could buy outright about 4-6 Soryus for dealing with long patrols against the PLAN and 6-8 EU boats for the balance of requirement.In fact,if the German U-boats are bought,it would be excellent for OZ as these boats are being built by the SoKos and used by sev. Asian navies which would give the Oz navy opportunities to cement logistic and other op facilities at these naval bases,thus reducing the need for such large subs to be acquired.

member_22733 · Post by **member_22733** » 28 Mar 2016 13:31

deejay wrote:, it is anybodies call as to which way the dice will roll. We are doing nothing today that will put us ahead of them 15 years hence. We are merely catching up on existing technologies.

We are floating waay OT so I am going to stop with this post.

I am no one to argue about military tech. But I have worked in technology for more than a decade and I think I can forecast some very general things. I may certainly be wrong in this (but for our sake I hope I am not).

In 15 years at around 8 - 9% GDP growth rate we should be > 5 Trillion $ economy in NOMINAL terms, in PPP terms it will be about 3 times of that. PPP defines the value of the economy with the local currency as the basis, which means that %age of defense spending in PPP terms is a better comparison of our spending.

In effect, our mil spending even at 1% would be much greater than that of the Britshiters (assuming they are still united). With that increase in GDP comes the corresponding increase in local manufacturing capability and also local R&D capabilities. They will tend to grow exponentially. It has to! If it does not, we are at risk of becoming slaves again.

If we fail in reaching the top 3 in defense R&D output and manufacturing in the next 15 - 30 years, we have signed our own death warrant. Our economy will not correspond to our power projection capability. An Analogy will be someone with a lot of Gold and no means to defend it.

Chagos is our near abroad, and it must be demilitarized at some point. Yes, I am dreaming, but it is necessary to plant such seeds of thought. Such violations of Human Rights must never be forgotten, neither forgiven. We do so at our own peril.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 28 Mar 2016 14:20

deejay wrote:UK has a nominal GDP of US$ 2.9 trillion as of 2015 and India has a GDP of US$2.05 trillion as of 2015 (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_c ... _(nominal))

As per NATO figures I checked, UK is one of the few partners in NATO with >2% of nominal GDP spent of defence consistently. 2015 nos. here http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/ ... pdf#page=2

India on the other hand is consistently below 2% of nominal GDP in spending on Defence. If I am not wrong, we are close to 1.75%.

UK military size is smaller so their Pensions and Salaries bill is smaller and their Cap Ex is definitely bigger than ours consistently.

UK has consistently taken part in military deployments away from home (backed by US might for sure) and has a history of engaging in warfare. India does neither. We do take part in UN missions.

UK has a mil- industrial complex we hope to achieve. And then they have rest of NATO alliance partners as alternate expertise providers.

The only place we will be able to beat them is body count. By miles.

You may hang me for saying this but if I were to leave aside my jingo banners, we are in no position to match UK or even catch up. They are far better placed today than we are and they have a greater will to use the military than we have. We have miles to go before we think of Chagos etc. From what little I know, it is one of their most important bases and if we ever threaten this base we will face the navies of the entire western world against us.

Let us worry about Pakistan now, UK and the rest maybe diminishing but as yet are in another orbital plane.

Thats a good analysis. Its tough if not damn impossible to call out a 15-20 year outlook of a particular nation's military capability in today's time given both the changing national security dynamics for most nations, as well as the world economy. Here in the US for example, no one thought that just over a decade after the last supper, peace dividend and MIC downsizing the US would put itself on a path to shave $1 Trillion over a decade, but that is what has happened. Most also did not foresee the sort of defense-spending positions Obama has taken which have largely been pro-military spending, modernization and a strong preparedness.

We do know from the latest defense white paper that the UK has drawn a line in terms of cuts and is willing to spend the money to modernize and retain readiness and they have managed to move away from retiring a fraction of their fighters force, not acquiring P-8's, and only maintaining one carrier etc. Where they are in 2030 is anyone's guess but that can be said about any nation on the planet including US, China and India. They are and have been a declining power ever since WW2 but that is a separate topic of discussion that I really don't care much about since I don't look at much outside of how they are able to commit to their national security needs, both as an independent island nation with some global interests, to largely being NATO and US-alliance centric in the military preparedness and response context. They have been, and will continue to increasingly look at their national security commitments through the NATO lens, and rightly so.

The point to keep in mind is that, for any nation, including India, the military capabilities are a reflection of the national security needs therefore comparing a nation X to its own military strengths from the past may not be the best way to look at it as national security needs change geopolitically and with technology so does the response to them.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/s ... b_only.pdf

Here's Jane's Navy take on their 2015 review and white paper :

In October 2010, the UK Royal Navy (RN) was left reeling from body blows delivered by the first Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Despite a National Security Strategy, published in tandem, which showed a growing focus on maritime issues, the SDSR itself cut a number of core maritime capabilities.

The review's decisions reflected the realpolitik of the day: a huge public spending deficit, an already over-committed defence budget, and a continued land-centric operational focus on Afghanistan.

The headline loss was Carrier Strike, with the withdrawal of the Invincible-class carrier HMS Ark Royal and the retirement of the Royal Air Force (RAF)/RN joint-operated Harrier GR9 force. The navy's expeditionary power projection capacity was reduced further with the mothballing of an amphibious ship, and the scaling back of high-readiness amphibious lift capacity from brigade-level to a commando group of up to 1,800 personnel.

The scrapping of the RAF's Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) programme also impacted on core defence tasks spanning: the protection of the independent strategic nuclear deterrent; anti-submarine warfare (ASW); generic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations at sea; and long-range search and rescue (SAR). While the MRA4 may not have provided an affordable or sustainable solution in the long term, the decision left the United Kingdom with a significant capability gap. This was highlighted in the week the review was announced, with media reports of a Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) loitering outside UK waters, and the United Kingdom having to rely on MPA capacity from international partners to search for the boat.

The UK's ability to conduct presence at sea was also restricted further by the review reducing destroyer and frigate (DD/FF) force levels from 23 to 19 hulls.

One of the most significant cuts was a reduction in personnel from 34,000 to a planned 29,000 by 2020. While personnel numbers grabbed fewer headlines than the carrier, Harrier, and MPA losses, the sharp cut left a scar across navy operations over the next five years. Arguably, it is also the one wound that SDSR 2015 has been unable to completely heal.

While the review provides for a small uplift in manpower, it does not fully address personnel numbers in the way that the senior echelons of the navy would have hoped. Concern remains that manpower resources will not match up against planned force levels, and could over time undermine the RN's ability to deliver force elements at readiness.

Impact at sea

SDSR 2010's cuts had an immediate operational impact on UK defence and security interests, notably in the face of rising levels of military activity on the part of a resurgent Russia. Alongside the lack of MPA capacity, steady reductions in DD/FF force levels over a number of years - prior to and also in the review - left the RN increasingly challenged to provide sufficient assets to deter Russian naval activity around UK waters.

The overstretch the RN faced was not confined to home waters. In the Libya campaign in 2011, the UK was the only major maritime power involved in the NATO-led operation without a large-deck platform from which to operate fixed-wing strike aircraft (although the UK had aircraft operating from bases in Italy). The UK was also only occasionally able to commit a surface ship to support the European Union's (EU's) 'Atalanta' Somalia counter-piracy campaign (although it provides the operational staff headquarters in the UK, and has also deployed ships to support NATO's 'Ocean Shield' Somali piracy operation).

In years prior to SDSR 2010, declining surface force levels had already begun to affect the RN's ability to consistently support key commitments around the world such as the Atlantic Patrol Tasking (North) deployment, covering the Caribbean region. Further DD/FF force level reductions in 2010 only exacerbated the navy's challenges in finding assets to support such commitments.

Some observers would argue that, of the three services, the RN came off worst in 2010. Yet they would also argue that the service continued to demonstrate its flexibility as it sought to support UK requirements, albeit with fewer assets and noticeable gaps. For example, off Libya the RN's landing platform helicopter (LPH) vessel HMS Ocean embarked the British Army AH-64D Apache for the first time in an operational setting, to enable the UK to bring the attack helicopter's capabilities to bear ashore.

ince 2010, though, the strategic setting has changed. The international focus has moved away from enduring engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq towards an emphasis on delivering strategic policy and military effect ashore from the sea. This re-awakening has given maritime matters revived relevance and laid a foundation upon which navies can re-build their strategic case. For the UK, the focus on maritime security in the build-up to the 2012 London Summer Olympic Games, an expansion in cross-government co-operation on maritime security, and the 2014 publication of the UK's first standalone national maritime security strategy exemplified the resonance of maritime matters at the highest levels of government.

The RN's First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir George Zambellas, has referred to this as a "maritime renaissance". His narrative over the past two-and-a-half years has sought to bridge the gap between the two reviews, and to steer the RN out of the strategic mist.

Headline goals

ust as in 2010, aircraft carriers sat at the centre of SDSR 2015 - but this time for very different reasons. In setting out plans for Joint Force 2025 - which, according to SDSR, "will ensure that the armed forces are able to tackle a wider range of more sophisticated potential adversaries" through projecting power, deploying more quickly and for longer periods, and making the best use of technology - the 2015 review confirmed that the maritime contribution to this joint force will be based around a carrier task group, at the heart of which will be one of the two new 65-000 tonne Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and its embarked air group.

The RN has argued that its capabilities have continued to support UK strategic requirements in a number of ways, despite the core capability losses suffered in 2010. Nonetheless, the statement early in SDSR 2015 that the UK has "chosen to invest in projecting [its] power, influence, and values" must have been music to the navy's ears. Prime Minister David Cameron reinforced this strategic perspective in the foreword to the review, underscoring the need for the United Kingdom to retain its "global reach and global influence."

Certainly, the concept of Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) will allow the UK to project both hard and soft power at reach (with the carriers able to embark anything from strike aircraft to relief supplies), and to be able to do so for sustained periods with no requirement for host nation support. Beyond this, the RN's potential contribution to UK defence and security interests was delineated clearly in a number of SDSR's headline goals, including: defence and security of UK territory; delivery of the strategic nuclear deterrent; providing strategic intelligence to improve the UK's understanding of the world; strengthening international security; and supporting crisis response requirements (with potential crises ranging from major strike and wider combat operations, to peace and stability support, and to the conduct of humanitarian missions).

These requirements are also set in the context of an international security environment that is becoming increasingly unstable. While SDSR 2010 identified international insecurity as central to its key strategy and capability decisions, there can be little doubt that the world has since become a more dangerous and uncertain place. Moreover, in contrast to 2010, Europe and its immediate surroundings now appear to sit very much in the centre of what could be seen as one crucible of this instability.

While in 2010 the SDSR and the National Security Strategy were published as parallel but separate documents, in 2015 the two outputs were merged. The SDSR 2015's defence content is arguably smaller than in 2010, but consolidating the two creates a single, more holistic document, in which it is perhaps more straightforward to determine the defence threads that relate to the wider national security context.

Indeed, the parameters of the new document set out a clear framework within which the maritime contribution fits. National Security Objective 1 noted the need for "agile, capable, and globally deployable" armed forces able to deter adversaries. The document also highlighted risks such as migration, narcotics trafficking, and piracy. In recent years, despite the operational challenges it has faced, the RN has remained a global force - as its deployment of an aircraft carrier, an air-defence destroyer, and an SSN to the Indo-Pacific region in 2014 demonstrated. As well as supporting counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and counter-narcotics operations in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, the RN has also made a prominent contribution to the international campaign in the Mediterranean Sea designed to address the maritime migration issue, firstly in a standalone capacity and more recently under the EU NAVFOR MED operation, 'Sophia'.

Perhaps the one key difference since 2010 is the return of fractious relationships between major states. SDSR 2015 said that the UK is "seeing long-term shifts in the balance of global economic and military power [and] increasing competition between states", and underscored the need to deter state-based threats and to respond rapidly to crises. Noting that Russia "is mid-way through a programme of major investment to modernise and upgrade its military" and highlighting its military activity "around the territory of [UK] allies, and close to UK airspace and territorial waters", the SDSR noted that state-based security risks ranged from the generation of strategic uncertainty, through the onset of state-versus-state crises, to the outbreak of military conflict.

SDSR 2010 did set out both state- and non-state-based security risks. In 2015, however, both types of risk arguably have a more clearly defined geophysical and geostrategic focus, with a Russian resurgence culminating in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the rise of the Islamic State leading to the November 2015 attacks in Paris. Indeed, highlighting the renewed strategic importance of the Mediterranean, the ongoing Syria crisis arguably is a nexus of the two. Pockets of instability around the world appear to be coming together to create more risk to the United Kingdom - and certainly more risk closer to home than five years ago.

Power and prosperity

The prime minister opened his foreword to the 2015 review document noting that the UK's "national security depends on our economic security". He added that the UK "[needs] the sea lanes to stay open and the arteries of global commerce to remain free flowing." With the UK's economic growth linked intrinsically to the economic growth of the international community and to the wider stability of the international rules-based system, protecting the sea lines of communication (SLoCs) along which the bulk of the world's international trade flows remains a primary task for the world's navies to carry out together.

Reflecting this need to maintain influence at distance to protect national interests - and also, again, underscoring the prominent contribution of the RN therein - National Security Objective 2 emphasised the need for the UK to project its global influence. Reflecting the RN's power projection capabilities as well as the soft power focus the UK believes is central to supporting its own international interests as well as wider global security, the SDSR also noted that "Royal Navy ships' visits ... are an important way of projecting our soft power".

As navies deploy at sea on a daily basis, in large part to provide presence to ensure the calm flow of maritime commerce across the world's oceans and along the SLoCs that dissect them, navies of all shapes and sizes have regular experience of working together in support of this common aim.

Alongside detailed references to the UK's established partnerships with France and the United States, SDSR 2015 also highlighted the need to develop relations with a number of states that are all emerging as key naval actors in their own right: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea. The geographic and diplomatic presence that the RN seeks to maintain around the world would enable it to support government initiatives designed to bolster relations with these and other powers.

The United Kingdom also continues to develop strategic relations with a number of key allies in the Gulf region. Here, its presence will be augmented with the establishment of a new naval facility in Bahrain to support RN operations in the region.

As far as relations with France are concerned, the bilateral Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) established under the 2010 Lancaster House agreements will be up and running in 2016, with the force scheduled to achieve full operational capability during Exercise 'Griffin Strike' in April. The SDSR noted that the CJEF is intended to "provide a potent combined reaction force of up to 10,000 personnel available to plan for and respond to crises, including beyond Europe". A maritime force, based around the carrier and amphibious capabilities both nations will have, could play a central role in projecting that force within Europe and elsewhere.

Key SDSR decisions underscored the enduring centrality of relations with the United States Navy (USN) as the RN rebuilds for the future. Alongside working together to deliver the UK's Continuous At-Sea Deterrent and CEPP concepts via future nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and aircraft carrier programmes, one of the SDSR's major decisions was the off-the-shelf purchase of nine P-8A Poseidon MPAs to fill the capability gap left by the 2010 review. The SDSR said that operating a common MPA type would enable the two nations "to provide protection to each other's aircraft carriers and further improve our interoperability in anti-submarine warfare".

Good and bad

While the strategic framework set out by the SDSR seemed to reinforce the importance of the maritime component in meeting UK defence and security interests, the review's equipment decisions perhaps represented something of a curate's egg for the RN. On the positive side, alongside the commitment to the carriers and the MPAs, the review gave a green light to accelerating orders for the F-35B Lightning II short take-off/vertical landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter; announced plans for acquiring three new Future Solid Support (FSS) ships for task group support; and provided renewed political and programme commitment to the Successor SSBN replacement program.

However, there were other areas where the outcomes are less propitious. Plans to retire Ocean in 2018 will leave the navy without a mission-optimised LPH, even though the SDSR stated that one of the Queen Elizabeth carriers would be enhanced to support amphibious operations. In addition, while the DD/FF fleet will stay at 19 ships - with an aspiration to grow this number post-2030 - the future composition of the surface force has been re-scoped: the Type 26 Global Combat Ship (GCS) programme will run to just eight ships, with plans announced for a smaller, cheaper general-purpose frigate to sustain, and potentially increase, DD/FF hull numbers as the Type 23 frigates retire.

he future of the UK's naval engineering and shipbuilding sector is necessarily intertwined with this new force structure model. As has been presaged by the government in recent months, a national shipbuilding sector strategy, intended to "lay the foundations for a modern and efficient sector capable of meeting the country's future defence and security needs", according to the SDSR, is to be published in 2016. With the UK seeking to shape the future of its complex warship design and manufacturing sector, work to define this overarching, long-term strategy is already under way.

Poseidon choice

The P-8A decision provided the biggest SDSR headline in terms of new equipment. The nine aircraft will be acquired government-to-government under US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arrangements. The MPAs would "increase further the protection of our nuclear deterrent and our new aircraft carriers", said the SDSR. "These aircraft will be based in Scotland and will also have an overland surveillance capability," the review added.

The decision to bypass a competition and buy direct from the United States has angered many in UK industry, but reflects the political and operational imperative to acquire a credible, sustainable, and inherently low-risk solution that could achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) before the end of the current parliament in 2020. This time frame also ensures the availability of an MPA task line (three aircraft) in time to support the regenerated Carrier Strike capability.

Following on from previous government statements, including from the prime minister during the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the SDSR confirmed that both carriers will be brought into full service, thereby "transforming the Royal Navy's ability to project [UK] influence overseas". The review said that the carrier capability would begin to be available from 2018 - although IOC (Maritime) is not planned until late 2020 - with one carrier being "available at all times" once both ships have entered service.

Attendant to the delivery of Carrier Strike is the decision to accelerate F-35B acquisition. The SDSR is funding the delivery of a second squadron, with the UK planning to have 24 aircraft available from 2023 or earlier (compared with eight aircraft under previous planning assumptions).

On the surface

Another SDSR outcome was the decision to modify and enhance one of the carriers to support littoral manoeuvre operations in the LPH role. Enhancements to the future HMS Prince of Wales , the second carrier, will enable the ship to support a range of tasks from the sea, including amphibious operations, Commando and Special Forces raids, and counter-terrorism operations. The RN's reference to using carriers in counter-terrorism operations could be seen as an effort to highlight the role of high-end naval capabilities in supporting a wider range of tasks.

Naval sources told IHS Jane's that detailed programme plans were still being drawn up for the package of modifications for Prince of Wales , but acknowledged that a fully qualified LPH capability would be in line with an IOC in 2023.

However, Ocean 's decommissioning will leave the RN without a role-dedicated LPH. While the decision was not mentioned in the main SDSR document, the ship's retirement date was revealed subsequently. It is understood that Navy Command had been pushing an SDSR option to retain Ocean through to 2024. Naval sources point out, though, that in the event of a contingent requirement arising before 2023, lead carrier the future HMS Queen Elizabeth could receive clearance for expanded rotary-wing operations from 2018 "in extremis", although this capability would necessarily be more limited.

One of the most significant SDSR announcements concerned changes to the surface force recapitalisation plan. The current DD/FF force level comprises six Type 45 air-defence destroyers and 13 Type 23 frigates. Under previous plans, the Type 23s - eight of which are configured for ASW operations with the Sonar 2087 low-frequency active/passive sonar - would be replaced one-for-one by the new Type 26 GCS.

However, while the SDSR maintained the commitment over the medium term to 19 DD/FFs, only eight Type 26s will now be built to replace the eight ASW-roled Type 23s. Instead, the government stated its intention to launch a concept study for the design and build of "a new class of lighter, flexible, exportable general-purpose frigate to complement the Type 26 so that by the 2030s we can further increase the total number of frigates and destroyers". It added that these general-purpose frigates "are also likely to offer increased export potential".

The new national shipbuilding strategy will attempt to define a balanced, sector-wide framework designed to meet RN operational needs while also sustaining an industrial enterprise able to deliver value-for-money for the taxpayer. The SDSR stated that the Type 26 programme would "be crucial to the future of the UK's warship-building industry and form a central part of the strategy". The review noted that Type 26 build will start "for the first ships once we have further matured the design", adding that it was planned to "compete elements of the manufacturing work so that the programme delivers on time and to cost".

Separately, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that the Type 26 will now begin entering service in the mid-2020s, indicating a delay of between one and two years on previous assumptions; steel cutting for the first Type 26, previously planned for late 2016, will be delayed. As a result, two more Batch 2 River-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) are to be built to provide "continuity of shipbuilding work and additional capability for the Royal Navy in the short term".

The intention is that the RN will end up with a force of six OPVs, comprising five Batch 2s plus the Falkland Islands patrol vessel HMS Clyde . The three in-service Batch 1 OPVs will be decommissioned.

As regards plans for a new, lighter, and more exportable general-purpose frigate, concept work is now getting under way to establish the cost and capability balance and to feed into the shipbuilding strategy. Industry sources told IHS Jane's that the scheduling of the frigate programme would have to take into account UK maritime sector capacity constraints.

While the long-term plan to increase the size of the surface fleet will be welcomed by the RN, the decision to truncate the Type 26 programme at eight units will raise concerns as to the ability of the future DD/FF force to respond to warfighting contingencies. Adm Zambellas had previously made clear his view that 'high-end' capability could not be traded for hull numbers.

It is as yet unclear where these ships will sit on the cost/capability curve, although it is noteworthy that Adm Zambellas, in his post-SDSR 'galaxy message' to the fleet, referred to "a new generation of credible general-purpose frigates".

With regard to enhancement of existing surface ships, the SDSR confirmed that further work would be conducted to investigate "the potential of the Type 45 destroyers to operate in a BMD [ballistic missile defence] role". This work will build on successful science and technology experiments undertaken during 2013 and 2015.

Outside of the main SDSR document, it has also been confirmed that a Type 45 machinery improvement package is to be implemented. This is intended to improve the robustness and reliability of the power and propulsion system, which has experienced a range of issues in operations to date.

The SDSR also announced the planned acquisition of three FSS ships to enter service with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) from the mid-2020s as replacements for the dry stores ships RFA Fort Austin and RFA Fort Rosalie , and the auxiliary oiler replenishment ship RFA Fort Victoria .

It is as yet unclear how the new vessels - expected to displace 35,000-40,000 tonnes - will be categorised from an acquisition standpoint, and whether or not they will be included in the shipbuilding strategy. UK policy allows non-complex ships to be procured offshore, as with the RFA's four new Tide-class fleet tankers. However, there is an acknowledgement that the FSS design - which will be required to deliver ammunition and stores at sufficient tempo and volume to support Carrier Strike operations - will be somewhat more complex than that of the Tide-class tankers.

In terms of mine countermeasures (MCM) capability, the SDSR confirmed that the MCM force would be reduced to 12 units with the decommissioning by 2025 of three of the oldest Sandown-class MCM vessels (MCMVs). The assumption is that a new generation of remote offboard MCM systems will begin to enter service in the post-2020 time frame, building on a current French/UK demonstrator program.

Personnel

Manpower remains perhaps the most critical issue for the RN and an area where the SDSR did not meet aspirations. The review announced that the total naval headcount would rise to 30,400 (400 more than today's nominal number, and 1,400 more than envisaged by SDSR 2010).

In his galaxy message, Adm Zambellas said this meant "no repeat of the redundancy rounds of the last review and a continued commitment to recruiting and retaining the best, most diverse talent". Yet in putting forward its SDSR case, the Navy Board is believed to have argued for a headline increase of around 2,000-2,500.

Dr Tim Benbow, from the Department of Defence Studies, King's College, London, commented that the SDSR's manpower uplift would not ameliorate current and, more importantly, future shortfalls. "The risk is that the impressive headline force will in practice be much smaller, as holes can only be filled by leaving ships tied up alongside for extended periods," he said.

He also saw additional problems arising from the decision to further reduce the number of MoD civil servants, noting that "previous savings were taken by shifting uniformed positions into civilian ones, which will leave gaps if the latter are further chopped. The tendency to dismiss support ... is regrettable and stores up problems for the future".

SUCCESSOR PLANS CONFIRMED, BUT WITH REVISED COST AND SCHEDULE ESTIMATES

With the Conservative government judging that an assured deterrent "remains vital to [the UK's] national security", the SDSR confirmed plans for the continued investment in maintaining "a minimum, credible, independent nuclear deterrent, based on Continuous At-Sea Deterrence (CASD) and assigned to the defence of NATO". With the four current Vanguard-class SSBNs due to start retiring by the early 2030s, work on a replacement Successor submarine design is now at an advanced stage, with long-lead items already on order.

To sustain CASD, the government has concluded that four submarines are needed to ensure at least one will always be at sea. Reflecting the commitments made five years ago under SDSR 2010, the 2015 review added that the deployed submarine would embark up to 40 nuclear warheads on no more than eight operational missiles: this force level would be generated from a stockpile of no more than 120 operationally available warheads; overall, by the mid-2020s, the total warhead stockpile would be reduced to no more than 180.

Successor programme design phase work began in 2011. Since then, the MoD has worked with its Tier 1 industrial partners - BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, and Babcock - to deliver the programme within wider efforts to drive process and efficiency improvements across the submarine enterprise. The next phase of the programme, focused on risk reduction and demonstration, is planned to begin in 2016.

However, the SDSR made it clear that much work remains to get the submarine sector 'match fit', stating: "Improvements are required to deliver this national endeavour, drawing on the experience of major projects in government and the private sector in the UK and beyond .... Working with industry, we will confirm and implement the organisational, managerial, and contractual changes needed to deliver the Successor programme."

This shake-up will see a new team established in the MoD to function as the single sponsor for all aspects of the defence-related nuclear enterprise, including boats, warheads, industrial skills, infrastructure, and policy. In addition, a new delivery body will be set up "with the authority and freedom to recruit and retain the best people to manage the submarine enterprise" so as to strengthen procurement and in-service support arrangements. Efforts to improve performance will continue, including long-term investment in skills and infrastructure.

New industrial and commercial arrangements also will be put in place for the programme, shifting away from a single 'Main Gate' approach - no longer judged appropriate for a programme of this scale and complexity - to a more staged investment programme.

The SDSR also brought a reassessment of the resources and time frame required to deliver Successor: "Our latest estimate is that manufacturing the four Successor submarines is likely to cost a total of GBP31 billion [USD47 billion] (including inflation over the lifetime of the programme), with the first submarine entering service in the early 2030s." This contrasts with the GBP15-20 billion cost estimate set out in 2006 under the then Labour government's deterrent white paper. Some uncertainty remains over dates, however, with previous statements referring to a 2028 delivery date for the first boat, and with the SDSR citing the "early 2030s" as its in-service date.

The SDSR said that "the revised cost and schedule reflect the greater understanding we now have about the detailed design of the submarines and their manufacture". Given the complexities and risks inherent in such a programme, a contingency fund of GBP10 billion also has been set aside.

Work is continuing to determine the optimum life of the warhead stockpile. While a new warhead is not required before the late 2030s at the earliest, the lead times involved mean that a decision on a future warhead "may be required in this parliament or early in the next". Investment in the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston will be maintained to sustain the facilities and skills required to assure the safety and security of the current stockpile, and also the ability to develop a replacement warhead as required.

The change in tack for the UK's DD/FF programme was perhaps not unexpected. While the commitment to eight ASW hulls as a primary requirement remains, it seems unlikely that the RN would have wished to commit to a capability template for the last five hulls when the first of these would not be entering service for perhaps another 15 years. The differing strategic emphases between the 2010 and 2015 reviews show how much the world can change in five years alone.

The flip-side of this argument, however, is that while the prospective increase in DD/FF force levels would be good news for the RN, the time frames are so far ahead of current planning that there can be no certainty it will happen.

Just as in 2010, the SSN force level received little attention in 2015, although it is a capability being put to significant operational use.

This use is likely to continue. First, the United Kingdom is likely to wish to maintain the requirement to deploy an SSN East of Suez on a regular basis (as it has done for some time). Second, the increasing levels of Russian submarine activity, both around UK waters and in key areas of interest such as the Mediterranean (with the ongoing Syria crisis seeing reports of cruise missile-capable Russian submarines operating there) may mandate an increasing requirement for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) presence at home. The arrival of the P-8A MPA may provide part of the solution here, but the role of the SSN in both protecting the deterrent and prosecuting suspected submarine targets will remain critical. Third is the significant issue of the entry into service of the two carriers; with one to be permanently available (and maybe, on occasion, two), these carriers will require SSN protection when deployed.

Despite the strategic logic, there is no evident discussion of increasing SSN force levels. Along with industrial and personnel base issues, an eighth Astute-class SSN might not be seen as offering value when the P-8A and the Type 26 are being acquired to support ASW tasks and when funds will continue to remain tight.

The key issue thus for the SSN flotilla is how the RN and the Ministry of Defence could maximise the available sea time with the existing seven boats through different crewing patterns and optimised upkeep routines. The fact that the new Astute-class boats have been built with a through-life reactor core should deliver greater availability, as it removes the requirement for lengthy refuelling refits.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 31 Mar 2016 02:23

A colorful fellow indeed. Met him last year at the same venue but different event, missed this one.

CAPT Tal Manvel, USN (Ret), the first Navy Program Manager for Future Carriers, discusses designing the Ford-class aircraft carrier on 7 January 2015 at the US Naval Academy Museum's Shifley Lecture Series

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 31 Mar 2016 04:44

^^^^^

Must watch vid for numbers and other decision criteria.

Thanks.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 01 Apr 2016 04:15

Throw back to what Jane's and the older defense coverage used to be till a decade and a half ago. Not surprising given the author's past work

At Sea Aboard the Zumwalt

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 01 Apr 2016 15:19

Navy Set to Buy AWESUM Miniature Sub-Launched UAVs

THE PENTAGON — U.S. attack and guided missile submarine are set to field miniature unmanned aerial vehicles that will act as the eyes and ears not only for the boats below water but also help special operations forces and strike aircraft target weapons, the Navy’s Director of Undersea Warfare told USNI News last week.

As part of the Fiscal Year 2017 budget submission to Congress, the Navy is asking for small Blackwing UAVs to be launched from attack and guided missile submarines, the Navy’s director for undersea warfare Rear Adm. Charles Richard told USNI News.

“So there’s 150 small unmanned aerial systems coming in on submarines, so we’re now buying them,” Richard said.
“It’s not something that you would [just] see on a PowerPoint presentation. These are fully integrated they’ll go in talk back to the ship, talk to the combat control system and additionally we’ll have 12 of a 21-inch torpedo tube launched vehicles with much longer launched duration.”According to a follow-on statement provided by the Navy, “the three-inch canister launched UAVs are part of Advanced Weapons Enhanced by Submarine UAS against Mobile targets (AWESUM) demonstrates submarine launch, data sharing and control across the Joint Force.”

The current year budget move is set to further operationalize a years-long program to use small UAVs from attack and guided missile boats.

Naval Sea Systems Command Program Executive Officer Subs briefed the AWESUM program publically in late 2013 and outlined the work with U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and the U.S Air Force.

The briefing slides from late 2013 indicated the Blackwings would communicate with a submarines antennas and could provide third party targeting information to aircraft through Link 16 data links. In addition to the targeting function, the UAVs could also possibly be weaponized as a defensive measure for submarines operating in the littorals.

The miniature UAVs are launched through the boats’ existing systems it uses for acoustic countermeasures and have a flight endurance of less than an hour, according to the 2013 presentation.In 2013, the Navy Research Lab (NRL) also tested larger Sea Robin UAV, powered by fuel-cell technology and launched from a modified Tomahawk Land Attack Missile canister.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 01 Apr 2016 15:31

As China Builds Up Carrier Force, The Mission Remains Unclear

Indian Ocean likely will see Chinese aircraft carriers in the next decade

As construction progresses on China’s second aircraft carrier, with work reportedly also underway on a third, an outstanding question is exactly what China will use the ships for. They look like doubtful assets for a hot war against a major power such as the U.S. or Japan, and they may not even be of much use against a much weaker enemy with lurking submarines.

Peacetime menace or wars against enemies that can barely exert power at sea appear to be more realistic functions, but China so far shows no interest in becoming embroiled in the Middle East, for example. And carriers would be an expensive way to assert economic interests in Africa.

Still, the Chinese navy must have persuaded the government that carriers could do something useful—such as operate around Southeast Asia, where they could back China’s claims to disputed islands and shoals as part of an evident long-term objective of annexing the South China Sea.Beyond that, Chinese fixed-wing naval operations are likely to appear in the Indian Ocean once the second carrier enters service, according to a new Japanese research report on Chinese military power. Weak anti-submarine capabilities, however, remain an enduring problem for the Chinese navy, says the report, issued by the National Institute for Defense Studies, a government think tank based in Tokyo. Those shortcomings may constrain Chinese carrier operations.

Since it was commissioned in 2012, the first Chinese aircraft carrier, Liaoning, has been kept close to home while the navy has learned how to operate it and its air wing, in part through exercises in the South China Sea.

“It is assumed that [China] will use its aircraft carriers to project air power in sea areas where air support from the mainland is difficult, such as the southern part of the South China Sea,” writes Masafumi Iida, the author of the report’s chapter on the Chinese navy. Ports and runways China has built on artificial islands in the South China Sea will contribute.

Carrier air power should be projected at greater distances when the second carrier appears. “Chinese submarines have started advancing into the Indian Ocean in recent years, and such operations are expected to become more frequent,” the report states. “Once the aircraft carrier the [Chinese navy] is said to be constructing comes into service, it is also likely to enter the Indian Ocean.” The ship is likely to be operational early next decade.

“By deploying this aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean, China will not only be able to secure its sea lines of communication and its overseas interests but also augment its pressure from the seas on India, with which it has an ongoing land border dispute,” the report says.

Such a deployment would certainly get India’s attention and probably encourage it to build up security ties with other countries that are uneasy about Chinese assertiveness. India has begun doing so with Vietnam and Japan.

A clear challenge for China in using aircraft carriers in war is that they must be protected against submarine attack, especially in the South China Sea, the size of which limits ships’ opportunities to hide. The Chinese navy has long been weak in dealing with submarines. Deployment of many fixed-wing aircraft for wide-area anti-submarine warfare is essential, says Iida, noting that the Chinese navy has only just begun using such an aircraft, the Y-8Q, a much modified derivative of the Antonov An-12 airlifter. Chinese media say the type lacks the range of the Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion.

Vietnam, a competing claimant to some features in the South China Sea, is alive to China’s weaknesses. Its newly established underwater arm will receive its sixth Russian Project 636.1 (Kilo) submarine this year. India has 14 submarines and decades of experience in underwater operations. Japan has 16 combat submarines, highly regarded by the U.S. Navy, and plans to increase its force to 22. Fighting between China and Japan, the Philippines or Taiwan would presumably bring in the threat of U.S. nuclear submarines; Liaoning and its sisters would have to be kept at a safe distance, maybe in port.

A good theory is that the Chinese navy wants aircraft carriers simply because other countries, especially the U.S., have them, says Andrew Davies of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra. The justification offered to the government probably included operations in the South China Sea and protecting shipping routes to the Middle East, even though that would hardly be practicable, he says. So Davies agrees that appearances in the Indian Ocean are likely.

The government may have been eager to be persuaded, anyway. Carriers are symbols of national power that please the Chinese people and thus improve satisfaction with the Communist Party.

The second carrier, under construction at Dalian, will have a displacement of about 50,000 metric tons, the official military newspaper, the PLA Daily, said in January, citing a naval research officer. Since the loading condition of the ship at that displacement was not specified, it could be as big as Liaoning or rather smaller. Liaoning displaces about 60,000 tons fully laden, compared with U.S. carriers’ 100,000 tons.According to a Taiwanese intelligence report leaked last year, the second Chinese ship will be about as big as Liaoning. China says it will operate J-15 fighters, the design of which is derived from the Sukhoi Su-33. China is building another aircraft carrier at Shanghai, also about the size of Liaoning, according to the intelligence report. China has not confirmed construction of a third carrier.

Conceivably, Liaoning’s successors could be closely based on its largely Soviet design; China bought that ship unfinished from Ukraine and completed it at Dalian. The second ship will at least use the same methods of aircraft operations: short takeoffs using a ski jump and arrested recoveries on an angled runway. But the research officer, Senior Capt. Zhang Junshe, told the PLA Daily it would have power, propulsion, and electronic and weapon systems developed in China.

Zhang adds that the ship will be of completely domestic design, while one of his colleagues at the navy’s Academic Research Institute, Cao Weidong, specifically says that the hull has been independently designed. Such claims must be treated carefully, however, because Chinese officials routinely make them about even flagrant copies, including the J-15, for example.

A top provincial official said two years ago the carrier under construction at Dalian was due for delivery in six years, meaning around 2020. That looks quite achievable. Chinese media have published unofficial but apparently genuine photographs that show construction is well advanced, with the stern block of the hull attached by February and the bow block lowered into position by early March.

If China needs three years between launch and delivery, the same time that Britain is taking for its two Queen Elizabeth-class ships of 70,000 tons, full load, then the new ship at Dalian could be floated out of its building dock next year and handed over to the navy in 2020. Making it operational could then easily take another year.

Following the precedent set by Liaoning, it will probably be named after a province.

The National Institute for Defense Studies says the content of its report on Chinese military power, published in March, expresses the views of its authors.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 03 Apr 2016 10:23

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ho ... 64491.html

HMS dauntless reduced to welcoming foreign officials and training naval dogs. Expensive fixes needed.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 03 Apr 2016 10:50

Singha wrote:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ho ... 64491.html

HMS dauntless reduced to welcoming foreign officials and training naval dogs. Expensive fixes needed.

They tend to build very expensive ships in small number and take a long time to fix teething problems , Once upon a time IN ships were built on Fine RN desgin like the Leander class but seems like RN has lost the art of building cost effective and fine ships.

Few year from now we would only see about RN exploits in James Bund movies , Trying to Save the World

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 03 Apr 2016 16:21

DARPA’s Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) program has designed, developed and constructed an entirely new class of ocean-going vessel—one intended to traverse thousands of kilometers over the open seas for months at a time, all without a single crew member aboard.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 04 Apr 2016 08:11

Naval drone for hunting subs exclusively

AbhiJ · Post by **AbhiJ** » 04 Apr 2016 15:30

Putting the Type 45 propulsion problems in perspective

Amongst informed defence commentators it has been an open secret for several years, but on 29th January a BBC report finally put the engine problems of the Type 45 destroyers into the public eye. The MoD has consistently played down the seriousness of the issue, that had on occasions resulted in total propulsion and electrical failure, leaving ships dead in the water. Even Parliamentary questions were met with vague assurances that “progress was being made”. The media coverage has since been predictably excessive, giving the unfortunate impression that Type 45s are £1Billion cripples. Although these breakdowns have hampered their operation, all the Type 45s have completed major deployments and HMS Defender is currently on a 9-month Gulf and Indian Ocean deployment.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 04 Apr 2016 15:41

Type45 and zumalt are only warships with all electric drive right ie no gearbox or propulsion shaft coming from the gas turbines and instead the turbines generate electricity for motors?

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 04 Apr 2016 18:18

http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-a ... aval-spear

Vietnam seizes Chinese ship in South China Sea in rare move
South China Sea: Hainan is the 'tip of the naval spear'

China's navy officers at a ceremony in Sanya, Hainan province, to welcome the Hefei - a guided missile destroyer commissioned by the People's Liberation Army Navy - to the South Sea Fleet in December last year. The province hosts China's conventional
China's navy officers at a ceremony in Sanya, Hainan province, to welcome the Hefei - a guided missile destroyer commissioned by the People's Liberation Army Navy - to the South Sea Fleet in December last year. The province hosts China's conventional and nuclear submarines, and is likely to host its aircraft carriers as well.PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES

Balmy beaches, patriotic cruise passengers and a nuclear submarine base - all these are to be found in Hainan, the linchpin in Beijing's southern seas strategy. In the second of a three-part series on the South China Sea disputes, The Straits Times reports on the geopolitical importance of this sunny isle.

Published: Apr 4, 2016, 5:00 am SGT
Teo Cheng Wee China Correspondent In Sanya (Hainan)

Except for a few transient fishermen living in wooden huts, the tranquil shores of Woody Island were for decades largely devoid of inhabitants or civilian facilities.

Then, in 2012, it all changed for the biggest island of the disputed Paracels in the South China Sea.

That year, China - which controls the archipelago - established the Sansha city government, giving it the authority to "govern" the South China Sea islands and surrounding waters. Soon after, it added a library, a school, a hospital and even a satellite TV station, in an area half the size of Sentosa. Cafes and supermarkets line its main thoroughfare, Beijing Road.

(Far left) Chinese tourists Li Weixiang and wife Li Qingqing taking wedding photos when they travelled to the Paracels on a cruise. (Middle and right) Paracels travel pictures posted on microblogging site Weibo by Chinese netizens.

An island that stirs their patriotic feelings

The Chinese call the island Yongxing, or "eternal prosperity", and it now has more than 1,000 residents, as China moves to solidify its claims in this and other disputed areas of the South China Sea.

Such rapid developments have shone a spotlight on Hainan, the country's southern-most province, whose geopolitical importance has risen in tandem with the tensions in the region.

Hainan not only administers Sansha, but is also home to Yulin Naval Base and its submarine bunker, located mere kilometres away from crowded tourist beaches of seaside resort Sanya.

Such oddities have led some to dub Hainan - roughly the size of Taiwan - as having "a curious blend of beaches, babes and naval bases". But experts have no doubt about the island's strategic significance.

"Hainan is the tip of the naval spear vital to China's projection of power," noted Beijing-based security analyst Xie Yanmei from the International Crisis Group.

The province hosts China's conventional and nuclear submarines, and is likely to host its aircraft carriers as well, she said.

"China's recent build-up of outposts in the South China Sea is partly aimed at making spying on the Hainan bases riskier and more complicated, and stretching the depth of defence to shield Hainan," Ms Xie told The Straits Times.

Hainan's importance to China's national security prompted the launch of the country's first 24-hour anti-spying hotline in the province last year. According to Chinese media reports, the hotline aims to crack down on "foreign intelligence networks keen on knowing China's military capabilities".

A Chinese vessel (right) using a water cannon on a Vietnamese vessel near the Paracel islands in May 2014. Chinese boats reportedly rammed Vietnamese vessels near disputed waters where China had stationed an oil drilling platform. Fish produce at a m

South China Sea: Fish Wars

Hainan could also play an important role if China decides to declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea, noted senior fellow Ian Storey from the Iseas-Yusof Ishak Institute. As recently as last week, China defended its right to do so.

"If China declares an ADIZ over northern parts of the South China Sea, it could be administered from either Hainan or the Paracels," Professor Storey said.

Yet, Hainan is not just about military hardware. Elsewhere on the island, its fishermen are tasked with protecting China's sovereignty through their frequent fishing trips.

In Sanya, a passenger cruise ship has been offering nationalistic tours of the Paracels since 2013.

All these moves are aimed at safeguarding China's interests - and more such measures can be expected in the coming months.

Sansha's deputy mayor Feng Wenhai said in January that the authorities will start to operate civilian flights, build judicial courts and provide full Wi-Fi coverage on Woody Island this year, as the city gears up to celebrate its third birthday.

"Hainan's officials have for years been the most ardent advocates for more aggressive development of the South China Sea," noted Ms Xie. "They often argue that such actions are vital to the defence of China's sovereignty and maritime rights."

• TOMORROW: China's front line fishermen and their claims on ancestral waters.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 04 Apr 2016 23:22

Singha wrote:Type45 and zumalt are only warships with all electric drive right ie no gearbox or propulsion shaft coming from the gas turbines and instead the turbines generate electricity for motors?

I am guessing SSKs are also electric?

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 05 Apr 2016 16:58

A few months old, but good context as the AMDR moves to the Pacific range in the next few days.

Surface Navy 2016: Raytheon completes first AMDR, with tests to follow before move to Pacific range

Raytheon has completed the first AN/SPY-6(V) radar array, fully populated with component Line Replaceable Units (LRUs), including more than 5,000 Transmit/Receive (TR) elements, the company announced on 13 January.

The AN/SPY-6(V), formerly known as the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), is being built for the US Navy's (USN's) Flight III DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers.

"We are fully integrated and built now. We built it in 79 days. [On 29 July] the array arrived and we had it fully integrated in under 80 days," Tad Dickenson, Raytheon's AMDR programme director, told IHS Jane's during the Surface Navy Association annual symposium, held in Washington, DC, on 12-14 January.

The radar now has all of its cooling, power, fibre-optic infrastructure, chassis, and radio frequency beam-forming networks, he said.

"It is ready to be populated with the TR modules and the digital receiver exciters," Dickenson added.

SPY-6(V) chamber testing will be finished early in the second quarter of 2016.

Then, in the April time frame, the radar will be moved from Raytheon's Near Field Range test site to the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii, where there are opportunities to trial the system against ballistic missile targets, Rear Admiral Jon Hill, programme executive officer for integrated warfare systems, said at the symposium.

"We're going to fly supersonics against it, we're going to fully test that radar and de-risk it" before delivery to the DDG 51 Flight III programme, Rear Adm Hill said.SPY-6(V) will be the first US-built ship-based radar to include gallium nitride (GaN) semi-conductors, writes Geoff Fein .

A USN radar hull study for maritime vessels noted, among other things, that ships required a certain level of sensor sensitivity, which in turn necessitated a certain power aperture. This led Raytheon to develop AMDR using GaN. In order to fit SPY-6(V) on DDG 51 Flight III hulls, within the ship's power and weight budget, the USN would need a high-performing, high-power semi-conductor. Gallium arsenide (GaAs) would not fit within the size and weight required and was not as efficient as GaN.

GaN is a wideband gap semi-conductor, so it has a higher voltage breakdown; this provides SPY-6(V) with a higher power density on the RF Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit amplifiers that Raytheon builds. Along with GaN's high temperature capability, it enables Raytheon to create a high-power radar aperture and run it at high-duty cycles.

An integrated air and missile defence radar, SPY-6(V) allows the conduct, simultaneously and continuously, of integrated air and ballistic missile defence and has the power aperture to deliver that within the required time frame.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BWUTbaI ... pp=desktop

And another more recent article from Aviation Week on the AMDR program cost (Development+Testing+Initial procurement) that exposes some of the madness residing in the GAO -

AMDR Cost Estimate Drops Again

The U.S. Navy continues to carve away at the proposed price for its Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), although some later testing and upgrades could boost the cost, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).

The price tag now is a bit more than $3.9 billion, compared to about $4.1 billion a year ago, according to the recently released annual GAO report on Pentagon program spending. Two years ago, the cost was $4.8 billion, a major drop from the previous GAO estimate of about $15 billion.

AMDR will consist of an S-band radar for ballistic missile and air defense, an X-band radar for horizon search, and a radar suite controller that controls and integrates the two radars. AMDR will initially support the DDG 51 Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The radar suite will anchor the Navy’s BMD plans.

Navy and contractor officials have attributed the cost reduction mostly to transmitter-receiver technology breakthroughs, which have helped to increase effectiveness while reducing space and power needs.

But GAO does have some concerns, noting that Pentagon testers in 2013 had “disapproved AMDR’s Test and Evaluation Master Plan because of operational realism concerns, noting that use of an unmanned AMDR and Aegis-equipped self-defense test ship is needed to ensure adequate operational testing. No decision has been made on whether a test ship will be used for the testing. If a test ship is used, early DOD (Defense Department) estimates suggest that operational testing costs will increase by $300 to $400 million.”

Also, GAO says, “The Navy also has approved plans to upgrade the combat system for integration with AMDR, but the requirements for the upgrade have not yet been defined. The interface between AMDR and the combat management system will require a significant software development effort, with software builds expected to be completed in fiscal year 2021.”

The Navy says it intends to complete the requirements for the upgrade of the combat system for integration with AMDR by the fall of 2016.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 05 Apr 2016 19:05

The Baltic Fleet (E01): Russian stealth corvette and ‘black hole’ submarine get ready for a face-off

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 07 Apr 2016 20:33

X Posting from SPF :

GQM-163A Coyote, Supersonic, Sea-skimming Target Missile

TSJones · Post by **TSJones** » 07 Apr 2016 22:46

^^^^^

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gqm ... ses-03155/

The rocket-boosted, ramjet-powered GQM-163A was developed to simulate supersonic cruise missiles like the SS-N-22 external link Sunburn, Kh-31 external link (aka. AS-17 Krypton, which may have an anti-air AWACS-killer version external link), the Indo-Russian PJ-10 external link Brahmos, etc., which are proliferating throughout the world. Their speed and evasive maneuvers compress the amount of time a defense system has to deal with them to under a minute. A training target that can simulate their performance is critical to both proper preparedness and pursuant performance.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 07 Apr 2016 22:56

Besides providing a supersonic target for testing SM6/M2 and ESSM, the biggest purpose of a target (any) is to validate analytical models in support of improving things like AEGIS over its design cycle. In the former capacity, the Coyote has been used by both the Navies of Australia, and France since its a unique target in that capacity since it can execute a terminal weave and pop up maneuver in the sea-skimming supersonic profile to simulate AD response to more advanced threats. With targets it is important to be able to customize performance easily based on classified level intel on a threat weapon and if your target from that start is capable of executing terminal maneuvers then its something that you can build upon at a more classified level and not end up in a situation where a threat can over the short-medium term make your target inadequate when live and synthetic testing is done using it. The gap existed prior to the GQM-163A's induction over a decade ago, the then supersonic threat targets were grossly inadequate, hence the GQM-163A to provide a realistic, configurable target to stress the AEGIS better to both test and develop it further.

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Wfi3wW3nps8/T ... neuver.jpg
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/2 ... ccessfully

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 08 Apr 2016 13:46

Navy to launch Great Green Fleet with 77 million gallon buy of cost-competitive, non-food advanced biofuels blends

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 08 Apr 2016 16:55

US Christens First Ghost Ship (and The Dawn of The Robotic Navy)

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 09 Apr 2016 16:54

Spying for which nation?
http://abcnews.go.com/US/us-navy-office ... d=38265003

US Navy Officer Charged With Espionage
By Luis Martinez
Apr 8, 2016,

A Navy officer assigned to a maritime reconnaissance unit has been charged with espionage and attempted espionage, according to charging documents. The officer was arrested approximately eight months ago, but the details of his case were first made public Friday at a preliminary court hearing that will determine whether the case will proceed to a court martial.

The unidentified officer is currently assigned to Commander Patrol and Reconnaissance Group, a maritime patrol and reconnaissance unit in Norfolk that provides airborne anti-submarine warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance using P-8A Poseidon aircraft, P-3 Orion aircraft and MQ-4 unmanned aircraft.

A U.S. official says the lieutenant commander has been in pre-trial confinement since being arrested approximately eight months ago at an airport in the U.S. Pacific Command region while bound for a foreign country.

He is being held at the Naval Consolidated Brig in Chesapeake, Virginia. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the FBI are still investigating details of this case.

An Article 32 hearing held Friday in Norfolk, Virginia will determine if the case should proceed to a court martial. The hearing, vaguely referenced in a Navy court docket, was the first public confirmation of the case and was slated to last a day.

Charge sheets presented at an Article 32 hearing were heavily redacted and did not disclose the identity of the Naval officer nor where the alleged acts of espionage occurred.

According to the charge sheets, the officer has been charged with five counts of espionage and attempted espionage. The documents allege that on "divers occasions" the officer did "with intent or reason to believe it would be used to the advantage of a foreign nation, attempt to communicate SECRET information relating to the national defense to a representative of a foreign government."

He was also charged with four counts of a violation of a Lawful General Order by “wrongfully transporting material classified as SECRET." There were also seven counts of violating Article 134 of the UCMJ for communicating defense information "to a person not entitled to receive said information," patronizing a prostitute and adultery. These specifications also note that he signed a leave request with a false address “rather than the actual foreign destination."

“We cannot provide additional information at this time given that the investigation is ongoing,” said Navy spokesman Lt. Commander Tim Hawkins said when asked for further details.

The case has been designated a national security case which is why the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command is the convening authority in the case.

It is unclear when the presiding officer in the case will make a recommendation as to whether the case should move to trial.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 10 Apr 2016 00:05

ACTUV Timelapse

John · Post by **John** » 10 Apr 2016 04:02

TSJones wrote:^^^^^

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gqm ... ses-03155/

The rocket-boosted, ramjet-powered GQM-163A was developed to simulate supersonic cruise missiles like the SS-N-22 external link Sunburn, Kh-31 external link (aka. AS-17 Krypton, which may have an anti-air AWACS-killer version external link), the Indo-Russian PJ-10 external link Brahmos, etc., which are proliferating throughout the world. Their speed and evasive maneuvers compress the amount of time a defense system has to deal with them to under a minute. A training target that can simulate their performance is critical to both proper preparedness and pursuant performance.

IMO they can't quite simulate liquid fueled ramjet missiles like moskit or Oniks/Brahmos because they are capable of throttling. Also their engine is much cleaner and gives out a much lower IR signature

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 10 Apr 2016 05:59

John wrote: IMO they can't quite simulate liquid fueled ramjet missiles like moskit or Oniks/Brahmos because they are capable of throttling. Also their engine is much cleaner and gives out a much lower IR signature

Thats not what you really need to stress your system or a target to represent. A target need not be a carbon copy of a specific system only simulate a specific stress on your air-defense system. If the need for a liquid ramjet simulator was big enough they could easily build a target to mimic this. As of now no such threat representation has been sought, and they ask for money to simulate very specific threats each budget cycle. Specifically, there exist unspecified and semi-classified ballistic missile targets simulating unspecified countermeasures with the MDA that came as a result of an 'urgent' need based on intelligence. The job of all the targets you put up against your AD's is to simulate a lot of different threats and find cracks within your defenses. No one system needs to find all the stress points but you do need to cover charecteristics on both extremes i.e. very high speed, low skimming where you have a peculiar signature but not enough time, and a medium altitude low-RCS cruise missile, where you have time but not a wide enough sensor net to catch all the LOW RCS targets all the time. Moreover you need to make sure your long range OTH interceptor can destroy high mach cruise missile trajectories..

The Coyote's role is to provide a high supersonic, medium-high altitude cruise missile (up to Mach 3.25, up to @ 35,000 ft) target for the SM6 and a supersonic sea-skimming target for the ESSM. Its biggest role is to shore up the analytical models which you don't need a heck of a lot of launches to do so that you can tweak it further. It provides a stressful target that can attack using different representative profiles and execute end-game maneuvers and provide realistic assessment of your future enhancements. Thats about it.

http://www.rocket.com/coyote-ssst-vfdr

Oniks/Brahmos because they are capable of throttling.

The GQM-163 is also throttleable, being the first operational VFDR beating out the meteor by a number of years (and I believe more 163's have been launched than meteor, with the 53rd launched for the Japanese at white sands). In fact had they chosen the liquid ramjet approach, they would have fielded a target much earlier since multiple teams were demonstrating them on the HARM-ER that was also in testing in the 90s. As it did in the Meteor down-select (where Raytheon did at one time suggest a non VFDR AMRAAM variant) the VFDR in the SS Target came with the highest design complexity and risk of failure but they stuck with it to advance the VFDR program. The Coyote follows from ARC's successful demonstration of the VFDR AMRAAM in the late 80's and early 90's. In fact, it shares a lot with that AMRAAM demonstrator. It was the same program that was supposed to roll into the Joint Dual Role Air Dominance Missile (JDRADM) the AMRAAM replacement, that was cancelled and rolled onto multiple smaller programs for the future:

Aerojet Demonstrates NextGen Solid Ramjet Fuel-Source: Aerojet; issued August 10, 2010

SACRAMENTO, Calif. --- Aerojet, a GenCorp company, announced today that it has successfully tested an advanced solid ramjet fuel in an engine ground test. The fuel is being developed to provide long-range, high-speed capability for the U.S. military and potentially for the future USAF/Navy Joint Dual Role Air Dominance Missile (JDRADM).

Ramjet engines have historically used liquid fuel which mixes with atmospheric air in order to provide thrust at high speed. However, for tactical missiles, the military services have expressed interest in a storable solid fuel. In order to meet this need, Aerojet developed the world's first throttleable solid-fueled ramjet for the U.S. Navy GQM-163A Coyote missile target starting in the year 2000. Since that time, Aerojet has been developing a family of advanced formulations called AerGen fuels with properties suitable for a tactical missile ramjet engine. The fuel burns very efficiently, resulting in more delivered energy and reduced visible exhaust.

The ground testing was conducted at Aerojet's Airbreathing Test Facility located in Orange County, Va. A full-scale engine was tested at conditions simulating high-altitude, high-speed flight. "Our airbreathing propulsion business represents cutting-edge technology aimed at future military requirements," said Aerojet Vice President and Deputy to the President, Dick Bregard. "Aerojet is proud to demonstrate our commitment to advancing our country's military capability through this innovative ramjet fuel research."

Aerojet is a world-recognized aerospace and defense leader principally serving the missile and space propulsion, defense and armaments markets. GenCorp is a leading technology-based manufacturer of aerospace and defense products and systems with a real estate segment that includes activities related to the entitlement, sale, and leasing of the company's excess real estate assets.

On a related note, Even the Japanese recently tested their SAM against the target:

100 Percent of Targets Destroyed: Japan Is Testing New Missile in US

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 10 Apr 2016 23:26

8 Bells Lecture | Rear Adm. Chris Parry: Falklands War and the Importance of Naval Corporate Memory

John · Post by **John** » 11 Apr 2016 04:25

brar_w wrote:The Coyote's role is to provide a high supersonic, medium-high altitude cruise missile (up to Mach 3.25, up to @ 35,000 ft) target for the SM6 and a supersonic sea-skimming target for the ESSM. Its biggest role is to shore up the analytical models which you don't need a heck of a lot of launches to do so that you can tweak it further. It provides a stressful target that can attack using different representative profiles and execute end-game maneuvers and provide realistic assessment of your future enhancements. Thats about it.

With improved simulation technologies such targets can easily be simulated and you don't necessary a hard target to prove out the capability of the missile. A simulated target can more accurately mimic the enemy system especially if you have tactical knowledge of the enemy weapon system (Israel for example intercepted simulated Yakhont missile).

brar_w wrote:The GQM-163 is also throttleable, being the first operational VFDR beating out the meteor by a number of years (and I believe more 163's have been launched than meteor, with the 53rd launched for the Japanese at white sands).

Interesting thought Meteor was first of its type, as for reason they went with Solid rather than liquid fueled ramjet is also IMO to simplify maintenance. For example Brahmos requires canisterization which reduces the need for maintenance but air launched variant still has same problem.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 11 Apr 2016 05:33

With improved simulation technologies such targets can easily be simulated and you don't necessary a hard target to prove out the capability of the missile. A simulated target can more accurately mimic the enemy system especially if you have tactical knowledge of the enemy weapon system (Israel for example intercepted simulated Yakhont missile).

You still need live targets to both periodically put your AD's through live testing, and to validate your analytical models so that they are accurate when pitted against a synthetic threat that you constantly change based on your clandestine operations. Again, this isn't something new, the USN has been dealing with testing, and dedicated targets for ages and along with the MDA have the most comprehensive air-defense testing currently ongoing with a wide range of threat simulators simulating both generic (known MDA TBM targets) to certain classified elements that are acknowledged to exist but who's flight profile, and countermeasure range isn't shared. A super-sonic cruise target is just one aspect of this that the AEGIS should be prepared to defend against given the Pacific.

The Coyote has been in fairly high demand internationally with 3-4 nations using it to get some realistic testing for their systems. I believe the MEADS plans a couple of tests as well before its declared operationally ready. No one can have 100% resources to cover all potential threats, hence the need for synthetic simulation and going into the virtual construct. However, there are things you can only do with high degree of confidence if you actually validate your construct and simulations through live testing and then provide live-testing to your operators to periodically test out changes. There is immense value in that, hence even Israel tests a host of Air Defense systems against various types of threats. Heck, the MDA co-funds a lot of this testing. At the end of the day, your test program matches your resources, and if you do with what works best. Even the well funded USN is lacking certain endo-RV live simulator that they have been demanding for a few years now. Not that they don't access to incoming RVs to shoot down, but they want a certain type with certain characteristics. Its a test-capability gap that they must fill through developing a virtual construct but there is still a need to do some live testing to shore up your models since Air Defense systems are so critically important given the value in terms of capability, money, and human resources they protect.

Interesting thought Meteor was first of its type, as for reason they went with Solid rather than liquid fueled ramjet is also IMO to simplify maintenance. For example Brahmos requires canisterization which reduces the need for maintenance but air launched variant still has same problem

The reason they went for the riskiest option wasn't alone to better maintain the system since they can spend a good bit extra per round to get an SST through. The reason for the shift was primarily driven by the need to develop an SST that could not be rolled into an anti-ship missile even if the USN wanted to, and to protect the VFDR program which by then had suffered a setback when the plans to develop a VFDR AMRAAM were sent back to the drawing board. The VFDR program hasn't really stopped since given that Raytheon tested a 3-4 VFDR equipped BVR Missiles under DARPA's Triple Target Terminator Program a few years ago, and the fact that Aerojet is an expected winner of the AARGM_ER and is widely expected to use the VFDR to get higher speed and range.

The first reason was also important. Plenty of other SST's for the Navy had failed because the operator wanted a target they could through upgrade turn into a supersonic anti-ship missile in the future. Such dual-role was the technical risk and cost that killed a fair number of projects and proposals. By carrying for a non-optimum diameter missile (borrowed from an earlier, non-related program) they essentially killed the chances of ever converting the Coyote to a RATTLRS like ranged weapon thereby preserving it as a target, and therefore getting it through as a program. The OSD and the Congress made sure the Navy couldn't get a future Anti-ship missile masquerading as a target in through the acquisition cycle with all the risk that is associated with an operational, offensive system.

For example Brahmos requires canisterization which reduces the need for maintenance but air launched variant still has same problem.

They could have developed an SST and canisterized it as well, since there was no requirement to ever launch the target either from the air or a ship (since the navy wouldn't allow a liquid fueled weapon onboard). In the end with the VFDR they accomplished multiple things and allowed Aerojet to develop the smokeless system that would have been required for a BVR weapon and demonstrate it through subsequent Coyote's. This was before the Joint Dual Role Air Dominance (Formerly Next Generation Missile) was cancelled and rolled onto multiple demonstrators such as DARPA's T-3 and other USAF/DARPA led programs like the SACM.

Solid Ramjet missiles used to be discussed a lot in the US when ARC was still independent and they used to market these concepts a lot given their expertise. Since they became a part of Aerojet, and now Aerojet Rocketdyne you see them as solutions to missile systems that neither the OEM or the prime customer (DARPA, or USN) wish to openly talk about. Do a quick google search now and one would think that Bayern Chemie is the only OEM taking this seriously. Folks had to dig through publicly available budget documents to figure out that 3-4 Solid VFDR missiles had been launched in late 2014 in support of a future BVR missile for example (DARPA T-3). Even the Coyote gets little attention given that achieved a lot of firsts and as far as timelines was well ahead of the Meteor.