India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Leonard · Post by **Leonard** » 12 Sep 2020 23:29

From a veteran - who has been there & done a WHOLE LOT more than "us" ... Things are moving fast ...

https://twitter.com/hellfire_81/status/ ... 0931272704

>>
So, an update is due.

Our Beetroot Manchurian is getting desperate. (Embarassing failure of mighty PLA) . Apart from a few isolated instances where he was able to check IA maneuvers with his own, he faced reverses in quite a few locations which have made his defences tenuous.

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Quote Tweet

@hellfire_81
· Sep 8
Maneuvers by PLA over last 24 hours include dispersal of troops & weapons/armour & forward posturing of troops consistent with a posture for potential conflict.

Few PLA troops tried to crawl up to few of own forward lines.

Got surprised.
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Reverses in Chumar, Chushul (Moldo-Rudok is technically 'open for taking') in ground situation & consolidation by IA of defences along Depsang with demonstrated intent to not only defend but carry the war into enemy held territories, has upset the calculus.

Only saving grace has been the outflanking done at Fingers 4 & a comparative local advantage gained at Finger 3 by going up the spurs to open new defences, since negated by IA's reported heli insertion of teams at higher locations on common spur from which fingers emanate.

These reported insertions by IA of teams at commanding & easily defendable heights, permit unobstructed view of the positions upto Finger 8.

Coupled to reported hold of Black Top by India, which should be the GTI for Chushul, the overall situation of Indian troops is much better

Amusing to see few OSINTs post photo of LAC passing through Gurung, Magar Hills, which is precisely what our Manchukins wants world to believe.

Those hills are on Indian side of LAC & LAC passes through Black Top. Hence, no crossing of IA of LAC even at Black Top.

So, Beetroot Manchukin is getting desperate by the day.

Expectation is of a limited firefight being engineered in near proximity of the common spur north of the fingers, in order to try & wipe out the IA positions there.

Reportedly, special forces of PLAAF XV Airborne Corps.are in the region. Perhaps, an action in next 96 hours?

The 96 hours is pure speculation. Don't stress on it much.

Attempts to engineer a crisis seem to be on cards. This is, I repeat, my speculation, arising from reading troop movements by PLA.

Our friend Beetroot Manchukins unhappy twitter.com/hellfire_81/st…

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hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 12 Sep 2020 23:40

Guddu wrote:
jamwal wrote:
Imagine fighting a war in Delhi where the nearest supply depot is in Bangalore thats about 1500 km. Galwan to Chengdu is 1500 km too. What am I missing ?..why the dhoti shiver.

2700 km.

williams · Post by **williams** » 12 Sep 2020 23:54

So EAM talk is really India reading the riot act to Wang Yi and his cohorts?

I don't see any de-escalation steps or even announcements of further talks. Looks like 5 point statement is provided as a face-saver for Chins to quietly withdraw.

sivab · Post by **sivab** » 13 Sep 2020 00:02

https://twitter.com/neeraj_rajput/statu ... 8254011395

Neeraj Rajput
@neeraj_rajput
India has taken a large part of #Kailash mountain ranges on the night of 29-30th August during pre-emptive action along LAC, yes part of holy Kailash Mansarovar

Kailash ranges stretch from holy Mount Kailash in Tibet till south of Pangong Tso lake including Rechin La, Mukhpari, Gurung Hills & Magar hills about 450 kms

So roughly 60-70kms of this Kailash Ranges is now control by #IndianArmy ie RechinLa, Mukhpari, Magar & Gurung Hills upto Hainan coast on Pangong Tso lake, which were taken under control on 29-30th August

In pre-'62 war era Indian pilgrims used to visit Kailash Mansarovar from Ladakh via Demchok but route now closed as #Tibet was illegally occupied by #China where lies the holy abode of Lord Shiva & the pious lake

Rishirishi · Post by **Rishirishi** » 13 Sep 2020 00:03

hanumadu wrote:
Guddu wrote:
Imagine fighting a war in Delhi where the nearest supply depot is in Bangalore thats about 1500 km. Galwan to Chengdu is 1500 km too. What am I missing ?..why the dhoti shiver.
2700 km.

The PLA can move at higher speeds. Their highways are very good, and most of their terrain is flat. 1500 km can be moved within 24ish hours.

But they still have to climb the mountains. Hard work for the short and small princes. I understand most of their forces are mechanised divisions, who will be sitting ducks.

If IAF cut a single road, the chinse will have to fly in the supplies from 1500Km away. India only have a a few hundred km, supply line. The main issue here will be Air power.

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 13 Sep 2020 00:23

Kakarat wrote:https://twitter.com/detresfa_

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EhtbaH5UcAE ... =4096x4096
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ehtbdz2UcAI ... name=large
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ehs78WwU0AE ... name=large

So Indians are nowhere near Black top

Black top is on the other side of the "LAC", and has been reported that we are not occupying it. However there are some analysis based on satellite images that we are not on Helmet Top (this was reported by Nitin G and Vishnu Som), Point 5157, Bump (highest point which is on the "LAC" apart from Black Top), and possibly Table top. We do appear to be on Gurung hill but that much lower on the same ridge as Bump/Table top (would make that position un tenable for us) - if that is correct then it would mean that the PLA is on the entire ridge line of the LAC on the western side of Spanggur gap (except Gurung).
Added: the situation on the eastern time is much clearer showing us taking the heights.

vijayk · Post by **vijayk** » 13 Sep 2020 00:32

XI-tler won't resign or forced to resign. Either he will be killed or he will kill several of them. That news on him is bogus

hnair · Post by **hnair** » 13 Sep 2020 00:40

Rishirishi wrote:
The PLA can move at higher speeds. Their highways are very good, and most of their terrain is flat. 1500 km can be moved within 24ish hours.

But they still have to climb the mountains. Hard work for the short and small princes. I understand most of their forces are mechanised divisions, who will be sitting ducks.

If IAF cut a single road, the chinse will have to fly in the supplies from 1500Km away. India only have a a few hundred km, supply line. The main issue here will be Air power.

Some old art work from BR gallery:

williams · Post by **williams** » 13 Sep 2020 00:42

abhik wrote:
Kakarat wrote:https://twitter.com/detresfa_

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EhtbaH5UcAE ... =4096x4096
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ehtbdz2UcAI ... name=large
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ehs78WwU0AE ... name=large

So Indians are nowhere near Black top
Black top is on the other side of the "LAC", and has been reported that we are not occupying it. However there are some analysis based on satellite images that we are not on Helmet Top (this was reported by Nitin G and Vishnu Som), Point 5157, Bump (highest point which is on the "LAC" apart from Black Top), and possibly Table top. We do appear to be on Gurung hill but that much lower on the same ridge as Bump/Table top (would make that position un tenable for us) - if that is correct then it would mean that the PLA is on the entire ridge line of the LAC on the western side of Spanggur gap (except Gurung).
Added: the situation on the eastern time is much clearer showing us taking the heights.

The counter-argument from Lt Gen Hasnain:

https://twitter.com/atahasnain53/status/1303724149412487168?s=20

g.sarkar · Post by **g.sarkar** » 13 Sep 2020 00:50

vijayk wrote:XI-tler won't resign or forced to resign. Either he will be killed or he will kill several of them. That news on him is bogus

As far as India is concerned, Eleven will be replaced with a Twelve (XII). The same difference, as China's behavior towards India, Tibet, Xinjiang or the world will not change in any significant manner. Agreements made by Sugarland will still be ignored whenever it suits them. So, while it may be satisfying to have him clean pig manure for the rest of his life in a re-education camp, it will not make a difference.
Gautam

Lohit · Post by **Lohit** » 13 Sep 2020 00:55

Latest ToI report,

China has mobilised thousands of soldiers, tanks and howitzers within "rifle range" of our troops

China has deployed its "militia squads" consisting of boxers, mountaineers and folks from "local fighting clubs"

https://m.timesofindia.com/india/india- ... 079438.cms

Gen Panag is having a twitter melt down as he predicts that without black top we are doomed

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 13 Sep 2020 01:10

^^^
To add fuel to the fire the our trusted and favourite colonel is reporting a huge build up of PLA in in Spanggur (prelude to an attack)

Leonard · Post by **Leonard** » 13 Sep 2020 01:17

Round & Round we go with Black Top ...

https://twitter.com/danvir_chauhan/stat ... 3529612288

danvir_chauhan
>>
Sir, I can tell you with 100% confirmed source information that Helmet and Blacktop are firmly under our boots. In fact our boys are sitting on the saddle of the spur that juts out towards Spangur. Just forget the malicious propaganda by a few.
Quote Tweet

Col Malkiat Singh
@MalkiatCol
· 1h
Any one who feels happy to see India's chips down as sadistic pleasure, then do it privately. Don't spoil nation's mood twitter.com/VishnuNDTV/sta…
10:45 AM · Sep 12, 2020·Twitter for iPhone
107
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8
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369
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Notorious2.0
@0Notorious2
·
1h
Replying to
@danvir_chauhan
Sir are you sure about it the media houses are saying otherwise!
Tango Charlieee
@TangoCharlieee
·
1h
Trust the army not the media it is all sold out dancing in Chinese lap ! Chinese spend like billions of $ a year to feed media houses globally and keep the narrative in their control
Command & Conquer (100% follow back)
@commandconquer5
·
1h
Replying to
@danvir_chauhan
People think satellite pictures are the holy gospel! Just because OSINT guys aren't able to spot our camps, doesn't mean we are not there. Who knows we might be physically manning it? Still satellite pictures afterall can't catch live human movements.

Replies to "Nitin G"

Some one has misled you on this. Both are with us unless we have vacated them. Which in any case we have not. Secondly Chinese don’t have ‘defended post’ concept. Their doctrine is offensive defence and not the static one.

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Quote Tweet

Nitin A. Gokhale
@nitingokhale
· Sep 8
Replying to @NarangVipin
Black top is not with India. Neither is Helmet.
<<<

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 13 Sep 2020 01:31

1. I don't think we should spam the thread with twitter copy paste from just any handle that supports our pov.

2. Trust the IA for having the correct military posture. After-all their lives and reputations are on line.

3. GOI wouldn't not be confident without a decent defensive/offensive readjustment.

4. Finally, IF the Chinese have the upper hand we can expect them to make their move sooner than later. Nithin Gokhale has always claimed that Black top and Helmet was in the Chinese possession. Even after that our position was considered strong and the Chinese where bothered by the re-adjustment.

Lets wait for a couple of days/weeks and the situation will be clear based on what the Chinese do and how we respond. No point in trying to second guess our forces on the ground.

vijayk · Post by **vijayk** » 13 Sep 2020 01:32

abhik wrote:^^^
To add fuel to the fire the our trusted and favourite colonel is reporting a huge build up of PLA in in Spanggur (prelude to an attack)

Dhoti shiver time? I am extremely nervous ... Any sign of attack, hope our boys are proactive, cut off the supply lines. and start pounding mofos into bits and pieces. Mad******s should remember for next 50 years.

nam · Post by **nam** » 13 Sep 2020 01:34

God this nonsense about if Black top is with us or not. As if not having it is end of the world.

Black top is not the only height in the region. We are dominating the region, that is why the Chinis are so desperate to get us down. It doesn't matter which top is it, as so far no bullets are fired.

If the ballon goes up, we will see it coming and will not make the mistake of 62 again.

nam · Post by **nam** » 13 Sep 2020 01:39

In their hurry to show their TFTA ness the Chinis left a opening in Spangur gap. The finger positions are not strategic in nature, but the Spangur gap is.

It is the door in to Leh AND Tibet. We are now holding the door. The Chinis cannot dislodge us without force. And any action cannot be limited to Chusul.

No wonder we had 7 days of Brigadier talks from the Chinis..

Kakarat · Post by **Kakarat** » 13 Sep 2020 01:41

India is better armed now to take care of such situation than in Kargil. We have excalibur artillery rounds and also can do LGB strikes from well within our side to take care of these ridge sitters.

Lohit · Post by **Lohit** » 13 Sep 2020 01:41

If Black and Helmet tops are indeed "under" our control, govt may have given directive to MSM to not claim this as such as it may be in techincal contravention of previous agreements.

As Gen Hasnain said, we wouldn't even be seeing these PLA maneuvers had we not captured their heights.

rpartha · Post by **rpartha** » 13 Sep 2020 01:43

From Shooklaw...

Hearing news of an ongoing, heavy Chinese build-up in the areas of Black Top and Gurung Hill. Is anyone else picking up the same signals?

Does the PLA believe it has no choice but to attack? If so, its not going to be pretty!! Indian units seem prepared for any such eventuality

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 13 Sep 2020 01:48

^^
Crooklow hasn't switched sides .. he is just being cautious now that the IA has an upper hand in the Chushul/Spanggur sub-sector.

Why are the Chinese so bothered about our re-adjustment in the area?

Because teh readjustment has made the Chinese defense of Spanggur bowl very weak. The Chinese have the choice of evicting us pronto or see out positions harden and always live with the threat of eviction from the bowl at short notice and loose about 250-300 sq. km territory in the bargain and see India advance its position towards Rutok/G219.

Every day lost to inaction is one day more for the Indian Army to harden its position, same as the Chinese deal between F5/8.

rpartha · Post by **rpartha** » 13 Sep 2020 01:51

^^ true that... IA must be in control and that is why Shooklaw is playing it safe... also too many points counter points about Black Top... honestly it doesnt matter... it is just one of the peaks... we must be holding atleast few strategic peaks and that is why Chinkus are jumping up and down...

vijayk · Post by **vijayk** » 13 Sep 2020 01:59

Can we block chinese ships in Indian Ocean? These scums need to be screwed in every possible way.

What is US reaction to this all? Trump must be thinking of how to use this for his re-election. If he can show this as Chinese fault, I am sure it helps him at this time

ManuJ · Post by **ManuJ** » 13 Sep 2020 02:16

Can't talk about Black Top, but Helmet Top definitely has to be under IA control.
It's the closest peak to IA's Thapung post and accounts mention it as the first peak being captured in the Aug29 offensive.

Chinese occupying Helmet would mean dominating our defenses on the South shore of Pangong Tso, including Thapung.

williams · Post by **williams** » 13 Sep 2020 02:20

vijayk wrote:Can we block chinese ships in Indian Ocean? These scums need to be screwed in every possible way.

What is US reaction to this all? Trump must be thinking of how to use this for his re-election. If he can show this as Chinese fault, I am sure it helps him at this time

Yea all of that should be in the cards. The world is very angry with the Chinese. Anybody who stands up to it will have their support. Even Biden has to appear strong before the Chinese given his past disrepute. Chinese are cornered here there is no escape route irrespective of US election results.

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 13 Sep 2020 02:39

Rishirishi wrote:
hanumadu wrote:
2700 km.
The PLA can move at higher speeds. Their highways are very good, and most of their terrain is flat. 1500 km can be moved within 24ish hours.

But they still have to climb the mountains. Hard work for the short and small princes. I understand most of their forces are mechanised divisions, who will be sitting ducks.

If IAF cut a single road, the chinse will have to fly in the supplies from 1500Km away. India only have a a few hundred km, supply line. The main issue here will be Air power.

Its not 1500 km, its 2700 km. It's not just the distance, but the route also. There are limited road connectivity to the India - Tibet border and they can be disrupted.

Suraj · Post by **Suraj** » 13 Sep 2020 02:39

KLNMurthy wrote:
Aditya_V wrote:True unfortunately parts of Indian media and some brainless parts of our opposition are compromised and openly stating Chinese propaganda.
I’ve noticed one thing: outlets like Indian Express routinely headline the Chinese version. The Indian version from EAM or DM is buried deep inside the report.

This can’t be put down to carelessness or coincidence as it seems highly consistent.

I want to be told that I am wrong, and my paranoia is making me see non-existent patterns.

The purpose of the press as seen from their own perspective is not to report the facts, but to get them business and stay aligned to the sources of their funding and patronage. The clearest unadorned content containing only that sides spin of the situation , will be the government press releases on either side , not any press source .

Suraj · Post by **Suraj** » 13 Sep 2020 02:41

KLNMurthy wrote:
Aditya_V wrote:True unfortunately parts of Indian media and some brainless parts of our opposition are compromised and openly stating Chinese propaganda.
I’ve noticed one thing: outlets like Indian Express routinely headline the Chinese version. The Indian version from EAM or DM is buried deep inside the report.

This can’t be put down to carelessness or coincidence as it seems highly consistent.

I want to be told that I am wrong, and my paranoia is making me see non-existent patterns.

The purpose of the press as seen from their own perspective is not to report the facts, but to get them business and stay aligned to the sources of their funding and patronage. The clearest unadorned content containing only that sides spin of the situation , will be the government press releases on either side , not any press source .

It is also important to remember that no one is going to provide all the facts, including and especially the government . Some gains are better off not being reported . At best, such acknowledgement will happens only weeks or months later .

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 13 Sep 2020 03:20

What are the CCP army's next line of defence if we breach them around Spanggur Tso and Pangong Tso. The distance from LAC to the border is around 15 km near Spanggur Tso and 30 km near Pongang Tso. Can we set up a defence on the Indo Tibetan border? Can we make a run for G219 in Tibet or even upto Ngari Town?

Guddu · Post by **Guddu** » 13 Sep 2020 03:21

hanumadu wrote:
Guddu wrote:
Imagine fighting a war in Delhi where the nearest supply depot is in Bangalore thats about 1500 km. Galwan to Chengdu is 1500 km too. What am I missing ?..why the dhoti shiver.
2700 km.

You are right..1500 miles as the crow flies to Chengdu and approx. the same distance from Delhi-Kanyakumari.

vimal · Post by **vimal** » 13 Sep 2020 03:30

If PLA is massing near the LAC that can only mean a huge 62 style human wave attacks. But this is not 62 and human waves will be harakiri and nothing else.

Is it time to declare breakfast at Pangong Tso and Lunch at Lhasa?

vijayk · Post by **vijayk** » 13 Sep 2020 03:36

vimal wrote:If PLA is massing near the LAC that can only mean a huge 62 style human wave attacks. But this is not 62 and human waves will be harakiri and nothing else.

Is it time to declare breakfast at Pangong Tso and Lunch at Lhasa?

Scums want to intimidate like school bullies and use internal scums like PAPPU and CROOKSLAW to question the Govt and force a situation like IA hijack .... Once the conflict starts, I am sure channels like AajTak will parade jawans' families asking them how they are dealing with this. Burkha must be already figuring it out where to go in Bihar and WB. Lot of public pressure on Modiji will be applied.

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 13 Sep 2020 03:37

Guddu wrote:
hanumadu wrote:
2700 km.
You are right..1500 miles as the crow flies to Chengdu and approx. the same distance from Delhi-Kanyakumari.

No sir, Its 2700 as the crow flies. It's much longer by the road.

https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Chengdu ... d32.501111

vimal · Post by **vimal** » 13 Sep 2020 04:04

hanumadu wrote:
Guddu wrote: You are right..1500 miles as the crow flies to Chengdu and approx. the same distance from Delhi-Kanyakumari.
No sir, Its 2700 as the crow flies. It's much longer by the road.

https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Chengdu ... d32.501111

Thanks for sharing this hanumadu.
So thats almost 15 hours of flight from Chendu to Ngari and 60 hours of road journey non-stop.
No wonder Hans have been so circumspect about escalating this beyond a point. There is no good way to supply the Beetroot army from so far without draining its whole treasury. Mountain routes are not the most easy to navigate and have many choke points.

vijayk · Post by **vijayk** » 13 Sep 2020 04:18

what is Beetroot army?

https://swarajyamag.com/insta/india-chi ... -in-ladakh
India, China Troops Within Shooting Range At Spanggur Gap Near Pangong Tso In Ladakh

China has mobilised thousands of soldiers, tanks and howitzers within rifle range of Indian Army deployment at Spanggur Gap in the southern part of Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh, sources said, even as Indian troops are on high alert.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army made provocative military deployments at Spanggur Gap, which is between Gurung Hill and Magar Hill, from 30 August after Indian soldiers seized tactical heights on the ridge line on the southern bank of Pangong Tso near Chushul at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

"Seeing the Chinese PLA troop and guns mobilisation, the Indian Army too made mirror deployments at Spanggur Gap. Both the countries' troops and guns are within shooting range," said a government official.

Further, sources said, China has deployed its militia squads to "consolidate the border" and "stabilise Tibet region". They have been tasked to try and dislodge the Indian Army soldiers from the tactical heights.

The militia is an irregular mix of mountaineers, boxers, members of local fight clubs and others. Most of the members are raised from the local population.

durairaaj · Post by **durairaaj** » 13 Sep 2020 04:20

The reason GOI is not claiming Black top and Helmet top is that GOI is interested in trading them to get back Depsang plains, without much public relations issue.
Thats why GOI is not saying anything about Depsang plains and want to avoid saying about our positions on Helmet top and Black top. NitinG and Sjha are close to insiders in GOI and towing the line of GOI. Others who claim Indian possession of Helmet top and Black top, get information from Indian army insiders.
This is similar to trading Haji-Pir pass to get back region lost near Akhnoor dagger during 1965 war. Presently, GOI may not be in mood for war, because China virus and state of economy have depleted everything from treasury.

Rishirishi · Post by **Rishirishi** » 13 Sep 2020 04:49

vimal wrote:
hanumadu wrote:
No sir, Its 2700 as the crow flies. It's much longer by the road.

https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Chengdu ... d32.501111
Thanks for sharing this hanumadu.
So thats almost 15 hours of flight from Chendu to Ngari and 60 hours of road journey non-stop.
No wonder Hans have been so circumspect about escalating this beyond a point. There is no good way to supply the Beetroot army from so far without draining its whole treasury. Mountain routes are not the most easy to navigate and have many choke points.

It is not a 15 hour flight, unless the PLA plans to purchase the ticket on www.cleartrip.com

The road transport is not going to be any great challenge, because they have the capacity. Movement of goods it not a problem in China. It will take max 2 days. Their greatest worry is Air threat. If IAF can disrupt their roads to Kashghar and Lahsa, they will freeze to death. But the same goes for Indian troops as well. I think the key in this conflict, if it it escalates, will be airpower. The Chinease Su-30 copies are known to have poor engines and very limited range. They are going to find it hard to support their troops from far away places.

If the Chinese loose Aircover, they will be sitting ducks. They will be ******....ed. Imagine having 50K soldiers without supply. The 5 Rafaels came just in time. Little is knows about the quality of Chinese weapons like their air to air missiles and clamed stealth J-20. It is a knows fact that China has been trying to get hold of Russian aircrafts like more Su30MKK. Why would they need this, if their J-20 was truly stealth?

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 13 Sep 2020 05:42

Rishirishi wrote:
vimal wrote:
Thanks for sharing this hanumadu.
So thats almost 15 hours of flight from Chendu to Ngari and 60 hours of road journey non-stop.
No wonder Hans have been so circumspect about escalating this beyond a point. There is no good way to supply the Beetroot army from so far without draining its whole treasury. Mountain routes are not the most easy to navigate and have many choke points.
It is not a 15 hour flight, unless the PLA plans to purchase the ticket on http://www.cleartrip.com
The road transport is not going to be any great challenge, because they have the capacity. Movement of goods it not a problem in China. It will take max 2 days. Their greatest worry is Air threat. If IAF can disrupt their roads to Kashghar and Lahsa, they will freeze to death. But the same goes for Indian troops as well. I think the key in this conflict, if it it escalates, will be airpower. The Chinease Su-30 copies are known to have poor engines and very limited range. They are going to find it hard to support their troops from far away places.

They cannot disrupt Indian supply chain till Punjab, Jammu, Himachal Pradesh. From there to Leh we have limited connectivity but I doubt they can do much even here. And we can fly stuff to Leh if we so want.

From Leh, our distances are much shorter though the terrain is mountainous.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 13 Sep 2020 07:47

53 Years ago, yesterday, the IA showed the PLA how 1962 was history. Some parallels between then and now are highlighted in the excerpts.

https://indianexpress.com/article/books ... m-6592347/

The Chinese conundrum and how India met it in 1967

In September 1967, clashes between the People’s Liberation Army and the Indian Army across two high-altitude passes in Sikkim — Nathu La and Cho La (15,000 feet) — left hundreds of dead on both sides. It was the first time since the 1962 war that the two nations had exchanged artillery fire. It remains the most recent exchange of fire in what has turned out to be an intriguing military standoff between the two large neighbours. There has been continued hostility and recurring face-offs without bloodshed across what is probably among the most inhospitable stretches of frontiers on this planet. It was a peculiar calibration of conflict between two rising powers.

The tipping point for the crisis came on September 11 in a round of pushing and shoving in which the commissar was allegedly roughed up by Indian soldiers. The PLA quietly withdrew after the scuffle and the Indian fence-laying party of 70 Engineer Regiment, continued their fencing operation along with 18 Rajput. Soon after, the PLA opened fire with MMGs accompanied by mortar and artillery fire, inflicting about 40 casualties on the Indians. Rai was injured and two young officers were killed in action while rallying the troops. It took a while for the Indians to calibrate a suitable response. In the ensuing riposte, scores of PLA soldiers are said to have been killed by well-directed Indian artillery fire, which blasted Chinese bunkers and silenced MMGs in a display of outstanding gunnery. Clearly, the PLA — which had stunned and shocked the Indian forward defensive line in all the sectors in 1962 — had received a taste of its own medicine.

PK Roy, an Indian reporter for the Baltimore Sun, wrote quite disparagingly about the fitness and preparedness of the PLA soldiers as compared to their Indian adversaries. He observed that the Chinese 11 Division was stationed near Nathu La, but most of the Chinese soldiers seemed to be less acclimatised to the high altitude than the Indians. Chinese soldiers had been seen gasping while climbing. The impact of good leadership, fitness and morale of the Indian troops at Nathu La was telling, as was the decision to surprise the Chinese with artillery fire. Two weeks later, in a concerted attempt to hit back after the reverse at Nathu La, the PLA attempted to overrun another Indian position at Cho La, the highest pass on the Sikkim-Tibet border located at a height of over 15,000 feet. By then, the Indian Army had reinforced defensive positions with crack paratroopers who along with the determined Gorkhas, pushed the PLA 3 km back. Brigadier Vivek Sapatnekar, who commanded India’s parachute brigade in the mid-1980s, was at Cho La as a young officer during the skirmish. He recalled that the Indian Army used its positional advantage to blunt the Chinese attack and once again effectively used mortars and field artillery.

In a telling assessment of the larger strategic picture, Joseph Lelyveld — better known for his controversial biography of Mahatma Gandhi, Great Soul — praised India for its firm stand at Nathu La in what he described as a Himalayan street fight. He wrote in The New York Times that in their military and diplomatic posture, the Indians sought to reflect firmness and restraint. Emphasising this, he wrote, “This was not just posturing. In 1962, when they were woefully underprepared to meet the Chinese, they engaged in a good deal of braggadocio; the Chinese ruthlessly made them eat their words. This time, after five years of building up their Himalayan defences, the Indians felt no need for brave words.”

India’s politico-military leadership of the time demonstrated great self-assurance . . . As the firing peaked on September 14, Sam Manekshaw, Jagjit Singh Aurora and Sagat Singh visited the scene of battle. This gave much cheer and confidence to the Indian troops, whose morale had remained high . . . despite the loss of two officers and the wounding of a battalion commander. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made her first major public statement about the skirmish only after the Cho La incident on October 1. In Mumbai, she said that she “hoped that it would only prove to be a local affair like the previous exchange at Nathu La.” She also went ahead with her plans to visit Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) even as the Defence Minister Swaran Singh, and the Chief of Army Staff, General PP Kumaramangalam, continued their official visits to Moscow and France respectively. . .

Notwithstanding the robust response, an all-round analysis of India’s defence preparedness was undertaken within its military and strategic establishment. There was a realisation that India would never be able to confront the Chinese on equal terms if it had to defend a border with too many forward positions.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 13 Sep 2020 07:57

Very engrossing read.

https://karansinghrathore17.blogspot.co ... h.html?m=1

Hanut Tales: How General Hanut Singh Handled The Chinese in Sikkim
There is much talk of the Chinese intrusion in Doklam plateau in Bhutan since June 2017, where Indian soldiers and the Chinamen stand nose to nose and toe to toe with neither side willing to budge.
'Tis an old bullying habit of the Chinese. They push countries that they perceive are weaker. They are blatant, boorish and couldn't care about international norms and such like things. These are to be called upon only when it suits the Chinaman.

So in 1982, Maj General Hanut Singh, MVC, the doyen of armoured warfare in the South Asian region and hero of 1971 war Battle of Basantar, was posted by Indian Army MS Branch to command 17 Mountain Division in Sikkim. The armour general protested and demanded that he be given command of an armoured division, as it rightfully and logically be done in view of his deep insight of armoured warfare and the opportunity to pass it on to his subordinates. However, the DNA of all MS Branches across all armies, is such that they are given to convoluted line of thought and Indian Army MS Branch is no exception to the lot. So they informed the good general that he was being posted to command 17 Mountain Division so that he could improve his service profile. In summer of 1982 General Hanut Singhji took over the division and I was posted as his ADC in autumn the same year.

The Chinaman then was no different than he is now. At will and at different geographical locations, he would intrude into our territory sending the troops and commanders on ground into a tiffy and the staff would be running around like headless chicken in trying to manage the intrusion. North and East Sikkim was their playground. The Sino Indian border at Sikkim is supposed to be a settled and delineated one, however the Chinaman was not given to respect such niceties, being a bully.

This sort of situation prevailed till warrior Hanut of the armoured corps, the one who had been sent by MS Branch to improve his profile, arrived as GOC 17 Mountain Division.

On taking over, General Hanut Singhji visited all Brigades and forward posts of his formation and took stock of the situation on the ground.Those days most journeys to forward brigades was in a Jonga and move to forward posts on ponies or on foot. For some very good reasons 33 Corps at Sukna, was tightfisted in allotting helicopters for movement of GOC 17 Mountain Division. You will get a good hint if you read my earlier post on General Hanut 'The Call'.

As the general would mention later in his conversations, after his familiarisation recce, he asked of the Corps Commander as to what were the instructions in case the Chinese were to intrude. He did not get a clear reply. When General Hanut persisted, the Corps Commander told him, ' Hanut, you are a mature person, handle the situation in a mature manner.' or words to that effect.

With instructions received Gen Hanut decided to take things in hand and resolve the prevailing situation pertaining to Chinese intrusions. In those days and as it remains to date, the drill on a Chinese intrusion happening was well laid down and very passive. It involved a small officer led unarmed body of troops, usually section or platoon strength, moving towards the Chinese, and unfurling a banner with Chinese characters printed on it which read that you are in Indian territory and requested to go back.
Meanwhile, the only Chinese language interpreter in the brigade would come huffing and puffing and try to speak to the Chinese in the language they understood. The Chinese on the other hand would be nonchalant. Carrying on with what they were doing, map reading or even having their lunch while we stood there with our banners, watching.

General Hanut Singh the warrior, introduced a new language to the Chinaman, Hindi. In those days there used to be three mountain brigades deployed in Sikkim in defense of the State, under 17 Mountain Division. General Hanut visited all Brigades personally and held a Sainik Sammelan or durbar in each brigade. He insisted that maximum troops be present for his address and he addressed the gathering in hindi as such.

The General informed the gathering that the boundary of Sikkim is as what is our understanding of the boundary. In case the Chinaman has a doubt then he can talk to Delhi but he should certainly not violate the border as we understand, hold and defend. He then went on to lay down a new drill in case the Chinese were to intrude.

As per the new drill, in case of a Chinese intrusion, the unit or formation concerned, would tactically deploy a company or more in vicinity of the Chinese and warn them thrice in hindi that they have intruded into Indian territory. In case the Chinese did not withdraw, the senior officer present should order opening fire on the Chinese till such time they vacated Indian territory. The General also empowered NCOs to order opening fire in case a situation was developing that warranted opening fire.

General Hanut laid down one caveat while giving out these instructions to his command. He said under no circumstance, will the enemy be allowed to open fire first because our hesitation in opening fire on earlier occasions, had always resulted in high casualties to our troops. 17 Mountain Division will fire first and inflict maximum damage on the enemy in case our territory was violated. He also went on to state that in case the Chinese opened fire first and inflicted casualties on our troops and it was established that the senior officer present had hesitated in ordering fire, he would court martial that person for cowardice. Brigade commanders were authorized to order opening up of Artillery fire. General Hanut was not going to wait for instructions from a dithering and hesitant political and military hierarchy.

And thus in that year 1982 new orders for dealing with Chinese intrusions were personally given out by the GOC General Hanut Singh to his command. I had the privilege of being present in each of the three durbars that the General addressed in the Mountain Brigades. His staff was also instructed accordingly so that the entire formation was on one wavelength and the GOC's intent was clear to all.

The message went out loud and clear to the Chinese that a new General has arrived who has a different take on their activities. It also manifested in greater confidence and changed body language of our units and troops and the shrewd Chinaman was quick to note that. In the year plus that General Hanut spent as GOC 17 Mountain Division before moving to take over 1 Armoured Division at Ambala, there were no Chinese intrusions. The Chinaman had got the message that a warrior has arrived.

General Hanut's decision to personally address the troops of the three brigades, is an example of leadership of the highest order. He gave out some very tough instructions, the officers and men heard him loud and clear and there was no doubt in their mind as to how intrusions will be dealt from now on. Responsibility and accountability at all levels was clearly laid down. The General was ultimately accountable for everything. For once clear rules of engagement had been laid down by a Commanding General and the results were there to be seen.

The steely resolve that we get to see in the personality of this great warrior, is that what had carried his Regiment The Poona Horse across an uncleared minefield at Basantar in December 1971 and the subsequent destruction of Pak 8 Armoured brigade by The Poona Horse. That same steely resolve we were to witness in the grey mountains of Sikkim.
Indian army and schools of instruction would do well to study the personality and teachings of this great warrior. They would learn much and their leaders would be better leaders, imbibed with the spirit of Hanut Steel.