Judging potential nuclear arsenal size even for a non-deployed force is feasible if enough is known about fissile material production. India's and Pakistan's "dedicated weapon facilities" continue to produce fissile material. Their outputs can be thought of as "nuclear weapon equivalents" (NWEs). Although the actual number of operational weapons in either's arsenal is not known, analysis suggests that India has, and probably will retain, a significant lead over Pakistan. We estimate India had over 100 NWEs from its dedicated facilities by 2000 -- at least twice and perhaps three times as many as Pakistan. India's NWEs from dedicated facilities are far fewer than China's estimated arsenal of about 450 weapons. By appropriating fissile material from its unsafeguarded civilian power reactors, however, India could reach a potential of several hundred NWEs, exceeding estimates of China's operational nuclear stockpile.
India has had active programs in air defense and has been acquiring high-altitude Russian SAM systems that may have some tactical anti-ballistic missile capability. Pakistan has a less robust high-altitude air defense program but is seeking new capabilities in this area as well.
Nuclear force size, technological capacity, and geographic vulnerability -- as these relate to plausible enemies and threat perceptions -- are natural starting points for this assessment of nuclear deterrence policies, postures, and strategies in South Asia. In this regard, the most basic point about the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of India and Pakistan are the large asymmetries in India's favor. India's nuclear superiority stands out on all levels, delivery systems, nuclear warhead stockpile capacity, and possibly design experience with early generation devices of thermonuclear yield.4 This nuclear asymmetry is magnified by India's strategic depth and Pakistan's relative lack of geographic depth. In addition, India is far ahead of Pakistan in space surveillance, having begun to launch observation satellites on Soviet launch vehicles as early as 1988, and on its own space launch systems in the 1990s.5 India also has a large variety of long-range airborne reconnaissance assets, while Pakistan's surveillance and early warning capabilities are comparatively rudimentary.6 In
deciphering Pakistan's likely nuclear strategy and minimum requirements, discussed later, this overwhelming asymmetry is the point to return to.
Thus, in a simple deliverable nuclear weapon count, the asymmetry today favors China against India. It is important not to overlook the fact, however, that China's nuclear inventory and delivery systems were acquired to deal with the former Soviet Union/Russia and the US overseas presence in Asia, not India. After subtracting Chinese withholds for these requirements, China's nuclear superiority over India is less substantial.
Sanjay: Your proposition of 20 air delivered bombs, is inconsist with significantly large delivery capability as evidenced below, and also that the dispersal of weapons and aircrafts around large number of small airfield around th ecountry gives teeth to assured second strike, as compared to handful of Agnis.Chart 2 introduces estimates that are confined to India's unsafeguarded civilian heavy water power reactors (HWRs), which easily could be operated to produce high quality weapons-grade plutonium. (Pakistan has no unsafeguarded civilian power reactors, and therefore does not have a corresponding bar in Chart 2.) Even if these Indian power reactors have not all been operated optimally for the highest quality of plutonium for weapon purposes, their reactor-grade plutonium could be used for weapons, albeit weapons that each would require larger critical mass quantities of plutonium (see assumptions in Appendix A). In essence, Chart 2 shows Pakistan's and India's "best guess" NWE production profile from dedicated facilities along side India's potential NWE production of plutonium from its unsafeguarded power reactors -- with separate bars showing the NWE quantities that could be derived from the already separated (reprocessed) plutonium, and also from the thus far unreprocessed spent fuel.
These Chart 2 figures show that, as of 2000, India probably could derive up to 113 NWEs from the separated HWR plutonium alone. From the unreprocessed HWR spent fuel, India could, over time derive approximately 475 additional NWEs (the pacing being limited, perhaps, by installed reprocessing capacity). Taken together, these Indian figures in Chart 2 suggest a notional capacity of about 700 weapons, as of 2000 . This is about half again as many NWEs as are estimated to be in China's operational nuclear arsenal (see second paragraph below). These Indian figures will continue to climb.
India's approximately 310 nuclear-capable ground-attack aircraft, on the other hand, hold all of industrialized Pakistan at risk. They include state-of-the-art types of attack aircraft: 40 Su-30MK (Flanker) and 64 MiG 29 (Fulcrum) -- among the most advanced Russian combat aircraft. In addition India deploys 88 highly capable Jaguar S (I) and 147 sturdy MiG-27 Flogger strike aircraft. Numerically, India's ratio of combat aircraft to Pakistan's is just a little over 2:1 overall, but the nuclear-capable ground-attack ratio is at least 3:1. If qualitative superiority were factored in, however, India's nuclear-capable (and conventional) air attack edge over Pakistan probably would have to be treated as 5:1 or 6:1 at least. India also has a nuclear-capable (Jaguar) maritime attack squadron.
India's most up-to-date fighter-interceptors and ground-attack aircraft are also superior to the bulk of China's (the exceptions China's recent imports of Russian Su-27s and Su-30s). Indian planners believe their conventional forces, with the added advantage of shorter lines of communication, would greatly outmatch China's in any renewed Himalayan border confrontation. Most Indian nuclear-capable ground-attack aircraft, however, have not had the range to pose a threat to China's interior and eastern cities -- without heroic measures.9
Following was added later:These long-range aircraft provide India with putative nuclear delivery systems of strategic reach for contingencies related to China. They could become the nucleus of an imported strategic bomber force. Even in an exclusively maritime role, these aircraft further accentuate the overwhelming Indian conventional asymmetry vis-a-vis Pakistan. If reconfigured for nuclear delivery, these aircraft also could mitigate China's still large current nuclear advantage against India.
Ramana's referneces "500 Kg" weapon. This report mentions 450Kg nuclear payload. Some other sources state the S1 weapon weights less then 300Kg.
Having tested several nuclear explosive devices, it would be surprising if India were unable to package a nuclear warhead under 450 kg. In any case, given the range/payload tradeoff, a slightly heavier warhead may require merely a sacrifice in maximum range.
The Alfa may also be used as by India in the R&D process as a test-bed for developing the longer-range and unmistakably nuclear-capable Lakhshya cruise missile .
