Deterrence
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So what happened to the scholarship at JNU!!!
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Am reading one of the references Avoiding War And Crisis Management by Alexander George and trying to see how the template fits in Indian wars since 1947.
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Went up by several notches.ramana wrote:So what happened to the scholarship at JNU!!!
I suspect high level of thinking was always there, and is coming out freely now, since jnu is no longer in the tight grip of lefty idiot goons.
Our EAM Dr SJ is a JNU alumini as well !
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gosh , well he is exemplary, a credit to JNU ..hard to believe!! isn't our FM a JNU alumni as well ?Cyrano wrote:Went up by several notches.ramana wrote:So what happened to the scholarship at JNU!!!
I suspect high level of thinking was always there, and is coming out freely now, since jnu is no longer in the tight grip of lefty idiot goons.
Our EAM Dr SJ is a JNU alumini as well !
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Yes Nirmala Seetharaman is JNU alumni
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As if on cue, Upgrades for China’s nuclear triad as Xi Jinping pushes for stronger strategic deterrence: analysts - SCMP
China is expected to upgrade its air, ground and sea-based nuclear delivery systems – or nuclear triad – following President Xi Jinping’s call for a “strong system of strategic deterrence”.
Xi made the call in his work report to the 20th Communist Party congress earlier this month in comments laying out the country’s development path for the next five years and beyond.
Defence analysts said the Ukraine war and an increasingly uncertain global order had reminded Beijing that conventional weapons were not enough for real “strategic deterrence”.
Along with the US and Russia, China is now one of three members of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to have a complete nuclear triad.
That capacity was revealed in October 2020 when the PLA Air Force released footage of the Xian H-6N bomber carrying a ballistic missile.
The footage showed that China had all the components of a nuclear triad: ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched missiles and air-launched weapons.
China’s most powerful nuclear deterrent, the Dongfeng series of ICBMs were on show during its National Day military parade in 2019. They included the land-based DF-41, the road-mobile DF-31AG and the submarine-launched JL-2, all of which could reach the US mainland.
Zhou said that capacity would be boosted with the development of the Xian H-20 supersonic stealth bomber.
“Among the world’s nuclear states, only those possessing nuclear triad capabilities are real superpowers. China’s strategic deterrence will be significantly upgraded once the H-20 is put into service,” he said.
Chinese military magazines and social media suggested the H-20’s maiden flight could happen this year, but Beijing has been reluctant to announce any progress on the bomber.
The H-20 is expected to double China’s nuclear strike range. It has a maximum take-off weight of at least 200 tonnes and the ability to fire four powerful hypersonic stealth cruise missiles.
It is one of the country’s “20-series” of new generation warplanes, which includes the J-20 stealth fighter jet, the Y-20 transport aircraft and the Z-20 medium-lift utility helicopter.
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A little dated but interesting viewpoints.
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https://indianexpress.com/article/idea- ... t-8239499/
It seems to be consensus building excercise, in favour of Indian nuke tests.
October 31, 2022Ashley Tellis at Idea Exchange: ‘India may be compelled to test again, and when it does, it’s in US interest to avoid penalising it’
It seems to be consensus building excercise, in favour of Indian nuke tests.
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There is a point in not going into an arms race , with American blessings or not.Pratyush wrote:https://indianexpress.com/article/idea- ... t-8239499/
October 31, 2022Ashley Tellis at Idea Exchange: ‘India may be compelled to test again, and when it does, it’s in US interest to avoid penalising it’
It seems to be consensus building excercise, in favour of Indian nuke tests.
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Kit correct. And who is Ashley Tellis to muddle in Indian decisions?
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He's giving his opinion. What exactly is the issue?ramana wrote:Kit correct. And who is Ashley Tellis to muddle in Indian decisions?
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And we can question him, his motives, expertise and his arguments. What exactly is the issue?
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He is of Indian origin, born in Mumbai according to Wikipedia. There is very little on him there.ramana wrote:Kit correct. And who is Ashley Tellis to muddle in Indian decisions?
The name Tellis can be Goan, Manglorian or possibly East Indian in that it is of Portuguese origin.
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Aldonkar ji, he and his history is well known in BRF. He was the architect of the Indo-US nuclear deal 123 something during MMS govt.Aldonkar wrote:He is of Indian origin, born in Mumbai according to Wikipedia. There is very little on him there.
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Tellis always peddles the American POV and narrative. And perhaps rightly so as he is an American citizen. However annoying as it his statements (and the fawning over them by the Shekhar Gupta types) might be, he is relatively pro-India (at least by beltway standards) and could be a useful go-between.
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He has his (legitimate) agenda. I find him reasonable.
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Never said you couldn't. Find it unnecessary to give him so much importance. But by all means go ahead.Cyrano wrote:And we can question him, his motives, expertise and his arguments. What exactly is the issue?
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I think we should use his arguments, if suitable to Indian interests. Oppose him if it does not. Our DDM listens to "experts" such as him and he has influence with policymakers and the liberal elite. The public perceptions created is an important component of how our own policy makers make policy. I say, lets' use him.
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Might have been true before 2014, a lot less since then. Especially so regarding perceptions abroad.The public perceptions created is an important component of how our own policy makers make policy.
His previous articles had some clever mix of authoritative sounding mumbo jumbo on India's nuclear yields and weapons design which will only impress Coupta types who peddle a watered down version of such stuff to their own audiences and try to look omniscient. Never once pausing to ask how can Tellis make such precise claims on matters only a handful of people in the country really know and such info is of highest level of confidentiality and putting it in public domain==treason? Perhaps because no one in the Indian administration will -rightly- confirm or deny or react to their blabbering and therefore they can continue to look smart and insightful to those who know even less.
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Huge nuclear arms push by China would worry neighbours, analysts warn, as US report sees 1,500 warheads by 2035 - SCMP
An exponential increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and military power would trigger concerns among its neighbours, even though Beijing has valid reasons for security build-up, military analysts said.
The annual Pentagon report on Chinese military might and strategy, published on Tuesday, said the country currently has about 400 nuclear warheads, and the number could reach 1,500 by 2035.
Zhou Chenming, a researcher from the Yuan Wang military science and technology think tank, said the unstable security situation around China has pushed China to rapidly build up its military power.
“Beijing is confronted with several challenging situations [in the region]. Cross-strait relations are becoming increasingly volatile and it might easily become a regional crisis … China also must be ready to prevent and tackle any sudden military conflict along the border with India to maintain internal peace,” Zhou said.
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Just an alarmist drivel. India's security got jeopardized long ago in 1964. So China doesn't need more nukes to confront India.
This augmentation is due to changing world geopolitics.
Throughout Cold War, China felt confident in its small arsenal of ~350 nukes.
China only now feels the need to quadruple it.
So what changed?
We have Obama's pivot to Asia, Trump's Quad, and Biden's Taiwan card.
This augmentation is due to changing world geopolitics.
Throughout Cold War, China felt confident in its small arsenal of ~350 nukes.
China only now feels the need to quadruple it.
So what changed?
We have Obama's pivot to Asia, Trump's Quad, and Biden's Taiwan card.
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Russia may resume nuclear weapons tests, Putin says
Hope our shafts are ready.“Russia’s Ministry of Defense and (Russian nuclear operator) Rosatom must ensure readiness for testing Russian nuclear weapons,” he said.
“We won’t be the first to do this. But if the United States conducts these tests, we’ll do the same.”
The dictator claimed that his decision was due Washington allegedly “mulling a natural test of nuclear weapons” and developing “new types of nuclear munitions.”
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That article is relayed by yahoo from"The New Voice of Ukraine" - the dictator won't be happy
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The latest kerfuffle over numbers in the missile dhaga prompted me to post here.
First rule of Deterrence. It is all in your mind.. And that is the only rule.
Let me give an example. I needed to update PAN card for my bank and went with a printout. The printout had the last line missing, where the slip is suppossed to be cut and you can carry the "card" in your wallet. Because of that the bank rejected the printout. I had to cut that last piece out and presented the same paper, pointing out that the instructions indicate to cut the last piece out for wallet. The same printout was accepted after the last portion was cutout! The mind of the teller was coached in just following the rules. The rules indicated cut the piece of paper out. So it was cut out and the same printout was now acceptable!!
So what's the story here?
Let's say the number of Brahmos at 14k is unconvincing. Pick a convincing number? 1.5k? It is in service since 2005. So let's say only two missiles are produced every week. That's still ~1600 missiles. So 1.5k sounds plausible.
Now let's say a hot war takes off between Cheen and you-know-where. From Ladakh to Sichuan. And we spare say 1.2k for Cheen theatre. And for each target you need 2 brahmos to completely destroy it. That means 600 targets. Can anyone identify 600 targets within 300km of the boundary? Okay let's identify 100 high-value-targets (HVTs) and target that only. That means for 6 days, one can easily target daily with 2 Brahmos.
Take it other way, Indo-Cheen boundary is 3500km long. It takes only 12 batteries of Brhamos to provide lateral coverage. Since it is not linear, it will actually take less then that. But let's stick with 12. So each battery can be sourced with 100 Brahmos. And each battery can target ~8 HVTs within its sector. That's some serious pounding stretching 200+ Km into tibet and cheen. Do you know that Lhasa to tawang is ~240km?
No country will want to escalate against such serious fire power. And this is assuming that number quoted is only 10% accurate. What if it is 20% accurate? 33% accurate? That's like 3000 missiles dedicated to that sector only!
First rule of Deterrence. It is all in your mind.. And that is the only rule.
Let me give an example. I needed to update PAN card for my bank and went with a printout. The printout had the last line missing, where the slip is suppossed to be cut and you can carry the "card" in your wallet. Because of that the bank rejected the printout. I had to cut that last piece out and presented the same paper, pointing out that the instructions indicate to cut the last piece out for wallet. The same printout was accepted after the last portion was cutout! The mind of the teller was coached in just following the rules. The rules indicated cut the piece of paper out. So it was cut out and the same printout was now acceptable!!
So what's the story here?
Let's say the number of Brahmos at 14k is unconvincing. Pick a convincing number? 1.5k? It is in service since 2005. So let's say only two missiles are produced every week. That's still ~1600 missiles. So 1.5k sounds plausible.
Now let's say a hot war takes off between Cheen and you-know-where. From Ladakh to Sichuan. And we spare say 1.2k for Cheen theatre. And for each target you need 2 brahmos to completely destroy it. That means 600 targets. Can anyone identify 600 targets within 300km of the boundary? Okay let's identify 100 high-value-targets (HVTs) and target that only. That means for 6 days, one can easily target daily with 2 Brahmos.
Take it other way, Indo-Cheen boundary is 3500km long. It takes only 12 batteries of Brhamos to provide lateral coverage. Since it is not linear, it will actually take less then that. But let's stick with 12. So each battery can be sourced with 100 Brahmos. And each battery can target ~8 HVTs within its sector. That's some serious pounding stretching 200+ Km into tibet and cheen. Do you know that Lhasa to tawang is ~240km?
No country will want to escalate against such serious fire power. And this is assuming that number quoted is only 10% accurate. What if it is 20% accurate? 33% accurate? That's like 3000 missiles dedicated to that sector only!
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Some of this anal-cysts are just that. It is easy to play a numbers game. I have 1000 bums. You have only 100 bums. You must shiver in your dhoti. We know what happened to cheeni bums in Doklam.SSridhar wrote:Huge nuclear arms push by China would worry neighbours, analysts warn, as US report sees 1,500 warheads by 2035 - SCMPAn exponential increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and military power would trigger concerns among its neighbours, even though Beijing has valid reasons for security build-up, military analysts said.
The annual Pentagon report on Chinese military might and strategy, published on Tuesday, said the country currently has about 400 nuclear warheads, and the number could reach 1,500 by 2035.
Cheen may increase its nuclear arsenal. But unless it can destroy second strike capability of any nation, those bums will result in MAD and hence useless. And for second strike capability, all India has to do is lower some pontoons in the Bay of Bengal with Agni-5. Fifty such Agni-V at 300kt will suffice.
So what's the point of the above analcyst farticle? It is basically a way of cheenis saying that look *because* of your offensive posture, I am spending behind my defensive posterior. It is not me, it is you at fault. Just a way of gaining an upper hand at the chai-biskoot session.
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i dont think India would be scared of any of these numbers, there was more than enough unsafeguarded fissile material for nearly 2800 warheads { in 2018 ! ] , one can just guess the numbers that would be available now !!
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Isn't deterrence a 2 step game of capability and intent/will to use it? To some extent the size of your capability may influence their usage but untimely it's the intent that determines how (much) you will react and therefore how credible your deterrence is.
Maintaining an ambiguous posture on both fronts is the best deterrent as will constrain the adversary to guess work which in most cases will weaken his own intent.
Maintaining an ambiguous posture on both fronts is the best deterrent as will constrain the adversary to guess work which in most cases will weaken his own intent.
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Hence the concert to remove NaMo.
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Cyrano, the Chinese used to believe at least until a few years back that India went nuclear for both (domestic) political and geopolitical prestige and would have no stomach to use the weapon when it came to the crunch. I am sure that 2017 and 2020 made them re-think even though neither of these events went that far. They would have realized that India meant business and hope they extended that assessment to the nuclear realm as well.Cyrano wrote:Isn't deterrence a 2 step game of capability and intent/will to use it? To some extent the size of your capability may influence their usage but untimely it's the intent that determines how (much) you will react and therefore how credible your deterrence is.
Maintaining an ambiguous posture on both fronts is the best deterrent as will constrain the adversary to guess work which in most cases will weaken his own intent.
However, keeping our intent ambiguous is not a good idea. The nuclear posture doctrine makes it unambiguous as to when we will resort to these weapons and what we shall do with them. So, it is already very clear and in the open. If a country like China concluded that it was all for the sake of prestige in India in spite of the Doctrine, it is their prerogative and they face the consequences. But, nuclear signalling should not be ambiguous even during peace times. We do not bandy about that in the open or unnecessarily, but if the situation demanded, if an opportunity presented and if GoI felt that it needed to convey its determination, it would do so in private and at the suitable level.
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From a telegram channel: @lordofwar
Curious comments on the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released last October, from senior Pentagon officials Richard S. Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy, and Drew Walter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Affairs, who spoke February 15 at the Nuclear Deterrence Summit in Arlington.
“The new NPR recognizes that the international security environment has unfortunately worsened even since 2018,” Johnson said, referring to the year the last NPR was published.
“Obviously, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a stark reminder of the nuclear risks in today’s conflict. In the meantime, China’s nuclear modernization and arsenal expansion is taking place, which presents us with new risks and new uncertainties,” Johnson said.
These developments will mean that the United States will for the first time face two major rivals with nuclear weapons. This creates new dilemmas for US strategic and regional deterrence, Johnson said, adding that North Korea and Iran also pose challenges.
While the NPR states that the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack, it affirms a broader set of roles, the first of which is to deter a strategic attack, the second is to provide confidence to allies and partners, and the third is to achieve US goals in if containment doesn't work.
This NPR sets a very high bar for the use of nuclear weapons, he said, and the United States will only consider using nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to protect the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.
Walter noted that NPR calls for a balanced and flexible nuclear arsenal that can respond to threats, uncertainty and remain effective.
According to Walter, current nuclear weapons systems are outdated and not very flexible or adaptable.
Last edited by Cyrano on 26 Feb 2023 11:35, edited 1 time in total.
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and that can be pithily summarised as Modi said " our nukes are not for Diwali fireworks" ., the intent to use if required is there.And that is a paradigm shift.SSridhar wrote:Cyrano wrote:Isn't deterrence a 2 step game of capability and intent/will to use it? To some extent the size of your capability may influence their usage but untimely it's the intent that determines how (much) you will react and therefore how credible your deterrence is.
We do not bandy about that in the open or unnecessarily, but if the situation demanded, if an opportunity presented and if GoI felt that it needed to convey its determination, it would do so in private and at the suitable level.
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Cyrano Which part lead to Rolling Eyes? Pleas go back and highlight.
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So for the US nuclear weapons are not weapons of last resort to defend itself or prevent large scale attack by another nuclear power by promising MAD situation. A very flexible and extensible role definition there that could very well apply if any attack is labelled as "strategic".While the NPR states that the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack, it affirms a broader set of roles, the first of which is to deter a strategic attack, the second is to provide confidence to allies and partners, and the third is to achieve US goals in if containment doesn't work.
This is a clearly stated ambiguous position. Works better at dissuading than a very clearly stated unambiguous position like "NFU" which means no use against a non nuclear attack by an(y) enemy whether he possesses nuclear weapons or not, no matter how devastating or strategic such attacks might be.
Let's take them one by one:
1. Deter a strategic attack:
The US doctrine doesn't say it has to be a physical attack or a military attack. So does a cyber attack qualify? At what level of impact? Does a financial attack qualify? Say China starts shorting the dollar by the trillions, would that qualify? Probability is not the point here nor is the merit of some action considered as a strategic attack. Does the size and capability of the attacker play a role here? ie the capacity to inflict multiple strategic attacks whatever they may be, and not just one?
The US doctrine seems to rest on its own purely subjective interpretation on a case by case basis.
2. Provide confidence to allies and partners
Confidence about what? That US will respond with nuclear weapons if the attacked party is an ally or partner of the US? Does such attack on the Ally/partner have to be nuclear or even an attack considered as strategic by the ally/partner or the US or both, also qualifies for a nuclear response by the US?
By this token Ukraine should have qualified already.
3. to achieve US goals in if containment doesn't work.
Now this is so vague that anything from oil spills to pissing on the street after one too many can qualify.
The long and short of the whole thing is, this kind of doctrine forces a US adversary to take into account a possible US nuclear response to a variety of actions it may be contemplating. Fashionably said, it "procures broad spectrum deterrence against a wide array of adversarial actions against American assets, interests and American people."
It also indicates a high level of trust in the leadership, institutions, checks and balances, and the nuclear chain of command, to give them the possibility of nuclear response in a wide(er) set of possible and probable scenarios.
In the face of all this, why should any other nation straight jacket itself into NFU ie I No F U until U Nuclear F me First doctrine and publish it unambiguously ?
All these went thru my mind in lightspeed and ended up as coz I got called for something.
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Lot of third rate fellows are allowed in recent times to talk nuke policy.
However strategic always meant nuclear weapons. This is core deterrence.. And when NPT was extended US gave negative security assurances which means they won't attack non nuclear weapon states (NWS).
However recent Presidents have been dubious folks without real background in Cold War dynamics. Since 911, they have treated nukes as any other weapon. And walked out of strategic arms treaties like ABM and INF Treaty.
Consequence is more nuke weapon states.
US always assured allies they won't come under nuke threats. This is to prevent them acquiring nukes. This is extended deterrence.
In 1990 Bush threatened to use nukes on Chemical and Biological weapons. This is expanded deterrence.
Now if deterrence fails they have to respond.
The problem is nothing new but every joker wants to pretend they did more.
However strategic always meant nuclear weapons. This is core deterrence.. And when NPT was extended US gave negative security assurances which means they won't attack non nuclear weapon states (NWS).
However recent Presidents have been dubious folks without real background in Cold War dynamics. Since 911, they have treated nukes as any other weapon. And walked out of strategic arms treaties like ABM and INF Treaty.
Consequence is more nuke weapon states.
US always assured allies they won't come under nuke threats. This is to prevent them acquiring nukes. This is extended deterrence.
In 1990 Bush threatened to use nukes on Chemical and Biological weapons. This is expanded deterrence.
Now if deterrence fails they have to respond.
The problem is nothing new but every joker wants to pretend they did more.
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BTW, I'm not saying India's current position is an NFU straight jacket. I need to reread this thread and catch up on this topic. Its my impression that we indeed held such a position in the past and were eager to paint ourselves as a "responsible nuclear nation" and get that pat on the back from the "international community". But a lot of water has flown down the Ganga since those pre ABV days...
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It's not a strait jacket but good policy.
ll policies are subject to revisiting with time.
ll policies are subject to revisiting with time.
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By and large yes. I remember debates about how Pakis were able to needle and harass India endlessly to the extent of attacking our parliament among others due to their perceived nuclear impunity for self since they are irresponsible fundamentalists (the islamic bomb label was widely used by Pak those days to spread and reinforce this unstable image which many Indians and others bought into) and India didn't threaten any retaliation except to lament at the UN since she proudly wore the ball and chain of being a responsible n power with a published NFU.
But I agree, expanding n use doctrine to loosely defined scenarios and beyond self to others opens a series of headaches that the present lot of particularly incompetent world leaders and their agenda driven advisors are totally ill equipped to deal with.
But I agree, expanding n use doctrine to loosely defined scenarios and beyond self to others opens a series of headaches that the present lot of particularly incompetent world leaders and their agenda driven advisors are totally ill equipped to deal with.
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My understanding of our NFU as of today is. "We will not use nuclear weapons first, unless we deem the enemy is about to and in such a scenario will not wait to absorb first". The one major change we should advocate for is to move away from (never applied to us!) the logic of the now defunct INF treaty, which argued for strategic stability through signaling and capabilities. Our enemies and our capabilities both do not afford us this luxury. Prefer our entire missile arsenal to be available for "dual" use.
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Fifty such Agni-V will assure unacceptable levels of damage not a complete assured destruction of China capabilities to inflict further damage. Deterrence is a mind game, until it is not. If the entire set of nuclear treaties have taught us something it is how careful they were to ensure numbers needed for MAD and then some were always assured.disha wrote:
Some of this anal-cysts are just that. It is easy to play a numbers game. I have 1000 bums. You have only 100 bums. You must shiver in your dhoti. We know what happened to cheeni bums in Doklam.
Cheen may increase its nuclear arsenal. But unless it can destroy second strike capability of any nation, those bums will result in MAD and hence useless. And for second strike capability, all India has to do is lower some pontoons in the Bay of Bengal with Agni-5. Fifty such Agni-V at 300kt will suffice.
So what's the point of the above analcyst farticle? It is basically a way of cheenis saying that look *because* of your offensive posture, I am spending behind my defensive posterior. It is not me, it is you at fault. Just a way of gaining an upper hand at the chai-biskoot session.
It is another matter that we do not have those number of missiles at required ranges and required vessels to launch. If we are serious about this game with China, will have no choice but to match whatever Chinese numbers are in this area. Just with the new MIRV capabilities alone China will likely up their available warheads 5-10 times. China knew in 86-87 itself with the Sumdorong Chu standoff that India is not to be trifled with. If we have to continue that image (and all for it) we will have no choice but to increase our numbers and continued investments into MIRV, ranges and assured strike assets in the triad.