What Lt.Gen GS Katoch is saying is the Pak I crops lost two brigades on 33rd Pak division, one to counter the Indian 11th division in Naya Chor area and the to reinforce Pak 18th Div elements at Longewala prevented the launch of their attack in Punjab.
And 1st Armored was lurking in Punjab.
So the battle of Rajasthan had a big impact in the battle for Punjab.
1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
https://www.claws.in/static/MP_90-India ... r-1971.pdf
India-Pakistan-war-1971
Examining-the-evolution-of-indias-decision-making-for-the-war
A 42-page pdf...
India-Pakistan-war-1971
Examining-the-evolution-of-indias-decision-making-for-the-war
A 42-page pdf...
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
Mushy keeps talking abt how him and his 10 foot SSG kammandus were going to be para dropped to take a bridge and ordered to linkup with Advancing armour but Niazi had surrendered by then and the OP was cancelled. i always thought he pulled this story out of his Musharraf.ramana wrote:What Lt.Gen GS Katoch is saying is the Pak I crops lost two brigades on 33rd Pak division, one to counter the Indian 11th division in Naya Chor area and the to reinforce Pak 18th Div elements at Longewala prevented the launch of their attack in Punjab.
And 1st Armored was lurking in Punjab.
So the battle of Rajasthan had a big impact in the battle for Punjab.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
https://twitter.com/News9Plus/status/15 ... 7uH9scgdHA ---> Watch #NervesOfSteel, a #News9Plus special series on one of the most glorious chapters of India's military history - the victory in the #IndPakWar of 1971.
http://bit.ly/3aHzTMm
Story by: @sapna1singla, @niki0292
http://bit.ly/3aHzTMm
Story by: @sapna1singla, @niki0292
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
US wanted China to intervene against India in 1971 War
https://www.rediff.com/news/column/clau ... 211216.htm
16 Dec 2021
https://www.rediff.com/news/column/clau ... 211216.htm
16 Dec 2021
-
ArjunPandit
- BRF Oldie
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
pk army didnt distinguish itself even in punjab..battle of basantar was case..despite of sending reinforcements and afterattacks they could not regain waht they lost thereramana wrote:What Lt.Gen GS Katoch is saying is the Pak I crops lost two brigades on 33rd Pak division, one to counter the Indian 11th division in Naya Chor area and the to reinforce Pak 18th Div elements at Longewala prevented the launch of their attack in Punjab.
And 1st Armored was lurking in Punjab.
So the battle of Rajasthan had a big impact in the battle for Punjab.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
My father took part in the IN raid on Karachi in 71. He was on INS Kiltan. One interesting insight was that they spoke in Russian (if they were forced to use radio) to avoid Pak listening in to their communication. Many of the officers had been trained in the USSR.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
Yes, we didn't want a repeat of Pak's 1965 offensive in Assal Uttar. They had a good plan which was badly executed. In 1971, Tikka Khan's II CorpsBishwa wrote:I believe 1st Armoured Div was kept in reserve to counter the Pakistan Armoured Division. It may have been in Punjab, Muktsar area.ramana wrote:One surprise to me is the total lack of activity of 1st Armoured Division, aka Black Elephant division.
On the Western front, we saw action in Kashmir(defensive), Shakargarh(Basantar), Rajasthan (Longewala and the Para raids).
But not much action in the Punjab sector except for the Battle of Basantar (a brigade-level attack).
Why?
Was Basantar a prelude to launch 1 st Armored?
comprising its 1st Armoured and 33 infantry division was tasked to attack between Ganganagar and south of the Sutlej in Southern Punjab. To counter that, we had 3 brigades in a defensive posture covering the possible axis of attack and to counterattack, had our 1st Armored division and 14th Infantry division. The book `India's wars since independence' by Maj. Gen Sukhwant Singh gives a good account of operations in this sector.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
A good description of the Battle of Burj in Punjab.
https://forceindia.net/guest-column/gut ... s-victory/
https://forceindia.net/guest-column/gut ... s-victory/
...Between 6 and 17 December 1971, the Burj Post was central to several close quarter skirmishes hovering around it. There were the battles for Vera (Vehra) and Bhindi Aulakh with the Ganpats holding on; the recapture of Chhan Kalan which ended successfully on 17 December 1971. Post war, the enemy was rendered hors de combat — unfit for battle. Such serious loss and mauling eventually led to disbanding of 43 Baluch, a disgrace which shamed the Pakistanis.
As a fighting entity, the Ganpats won 16 awards of which most were won by Ranbir’s company (13) including 1 MVC and six VrCs. Ranbir recovered from his wounds and, on discharge from MH in June 1972, accompanied GOC 11 Corps on a helicopter to explain the Burj battle to him after which he was awarded a delayed VrC. He later did a land tour and carried out Battle Study Burj for GOC 15 Inf Div, all Brigade Commanders and COs. Immediately after that, he was posted as CO 4 Maratha LI to Tanot.
In terms of recoveries and cumulative enemy casualties, Ranbir’s lads between 3 and 9 December captured 11 BMG’s, 17 rifles, 9mm sten-guns, 2 RLs, 1 RCL, and mainstream Signals equipment. The enemy suffered 52 dead, several times that number wounded with two companies rendered unfit for war. The December 9 Vera (Vehra) attack had 32 Baluchis dead. The Ganpats overall had 30 killed against over 200 killed and wounded for 43 Baluch. Ready to capture Bhago-Kamo, the Ganpats were chagrined because cease-fire intervened.
As Battle Honours go, Burj will remain a landmark battle like few others. That said, it is hard to understand why the formation did not take the lead in capturing the enclaves and posing a serious threat to Pakistani lines of communication and their vital communication centres/nodes. Clearly, the formation had very capable troops and leadership and should have taken the plunge to use them brilliantly in offensive operations.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
The (still) missing 54.
A very detailed article by Op India. And a hard one.
Missing 54: The heroes who never returned after the 1971 war, who they were and the chronology of the quest to get them back
A very detailed article by Op India. And a hard one.
Missing 54: The heroes who never returned after the 1971 war, who they were and the chronology of the quest to get them back
It has been 51 years since India won the 1971 war against Pakistan, and Bangladesh was born. No Indian can forget the legendary photograph of Pakistani Commander of Eastern Command Lt-Gen AAK Niazi signing the Instrument of Surrender in Decca. Lt-Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, Vice Adm N Krishnan, Air Marshall HC Dewan, Lt-Gen Sagat Singh, Maj Gen JFR Jacob and Flt LT Krishnamurthy witnessed the historic moment. Each of them played an important role in India’s victory. At that time, India captured 93,007 Prisoners Of War, out of which 72,795 were Pakistani soldiers. Later, all of them were sent back to Pakistan as per the Shimla Agreement and under the provisions of the Geneva Convention on POWs.
While India fulfilled its duty as a mature nation, Pakistan did just the opposite. For the last 51 years, India has been waiting for information on the whereabouts of its 54 soldiers, officers and fighter pilots who were captured as POWs by the hostile nation sitting right next to us. The Government of India has marked them as ‘Missing In Action’. Sadly, the Pakistani government has repeatedly denied the presence of the 54 soldiers in the country. It is notable that in 1989, former President of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s lawyer was informed that there were POWs in the same prison where Bhutto was lodged in Lahore. The incident found its mention in a book, but later President Pervez Musharraf denied the presence of the 54 POWs in Pakistan.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... rup-277934
Lt Col Dilbag Singh Dabas (Retd)
Chakra awards are associated with the bravery displayed in the face of the enemy. During war, the senior-level commanders’ primary role is planning of operations based on overall strategy and for that they need not be personally facing the enemy. They perform the most challenging tasks by formulating operational plans sufficiently simple and flexible for the junior commanders and leaders to execute.
A military operation seldom proceeds as planned because the enemy’s reaction can never be factored in since his representative wouldn’t be on board while planning. During execution, the senior commanders follow minute-to-minute progress of the battle and should the execution get stalled or even boomerangs, take on-the-spot decisions to ensure success. They are not just responsible but also accountable for the successes as well as failures. By shouldering such huge responsibility, and being accountable for the outcomes, are they any less Virs or Maha Virs?
Brigadier Hardev Singh Kler, AVSM, and Brigadier Anand Sarup are among the seven Brigadier-ranked officers awarded the Maha Vir Chakra during the 1971 India-Pakistan war on the eastern front.
Brig Kler, a third generation soldier, belonged to the illustrious Kler family of Kakrala Kalan near Ludhiana. His father Captain Chhajja Singh earned the Order of British India (OBI) award during the Second World War. Hardev, his second son, carried forward the legacy earning the Ati Vishist Seva Medal in the 1965 India-Pakistan war and the Maha Vir Chakra during Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ in 1971, thus becoming the highest decorated Kler in the family.
After graduation from Gordon College, Rawalpindi, Hardev was commissioned into the Corps of Signals in 1943. At 19, he was the youngest Indian to have been commissioned into the British Indian Army. After five mandatory parachute jumps as a volunteer, he was given an option to permanently get seconded to the elite Paratroopers Brigade. Hardev, now a Captain, declined the option, and not without considered reason; Captain Chhajja Singh, his father, had earned all the laurels as a dedicated Signalman and young Hardev preferred following in the footsteps of the senior.
During the 1965 war, Hardev, as Lieutenant Colonel, for his distinguished wartime services rendered during ‘Operation Gibraltar’ was awarded the AVSM, a rare honour for a Lt Col.
During Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, Hardev Kler, now a Brigadier, while commanding 95 Mountain Brigade in the eastern theatre, boldly led the advance with Dhaka as the terminal objective. By December 8, the brigade under his command contacted Jamalpur, strongly held by Pakistan’s 93 Infantry Brigade. The fortress Jamalpur, though encircled, held on even after Brig Kler, through a messenger, urged Lt Col Sultan, the head of Jamalpur Garrison, to surrender. The reply by the Pakistani Col showed that despite the chips going down steadily, the morale of the Pakistani commanders was far from down. Sultan sent back a defiant reply, enclosing a bullet in his letter. The letter reproduced below surely deserves a place in military history.
Dear Brig,
Hope this finds you in high spirits. Thanks for the letter.
We here in Jamalpur are waiting for the fight to commence. It has not started yet. So let us not talk and start it. 40 air sorties, I may point out, are inadequate. Please ask for many more.
Your remark about your messenger being given proper treatment was superfluous. Shows how you underestimate my boys. I hope he liked his tea. Give my love to Muktis.
Hoping to find you with a sten gun in your hand next time, instead of the pen you seem to have so much mastery over.
I am, your most sincerely
[Col Sultan]
Col Sultan, however, was unaware of the fact that when he dispatched the letter, with a 9 mm live bullet enclosed, the 95 Mountain Brigade Group was sitting behind him south of Jamalpur.
During the final assault on Jamalpur by 1 Maratha Light Infantry, Brig Kler advanced along with the forward platoon of the Marathas, with a loaded sten gun in hand. But he could not show to his counterpart that though a Signalman, he was equally proficient in handling the small arms, since on the night of December 10/11, Col Sultan along with Brig Abdul Qadir Khan, Commander of 93 Pakistan Infantry Brigade, together with 31 Baluch had pulled out of Jamalpur and took defences at Tangail 9 km in the rear.
Throughout, Brig Kler remained close to the leading troops and ensured the execution of his plan, without breathing on the neck of the commanding officers.
In recognition of his bold planning, execution and personal conspicuous bravery, Brig Hardev Singh Kler, AVSM, was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. The citation reads:
“Brigadier Hardev Singh Kler, AVSM, was commanding a mountain brigade on the eastern front. He led the advance of his brigade from Jamalpur up to Turag river. During all the actions in the advance, Brig Kler was personally present with the leading troops and directed the operations with complete disregard to his life. By personally going into the thick of the battle, he provided great inspiration to his troops who had laid siege behind enemy positions south of Jamalpur. Under his command, the brigade inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and captured 379 prisoners as well as large quantities of weapons and ammunition.”
His son, Flight Lieutenant DJS Kler, also fought the war in the eastern theatre and in the same sector — quite unusual for father and son fighting on the same front.
Brigadier Anand Sarup’s father Khem Chand was a Viceroy Commissioned officer (present day Junior Commissioned Officers), but Anand aspired to be an Indian Commissioned Officer.
After Senior Cambridge from King George’s Royal Military College, Jalandhar, Anand cleared the Indian Military Academy entrance test. Despite communal tension prevailing in Punjab as a fallout of Partition, he made his way from Jalandhar to the Services Selection Centre at Meerut as a stowaway in a vehicle carrying a British Colonel’s luggage. After successfully clearing the selection process, Anand joined the Academy and was commissioned into 8 Gorkha Rifles in 1949.
Just before the 1971 war, Anand Sarup, now a Brigadier and Commandant of the Counter Insurgency & Jungle Warfare School in Mizoram, was handed down the command of an ad hoc establishment named ‘Kilo Force’ created with two regular modified infantry battalions (31 Jat and 32 Mahar, present day 12 Jat and 15 Mahar) from Mizo Hills, 4th and 10th East Bengal Battalions, 92nd BSF battalion, one CRP battalion, one Mukti Fauj battalion, an artillery mountain regiment, Mujib artillery battery and a BSF Post Group.
Within a fortnight of the raising of the ad hoc force, after intensive yet planned joint training, Brig Sarup welded 5,000 to 6,000 men under his command into a cohesive fighting force. At the outbreak of war, ‘K’ force was launched into the battle from its firm base in Mizoram near East Pakistan border.
After declaration of the war on December 3, the Kilo Force surged forward. After winning over some hard skirmishes en route, the hot pursuit got stalled at Feni town, which was strongly defended by two enemy companies. Feni was a tactically important road and rail route to Chittagong harbour and needed to be captured to cut off the harbour from the rest of East Pakistan. Based on a reconnaissance report, Brig Sarup formulated a bold plan and by December 6, Feni was captured.
The force also captured and occupied Karrehat and Zorarganj by December 8 and commenced its advance to Chittagong. To speed up the capture of Chittagong, Kilo Force was reinforced with 83 Mountain Brigade under the overall command of Brig Sarup. After fighting through and clearing Kumarighat held strongly by two enemy companies, 15 Baluch and 25 Frontier Force, Kilo Force reached Faujdahat on the outskirts of Chittagong on the night of December 13/14 when operations were suspended.
At Faujdahat, the force, under the dynamic leadership of Brig Sarup, intercepted the enemy’s withdrawal and captured almost a battalion size of Prisoners of War and a great amount of arms and ammunition. The aggressive role played by the ‘K’ force contributed a lot in the Indian Army’s comprehensive and early victory on the eastern front.
During the entire operation, Brig Sarup, for his bold planning, outstanding leadership and conspicuous bravery, was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. The battle account on his award reads:
“Brigadier Anand Sarup was allotted the task of organising and launching into battle an ad hoc force for engaging the enemy at Pathanagar and in the area north of Feni town in eastern theatre. He organised and trained this force in a very short period and the troops under his command fought gallantly during the battles at Feni, Nazirhat, Kumarighat and Faujdahat. During the operations, Brig Sarup was constantly on the move, well forward with his troops, directing the operations. Under his leadership, the capture of Feni isolated the Chittagong harbour, which negated the war effort of Pakistan to a great extent. Capture of strongly held Kumarighat defended locality was truly the hallmark of the bold and innovative planning by Brig Sarup and equally bold execution by the troops under his command.”
Both the Maha Virs superannuated as General Officers.
To make the wartime decorations for the middle and senior-level commanders appear more realistic and down to earth, during IPKF operations in Sri Lanka in 1987, Yudh Seva Medals (Yudh Seva Medal, Uttam Yudh Seva Medal and Sarvottam Yudh Seva Medal) were instituted. The aim was to acknowledge the wartime distinguished services rendered by them, the services that carry a huge burden of responsibility and accountability irrespective of their not being in the face of the enemy.
Lt Col Dilbag Singh Dabas (Retd)
Chakra awards are associated with the bravery displayed in the face of the enemy. During war, the senior-level commanders’ primary role is planning of operations based on overall strategy and for that they need not be personally facing the enemy. They perform the most challenging tasks by formulating operational plans sufficiently simple and flexible for the junior commanders and leaders to execute.
A military operation seldom proceeds as planned because the enemy’s reaction can never be factored in since his representative wouldn’t be on board while planning. During execution, the senior commanders follow minute-to-minute progress of the battle and should the execution get stalled or even boomerangs, take on-the-spot decisions to ensure success. They are not just responsible but also accountable for the successes as well as failures. By shouldering such huge responsibility, and being accountable for the outcomes, are they any less Virs or Maha Virs?
Brigadier Hardev Singh Kler, AVSM, and Brigadier Anand Sarup are among the seven Brigadier-ranked officers awarded the Maha Vir Chakra during the 1971 India-Pakistan war on the eastern front.
Brig Kler, a third generation soldier, belonged to the illustrious Kler family of Kakrala Kalan near Ludhiana. His father Captain Chhajja Singh earned the Order of British India (OBI) award during the Second World War. Hardev, his second son, carried forward the legacy earning the Ati Vishist Seva Medal in the 1965 India-Pakistan war and the Maha Vir Chakra during Operation ‘Cactus Lily’ in 1971, thus becoming the highest decorated Kler in the family.
After graduation from Gordon College, Rawalpindi, Hardev was commissioned into the Corps of Signals in 1943. At 19, he was the youngest Indian to have been commissioned into the British Indian Army. After five mandatory parachute jumps as a volunteer, he was given an option to permanently get seconded to the elite Paratroopers Brigade. Hardev, now a Captain, declined the option, and not without considered reason; Captain Chhajja Singh, his father, had earned all the laurels as a dedicated Signalman and young Hardev preferred following in the footsteps of the senior.
During the 1965 war, Hardev, as Lieutenant Colonel, for his distinguished wartime services rendered during ‘Operation Gibraltar’ was awarded the AVSM, a rare honour for a Lt Col.
During Operation ‘Cactus Lily’, Hardev Kler, now a Brigadier, while commanding 95 Mountain Brigade in the eastern theatre, boldly led the advance with Dhaka as the terminal objective. By December 8, the brigade under his command contacted Jamalpur, strongly held by Pakistan’s 93 Infantry Brigade. The fortress Jamalpur, though encircled, held on even after Brig Kler, through a messenger, urged Lt Col Sultan, the head of Jamalpur Garrison, to surrender. The reply by the Pakistani Col showed that despite the chips going down steadily, the morale of the Pakistani commanders was far from down. Sultan sent back a defiant reply, enclosing a bullet in his letter. The letter reproduced below surely deserves a place in military history.
Dear Brig,
Hope this finds you in high spirits. Thanks for the letter.
We here in Jamalpur are waiting for the fight to commence. It has not started yet. So let us not talk and start it. 40 air sorties, I may point out, are inadequate. Please ask for many more.
Your remark about your messenger being given proper treatment was superfluous. Shows how you underestimate my boys. I hope he liked his tea. Give my love to Muktis.
Hoping to find you with a sten gun in your hand next time, instead of the pen you seem to have so much mastery over.
I am, your most sincerely
[Col Sultan]
Col Sultan, however, was unaware of the fact that when he dispatched the letter, with a 9 mm live bullet enclosed, the 95 Mountain Brigade Group was sitting behind him south of Jamalpur.
During the final assault on Jamalpur by 1 Maratha Light Infantry, Brig Kler advanced along with the forward platoon of the Marathas, with a loaded sten gun in hand. But he could not show to his counterpart that though a Signalman, he was equally proficient in handling the small arms, since on the night of December 10/11, Col Sultan along with Brig Abdul Qadir Khan, Commander of 93 Pakistan Infantry Brigade, together with 31 Baluch had pulled out of Jamalpur and took defences at Tangail 9 km in the rear.
Throughout, Brig Kler remained close to the leading troops and ensured the execution of his plan, without breathing on the neck of the commanding officers.
In recognition of his bold planning, execution and personal conspicuous bravery, Brig Hardev Singh Kler, AVSM, was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. The citation reads:
“Brigadier Hardev Singh Kler, AVSM, was commanding a mountain brigade on the eastern front. He led the advance of his brigade from Jamalpur up to Turag river. During all the actions in the advance, Brig Kler was personally present with the leading troops and directed the operations with complete disregard to his life. By personally going into the thick of the battle, he provided great inspiration to his troops who had laid siege behind enemy positions south of Jamalpur. Under his command, the brigade inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and captured 379 prisoners as well as large quantities of weapons and ammunition.”
His son, Flight Lieutenant DJS Kler, also fought the war in the eastern theatre and in the same sector — quite unusual for father and son fighting on the same front.
Brigadier Anand Sarup’s father Khem Chand was a Viceroy Commissioned officer (present day Junior Commissioned Officers), but Anand aspired to be an Indian Commissioned Officer.
After Senior Cambridge from King George’s Royal Military College, Jalandhar, Anand cleared the Indian Military Academy entrance test. Despite communal tension prevailing in Punjab as a fallout of Partition, he made his way from Jalandhar to the Services Selection Centre at Meerut as a stowaway in a vehicle carrying a British Colonel’s luggage. After successfully clearing the selection process, Anand joined the Academy and was commissioned into 8 Gorkha Rifles in 1949.
Just before the 1971 war, Anand Sarup, now a Brigadier and Commandant of the Counter Insurgency & Jungle Warfare School in Mizoram, was handed down the command of an ad hoc establishment named ‘Kilo Force’ created with two regular modified infantry battalions (31 Jat and 32 Mahar, present day 12 Jat and 15 Mahar) from Mizo Hills, 4th and 10th East Bengal Battalions, 92nd BSF battalion, one CRP battalion, one Mukti Fauj battalion, an artillery mountain regiment, Mujib artillery battery and a BSF Post Group.
Within a fortnight of the raising of the ad hoc force, after intensive yet planned joint training, Brig Sarup welded 5,000 to 6,000 men under his command into a cohesive fighting force. At the outbreak of war, ‘K’ force was launched into the battle from its firm base in Mizoram near East Pakistan border.
After declaration of the war on December 3, the Kilo Force surged forward. After winning over some hard skirmishes en route, the hot pursuit got stalled at Feni town, which was strongly defended by two enemy companies. Feni was a tactically important road and rail route to Chittagong harbour and needed to be captured to cut off the harbour from the rest of East Pakistan. Based on a reconnaissance report, Brig Sarup formulated a bold plan and by December 6, Feni was captured.
The force also captured and occupied Karrehat and Zorarganj by December 8 and commenced its advance to Chittagong. To speed up the capture of Chittagong, Kilo Force was reinforced with 83 Mountain Brigade under the overall command of Brig Sarup. After fighting through and clearing Kumarighat held strongly by two enemy companies, 15 Baluch and 25 Frontier Force, Kilo Force reached Faujdahat on the outskirts of Chittagong on the night of December 13/14 when operations were suspended.
At Faujdahat, the force, under the dynamic leadership of Brig Sarup, intercepted the enemy’s withdrawal and captured almost a battalion size of Prisoners of War and a great amount of arms and ammunition. The aggressive role played by the ‘K’ force contributed a lot in the Indian Army’s comprehensive and early victory on the eastern front.
During the entire operation, Brig Sarup, for his bold planning, outstanding leadership and conspicuous bravery, was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. The battle account on his award reads:
“Brigadier Anand Sarup was allotted the task of organising and launching into battle an ad hoc force for engaging the enemy at Pathanagar and in the area north of Feni town in eastern theatre. He organised and trained this force in a very short period and the troops under his command fought gallantly during the battles at Feni, Nazirhat, Kumarighat and Faujdahat. During the operations, Brig Sarup was constantly on the move, well forward with his troops, directing the operations. Under his leadership, the capture of Feni isolated the Chittagong harbour, which negated the war effort of Pakistan to a great extent. Capture of strongly held Kumarighat defended locality was truly the hallmark of the bold and innovative planning by Brig Sarup and equally bold execution by the troops under his command.”
Both the Maha Virs superannuated as General Officers.
To make the wartime decorations for the middle and senior-level commanders appear more realistic and down to earth, during IPKF operations in Sri Lanka in 1987, Yudh Seva Medals (Yudh Seva Medal, Uttam Yudh Seva Medal and Sarvottam Yudh Seva Medal) were instituted. The aim was to acknowledge the wartime distinguished services rendered by them, the services that carry a huge burden of responsibility and accountability irrespective of their not being in the face of the enemy.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
I recall when the Paki officer met Brig HS Kler, he asked which branch he was in?
And expressed surprise that a Signals Brig was leading the force!!!
And expressed surprise that a Signals Brig was leading the force!!!
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MeshaVishwas
- BRFite
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- Joined: 16 Feb 2019 17:20
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
A report from AP(Paki PoV more or less) on the war(in colour)
Edit: Adding more parts as I find them
Nothing more from AP archives but a superb documentary film by GoI on the war:
Edit: Adding more parts as I find them
Nothing more from AP archives but a superb documentary film by GoI on the war:
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
Tyar Bar Tyar: 4 Horse, Hodson's Horse at the Battle of Jharpal 1971:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqWKrWsG254
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqWKrWsG254
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
17 Poona Horse Fakhr-e-Hind (The Hand of God!!) at the Shakargarh salient, the battle of Basantar. A very good documentary. This is the battle where Arun Khetrapal was awarded the PVC, posthumously:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_p2CVZuujnc
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/17th_Horse_(Poona_Horse)
Lt.-Gen Hanut Singh one of the most brilliant Army commanders commanded Poona Horse at 1971 as a Lt.-Col.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_p2CVZuujnc
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/17th_Horse_(Poona_Horse)
Lt.-Gen Hanut Singh one of the most brilliant Army commanders commanded Poona Horse at 1971 as a Lt.-Col.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
Doesn't the word mean 'pride of india' ?vsunder wrote:17 Poona Horse Fakhr-e-Hind (The Hand of God!!) at the Shakargarh salient, the battle of Basantar....
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
Yes. Manish is correctManish_P wrote:Doesn't the word mean 'pride of india' ?vsunder wrote:17 Poona Horse Fakhr-e-Hind (The Hand of God!!) at the Shakargarh salient, the battle of Basantar....
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
@Kakkaji, you stopped posting in math dhaga.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
It appears forumers do not know The Hand of God. Poona Horse has a very famous Battle Honor Koosab where they captured a finial.
https://collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php ... 98-03-29-1
This Hand of God is in the Officer's Mess of the Poona Horse. I said two things in my post, Fakhr-e-Hind and Hand of God, Hand of God was NOT supposed to be a translation of Fakhr-e-Hind but recalling this Hand of God. For more on this:
https://twitter.com/joe_sameer/status/1 ... 01?lang=en
PS: Lt-Col. Hanut "Hunty" Singh's tank at the Battle of Basantar was named Kooshab from this famous engagement. Sameer Joshi ^^^ wrote a book with Jagan here.
See my post on 4 Horse, Hodson's. I start my post with Tyar Bar Tyar, which is the motto of 4 Horse. It translates to Utrinque Paratus loosely which is the motto of another famous unit, you can google and find out.
https://collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php ... 98-03-29-1
This Hand of God is in the Officer's Mess of the Poona Horse. I said two things in my post, Fakhr-e-Hind and Hand of God, Hand of God was NOT supposed to be a translation of Fakhr-e-Hind but recalling this Hand of God. For more on this:
https://twitter.com/joe_sameer/status/1 ... 01?lang=en
PS: Lt-Col. Hanut "Hunty" Singh's tank at the Battle of Basantar was named Kooshab from this famous engagement. Sameer Joshi ^^^ wrote a book with Jagan here.
See my post on 4 Horse, Hodson's. I start my post with Tyar Bar Tyar, which is the motto of 4 Horse. It translates to Utrinque Paratus loosely which is the motto of another famous unit, you can google and find out.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
^ Thanks for the sharing.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
Today marks the surrender of Pak Army and creation.of Bangladesj
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
The Day India Broke Pakistan | 1971 War in the Eastern Theatre | Vijay Diwas Special | Brig BS Mehta & Colonel Nitin Chandra
via Jaipur Dialogues as India celebrates Vijay Divas and celebrates the victory of Indian Armed Forces in 1971 war, over adversary Pakistan. Happy Vijay Diwas To Every Patriotic Bhartiya and Happy Surrender Day to every Puki Citizen. The birth of BD owes its existence to the Indian armed forces, political leadership of PM Indira Gandhi and the leadership in battle of Field Marshall Sam Manekshaw.
Brigadier Balram Singh Mehta and Colonel Nitin Chandra join Sanjay Dixit to discuss the humiliating defeat of the Pak Army resulting in the capture of 93000 POW, with focus on the Eastern Theatre and the fall of Dhaka.
Fighting formations of the Eastern Command which went to war in this Theatre were the 33 Corps, 4 Corps, 11 Communication Zone and the newly raised Strike Corps i.e., 2 Corps. 2 Corps was tasked for operations in the South Western sector of East Pakistan. The terrain in this sector was riverine with loose sand and criss-crossed by large number of rivulets, ponds and trees. The newly raised 2 Corps was allotted one tank regiment i.e., 45 cavalry (in which Brig Mehta was 2nd in command as a Captain), which had PT 76 light amphibious tanks (which in the recently released movie Pippa were famously known by the same name) was an ideally suited tank to operate and fight in this terrain. From the battle of Garibpur on 21 Nov 71 till the surrender was announced on 16 Dec 1971, 45 Cavalry fought 29 battles with 17 infantry battalions which is a record in itself, and lived up to it's war cry वीर भोग्या वसुंधरा
Saluting all the brave soldiers who fought, some gave their lives.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21nNyXvNonM
via Jaipur Dialogues as India celebrates Vijay Divas and celebrates the victory of Indian Armed Forces in 1971 war, over adversary Pakistan. Happy Vijay Diwas To Every Patriotic Bhartiya and Happy Surrender Day to every Puki Citizen. The birth of BD owes its existence to the Indian armed forces, political leadership of PM Indira Gandhi and the leadership in battle of Field Marshall Sam Manekshaw.
Brigadier Balram Singh Mehta and Colonel Nitin Chandra join Sanjay Dixit to discuss the humiliating defeat of the Pak Army resulting in the capture of 93000 POW, with focus on the Eastern Theatre and the fall of Dhaka.
Fighting formations of the Eastern Command which went to war in this Theatre were the 33 Corps, 4 Corps, 11 Communication Zone and the newly raised Strike Corps i.e., 2 Corps. 2 Corps was tasked for operations in the South Western sector of East Pakistan. The terrain in this sector was riverine with loose sand and criss-crossed by large number of rivulets, ponds and trees. The newly raised 2 Corps was allotted one tank regiment i.e., 45 cavalry (in which Brig Mehta was 2nd in command as a Captain), which had PT 76 light amphibious tanks (which in the recently released movie Pippa were famously known by the same name) was an ideally suited tank to operate and fight in this terrain. From the battle of Garibpur on 21 Nov 71 till the surrender was announced on 16 Dec 1971, 45 Cavalry fought 29 battles with 17 infantry battalions which is a record in itself, and lived up to it's war cry वीर भोग्या वसुंधरा
Saluting all the brave soldiers who fought, some gave their lives.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21nNyXvNonM
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
India held a quarter of the Pakistani Army and a big portion of their land after the 1971 war but returned them without negotiating for anything. Not even securing the release of its own prisoners of war before releasing theirs.
We could have permanently resolved the Kashmir issue, but Indira failed to capitalize on the battlefield victory, wasting the advantage gained at the expense of soldiers' blood.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1735888696854143115
please share ..
words of Field Marshal Manekshaw himself!!! .. any wonder the legendary soldier was denied the honours he deserved when alive ?!!
We could have permanently resolved the Kashmir issue, but Indira failed to capitalize on the battlefield victory, wasting the advantage gained at the expense of soldiers' blood.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1735888696854143115
please share ..
words of Field Marshal Manekshaw himself!!! .. any wonder the legendary soldier was denied the honours he deserved when alive ?!!
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
https://x.com/Victorforce2/status/17501 ... 18117?s=20 ---> Colorized photo of Indian Army soldiers along with a RCL jeep during Indo-Pak war of 1971.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
Nicely done photo. Doesn't even look artificially colorized.
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
One query - is there any book focussing on on Sam Manekshaw's generalship rather than his personality? While I have read the books by General Depinder Singh and Haldi Falki, both seem to be more about FM Manekshaw's flamboyance rather than his military skills. For example, what was his analysis of failures in the 1965 war and how did he bring about required changes in strategy/ tactics/ equipment in the Indian army? Hoping for an equivalent of PC Lal's "My Years with the IAF"...
Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion
https://m.tribuneindia.com/news/india/h ... ion-619251
Half a century after receiving Maha Vir Chakra in 1971 war, injured Navy diver who trained Mukti Bahini seeks grant of special pension
excerpts
Half a century after receiving Maha Vir Chakra in 1971 war, injured Navy diver who trained Mukti Bahini seeks grant of special pension
excerpts
During the war, he was seriously injured during a fiercely fought operation at Khulna harbour, and when Pakistan was preparing to surrender, he was taken prisoner of war (POW) along with a few other naval personnel.
After the surrender of Pakistan, the POWs were rescued by the Indian Army, who were not given any treatment in captivity, and airlifted to the Eastern Command Hospital, then to Military Hospital, Secunderabad, and finally to Bombay for treatment, which carried on for about six months.
In March 1972, he was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, the second highest gallantry award.
“While operating off Khulna his boat was sunk. He was very badly wounded by shrapnel. Enemy shore defences opened fire at the survivors in the water. Leading Seaman Singh noticed that two survivors, including an injured officer, were finding it difficult to keep afloat. In spite of the injuries and unmindful of his personal safety he went to their rescue and escorted them to the shore through heavy enemy fire. On reaching the shore, in spite of his wound he rushed at the enemy exposing himself to the enemy fire, thereby making it possible for his two colleagues to escape from being captured by the enemy. Leading Seaman Singh was eventually overpowered and taken prisoner by the enemy,” his citation states.