Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 16 May 2016 06:37

Karan M wrote:
brar_w wrote:Given the above description of how net-centric warfare works, one would ask HIDDEN to WHO?

BTW - There is a non AWACS augmented 114 km BVR kill recorded, as shown in the study you yourself shared.
As memory serves. the Russians took a very long range BVR shot with the R37 (?) fired by a MiG-31 and guided in by closer Su-30.

Not sure about that one but the 114 km shot was from an F-14 using the Aim-54.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 16 May 2016 06:43

Maybe other costs were included and so the final F-35 indicated cost was $115 million in the news reports.

The $85 Million is for the aircraft fly-away cost @ full rate production. The $115 million is for the unit procurement cost to Denmark, since they'll require components and hardware to set up their operational bases etc and that gets tagged into the per unit cost since its part of the acquisition contract. A different nation may be paying anywhere form 25% to 50% greater than that if they choose to go the full distance and do everything in house (the IDF is looking into that) even though the benefits to many NATO nations of the F-35 is the shared MRO facilities, and shared expenditure on things like software and EW labs as this saves a tremendous amount of capital expenditure. If you choose not to do that then obviously you'd pay more but if for strategic reasons one pursues such a path, then its an added expenditure on all fighters that such a nation is looking to acquire. However for some, these facilities may not be available at all.

srai · Post by **srai** » 16 May 2016 07:12

It seems modern CAS falls into two main categories. One is US-style "assault breaker" concept that brar-w posted and it calls for using area weapons to take out follow-on forces located behind to a depth of 150-300km. Although not immediate relief to front-lines, it saps the ongoing strength of the breakthrough units thereby providing longer term relief to the friendlies engaged with those first elements.

Second evolution to CAS is more of a "sniping" with small-diameter PGMs from outside of MANPAD ranges and destroying one target at a time. When your own troops are behind the next building or rock from the enemy, you need these very precise munitions with low collateral effect to take the enemy out (i.e. the next building from where your friendlies are) all the while being beyond MANPAD ranges. A 1000lb/450kg bomb is too big for this type of close support. Smaller class, like the 125kg, seems to be the trend. More and more rare for gun-runs or rocket-runs by fixed wing aircraft--new generation MANPAD proliferation is too much to overcome where aircraft losses would likely be heavy making those low altitude straight runs.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 16 May 2016 07:18

srai wrote: I do like articles posted in full or at the minimum important highlights with images on the forum thread itself. Good for reading flow (and quick skimming) without having to jump to different websites. Makes forum search better too.

Fair enough, and apologies for staying off topic. I personally find it easier to pick out what I find interesting without the highlights that the person who posts thinks are interesting - apart from forum formatting issues. My personal penchant is to link the article and post only quotes of what I find interesting and let others read the article for what they find valuable

srai · Post by **srai** » 16 May 2016 07:25

^^^
Agree.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 16 May 2016 07:31

srai wrote:It seems modern CAS falls into two main categories. One is US-style "assault breaker" concept that brar-w posted and it calls for using area weapons to take out follow-on forces located behind to a depth of 150-300km. Although not immediate relief to front-lines, it saps the ongoing strength of the breakthrough units thereby providing longer term relief to the friendlies engaged with those first elements.

Second evolution to CAS is more of a "sniping" with small-diameter PGMs from outside of MANPAD ranges and destroying one target at a time. When your own troops are behind the next building or rock from the enemy, you need these very precise munitions with low collateral effect to take the enemy out (i.e. the next building from where your friendlies are) all the while being beyond MANPAD ranges. A 1000lb/450kg bomb is too big for this type of close support. Smaller class, like the 125kg, seems to be the trend. More and more rare for gun-runs or rocket-runs by fixed wing aircraft--new generation MANPAD proliferation is too much to overcome where aircraft losses would likely be heavy making those low altitude straight runs.

Posting one "lament" from the article:

More than half of the Air Force’s combat units are not ready to fight the “high-end” fight, USAF Secretary James has told Congress, referring to a shift in focus toward operating in the permissive airspace of Iraq or Afghanistan. Skills for penetrating enemy airspace and attacking the most protected targets have atrophied.

What I see in the article is as follows and the retirement of the A-10 is only a minor part of the story.

The USAF:
1. Knows that its pilots are now accustomed to flying and fighting over uncontested airspace
2. It recalls from history that this rosy situation is not going to last forever and that sooner or later the air force has to be prepared to fight over well defended airspace.

Therefore:

The Plan

The Air Force is taking a number of steps to transform CAS, not only for permissive airspace but to establish the technology and tactics needed for CAS in contested airspace

It is likely (in my opinion) that the USAF will retain the ability to do CAS from far (for contested airspace) using F-35. F/A 18 etc, but will probably also bring in some new aircraft like the Scorpion (1st gen jet airframe with 4/5 gen tech?) for uncontested airspace.

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 16 May 2016 07:39

brar_w wrote:
Maybe other costs were included and so the final F-35 indicated cost was $115 million in the news reports.
The $85 Million is for the aircraft fly-away cost @ full rate production. The $115 million is for the unit procurement cost to Denmark, since they'll require components and hardware to set up their operational bases etc and that gets tagged into the per unit cost since its part of the acquisition contract. A different nation may be paying anywhere form 25% to 50% greater than that if they choose to go the full distance and do everything in house (the IDF is looking into that) even though the benefits to many NATO nations of the F-35 is the shared MRO facilities, and shared expenditure on things like software and EW labs as this saves a tremendous amount of capital expenditure. If you choose not to do that then obviously you'd pay more but if for strategic reasons one pursues such a path, then its an added expenditure on all fighters that such a nation is looking to acquire. However for some, these facilities may not be available at all.

Thanks braw_w. That makes sense. So for any potential purchase $85 million is the base fly away cost. All customization and support facilities are in addition to that for the aggregate procurement cost per unit.

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 16 May 2016 07:42

This Danish competition is so transparent in comparison to the MMRCA mess or any other opaque Indian defence purchase for that matter. The Danish parameters are well defined and the price comparison is an intrinsic part of the overall process. So you dont end up with a "winner" and then endless haggling over pricing and terms. What a fiasco.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 16 May 2016 07:44

Yes that pretty much accurately sums up the current costing data that the JPO is willing to provide to nations that approach it to fill in the blanks. Outside of procurement you have to pay the US Government for training, send your pilots, maintainers over to Luke and spend the months to possibly years to develop competency depending upon what sort of facilities you have back home. Concurrently you have to prepare your force to absorb the capability and this means having the logistics, the overhaul, repair, maintainer training facilities ready in time and this all requires a fair amount of money (more if you want to do this at multiple sites). The benefit to Denmark is that they'll have NATO nations operate MRO facilities in Europe so they can send their aircraft to Cameri and just pay the Italians a fixed amount every so years and rid themselves of the burden of having to design, build and sustain the backend work required to sustain the fleet. Others may not want to do that, so naturally they would have to make those investments to create the capacity to support the fleet. Then you offer those facilities up for the global partners and recover some of your investment. The Italians and Japanese are doing this and will continue to sustain foreign aircraft from their facilities for decades to come.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 16 May 2016 07:56

srai wrote:It seems modern CAS falls into two main categories. One is US-style "assault breaker" concept that brar-w posted and it calls for using area weapons to take out follow-on forces located behind to a depth of 150-300km. Although not immediate relief to front-lines, it saps the ongoing strength of the breakthrough units thereby providing longer term relief to the friendlies engaged with those first elements.

Second evolution to CAS is more of a "sniping" with small-diameter PGMs from outside of MANPAD ranges and destroying one target at a time. When your own troops are behind the next building or rock from the enemy, you need these very precise munitions with low collateral effect to take the enemy out (i.e. the next building from where your friendlies are) all the while being beyond MANPAD ranges. A 1000lb/450kg bomb is too big for this type of close support. Smaller class, like the 125kg, seems to be the trend. More and more rare for gun-runs or rocket-runs by fixed wing aircraft--new generation MANPAD proliferation is too much to overcome where aircraft losses would likely be heavy making those low altitude straight runs.

Neither of the above two scenarios is the likely dominant Indian scene, is it? Except for expeditionary missions, largely out of scope.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 May 2016 08:05

Brar the one I was referring to was a 300 km shot with a MiG-31 launching a R37 with a Su30 taking the handover and guiding it in. I suspect it was a classified check by the Russians of how to network MiG31 and su30 together. Later they introduced the Zaslon upgrade which moved it into full 300km class. It can guide missiles upto 280km. Refurbed r37 most likely with upgrades. Don't know if RVV latest for the long rangeis in production.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 16 May 2016 08:25

Karan M wrote:Brar the one I was referring to was a 300 km shot with a MiG-31 launching a R37 with a Su30 taking the handover and guiding it in. I suspect it was a classified check by the Russians of how to network MiG31 and su30 together. Later they introduced the Zaslon upgrade which moved it into full 300km class. It can guide missiles upto 280km. Refurbed r37 most likely with upgrades. Don't know if RVV latest for the long rangeis in production.

Jogging my memory Yefim Gordon mentioned in his book on Mig-31 an intercept range of 280 km using R-37 radar sometimes in early 90's did not mentioned Su-30 taking over. The range of R-37 is 300 km in loafted trajectory

RVV-BD is essentially R-37M with modern electronics ( active/passive seeker ) and jettisable booster and dual pulse rocket in same air frame which was developed for Mig-31BM cleared for export with range restricted to 200 km on MOD directive , Its got jetissable booster and in loafted trajectory its range is 400 km , top speed at Mach 6

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 May 2016 09:19

Yefim sometimes misses things, though he collates a lot of great info.. my recollection is from a google groups discussion with a NIIP dudes interview where they were talking of Su-30/MiG-31 combo..

RVV-BD with Super-30 upgrade would be a good AWACS killer.. yet to see a single AWACS with its own jammer (EMI/EMC perhaps?).. plus the arrogance that their escort will protect them..that's a freaking oversight in an era where Meteors and RVV-BDs are available..

srai · Post by **srai** » 16 May 2016 09:21

ShauryaT wrote:
srai wrote:It seems modern CAS falls into two main categories. One is US-style "assault breaker" concept that brar-w posted and it calls for using area weapons to take out follow-on forces located behind to a depth of 150-300km. Although not immediate relief to front-lines, it saps the ongoing strength of the breakthrough units thereby providing longer term relief to the friendlies engaged with those first elements.

Second evolution to CAS is more of a "sniping" with small-diameter PGMs from outside of MANPAD ranges and destroying one target at a time. When your own troops are behind the next building or rock from the enemy, you need these very precise munitions with low collateral effect to take the enemy out (i.e. the next building from where your friendlies are) all the while being beyond MANPAD ranges. A 1000lb/450kg bomb is too big for this type of close support. Smaller class, like the 125kg, seems to be the trend. More and more rare for gun-runs or rocket-runs by fixed wing aircraft--new generation MANPAD proliferation is too much to overcome where aircraft losses would likely be heavy making those low altitude straight runs.
Neither of the above two scenarios is the likely dominant Indian scene, is it? Except for expeditionary missions, largely out of scope.

Kargil for one

The IAF was at its most effective in that war doing those two scenarios attacking supply depots at Muntho Dhalo and using 1000lb Paveway-2 selectively on places like Tiger Hill (although not exactly the second evolution I described above but similar as the need was to target small area like a hilltop). This was a change in tactics once Stinger MANPAD brought down a Mi-17 doing rocket attack along with a MiG-21 and damaged a Canberra during recce. Approach and launch parameters were adjusted so that at the lowest point of delivery Mirage-2000s stayed above 5km altitude from target area.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 May 2016 09:29

Interestingly..
http://aviationweek.com/blog/t-50-update

Absent here is any sign of all-new weapons for the T-50, which instead looks likely to enter service with refined versions of existing systems. Interestingly, the closest that the T-50 (so far) is confirmed to be getting to an all-new weapon is a highly modified version of an existing anti-radar missile, the folding-wing Kh-58UShE.

Debate over the new weapon's intended relationship to the T-50 was settled by the video on the TMC stand:

The Kh-58UShE is very different from earlier versions. It is slightly shorter and has inertial mid-course guidance, and has a broadband seeker where earlier Kh-58s were fitted with different seekers for different targets.

The next likely candidate for the T-50's forward bay is the RVV-BD (air-to-air missile, long range), which is a modernized version of the Vympel R-37 that was designed for the MiG-31M Foxhound-B, but never put into production. Unlike the R-37, it is designed to be carried other than semi-conformal and videos and documents here show it carried by the Su-35S. However, its total external dimensions are within centimeters of the Kh-58UShE. It seems likely, therefore, that the T-50 forward bay has been designed around the minimum-risk RVV-BD, with the Kh-58 being modified to fit the same envelope.

This is all interesting to say the least, because since Day One of stealth in the US a guiding principle has been that stealth gets you close enough to use precise, short-range, low-cost weapons. And here come the Russians, equipping their first stealth fighter -- already fast and high-flying -- with a 1,400-pound ARM that can run out to 245 km at up to Mach 4, and an 1,125-pound, 200-kilometer range AAM.

Define irony?

IAF relying on T-50 with Kh-58 to take out PLAAF S-300 and S-400 units.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 16 May 2016 09:44

Karan M wrote:Yefim sometimes misses things, though he collates a lot of great info.. my recollection is from a google groups discussion with a NIIP dudes interview where they were talking of Su-30/MiG-31 combo..

RVV-BD with Super-30 upgrade would be a good AWACS killer.. yet to see a single AWACS with its own jammer (EMI/EMC perhaps?).. plus the arrogance that their escort will protect them..that's a freaking oversight in an era where Meteors and RVV-BDs are available..

Yes the RVV-BD are essentially AWACS/JSTARS type killer with a loafted and dive trajectory , with Passive/Active seeker they would just follow the emmision thats the idea behind having passive seeker , The active seeker can be used for other targets that are non-cooperative or dont emit. A 60 Kg warhead can afford a near miss of few meters !

I came across in Google Yefim book on Mig-31 and he mentions in 1994 a target drone was hit at 228 km using R-37 fired from Mig-31M( says world first ) , So it seems the target was tracked with Zaslon and MCU/MCG provided to track the drone till seeker went active.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 16 May 2016 09:54

Karan M wrote:Define irony?

IAF relying on T-50 with Kh-58 to take out PLAAF S-300 and S-400 units.

Thats the challenge both India and China will face when dealing with IADS , Both are Class I type Defence with good IADS and AF to match with either having something up the sleeve and evenly match ....I believe it will boil down to training and who can be innovative during war and can deal with the real pressure of war which is bombs falling on head and C4 system partially paralised. A foe that can be constantly innovative and can constantly update and stick to basic rule book under pressure of war as well as come with out of box solution to real problem that a war can throw something no exercise can substitute will have a better chance to survive and prevail like the Serbs did with the 2nd and 3rd gen IADS compared to Arabs with the same IADS who could not even stick to basic rule book manual !

Hence my rant against PAF that can afford to do more with less even with a IADS that would cost them much less they spend on fighter they are procuring or dreaming about at the least they can learn from their Deeper than Ocean and Taller than Mountain friend , What ever fighter PAF can throw it will be just a question of how many days will IAF need to sweep them because of over whelming numerical and technological superiority.

In that sense the PN is much better force to know its prime weakness and how it can compensate by investing in Subs for assymetrical warfare against far superior IN.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 May 2016 10:36

I think the biggest thing is to have weapons that work - we need Astras, NGARMs, Glide Bombs all in regular production and dozens of tests as with other gear.. to the point we know it works & how to use it. Every time we open the paper, there should be some test of some local munition.

Hopefully with S-3/4xx on our own, we can innovate & develop the tactics required to address them.

Otherwise importing some silver bullet Kh-58s and hoarding them for PLAAF may backfire.. we then discover some issues with this, that.

BTW Arabs managed to really whack Israel with their imported IADS which shows how new weapons suddenly introduced can be a pain. Serbs OTOH, nuisance value.. they sure made NATO use up all their HARMs and ARMS though.. and did get that huge F-117 win. But otherwise their infra did get pounded.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 May 2016 10:42

So Yefim states that RVV/BD is dual - passive seeker equipped? Very interesting. The RVV-BD seems to have been removed from the KRT site and only the older R-33E is now shown.
http://eng.ktrv.ru/production_eng/323/5 ... 880a3a8544
The website only showed an active seeker.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 16 May 2016 11:33

Karan M wrote:So Yefim states that RVV/BD is dual - passive seeker equipped? Very interesting. The RVV-BD seems to have been removed from the KRT site and only the older R-33E is now shown.
http://eng.ktrv.ru/production_eng/323/5 ... 880a3a8544
The website only showed an active seeker.

No Yefim is talking about R-37 AAM in his book Mig-31 , R-37M aka RVV-BD has a new Active/Passive seeker under dev which came in Aug 2011 in AW&ST , Plus Janes carried extensive report on R-37M program which spoke of the seperatable booster and 400 km range.

From AW&ST Aug 2011

However, industry is still very active in seeker development—primarily at the Agat research institute, which is a subsidiary of the Almaz-Antey air defense corporation. Agat is pursuing dual-mode seekers for air-to-air missiles, undaunted by the fact that an earlier semi-active/passive design, conceived for the very-long-range R-37, completed testing but never entered production.

One effort that remains in the development pipeline is the 9B-1103M semi-active/active seeker. The active element, used for terminal guidance, operates in Ku band with a range of 20-25 km. For initial weapons-cueing, the missile uses the L-band semi-active seeker.

Work on a passive/active seeker also is progressing. Production of prototype hardware is now under way. The passive element has broadband capabilities and is augmented by a Ku-band terminal guidance seeker.

Nearer to completion is a 9B-1103M-150MM Ka-band seeker; development trials could wrap up next year. The 150-mm-dia. device is designed for air-to-air missiles and would replace infrared seekers. The lock-on range for a target with a 5-sq.-meter radar cross section is given as 13 km or greater. The goal is to provide a radar-based fire-and-forget launch option using only preliminary target designation.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 16 May 2016 14:20

Karan M wrote:Brar the one I was referring to was a 300 km shot with a MiG-31 launching a R37 with a Su30 taking the handover and guiding it in. I suspect it was a classified check by the Russians of how to network MiG31 and su30 together. Later they introduced the Zaslon upgrade which moved it into full 300km class. It can guide missiles upto 280km. Refurbed r37 most likely with upgrades. Don't know if RVV latest for the long rangeis in production.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=5092&p=2018944#p2018944

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 16 May 2016 17:35

srai wrote: Kargil for one

The IAF was at its most effective in that war doing those two scenarios attacking supply depots at Muntho Dhalo and using 1000lb Paveway-2 selectively on places like Tiger Hill (although not exactly the second evolution I described above but similar as the need was to target small area like a hilltop). This was a change in tactics once Stinger MANPAD brought down a Mi-17 doing rocket attack along with a MiG-21 and damaged a Canberra during recce. Approach and launch parameters were adjusted so that at the lowest point of delivery Mirage-2000s stayed above 5km altitude from target area.

The IAF is also on record of how the Kargil type of CAS was NOT its expected CAS roles to perform and what they did in uncontested air spaces was an impromptu improvisation. The IAF in my view is largely gearing for classical air-land battle concepts. It will be a HUGE mistake to presume that Kargil is what is normal with the likely opponents we face.

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 16 May 2016 17:53

srai wrote:It seems modern CAS falls into two main categories. One is US-style "assault breaker" concept that brar-w posted and it calls for using area weapons to take out follow-on forces located behind to a depth of 150-300km. Although not immediate relief to front-lines, it saps the ongoing strength of the breakthrough units thereby providing longer term relief to the friendlies engaged with those first elements.

Second evolution to CAS is more of a "sniping" with small-diameter PGMs from outside of MANPAD ranges and destroying one target at a time. When your own troops are behind the next building or rock from the enemy, you need these very precise munitions with low collateral effect to take the enemy out (i.e. the next building from where your friendlies are) all the while being beyond MANPAD ranges. A 1000lb/450kg bomb is too big for this type of close support. Smaller class, like the 125kg, seems to be the trend. More and more rare for gun-runs or rocket-runs by fixed wing aircraft--new generation MANPAD proliferation is too much to overcome where aircraft losses would likely be heavy making those low altitude straight runs.

@Srai, Assault Breaker wasn’t CAS focused but was focused at demonstrating things that by then had been prototyped, developed but not really tested in a large force deployment exercise. As the architect of the Third Offset Strategy explains in the presentation, the second offset strategy was a solution to an ever increasing advantage the Soviets had amassed in conventional and strategic capability particularly in the tactical level. Prior to that non ‘doomsday’ strategic operations could only be conducted using Tactical Nuclear Weapons, an area that was born out of the first offset strategy and where the US had a lead. The Soviets not only closed in on that lead but over time had and were projected to have much higher capability given their spending and particularly given the conventional numerical superiority that would work alongside, or after the tactical nuke strikes. The Status quo option was to increase defense spending and go toe for toe as far as number of brigades, number of armor, number of tactical weapons, cruise missiles etc and this would have practically bankrupted the US and most NATO nations. The 2nd Offset looked to leverage technology to create similar ‘strategic or near-stratgic’ effects without the need to get into an acquisition arms race, a race the US would have lost. What PGM’s, advances in PNT, Mobility and effective long range Command and Control offered was a netted approach that essentially created near-strategic effects using conventional weapons or in a nut shell – created the same effects on a Red Force which would have earlier only been possible through deploying tactical nukes. It forced the SU to pause and think about their own modernization plans since they couldn’t any longer accomplish what they sought out to accomplish under a non-tac-nuclear threat umbrella.

Assault breaker offshoots were used in the GW, but at the end its still an 80’s concept, using technology of the 70’s and 80’s. It just so happens that pace of advances made in PGM’s and PNT in that time-frame under the Cold War threat have lasted this long with the rest of the world only now fielding some of this capability. Had the cold-war not ended the third offset would have probably have been required a decade ago. With the Pacific driving strategic thought process in the US, the concept is no longer the Air-Land battle but more of an Air-Sea battle even though they can’t call it that any more. CAS is and will continue to be threat defined, and platform agnositic, and that has been known for well over a decade now. The A-10’s have a place, and that palce is a lot narrower now than when it was designed…given the trade space, you can essentially trade out the gun, and low level survivability (because its no longer going to be as survivable) and retain the loiter charecteristics and what you essentially get is a cheap medium altitude pounder that can swing in and do ISR, and light strike. That’s the Scorpion approach and it makes sense if you can RECAP the A-10 fleet.

Otherwise CAS stays as is, if you can afford to do CAS with speciality platforms i.e. a specialty CAS platform for permissive environments, and another for no-premissive environments ther eis nothing like it – Assualt Breaker or no Assualt Breaker. But if you can’t, then you need to see what is realistically acheiveable given competing mission priorities. Do you take 20% funding away from Air-Supreiority to fund CAS? If so, what impact that reduction in air-superiority has on the ground troops? Do they need to beef up their air-defenses? It all boils down to system math and developing the best overall capability your pocket will allow.

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 16 May 2016 19:16

Marshal Ogarkov also made the following in his May 1984 interview:
Rapid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction and emergence in the developed countries of automated reconnaissance-strike complexes, long-range high-accuracy terminally-guided combat systems, unmanned flying machines, and qualitatively new electronic control systems make it possible to sharply increase, by at least an order of magnitude, the destructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness.

From Soviet reactions to NATO's emerging technologies for deep attack

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 May 2016 04:02

Just saying. CAS.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 May 2016 08:56

Austin wrote:
Karan M wrote:Brar the one I was referring to was a 300 km shot with a MiG-31 launching a R37 with a Su30 taking the handover and guiding it in. I suspect it was a classified check by the Russians of how to network MiG31 and su30 together. Later they introduced the Zaslon upgrade which moved it into full 300km class. It can guide missiles upto 280km. Refurbed r37 most likely with upgrades. Don't know if RVV latest for the long rangeis in production.
Jogging my memory Yefim Gordon mentioned in his book on Mig-31 an intercept range of 280 km using R-37 radar sometimes in early 90's did not mentioned Su-30 taking over. The range of R-37 is 300 km in loafted trajectory

RVV-BD is essentially R-37M with modern electronics ( active/passive seeker ) and jettisable booster and dual pulse rocket in same air frame which was developed for Mig-31BM cleared for export with range restricted to 200 km on MOD directive , Its got jetissable booster and in loafted trajectory its range is 400 km , top speed at Mach 6

Well, from what I can figure, the test took place before the upgraded Zaslon radar with a Su-30 positioned closer to the target feeding data back to the Zaslon which guided the missile in. Probably because the Su-30 radar provided better quality tracking at that range.
Now, with the Zaslon upgrade they probably don't need to do that.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 May 2016 08:57

ShauryaT wrote:
srai wrote: Kargil for one

The IAF was at its most effective in that war doing those two scenarios attacking supply depots at Muntho Dhalo and using 1000lb Paveway-2 selectively on places like Tiger Hill (although not exactly the second evolution I described above but similar as the need was to target small area like a hilltop). This was a change in tactics once Stinger MANPAD brought down a Mi-17 doing rocket attack along with a MiG-21 and damaged a Canberra during recce. Approach and launch parameters were adjusted so that at the lowest point of delivery Mirage-2000s stayed above 5km altitude from target area.
The IAF is also on record of how the Kargil type of CAS was NOT its expected CAS roles to perform and what they did in uncontested air spaces was an impromptu improvisation. The IAF in my view is largely gearing for classical air-land battle concepts. It will be a HUGE mistake to presume that Kargil is what is normal with the likely opponents we face.

And what if Kargil occurs again? Whether IAF wants CAS or not, till IA gets arty in sufficient numbers, they will need IAF to help.

Gyan · Post by **Gyan** » 17 May 2016 11:55

Army does not want to order Prahaar or support Pinaka-3, but only order very costly Brahmos. So where will heavy artillery support come from?

IAF also not want to order huge no. Of LCA but only super costly Apache and Rafale, so how will they do down and dirty CAS?

Any Indo-China border skirmish will be 100 times the size of Kargill. What will we do? Run crying to supplier of spare parts and ammo of hundreds of different OEMs?

We bloody import basic things like RPGs, Carl Gustafs, it's ammo, sniper rifles, it's ammo etc?

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 18 May 2016 07:03

Gyan,

Our defense forces are not above criticism. However, this constant drivel of yours against our defense forces is neither warranted nor helping the cause of domestic production, which you are rightly championing for. People can't take you seriously if you keep saying "Army does not do this, I know better", or "Army does not do this, which is clearly better for the country"!

Please take this as a genuine friendly feedback.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 18 May 2016 11:52

MOD Press

Exercise Red Flag:

The IAF Team Sets Course Back at the end of a ‘Perfect Flag’

Red Flag Alaska 16-1, which was an advanced aerial combat training exercise hosted at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska (a successor to the previous COPE THUNDER exercise series) held in the Alaska region, concluded on 14 May 16. The main phase of the exercise had commenced on 28 Apr 16 with a mix of combat and support elements participating from IAF, USAF and USN. Over the last decade, IAF has been actively participating in various operational exercises hosted by various countries wherein its capabilities has been pitted against the best air forces in the world. While referring to the overall exercise plan and objective Red Flag Alaska 16-1 the Team Leader Gp Capt H Assudani said, “(the) Objective of this inter-continental deployment was not only to showcase IAF capability in undertaking Integrated Air Ops but also to imbibe operational lessons from the exercise engagements which will help us add more teeth to our overall war waging capabilities”.

The exercise is played under multiple simulated scenario designed to provide realistic settings. The overall demarcation is between Red Force (simulated as the Defensive force component fighting to protect own airspace and assets) and the Blue Force (simulated as the Offensive composite package). The Red Forces was mainly constituted by the 18 Sqn Aggressor Sqn flying the F-16s. The IAF along with the other USAF (F-15, F-16, F-22) and USN (F-18) constituted the Blue force. During the exercise IAF also flew as a part of the Red Force alongside the Aggressors which was a first of its kind.

The Exercise saw the IAF’s potent SU-30 MKI aircraft participating in Offensive Counter Air Ops in which they provided Escort cover to the strike elements. Apart from this, the IAF Jaguars DARIN II undertook integrated strike missions dropping practice bombs over the world renowned JPARC Air to Ground Range). Both these fleets performed their roles exceptionally well. There were three missions commanded by Indian Airforce in this exercise. Mission commanders of both the Jaguars and Su 30s were involved in planning, execution and conduct of debrief. One of the missions was commanded by Sqn Ldr Sidhu, who while speaking on the mission said that “it was a great opportunity to lead all the coalition forces. It gives one an immense satisfaction when all the participants execute the briefed plan which becomes a success”.

While talking about the IAF in the red flag exercise Lt Col Brian Toth, Chief operations officer of 354 operations group said “ The IAFs participation has been extremely good from my perspective. For most nations it takes an exercise or two to step up to meet the requirements of a Mission commander. The IAF has been mission commander three times and also performed the package commander roles and they have done a tremendous job”.

During the exercise a set of Red Flag team formed the `white Force’ & using high tech instrumentation and mission debrief tools were used to evaluate the performance of the participants in an objective and logical manner. The White Force watched the entire exercise in real time on tactical displays in the operations room on ground. Kill removal (removal of the pilots and aircraft assumed shot by the enemy) made the exercise more realistic.

The temperatures were sub-zero during a large part of the exercise which posed a challenge to the maintenance team. The team kept all the aircraft fully serviceable and mission capable at all times. It is noteworthy that despite the challenging environment, the maintenance team ensured 100% serviceability of all platforms throughout the four weeks. Lt Col Clarence McRae, the RED FLAG-Alaska 16-1 Expeditionary Forces Maintenance Group commander said "RED FLAG-Alaska provided all of the participants a fantastic opportunity to train with members of the Indian Air Force. The exchange of lessons learned and best practices with our partners in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region have enabled us to strengthen our partnership and signifies our commitment to this area of operations. The professionalism of the IAF airmen made bolstering our countries' relationship easy and helped provide realistic combat training for all participants". The Senior Engineering Officers of the IAF units were happy with the comprehensive IAF technical practices which are well defined and meticulous. Adherence to these have ensured a high tarmac availability that allowed aircrew to perform their missions. Wg Cdr Pratyush Anand, SEO of SU-30 Sqn said, “out of box thinking of the technicians has earned praise from all quarters. The participating airmen got an opportunity to see a variety of aircraft and this exposure and interaction with other fleets will go a long way in evolving our own practices”.

In the closing address Col William Culver 354th Fighter Wing Vice Cdr said ”this was one of the best Red flags I has seen. I compliment the exceptional standards displayed by the IAF and am amazed to see all the ten aircraft IAF had brought (4 Su30s, 4 Jaguars and 2 IL-78s) maintaining 100% serviceability for the entire four weeks and their aircraft flying on all days as per plan”.

Wg Cdr Saumitra Tamaskar Exercise Director said “Having set out with well-defined objectives, the IAF contingent’s effort over the past month has ensured that they take back important lessons which will help undertake operations across a wide and diverse spectrum and meet any future challenges”.

The Contingent will start their de-induction phase on 14 May 16 and are planned to return to India in the last week of May 16. The Su-30s will additionally participate in exercise ‘Desert Eagle II’ with UAE Air Force on their way back.

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Wing Commander Rochelle D’Silva from Alaska USA / MKR

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 18 May 2016 18:58

Austin wrote: In the closing address Col William Culver 354th Fighter Wing Vice Cdr said ”this was one of the best Red flags I has seen. I compliment the exceptional standards displayed by the IAF and am amazed to see all the ten aircraft IAF had brought (4 Su30s, 4 Jaguars and 2 IL-78s) maintaining 100% serviceability for the entire four weeks and their aircraft flying on all days as per plan”.

This means that Vayu Sena know exactly the things that go wrong and are prepared for them. Good work.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 18 May 2016 19:38

It would be interesting to know how many BVR kills are these exercises recording, ranges and evasive techniques being recorded. If the rates are low as is suspected and if a merge happens and if the fifth gen platform is one of those that cannot climb, outrun or turn for WVR combat, what happens in these cases. It will be interesting to learn these statistics from these presumably real world exercises. Any pointers?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 18 May 2016 19:44

ShauryaT wrote:It would be interesting to know how many BVR kills are these exercises recording, ranges and evasive techniques being recorded. If the rates are low as is suspected and if a merge happens and if the fifth gen platform is one of those that cannot climb, outrun or turn for WVR combat, what happens in these cases. It will be interesting to learn these statistics from these presumably real world exercises. Any pointers?

That aside, to what extent did the aggressors get to their targets while defenders were using BVR, WVR, &VR, ZVR, %VR, $VR whatever

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 18 May 2016 20:36

Shiv..none got to their targets..the super uber mizziles with 100% kill probability shot down all aggressors...

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 18 May 2016 20:49

What exactly is the utility in making that information publicly available? And to the point of 100% record of these missiles being simulated, what is the basis for such a conclusion? Why not list some of the ranging parameters that have been known to be used in such a case (RF environment, Ground support through Air Defense systems etc etc)? Of course in many of these instances the odds are stacked in favor of the red-forces but that is by design, in order to stress the blue forces and to enhance training value.

What exactly is the point to run the most extensive Missile Test & Evaluation program with its own dedicated funding stream for prototype systems (DRFM Jammers, 3rd and 4th Generation fighter based targets – QF4 and QF16 and various IR countermeasures) and not incorporate the data in your own large force training? Other than drive forum discussion there is absolutely no reason for anyone to share such data since its use is in TTP and future system development efforts.

To the point of everything failing and it going into the merge – These are large force deployment exercises and as such you are looking at large furballs and there are umpteen things that give you an edge in that especially how and under what context you enter the merge. A fair bit is decided even before the merge and almost ALWAYS performance and the ability to perform effectively is dictated by the fuel and energy state. You don’t take off from an airfield and go straight into a dogfight. If you start an engagement in BVR, and are forced to merge you will have varying degree of fuel states and SA combinations essentially giving one side an edge vs the other. The entire object being to enter the WVR combat with a more favorable kinematic state to maximize your IR missile PK. Here better SA, and AEW coverage can be decisive in dictating how an aircraft enters the merge, of whether it chooses to do so at all. In a 5th generation vs 4th Genreation engagement, the 5th generation aircraft can also get a lot closer thereby impacting its MRAAM weapon PK. You do this by having the tactical freedom to maneuver at range since you enjoy a sizable range advantage vs your opponent. This allows you to develop tactics that keep you away from your opponents sensor FOV and in a better position to both engage in BVR and enter the shorter range engagement. It also allows you to exit the engagement if you are severely disadvantaged (fuel state, energy state or too few weapons etc).

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 18 May 2016 22:28

shiv wrote:
Austin wrote: In the closing address Col William Culver 354th Fighter Wing Vice Cdr said ”this was one of the best Red flags I has seen. I compliment the exceptional standards displayed by the IAF and am amazed to see all the ten aircraft IAF had brought (4 Su30s, 4 Jaguars and 2 IL-78s) maintaining 100% serviceability for the entire four weeks and their aircraft flying on all days as per plan”.
This means that Vayu Sena know exactly the things that go wrong and are prepared for them. Good work.

Shiv , AFAIK the previous Red Flag ex too IAF had 100 % serviceability ,perhaps by now they might have streamlined logistics.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 18 May 2016 23:23

Brar, exactly.

Besides which it would be beyond stupid, for every force to use actual weapons parameters in large multi national exercises especially if the other members have not procured similar systems without their disclosure legalities.

Here are what Cope India (way back in 2004) simulated:

The U.S. pilots used no active missiles, and the AIM-120 Amraam capability was limited to a 20-naut.-mi. range while keeping the target illuminated when attacking and 18 naut. mi. when defending, as were all the missiles in the exercise.

The exceptions made are when NATO allies train amongst each other (in some cases) for instance when USAF folks with Vipers with AMRAAM are against Danish Vipers with AMRAAM or when the Germans host US pilots to show the exact capabilities of the Archer and so forth.

What you often learn from these exercises are the processes (for AWACS directed LFE, the steps are...it should take x seconds - or better), the overall tactics (which can hold good despite the disparity in weapons systems) and how your training stacks up against other AF. How the overall platforms perform on each side (which you can then model into your simulations), the threats that can be generated (Red Flag is famous for the number of diverse SAM simulators it fields)..

USAF F-16 pilot after Cope 2 wrote:We started off on the first day with mixed formations doing fingertip flying, which was really cool. Next was some BFM, ACM, and Tactical intercepts. Then came the BVR Air Combat Tactics with us flying in mixed LFE formations with Su-30s, Mig 29s, Mig-27s, Mig-21 Bisons, and Mirage 2000s. The last phase was HVAA (High Value Asset) OCA and DCA.

Same as with Red Flag. 1vs1 etc and familiarization at Mountain Home & then Red Flag.

One thing to note on the BFM strategies was that their pilots would do maneuvers that we had not really thought of before...I am not saying that we didn't know how to react to it, I just mean that when we saw them do a certain maneuver we would think "wow, I never thought of doing that before"....so it was good learning on both sides.

Interestingly, in a few years time, IAF will have far more than it ever did to simulate advanced threats. Most of the tech building blocks for various systems will be with it. Expect TACDE to get more detachments. LCAs with AESA, 5G Pythons, MRSAM/Akash battery etc.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 18 May 2016 23:38

Check this out.

http://i.imgur.com/z1CVp5L.jpg

Waiting for the day that formation is above the Himalayas with AMCA, Su-30 MKI, Tejas, & FGFA.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 18 May 2016 23:46

Specific excerpts from the Red Flag exercise release by IAF

Comparing yourselves to the best out there, learning and then showing the capability.

IAF wrote: There were three missions commanded by Indian Airforce in this exercise. Mission commanders of both the Jaguars and Su 30s were involved in planning, execution and conduct of debrief. One of the missions was commanded by Sqn Ldr Sidhu, who while speaking on the mission said that “it was a great opportunity to lead all the coalition forces. It gives one an immense satisfaction when all the participants execute the briefed plan which becomes a success”.

What India can replicate in its own exercises.

IAF wrote: During the exercise a set of Red Flag team formed the `white Force’ & using high tech instrumentation and mission debrief tools were used to evaluate the performance of the participants in an objective and logical manner. The White Force watched the entire exercise in real time on tactical displays in the operations room on ground. Kill removal (removal of the pilots and aircraft assumed shot by the enemy) made the exercise more realistic.

Expeditionary deployment and serviceability challenges.

IAF wrote:The temperatures were sub-zero during a large part of the exercise which posed a challenge to the maintenance team. The team kept all the aircraft fully serviceable and mission capable at all times. It is noteworthy that despite the challenging environment, the maintenance team ensured 100% serviceability of all platforms throughout the four weeks.

Learnings that will be documented and passed onto the IAF crew

IAF wrote:The Senior Engineering Officers of the IAF units were happy with the comprehensive IAF technical practices which are well defined and meticulous. Adherence to these have ensured a high tarmac availability that allowed aircrew to perform their missions.

Seeing what other AF do and then applying that as well, or improving own procedures.

IAF wrote:Wg Cdr Pratyush Anand, SEO of SU-30 Sqn said, “out of box thinking of the technicians has earned praise from all quarters. The participating airmen got an opportunity to see a variety of aircraft and this exposure and interaction with other fleets will go a long way in evolving our own practices”.

Acknowledgement by folks who matter.

USAF wrote:Col William Culver 354th Fighter Wing Vice Cdr said ”this was one of the best Red flags I has seen. I compliment the exceptional standards displayed by the IAF and am amazed to see all the ten aircraft IAF had brought (4 Su30s, 4 Jaguars and 2 IL-78s) maintaining 100% serviceability for the entire four weeks and their aircraft flying on all days as per plan”.

IAF making it clear what they set out for and achieved.

IAF wrote: Wg Cdr Saumitra Tamaskar Exercise Director said “Having set out with well-defined objectives, the IAF contingent’s effort over the past month has ensured that they take back important lessons which will help undertake operations across a wide and diverse spectrum and meet any future challenges”.

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 19 May 2016 00:08

why cant the so called Indian IT vity wallas in cooperation with IAF do a desi chota REd Flag excercise?