Suraj wrote:Karan M wrote:You missed my point again.
What I am stating is you do both together. To push for change you have to figure out what is broken. What caused it to be broken. And then match that to where you want it to be.
Maybe, but I fundamentally don't think you are doing that, or at least I see nothing productive in your approach.
I have already stated my point - repeatedly in fact as to why one has to do both together. Beyond that I don't know what else to say. India has to go ahead with its current setup, ergo acknowledging its issues and reforming it is essential. To this point, just setting high level goals and being positive by themselves won't achieve much.
Which boils down to how why we cant hope to do x without even seeing how x can be achieved based on a dispassionate reading of what's presenting the GOI from achieving its immediate goals.
And why this effort needs to be made in the first place. The last also tempers expectations from those who mock the current GOI for not waving a wand and solving all issues. See how far you've come from "then" and "then" needs to be documented, articulated, making a case for things to change further as well. It also overcomes the deficit of historical memory.
People who saw 26/11 first hand need to document the utter disaster it was, bar NSGs intervention, to show how despite all the cribbing what a change the coordinated response to Pathankot was. The serious analysts need to point out what didn't change between the two either - to drive the case for further change. The fact we could have gone to war but the MoD had still not fixed the war making capacity or capability sufficiently, and what can be done in the short/medium/long term.
All proposals for change have to begin with a problem statement and also include an implementation proposal with real world constraints, capacity.
The Indian state has constraints and without fixing those constraints even the most ambitious programs and PPTs go nowhere fast. The countries which actually advance are those which work within their limitations and fix their weaknesses double quick.
When Russia was worried about US sanctions they first took hard measures to prevent external influence in their internal system and also devised sanction busting measures to ringfence both critical military hardware and economic sanctions.
Irrespective of whether which US president comes or goes, they have these measures in place.
That began with a hard nosed acceptance of the fact they had a problem. Civil society subversion and also the penetration of their state and economic apparatus via foreign levers of power. They saw that problem. And then figured out how to address the same.
On the other hand, I see that this administration has a mixed bag of successes and failures. What I like is that the successes are mostly not serendipitous accidents, and the failures are something they've frequently shown the ability to iterate upon until they hit a winning formula. For example, being bestowed a strong economy when you start out is an accident. UPA1 inherited one. Dismantling a broken system or building something from scratch (JAM/toilet/JJM...) is not an accident - it demonstrates a learned intellect. Similarly, Make In India didn't quite do much, but they kept iterating until they hit the PLI scheme that's triggered a wave of new FDI and production commitments. It takes effort to craft policy , understand what's stopping it working well, and fix it. I understand and appreciate the effort that's being taken.
The issue is not whether this administration is successful or not. Compared to most of India's prior GOIs they are streets ahead. The issue is whether they can even hit 100% with the kind of setup they have inherited, whether they are getting the right input from existing organizations which are resistant to change and what can be done to assist them beyond a pat on the back or merely electoral supporting them.
The institutions they rely on need to be fixed. And that's completely obvious when you see someone like Gadkari, who has performed despite the constraints, express his open frustration. He is merely articulating what many of his peers likely feel and Modi himself has openly stated.
I don't value 'understanding the problem' - that to me sounds like sociology - understanding people. I value case studies of understanding how problems were tackled. If one cannot explain ways to work around a problem, one fundamentally has not understood the problem . Therefore explanations of the problem don't really do much for me.
I don't even know what to say to this because clearly if one doesn't even wish to acknowledge a problem exists in the first place there will be no answers sought and second, many of India's problems are unique to it.
There are often no "case studies" to solve our specific issues since other countries did not inherit our processes and nor do they face our political issues in replacing existing processes and institutions.
There are people though who would solve the issues if they were aligned to recognizing an issue exists. And to do that you need to articulate how the current setup has not been optimal.
Why would anyone change if everything was already ok? In the Indian setup people delay files to the day of their retirement. People have actually seen this occur. Others leak information to sabotage procurement and this is not considered an issue until war is on the doorstep and we are short of kit.
Anyways this GOI is clearly making some moves on the lines of what I have pointed out.
The next step should be to fix the setup and reform the induction process itself.
Modi govt is shaking the foundation of India’s IAS-led civil service — one reform at a time
https://www.google.com/amp/s/theprint.i ... at-a-time/
The challenges can be seen in this one quote.
The phrase “committed bureaucracy” was coined by Indira Gandhi, but comes up often in conversations among civil servants nowadays. “Even before this government came to power for the second time, we were told to start planning for its second term,” said a senior IAS officer. “While at one level, it suggested that this government is thinking long-term, but on another, it felt as though we are expected to blindly be committed to their agenda even before they form the government.”
"Blindly be committed to their agenda" - as if in the pvt sector people stop working on managements directives merely because the CEO may change. If we need to change, so do those who often set policy and implement it.