Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

[ramana]

Changing gears.

Some huge realignment is going on between the big Four: US, China, India, and Russia. The Ukraine War has reduced UK, France, and Germany to non-entities. Japan.is trying to.find itself but faces a huge China.

[hgupta]

Unless India secures its own energy supplies, produces its own engines, and semiconductors, India will remain a small player despite its size and economy. It has to show that it is capable of withstanding blackmail attempts and still achieve its national goals. That means Modi cannot buckle under the onslaught by US and Canada wrt Khalistanis. If necessary, India must openly declare a dead or alive bounty on Pannu and his co-conspirators.

Therefore, India remains lower on the pecking order.

[Aldonkar]

Unless India secures its own energy supplies, produces its own engines, and semiconductors, India will remain a small player despite its size and economy. It has to show that it is capable of withstanding blackmail attempts and still achieve its national goals. That means Modi cannot buckle under the onslaught by US and Canada wrt Khalistanis. If necessary, India must openly declare a dead or alive bounty on Pannu and his co-conspirators.

Therefore, India remains lower on the pecking order.

Although India has made ground recently, it has far to go. In my own industry (electronics) I see so many weakness. This is being rectified by enticing companies such as Foxton (hope I have got it right) to manufacture in India but also there needs to be a change in attitude from the Public in that they need to see Indian manufacture as an asset. The quality may be inferior for a short wile but will improve. I remember going through this with Hong Kong, earlier Japan and even countries such as Holland (I am older than Modi!).

I blame the previous governments of India for not encouraging manufacturing as a means to gain employment for ordinary people. This government is the only one that has begun to tackle the problem.

[A_Gupta]

Not sure this is the correct China thread to post this in.
https://www.npr.org/2023/12/20/12205590 ... pects-wane

Last year, one of China's most popular buzzwords was runology, a pun referring to the art and science of emigrating. This year, China's middle class still has plenty of reasons to vote with their feet - a government crackdown on tycoons, a faltering real estate sector and geopolitical jousting with the U.S. But the journalist says that for people like himself, it basically boils down to three things. He says in Chinese...

(Through interpreter) One is your children's education and medical care. The other is the long-term safety of your family's assets. And for people in the fields of culture and media, there's another demand, which is freedom of thought and speech.

...
....
KUHN: Of course, Chinese have been emigrating, sojourning and going into exile in Japan for a long time. They include people like statesman Sun Yat-sen. In the early 1900s, Sun organized a revolutionary party based in Japan that overthrew the last Chinese imperial dynasty. Tokyo University China expert Akio Takahara explains.

AKIO TAKAHARA: A hundred years ago, all those revolutionaries came to Japan and found Japan as a good base, as it were, to prepare for the political change. And it is possible that Japan will play some kind of a role similar to that in the future.

KUHN: You can see that at the One Way Street bookstore in Tokyo's Ginza district, where people come to read and buy books and listen to lectures in Chinese. Bookstores in mainland China used to hold symposia like these where ideas and current events were debated, but in the current political environment, that's no longer possible. One of the speakers is Hu Ang, a professor of architecture at Tokyo University. He explains what brought him to settle in Japan.

HU ANG: (Through interpreter) In Kyoto, you can see the graceful architectural style of Tang and Song dynasty China. It's preserved in some places in China, but the place to find traditional Chinese culture preserved in a systematic and complete way is actually in Japan.

KUHN: Hu studied in the U.S. and taught at Oxford. But he says it was not until he came to Japan that he felt he returned to his cultural roots.

HU: (Through interpreter) When you see so many beautiful gardens and traditional architecture, it helps you to see your cultural lineage clearly, and slowly, the feeling of recognizing your mother culture comes to you.

KUHN: And that sense of belonging could make the difference between a feeling of going into exile, or emigrating, or coming home.

[ramana]

https://twitter.com/DivaJain2/status/17 ... g-egw&s=19

[ramana]

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-ne ... 16807.html

Indian media analysis of
Zhang Jiadong's Global Times article.

[ricky_v]

https://iai.tv/articles/understanding-c ... _auid=2020

Unlike his two predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, Xi Jinping is not a managerial but a transformational leader. He is changing China and intends to make a huge impact on the world. He aims to make what I will refer to as Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics the latest and best rendition of China’s Marxist-Leninist ideology. Having made himself leader for life, Xi will use his Thought to guide Chinese policy in the coming decade or two, if not longer. Now the two are intertwined, if we are to understand China we must understand Xi.

To use the imaginary of the digital era, China’s Leninist political system can be described as the hardware while its governing ideology is the operating system (OS). Xi has kept the hardware in place, but he has altered how it works by replacing the operating system. In effect, China’s system delivered totalitarianism under Mao Zedong’s OS1.0, ruthless authoritarian pragmatism focused on growth under Deng Xiaoping’s OS2.0, and a Sino-centric globally ambitious dictatorship under Xi’s OS3.0.

The one party rule means reinvigorating the Communist Party as a Leninist instrument of control, especially the concept of the Vanguard State enforcing ideology. As Xi has stated publicly, ‘whether it is in the East, West, South, North or in the middle, be it in the party, government, military, civilian or the educational realm, the Party leads everything’. Hence, elements of civil society that had emerged previously have been eliminated under Xi. Anti-corruption will be sustained as it is also used to remove any cadre whose dedication is deemed insufficient.

Beyond China, the China Dream is meant to secure ‘the common destiny of the humankind’. This term is deliberately mistranslated by the Chinese state and media into the anodyne ‘a community of shared future’, a usage adopted uncritically by the Western media and commentariat. The original Chinese term does not include the word ‘community’ which implies its members are equal and have agency of their own. It also clearly refers to ‘destiny’, not a future that is shared voluntarily.

Xi’s ‘common destiny of the humankind’ dovetails with the traditional Chinese concept of the world called tianxia, meaning all under heaven. To Xi, the tianxia paradigm applied when China was united and powerful in history. In this conceptualisation, tianxia prevailed when China led the world in wealth, power, advanced technologies and civilisation. As such China was not only magnificent but also benevolent, so much so that other states would choose to respect, admire and follow the leadership of China. Pax Sinica thus prevailed. To Xi, this is a better international order than the post-war liberal international variant – a façade for US hegemony for the benefit of the US and the rich capitalist Western countries.

To forge the common destiny of humankind, Xi has devised three global initiatives which were released in yearly intervals. They may come across as rhetorical mumbo-jumbo to Western leaders but they are designed to appeal to the Global South.

The first, the Global Development Initiative (2021), advocates that all countries deserve development. It was released when the West prioritised themselves over poor countries in coping with the Covid Pandemic. The Global Security Initiative (2022) was announced when the West focused on European traditional and energy security shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, when the Global South suffered acutely from food and energy insecurity. The Global Civilisation Initiative (2023) ‘pushes for and contributes to world peace and development’ with Xi stressing that ‘forging the common destiny of humankind is where the future of people of all countries lies’.

[A_Gupta]

Is the Chinese high speed maglev in a low-vacuum tube a vanity project or will it be practical?

[ramana]

Link: https://twitter.com/GrahamTAllison/stat ... E8BoA&s=19

He went on to use an interesting metaphor to describe the US-China relationship: “I am in you, and you are in me” (你中有我，我中有你).

[ramana]

Xi understood the Sino-US relationship better than the US ever did.
"We are in you, you are in us!"
Means very visceral to separate as US wants to.

After FSU collapse, US needs an adversary for own existence. GOAT on Islamist terrorism bankrupted the US leading to China showing its ambitions.
Eight years after 2008 financial meltdown XJP gave his 19th Congress speech outlawing China's grand strategy.

COVID pandemic took its toll 9n both countries.

We live in.interesting times.

[Vayutuvan]

Is the Chinese high speed maglev in a low-vacuum tube a vanity project or will it be practical?

Yes.

[ramana]

Plenty of reports from and about China indicate a collapse of the Communist regime.
It would be good to read about previous collapses of regimes and see the common signs.
Eg are
1) French dynasty before Bastille
2) Czarist Russia before the 1917 October revolution
3) 1912 Qin Dynasty
3) FSU collapse in 1992
Please identify the factors and signs.
After that, we see how many are present in the PRC.
Its possible like dead man walking the regime plods along but its vital spirit is gone.

Eg. After Kargil Gamble Pakistan is not what it used to be and most observers noted its a matter of when and not it will collapse.

Galwan represents PRC's Kargil Gamble.

[ramana]

French revolution

Factors
Empty Treasury due to American War of Independence.
Bourgeois and peasants were tired off French nobility
French monarchy since Louis XIII spent money on grand palaces etc.
Enlightenment era that questioned the rights of kings and authority.

Signs
Louis XVI convening the Estat general or Parliament

French nobility distancing from reality.

General economic slowdown causing misery to both Bourgeois and peasantry

These were prevalent for atleast 150 years as Louis XIII started consolidating France.
Please add.

[SSridhar]

Plenty of reports from and about China indicate a collapse of the Communist regime.

Ramana, that is true.

Someone was pointing to protests in memory of Li Keqiang and the stifling of the same by CPC.

It brings out a stark reality underlying the three incidents Nanjing/Tiananmen (1976), Tiananmen (1989) and possibly Li Keqiang (2023/2024). The first two have been defining moments in modern China's history.

All of them were as a result of displeasure against the CCP for not honouring, to the point of even disrespecting, what many in China consider as national heroes.

Zhou en-Lai in 1976, Hu Yaobang in 1989 and now Li.

In some quarters, there is lingering doubt about the sudden death of Li Keqiang.

Will the third be as effective?

[ramana]

As usual BRF is ahead if the curve.

Now watch copycat chatteratti on YouTube saying the same without attribution.

[ramana]

Link: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202404/1310477.shtml

OPINION / EDITORIAL
Modi's remarks on China-India relations are thought-provoking: Global Times editorial
By Global Times Published: Apr 11, 2024 11:51 PM
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi File photo:VCG

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi File photo:VCG

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's "rare" direct statement on China-India ties has been attracting attention. In an exclusive interview with US magazine Newsweek, he stated that for India, the relationship with China is important and significant; India and China "need to urgently address the prolonged situation on our borders so that the abnormality in our bilateral interactions can be put behind us." He said that stable and peaceful relations between India and China are important for not just the two countries but the entire region and world, adding that "I hope and believe that through positive and constructive bilateral engagement at the diplomatic and military levels, we will be able to restore and sustain peace and tranquility in our borders." Reuters interpreted the remarks as "an apparent softening of tone" on China-Indian bilateral issues.

On the Indian side, particularly among officials responsible for diplomacy and the military, occasional comments have been made on China-Indian relations and border issues over the years, sometimes soft, sometimes tough. However, Modi's direct statement, especially his clear position, is quite rare and carefully timed, hence receiving exceptional attention from the public opinion.

The last time his remarks were highly anticipated was when Modi emphasized that peace on India's border with China is essential for normal relations, and that India was committed to protecting its sovereignty and dignity, while attending the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Hiroshima, Japan, last year, which clearly catered to the Western audience who were wishing to see China-India row. This time, his remarks come after the intensification of China-India border tensions due to US' biased stance and before the upcoming elections in India, and are thus more worthy of consideration.

Modi's interview has sent out quite positive signals regarding China-Indian relations. It corrects the recent heating-up trend of India's attitude and actions on border issues, demonstrating a willingness to pragmatically resolve problems and ease bilateral relations.

In fact, this attitude is what China has always adhered to. The border issue is not the whole of China-India ties. It should be placed at an appropriate position in the bilateral relationship and properly managed. Both sides have enough wisdom and ability to resolve the issue through diplomatic and military channels. If India can implement Modi's statement and meet China halfway, bilateral relations moving forward on a healthy and stable track is something that can be expected.

Of course, regarding an interview published in Newsweek, an American magazine with significant influence, Modi clearly understands that the primary audience for these words is in the US and Western public opinion. These statements may not be so "pleasing" to some in Washington who hope to weaken China through worsening relations between China and India, but this is precisely the message India wants to convey to them at the moment. The top authorities of India have maintained a sober cognition toward Washington's desire for escalating "dragon-elephant rivalry" or even to steer China and India toward confrontation, and have kept strategic autonomy in developing relations with China in their own hands. They have also maintained a restrained attitude toward voices both domestically and internationally that hope for further deepening of ties between the US and India, leaving themselves more room for maneuver.

More importantly, these remarks reflect India's perspective on current geopolitical and economic relations. This interview discusses many aspects of India's "rise" in domestic and foreign affairs, and the views and attitudes of Modi, one of the most important candidates in this election, will undoubtedly offer a glimpse into the important direction of India's development in the next stage. Development remains the most important issue for India, necessitating a favorable regional environment. Being in conflict with China would squeeze the resources needed for development, while maintaining relatively stable relations with China is a more advantageous geopolitical and economic choice for India.

In fact, as two of the most eye-catching developing countries in the world, two Asian nations with ancient civilizations, how to perceive their relationship and how to approach development should transcend the mind-set and imagination of viewing each other as either friend or foe, or the zero-sum game of "your strength is my weakness." In fact, China has consistently advocated for India to grasp the bilateral relationship from a strategic and long-term perspective. India faces significant temptations and strategic traps to overcome in doing so, which requires the country to remain vigilant and discard distractions from third parties with ill intentions at all times.

Modiji is diplomat par excellence!

[ramana]

Link: https://twitter.com/RnaudBertrand/statu ... KiEDw&s=19

Wow, China and Russia issued an extraordinary joint statement yesterday, with almost 8,000 words when translated into English, and in many ways more important than the famous "no limits" partnership statement in February 2022.

Here are the points that stood out for me.

BUILDING A NEW WORLD ORDER
The statement says that it is an "objective factor" that "the status and strength of emerging major countries and regions in the 'Global South' [are] continuously increasing", and that "the trend of world multipolarity [is] accelerating". This in turn "accelerates the redistribution of development potential, resources, and opportunities in a direction favorable to emerging markets and developing countries, promoting the democratization of international relations and international fairness and justice".

They point out that "countries that adhere to hegemonism and power politics are contrary to this trend, attempting to replace and subvert the international order based on international law with a so-called 'rules-based order'".

Security-wise, the statement says that "both sides believe that the fate of the peoples of all countries is interconnected, and no country should seek its own security at the expense of others' security. Both sides express concern about the current international and regional security challenges and point out that in the current geopolitical context, it is necessary to explore the establishment of a sustainable security system in the Eurasian space based on the principle of equal and indivisible security."

They go on to say that China and Russia "will fully tap the potential of bilateral relations" in order to "promote the realization of an equal and orderly multipolar world and the democratization of international relations, and gather strength to build a just and reasonable multipolar world".

As for the vision of this world order these 2 principles seem to be the foundational ones:
1) An order with no "neo-colonialism and hegemonism" of any kind: "All countries have the right to independently choose their development models and political, economic, and social systems based on their national conditions and people's will, oppose interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries, oppose unilateral sanctions and 'long-arm jurisdiction' without international law basis or UN Security Council authorization, and oppose drawing ideological lines. Both sides pointed out that neo-colonialism and hegemonism are completely contrary to the trend of the times, and called for equal dialogue, the development of partnerships, and the promotion of exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations."
2) An order based on the UN Charter: "Both sides will continue to firmly defend the achievements of World War II and the post-war world order established by the UN Charter"

EXTREMELY STRONG CONDEMNATION OF THE US
This condemnation starts with the paragraph highlighted above that "countries that adhere to hegemonism and power politics are contrary to [the trend towards a multipolar world order]", and the statement also condemns the fact that these "countries" (i.e. mostly the US) are "attempting to replace and subvert the international order based on international law with a so-called 'rules-based order'".

They also write that "both sides call on relevant countries and organizations to stop taking confrontational policies and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, undermining the existing security architecture, creating 'small yards with high fences' among countries, provoking regional tensions, and advocating for camp confrontation."

They further say that "both sides oppose the hegemonic actions of the United States to change the balance of power in the Northeast Asia region by expanding its military presence and forming military blocs. The US, with its Cold War mentality and camp confrontation model, puts 'small group' security above regional security and stability, endangering the security of all countries in the region. The US should stop such actions."

On top of that the statement speaks of "serious concern about the United States' attempts to undermine strategic stability to maintain its absolute military superiority, including building a global missile defense system and deploying missile defense systems around the world and in space, strengthening the ability to disable the opponent's military actions with precision non-nuclear weapons and 'decapitation' strikes, enhancing NATO's 'nuclear sharing' arrangements in Europe and providing 'extended deterrence' to specific allies, constructing infrastructure in the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone treaty member Australia that could be used to support US and UK nuclear forces, engaging in US-UK-Australia nuclear submarine cooperation, and implementing plans to deploy and provide land-based intermediate-range and short-range missiles to allies in the Asia-Pacific and Europe."

The statement also condemns "the United States' unconstructive and hostile 'dual containment' policy towards China and Russia": "The United States' actions of conducting joint exercises with its allies ostensibly aimed at China and Russia and taking steps to deploy land-based intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region have raised serious concerns for both sides. The United States claims it will continue these practices with the ultimate goal of establishing routine missile deployments worldwide. Both sides strongly condemn these actions, which are extremely destabilizing to the region and pose a direct security threat to China and Russia, and will strengthen coordination and cooperation to respond to the United States' unconstructive and hostile 'dual containment' policy towards China and Russia."

On Asia-Pacific specifically they write that "both sides oppose the creation of exclusive and closed group structures in the Asia-Pacific region, especially military alliances targeting any third party. Both sides point out that the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and NATO's attempts to take destructive actions in the Asia-Pacific region have negative impacts on the peace and stability of the region."

They also "demand that the United States refrain from engaging in any biological military activities that threaten the security of other countries and regions" and they oppose the "use [of] outer space for armed confrontation and oppose the implementation of security policies and activities aimed at achieving military advantage and defining outer space as a 'combat domain.'"

Lastly the statement condemns "the US and its allies' deterrent actions in the military field, provoking confrontation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and exacerbating tensions on the Korean Peninsula, potentially leading to armed conflict", and asks that "the United States and NATO, as the responsible parties for the 20-year invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, should not attempt to deploy military facilities in Afghanistan and its surrounding areas again but should bear primary responsibility for Afghanistan's current economic and livelihood difficulties, bear the main costs of Afghanistan's reconstruction, and take all necessary measures to unfreeze Afghanistan's national assets."

ENORMOUS EXPANSION OF CHINA-RUSSIA COLLABORATION
This will be my last point, the statement has an immense list - dozens and dozens of items - of expanded cooperation fields between both countries.

These are some of the most important ones:
- Military cooperation: "[both sides] will further deepen military mutual trust and cooperation, expand the scale of joint training activities, regularly organize joint maritime and air patrols, strengthen coordination and cooperation within bilateral and multilateral frameworks, and continuously improve the ability and level of jointly responding to risks and challenges."
- More trade, mutual investments and help each other economic development: "continuously expand the scale of bilateral trade", "continuously improve the level of investment cooperation between the two countries", and "jointly develop advanced industries, strengthen technical and production cooperation, including in the civil aviation manufacturing industry, shipbuilding industry, automobile manufacturing industry, equipment manufacturing industry, electronics industry, metallurgical industry, iron ore mining industry, chemical industry, and forest industry"
- Cooperation on energy: "consolidate the strategic cooperation in energy between China and Russia and achieve high-level development, ensuring the economic and energy security of the two countries. Strive to ensure the stability and sustainability of the international energy market, and maintain the stability and resilience of the global energy industry chain and supply chain." Also nuclear energy: "deepen cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy based on the experience of successful and ongoing projects, including thermonuclear fusion, fast neutron reactors, and closed nuclear fuel cycles"
- Promote each others' currencies and financial infrastructure: "Increase the proportion of local currency in bilateral trade, financing, and other economic activities. Improve the financial infrastructure of the two countries, smooth the settlement channels between the two countries' business entities, strengthen regulatory cooperation in the banking and insurance industries of China and Russia, promote the sound development of banks and insurance institutions established in each other's countries, encourage two-way investment, and issue bonds in the financial markets of each other's countries in accordance with market principles."
- Deep education and scientific cooperation: "promote the expansion and improvement of quality in mutual study abroad programs, advance Chinese language teaching in Russia and Russian language teaching in China, encourage educational institutions to expand exchanges, cooperation in running schools, conduct high-level talent joint training and scientific research, support cooperation in basic research fields between universities, support activities of alliances of similar universities and high schools, and deepen cooperation in vocational and digital education"
- Cooperation in the media and shaping public opinions: "Strengthen media exchanges between the two countries, promote mutual visits at various levels, support pragmatic and professional dialogues, actively carry out high-quality content cooperation, deeply explore the cooperation potential of new media and new technologies in the field of mass media, objectively and comprehensively report major global events, and spread true information in the international public opinion field."
- Cooperation within global institutions: "deepen bilateral cooperation [at] the UN General Assembly and the Security Council", "supporting the role of the World Health Organization", "strengthen cooperation within the WTO framework", "cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)", "uphold the BRICS spirit, enhance the BRICS mechanism's voice in international affairs and agenda", etc.

I could go on and on, the scale of the cooperation they detail is absolutely breathtaking, both countries are going all in with each other.

This statement is absolutely extraordinary and will likely shape the world for decades to come. We now have Russia and China explicitly stating they're all in with each other to bring about a new "equal and orderly multipolar world and the democratization of international relations", and put an end to US hegemonic behavior. No more pretend, it's happening.

[ramana]

RUSI interviews Dr Peter Lorge

https://www.rusi.org/podcasts/talking-s ... ic-thought

Please post the transcript for our understanding.

[AshishA]

How much influence does Major General Peng Liyuan have over her husband? Is she another Madame Mao? She's rarely discussed yet Chinese media has become a little more slavish in their praise of Peng lately.

As for CCP collapse, I anticipate the internal struggles between the different factions intensifying over who can please the Supreme leader more and make others scapegoat for problems faced by Chinese public (economic downturn, unemployment, rising costs etc etc). In future, Xi will become more and more isolated. In a case like that, Peng might become prominent as Xi might come to rely on her heavily.

Xi is no Mao who can commit unimaginable crimes and remain unscathed especially from his own partymen. I also don't think the Chinese public are going to revolt anytime soon. China won't collapse until a power struggle involving the PLA and CCP decide that Xi needs to disposed off. Hence, there is a chance of CCP imploding. I dont think external factors can force the collapse of China beyond economic problems (which will make the internal fighting vicious and worse) and war.

In my honest opinion, Xi is here to stay and China's collapse isn't going to happen anytime soon. What will happen is CCP's internal struggles making all their territorial disputes worse and will make the world a dangerous place. The world will be at edge as long as Xi continues in this shape and form. From what I have read, the party thought has taken prominence in foreign policy and military. Lastly, Eleven's yes men will propose dangerous military adventurism and its going to have disastrous consequences for the region. Next 10 years is going to be very volatile for the world.

[ricky_v]

a very very thorough report, recommend reading in full, about 18 .pdf pages, has details on newer state organs and thus newer power players who head them, struggles between the state and the party

https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/file ... _Final.pdf

Beyond China’s Black Box
Five Trends Shaping Beijing’s Foreign and
Security Policy Decision-Making Under Xi Jinping

China’s foreign and security policymaking apparatus is often described as a metaphorical black box about which analysts know little. That is true to an extent, but at the same time, it is possible to develop a better understanding of the people, institutions, processes, and pressures that go into making China’s policies toward the world during Xi’s “new era,” that is, his time as the country’s top leader. This report pursues that
objective by identifying five major trends mostly internal to the People's Republic of China (PRC) party-state system that shape its foreign and security policymaking.
In addition, the paper describes the effects that each trend generates, from bureaucratic incentives to behavioral patterns.

The first trend is personalization of the system around
Xi. It reduces the influence of various interest groups
and therefore the need to bargain with and among them,
raises the prospect of groupthink among the loyalists Xi
has surrounded himself with, and potentially increases
the importance of achieving certain goals for China on
Xi’s watch. In addition, Xi’s centrality creates a major
management bottleneck that could hamper the system
during even brief absences.

The second trend is empowering the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) over the state. That trend has
made more officials into policy-implementers rather than
policymakers, even on issues below the level of strategy.
It has also increased central demands for ideological
activities, such as Xi Jinping Thought study sessions. At
the same time, while the leadership wants to improve
coordination and might be making some progress, it
stops short of actions that could allow government
organs to coordinate horizontally if doing so might plau
sibly jeopardize the center’s control.

The third trend is domestic policy headwinds and the
search for alternative forms of political legitimacy for the
CCP. This creates two contradictory pressures: China’s
reaching out and trying to improve ties with the world,
and its turn to an assertive and at times even aggressive
form of nationalism to counteract stalling economic
growth. It also dents the power and influence China
gained through its rapid rise and its role as a massive
market driving global economic growth.

The fourth trend is further elevation of regime security
over other concerns. This trend negatively affects
Beijing’s ties with foreign countries by worsening the
experience of foreigners visiting and living in China,
exporting repressive political ideas and techniques to
the world, and complicating how China’s foreign and security bureaucracy interacts with its counterparts.

The fifth and final trend is diplomatic and military
assertiveness and seeking an active global leadership
role, which feeds a self-reinforcing cycle of growing
tensions, requires PRC diplomats to shoehorn any
activities into Xi’s marquee frameworks, and leads
Beijing to build out structures of an alternative inter
national order.

Examining these trends helps illuminate the macro
pressures shaping China’s foreign and security policy
decision-making. Still, aspects of how the party-state
makes decisions about its foreign and security pol
icies—“known unknowns”—remain particularly
opaque.

However, insights about which
factors and actors truly shape Beijing’s foreign and
security policies have become seemingly harder to find.
Analysts can observe from the outside that an amalgam
of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organs and People’s
Republic of China (PRC) state bodies—often short
handed as the “party-state”—shape decision-making
processes. And CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping reigns
from the top as the ultimate authority.
Analysts frequently characterize what happens within
that system, though, as a metaphorical “black box”
wherein we do not know how decisions are made. Even
senior U.S. officials with access to classified information
confess to a lack of knowledge about how Beijing makes
foreign and security policies.

Trend 1: Personalization of the
System around Xi


In October 2016, the CCP recognized Xi as its
“core,” a powerful designation that had been retired in
2002, something it noted as “vitally important” for the
country and the party.6 In October 2017, Xi’s eponymous
“thought” was incorporated into the CCP constitution,
then into China’s state constitution in March 2018.7 In
November 2021, for only the third time in more than a
century of existence, the party published a “historical
resolution,” which devoted more than half of its space
to affirming Xi’s policies.8 In October 2022, the CCP
adopted a concept known as the “two establishments”
that formally established Xi as the core of the CCP
and established “Xi Thought” as its guiding ideology.9

Concepts like these can get arcane and even nonsensical to
observers who are not immersed in party-speak. But they
matter because they help Xi tie himself to the party, both
as a man and as an ideological agenda, and try to make the
two indistinguishable and thus beyond reproach. They also
provide a barometer of Xi’s grip on power.


It also raises the risk that handpicked officials can wash out quickly
because they have not been stress-tested for the rigors of their positions over the course
of long careers. This appears to have been the case for former State Councilor and Foreign
Minister Qin Gang, who was purged from his positions after just six months.

Xi has aimed to shorthand the party’s
history as such: under Mao the country stood up, under
Deng Xiaoping the country got rich, and under Xi the
country is becoming strong. It is now likely harder for
Xi to travel since he has taken a more direct role
in overseeing nearly every aspect of the Chinese
system, which creates the possibility of him
becoming overwhelmed even when he is not traveling.

Trend 2: Empowering the Party over the State

With himself as the “core,” Xi has also altered
China’s party-state system to empower the
party at the expense of the state. Some have
described this a “north-south war” between two separate
parts of Zhongnanhai, China’s leadership compound: the
south courtyard that houses the central organizations
of the CCP; and the north courtyard where the State
Council’s main offices sit.

In 2018, as part of a slate of organizational shifts, China created the Central Foreign
Affairs Commission (CFAC) to boost the party’s control
over foreign policy.21 The CFAC, which is led by Xi,
upgraded its predecessor organization, the Leading Small
Group on Foreign Affairs Work, to increase the overall
capacity and bureaucratic power of the CCP’s role in
foreign policymaking.22


Beijing has also enhanced the role of the party’s de
facto foreign ministry, the International Department,
which handles relations with foreign political parties, as
well as the international operations of the United Front
Work Department, which Xi has referred to as a “magic
weapon.”23 The fact that the International Department’s
Minister, Liu Jianchao, is reportedly being considered
as the country’s next foreign minister provides another
proof point for the CCP’s ascendancy in managing
China’s relations with the outside world.


In addition, the CCP has
conducted several major party
conferences on foreign affairs
topics. Those are rare meetings
where party leadership provides
“top-level design” for the policy
area it governs.25 These include
a major meeting on periphery
diplomacy in October 2013 and
three Central Foreign Affairs
Work Conferences in November 2014, June 2018, and
December 2023.


All
these moves to bolster the CCP’s formal power over the
Chinese state illustrate that Xi is different from Mao.
Instead of weaponizing a personality cult against par
ty-state bureaucracy, Xi strengthens party’s institutions
so he can harness them to his own goals, all while making
himself synonymous with party rule.3


In theory, this “top-level design” approach creates
unified, coherent decision-making and execution and
cuts down on any entities freelancing or going rogue. In
practice, however, strict enforcement of central control
often begets one of two outcomes: either paralysis as
officials try to avoid a wrong move by not moving at all,
or overzealous implementation to ensure officials cannot
be accused of soft-pedaling orders or to curry favor with
superiors. The trend of PRC diplomats acting as “wolf
warriors” by making caustic statement illustrates the
latter tendency.
Second, additional bureaucratic and technical capacity
is likely being offset by increasing demands to conduct
ideological activities such as Xi Thought study sessions.
One report from the U.S. investment firm BlackRock said
its employees in China spent a third of their time studying
such material.3

Rather, each area has its
own commission—the CMC, the CFAC, and the Central
National Security Commission (CNSC, more on that
body later)—with jurisdictions that sometimes appear
to overlap. Public information indicates Xi is the only
person who is a formal member of all three bodies, which
underscores that, while the leadership wants to improve
coordination and might be making some progress, it
stops short of actions that could allow government
organs to coordinate horizontally if doing so might plau
sibly jeopardize the center’s control

Trend 3: Domestic Policy Headwinds and the Search for Alternative Forms
of Political Legitimacy


This set of challenges is likely to create two contradic
tory pressures in Beijing’s foreign and security policy
decision-making. First, China’s leaders will feel pressure
to reach out and try to improve ties with the world.
China’s goals will be twofold: manage or resolve issues
that might distract or overwhelm policymakers who are
occupied dealing with domestic challenges, and beat back
efforts to “de-risk” away from China and instead deepen
economic and trade links. Further, PRC leaders need to
burnish China’s image as a trade and investment partner
to lure foreign capital and sustain technology transfer and
co-development.44


The second pressure, however, pushes in the opposite
direction.47 Xi and the CCP will be tempted to turn to an
assertive and at times even aggressive form of nationalism.
In the post-Mao era, the CCP has relied on high growth
rates as its primary source of legitimacy. The implicit social
contract, or what some have called the “authoritarian
bargain,” held that Chinese citizens would cede politics
to the CCP.48 The party would deliver expanded economic
opportunity and high growth rates in return. An era of
lower growth will mean the CCP must draw from other
sources of citizens’ support (along with repression) to
protect its hold on power.


Beijing is likely to avoid the most extreme possible
manifestation of nationalistic fervor, starting a diversionary
war, because the costs and risks of doing so are likely to
remain prohibitive.49 But Xi will still leverage nationalism
for diversionary purposes.50 Antagonism toward “hostile
foreign forces,” particularly the United States and Japan, can
provide a convenient scapegoat for China’s leaders who need
someone other than themselves to blame for the country’s
faltering economy. Fanning nationalist flames is not risk-free
or cost-free, though, as those same sentiments can catalyze
activists who later turn their ire against the domestic leadership.

But outreach probably
reflects more a tonal and tactical thaw—a charm offensive—
rather than a substantive and strategic reorientation.

Trend 4: Elevation of Regime Security over Other Concerns

Xi has put addressing domestic threats to regime
security, both real and perceived, at the center of his
governing agenda. The preeminence of Xi’s domestic
security agenda became clear early in his tenure with the
issuance in April 2013 of a communiqué that came to be
known as “Document 9.”54 That memo laid out a vision rife
with political threats and called on PRC leaders to strengthen
their work in the “ideological sphere.” Xi has built out the
vision through his concept of “holistic national security” and
formally called for integrating development and security,
thereby elevating security to the same priority level as devel
opment in party policy.


To oversee implementation throughout the par
ty-state, in November 2013, China established a new
Central National Security Commission (CNSC).56 That
commission primarily focuses on centralizing coordi
nation for domestic and regime security rather than
foreign affairs, as other countries’ national security
councils usually do. Reports suggest, though, that the
CNSC sometimes touches on foreign policy issues
when they might threaten internal social stability or
regime security.57

The same quest for political security drives Xi’s purge
of the CCP’s ranks through the Central Commission
for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and other tools.
That body targets officials at every level of the party.
The CCDI’s works focuses on countering corruption,
which Xi believes is an existential risk for the party.
But informally, the CCDI enforces other crimes, too,
mainly insufficient loyalty to Xi.

Anti-corruption work provides a tool Xi
uses to perpetually strengthen his control and ensure
his edicts are carried out, which is why he has a called it
a “forever journey.”61

China’s drive to address perceived political threats at
home and “make the world safe for the CCP” abroad also
shapes its overseas behavior in several ways.

Separately, the ascendance of security
bureaucracies appears to have boosted the power of
China’s security services, especially the Ministry of State
Security (MSS) and the Ministry of Public Security. The
then-head of the MSS, Chen Wenqing, was promoted
to the Politburo in October 2022.69 The MSS has clearly
felt emboldened to step out from the shadows and carve
a larger public profile than in previous years, including
by starting an account on the Chinese social media
website WeChat and issuing statements on events such
as Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election.

Trend 5: Diplomatic and Military Assertiveness and Seeking an Active Global Leadership Role

China’s foreign and security policy decision-making
is also driven by assertiveness and seeking to
actively shape the outside world through what Xi
has called “struggle.”


This trend affects China’s foreign policy in several
ways. First, it has fed a self-reinforcing cycle of growing
tensions. Beijing’s belligerent rhetoric and aggres
sive actions provoke countermeasures from targeted
countries. PRC policymakers then interpret those
countermeasures as evidence of foreigners’ hostile
intent toward China. Chinese leaders once viewed the
international environment as being in an unalloyed
“period of strategic opportunity,” but now Xi argues
that “strategic opportunity coexists with risks and
challenges, and uncertainties and unforeseen factors
are rising.”87 This justifies Beijing’s perceived need to
fight back against what Xi has called Western “all-round
containment, encirclement, and suppression.”88 To be
sure, most officials and scholars in the liberal demo
cratic world, including the author, believe that changes
in China’s behavior set off the cycle.

Information flows

The first is how information flows
to Xi and other senior leaders, or what in the U.S. context
is often called the “paper process.” Outside observers
do not know anything about what types and sources of
information Xi consumes regularly. He does not give
press conferences or unscripted interviews. Studies of
authoritarian regimes have shown that information that
gets to leaders tends to be poor quality because disagree
ment tends to be perceived as disloyalty.92 Nevertheless,
getting accurate information is essential for Xi to
assess how his policies are faring in practice. The lack
of a functioning feedback loop could create dangerous
misunderstandings. Better knowledge about those infor
mation flows that takes into account both longtime actors
and newer influences such as Chinese think tanks could
give analysts a more nuanced understanding of the sin
cerity of Xi’s apparent optimism about China’s trajectory
(among other topics). Specifically, it could indicate to
what extent Xi’s optimism is an attempt to inject confi
dence into the system or whether he underestimates the
challenges the country faces.

Dynamic among Xi and his top advisors.

The second is the role of Xi’s close advisors and exactly how they
exercise influence. Xi has succeeded in stacking the
leadership—including the Politburo and its Standing
Committee—with his men. (And they are all men; the
Politburo has no women for the first time in 25 years.)94
But from the outside it is not clear the degree to which
close confidants can speak truth to power or genuinely
debate new approaches.

The most likely effect has
been to create an environment prone to groupthink if not outright sycophancy.95 But a different dynamic is possible and could prevail in certain situations: Xi could
have enough trust in his inner circle’s loyalty to him that
he allows more frank advice and debate because he does
not feel the need to worry about their fealty to him or his
political agenda. The role Premier Li Qiang reportedly
played in convincing Xi to end Xi’s draconian zero
COVID policy—which had initially helped to control
the pandemic but had grown ineffective, costly, and
unpopular—provides an example.96 Meanwhile, Xi’s top
aides already appear to be jockeying among themselves,
particularly Xi’s Chief of Staff and “security czar” Cai Qi
and Premier Li.97

Structure and frequency of meetings. The third
mystery factor is China’s meetings process for foreign
and security policy issues. Some meetings of the formal bodies covering these issues are reported publicly: for example, the foreign minister’s annual address to PRC
diplomats and the Party Congress work reports every
f ive years. But key questions about the specifics remain,
namely whether meeting processes are structured to
always have the same people and occur on a regular
basis—or whether those meetings are more ad hoc, with
participants joining or falling off the list depending on the
issue being discussed and/or political winds.

PRC media
are not allowed to write what, in the American context,
are called “process stories,” or detailed stories about
how government decisions were made. Little is known
about how organizations that provide staff support to
senior leadership—such as the CCP Secretariat, the CCP
General Office, and the CFAC—function on a day-to-day
basis under Xi.

Informal constraints on Xi’s power

Fourth, it is not clear
whether there are, or could be, any meaningful checks and
balances in China’s elite decision-making under Xi. The PRC
system remains Leninist in both structure and culture and
was never designed to have formal checks and balances. But
the practice of collective leadership often pitted the ambi
tions of different factions against one another, forming a sort
of check against the unbridled exercise of power by any single
person or group. Even Mao confronted pushback in 1962
after his Great Leap Forward campaign ended in catastrophe.

Moreover, Xi’s consolidation of power has created a constitu
ency of losers in the system. Stories documenting a backlash
over Xi’s policies have become a perennial feature of China
analyses.

Leadership transition plans

The fifth aspect is Xi’s
plans for timing and manner of power transition. Xi obvi
ously has worked hard to remove any formal or informal
time constraints on his tenure as China’s paramount leader.
So transition plans might not yet exist, even in Xi’s mind.
He might be waiting to decide based on circumstances as
they evolve. Although it is clear he wants to avoid becoming
a lame duck once a successor is tapped, if for no other
reason than ceding power in an authoritarian system can
be politically and even physically dangerous. The question
of leadership transition could be resolved in a few dif
ferent ways, and nearly all of them would be messier than
a predictable transition to new leadership on a planned
schedule.99 In the meantime, observers will have to look for
indicators of how the dynamics of Xi’s leadership shift as
he continues to age.

[ramana]

A dated article on Mao and the Writers.
https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb- ... nd-writers

Repository

https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion

[ramana]

ricky_V
Thanks for the report.
Will study

[ramana]

https://fairbank.fas.harvard.edu/resear ... fucianism/

Negotiating the Gap: Communism and Confucianism—What the Struggle Between China’s Two Competing Social Philosophies Tells Us About the Country’s Future

November 13, 2023
Han Cheng, Topics:
Government, History, Law, Politics

In a special talk with Confucian expert Daniel A. Bell, three scholars consider the evolving role of Confucianism in China

During the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao and his Red Guards discredited Confucianism and denounced it as an encouragement of “bad elements, rightists, monsters, and freaks.” The Chinese Communist Party, in more recent times, has revisited the teachings of this fifth-century philosopher, who advocated for a synthesis of compassion and societal harmony—even as General Secretary Xi Jinping’s commitment to upholding political stability has led to an emphasis on rigid communist doctrines and principles. Can China eventually negotiate the gap between its two competing social philosophies? The Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies hosted a talk with Daniel A. Bell, Chair of Political Theory and Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong; Peter K. Bol, Charles H. Carswell Professor of East Asian Languages and Civilizations at Harvard University; and Wen Yu, Visiting Assistant Professor at Boston College, which looked to the sometimes-contentious relationship between communism and Confucianism as a lens through which to imagine the trajectory of the Chinese state.

Integrating Confucianism and Communism in the Post-Mao era
Political meritocracy within the administration of the Chinese Communist Party epitomizes a synthesis of seemingly divergent societal philosophies, a phenomenon that Bell analyzed in depth during his talk. According to Bell, this exemplifies how China is intertwining two seemingly disparate philosophies: one focusing on societal relationships, and the other, an ideal political vision. Interestingly, this amalgamation has given rise to what can be termed Confucian Communism in modern China—where Confucianism ideals seemingly aligns well with some communist ideals, and other contemporary ideals, like feminism.


Daniel A. Ball, giving his presentation on Confucian Communism

In his book, The Dean of Shandong: Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat at a Chinese University (2023, Princeton University Press), Bell delineates the traits of a successful public official within this framework. An official should exhibit above-average political and analytical acumen, possess superior virtue, and, most crucially, demonstrate an unwavering commitment to hard work and public service. The prevailing ethos within the Chinese government, under communist collective leadership, remains a dedication to serving the public, a sentiment that itself reflects a core Confucian value, though Bell notes there is a huge gap between the ideal and the practice, as we can see from the prevalence of corruption. Bell also noted the possibility of using Confucian teachings to combat corruption in the administration, rather than relying on the approach of legalism (Fa Jia 法家), which focuses more on rules and punishment.

In the 1980s, intellectual discourse was dominated by explorations of liberal democracy and capitalism, as thought leaders strived to find new paths for China. However, Confucianism experienced a revival in the 1990s, a phenomenon Bell attributes to four main factors. First, there was a political motive: the Party sought to portray itself as a successor to classic Chinese tradition, thus enhancing its political legitimacy within the Chinese context, going beyond the teachings of pure Marxism. Second, there’s a psychological aspect: Confucianism became a tool to promote an understanding of ethics and social responsibility among the populace. Third, the integration of Confucianism serves an economic purpose: it aids in China’s peaceful modernization process. And lastly, there’s an academic and cultural upside, since embracing Confucianism allows for greater diversity in social value systems and practices.

Confucian Complexity: Balancing Tradition, Governance, and Morality

Bol noted that many perceived Confucianism as a social system, just as communism was as a social-political system, not just an ideology. However, he harbored reservations about viewing Confucianism through the lens of a social-political system. It was, after all, something as embraced by a minute fraction of the Chinese populace, specifically, the educated elite, whence was drawn much of the political hierarchy. Bol posited that Confucianism is better understood as a learning paradigm concentrating on self-cultivation and personal practice, and constantly morphing and expanding over time. He noted that, likewise, interpretations and definitions of Confucian tradition have undergone significant transformations over time.


Peter K. Bol, in discussing Confucianism, explored instances where it opposes service

Expanding on Bell’s assertion that Confucianism teaches the virtue of public service as an aspect of the good life, Bol explored a contrasting dynamic where one might choose non-service—a rejection of acknowledging the ruler as the sage, and a deviation from societal norms. To illustrate this, Bol cited the Yongle Emperor, a ruler who defined himself as a sage, after usurping the throne in 1402. Fang Xiaoru (方孝孺, 1357 – 1402) was a Confucian who refused to recognize the Yongle Emperor, denying him legitimacy and branding him a usurper, steadfastly refusing to endorse his usurpation of the throne. Fang’s unyielding stance, despite severe threats, led to his execution along with his associates and family. Bol chose this story to highlight the inherent tension between state governance and Confucianism—which itself comes to echo the intricate balance between Confucian and Communist administration in contemporary China.

Varied Interpretations: The Multifaceted Approach to Confucianism in Modern China

Joining this conversation about the role and status of Confucianism in contemporary China, Wen Yu introduced three diverse groups of thinkers in China today whose different interpretations of Confucian learning have deeper roots in China’s debates on nation-building since the late 19th century. They are the Cultural Liberals, Confucian Socialists, and Institutional Confucians.


Wen introducing the three Confucian groups in contemporary China

The Cultural Liberals perceive Confucian learning as a kind of “Chinese humanism.” They emphasize its role in nurturing citizens in modern democracies by fostering civic duty and personal autonomy. This group would agree with Bol’s view of Confucianism as an elite tradition of moral cultivation, and this position largely aligned with China’s move towards market economy and political reforms in most of the ’90s. The camp of Confucian Socialism surfaced later, amid the New Left movement, exhibiting a strong inclination toward a populist interpretation of Confucianism. This group champions a distinct Chinese modernity characterized by social equality and a robust collective identity, endorsing a centralized, meritocratic government as the solution to equality while rejecting Western parliamentary democracy and global capitalism. This group attributes China’s current successes to the nation’s historical state institutions and communist legacy. Lastly, there are the Institutional Confucians. Yu portrayed this group’s solution as somewhat utopian, advocating for the transformation of China into a constitutional monarchy, with Confucius serving as a symbolic, meritocratic ruler representing universal values. This group is also critical of liberal democracy, but from the aspect of political meritocracy. Both camps contain elements of authoritarianism.

From Yu’s perspective, Bell’s suggestion to integrate Confucianism into Communist rule aligns with the principles of Confucian Socialism and incorporates elements of Institutional Confucianism. This approach, blending populism with meritocracy, indeed has the potential to enhance the Communist Party’s soft power and remind the Party to focus on the performance of the officials, just as Bell imagined. However, Yu has reservations about whether this position adequately addresses the increasing domestic and international concerns about China’s growing authoritarian state. She emphasized that there exist alternative approaches to bringing Confucian learning into China’s agenda of nation-building, and the Cultural Liberal group is a good example.

All three speakers would seem to agree that the interweaving of Confucianism and communism in China represents an effort to negotiate the gap between tradition and contemporary value systems. This is the case whether we apply it to Bell’s symbiosis of Confucian values and political meritocracy, Bol’s complexities and tensions between Confucianism and state governance, or Yu’s diverse modern interpretations and implementations, from cultural liberalism to a form of monarchy. These multifaceted discussions all served to illuminate China’s dynamic adaptations of ancient philosophies and to help us imagine how the state endeavors to forge a new path in the global landscape.

I think Bol is incorrect that Confucianism is an elite dogma.
The peasant also understood the analects in practice and carried the memory to modern times.
It is this memory that forces Communists to reconcile with Confucianism to get legitimacy.

[ramana]

Book Review:

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/D ... ist-party/

Book Review: From Rebel to Ruler: One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party

Published Dec. 29, 2021
By Author: Tony Saich; Reviewer: Ian Forsyth
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University Press --
Book cover: From Rebel to RulerPHOTO DETAILS / DOWNLOAD HI-RES


From Rebel to Ruler: One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party, by Tony Saich. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2021, 560 pp.



2021 was the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and consequently has yielded a plethora of excellent books by China scholars reflecting on the CCP’s past, present, and future. One of the standout works is Tony Saich’s From Rebel to Ruler. Saich is a professor of international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, and his expertise is evident. He has produced a work of both history and political science that tells the story of the CCP from its genesis in 1921 Shanghai to 2021 and beyond. Saich draws a line of the CCP in the past 100 years that is both straight and curved, though never broken. It is a CCP that still thrives where other communist parties have failed, and understands that the largest hurdles are self-created and the deepest wounds are self-inflicted. Yet the same qualities that cause these wounds also heal them and have maintained the CCP’s rule, with no real threat to its continued rule for now.

Saich commences the book with a long historical account of the CCP, with a recurring theme of surviving against massive odds though aided by a lot of luck. For example, Saich asserts that Japan’s brutal invasion of China in the 1930s was a gift to the struggling CCP: as the CCP withdrew into the countryside, it established itself as the grassroots, populist alternative to the ruling Nationalists, cultivating the support it would need to triumph in the upcoming civil war. Yet once in power, the CCP faced the difficult task of learning how to rule.

The CCP’s ability to rule faced hurdles of its own creation, notably the devastating economic consequences of Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the political chaos of the Cultural Revolution, though survival came through the reforms of Deng Xiaoping. Much of these portions were studies of Mao and his politicking. Saich lays out that this skill in politicking (along with subtle blackmail) helped to politically protect Mao, even through the unequivocal disasters of the GLF and the Cultural Revolution. Mao suffered criticism from colleagues in 1959 for the famine of the GLF, but he was able to deflect some blame to local implementation, as opposed to his general plan. He was also able to compel the CCP to choose between him and his critics; he made subtle threats about leading peasant and military revolutions against CCP rivals. Mao had made himself indispensable to the point where he could not be removed in the same way that he had removed political rivals over the decades. The CCP had become Mao and vice versa by the 1960s.

It is here that Saich makes his primary points about the CCP’s history and survival skills. Leninist systems are assumed to be brittle, yet the CCP has been remarkably adaptable. His first observation is that the CCP has been able to shed and then reclaim the virtues of Chinese culture and historical legacy for its own benefit. To evolve from casting off Confucianism in the GLF to owning it in the twenty-first century is a skillful display of adaptability, and Saich’s accounts lay this out. The CCP mastered continuity and change. Pragmatic adaptability was manifest in the way Mao was able to initially utilize, then vilify, intellectuals, writers, and artists for his own personal political gain.

Related to this dynamic is the unceasing and overriding control the CCP has maintained over the national narrative and national identity. Despite these self-inflicted catastrophes before, during, and after the Chinese civil war, CCP leadership—notably Mao—were able to rewrite history, whitewash if not blot out inconvenient facts, and curate the truth to justify all CCP actions and foster the belief in the inevitability of CCP rule. The CCP is a living case study of George Orwell’s quote, “He who controls the past controls the future, and he who controls the present, controls the past.” While this rule is in any dictator’s handbook, the fact that the CCP has been successful despite China’s long pre-CCP history and the many failures of the CCP itself make it remarkable that the party still flourishes. When the CCP has assigned blame, Saich tracks how it has usually targeted certain members of the CCP who follow the incorrect line and thus lead people astray, or “outsiders,” particularly foreigners, who interfere with CCP affairs.

A second observation from the book is the role of elite politics. Saich’s history of the CCP is a history of the party’s most senior leaders, their political views, and the policies they advocated to support those views. Saich downplays the role of structural politics, economics, and foreign affairs, because his account clearly emphasizes the struggles among various leaders, particularly Mao’s struggle to seize and maintain control throughout the CCP’s history. He addresses factions in CCP political struggles as a historian but does not examine factionalism as a political scientist.

Moreover, there are certain raised-but-unanswered questions in the book. First, comparatively little space is spent on foreign affairs. Major events are touched upon but not explored in the same depth as most domestic events. Does Saich infer that foreign affairs did not have a major impact on the survival of the CCP or of certain key leaders? The implication is that foreign actors such as the United States have limited leverage over the ultimate health of the CCP, its key leaders, and its overall legitimacy to rule China.

Along those lines, the other open question is CCP legitimacy and survival writ large. As noted prior, Saich lays out how masterful the CCP has been at controlling the narrative surrounding China’s past, its threats, and how the CCP is the sole entity that can protect China while also being truly Chinese. Saich outlines clearly that the CCP still enjoys performance legitimacy and that reforms have vested peoples into the system, which did not happen in Soviet reforms of the 1980s. That, coupled with a weak civil society, reveals infertile ground for a removal of the CCP or any type of democratic transition. Saich implies that China will not collapse nor reform politically, though he is not that explicit. Lastly, there are portions of the book where Saich goes into such detail (e.g., land reform in the 1950s) that he belabors the point and can lose the reader in details that have dwindling relevance.

Overall, this book is a must-read for students of Chinese politics and history; it tracks how that history set a trajectory for current Chinese political dynamics and future Chinese political developments. There are portions where the details are dense, and the impact of foreign affairs could be examined in greater depth, but it is a shining example of history feeding current affairs, research, and usefulness to practitioner and scholar alike.

For those who will not read the book, there are several bottom-line findings that must be acknowledged. The first is we should not hope for change to the CCP from below. The party has been effective at co-opting the grassroots on the issue of CCP rule. Civil society is negligible at best; the general public still supports the CCP due to decades of growth and modernization. Potential opposition, most notably in the private sector, has been absorbed. A second is that foreign affairs have had only limited impact on CCP dynamics and internal churn; so, we must remind ourselves that most of Xi Jinping’s statements and acts are usually directed at a domestic audience first and foremost. Certainly, international affairs matter to the CCP, particularly given how integrated China is in the world economy and how global its interests are, but the all-politics-is-local conventional wisdom is true with the CCP. However, a related conclusion to draw from Saich’s work is that we should expect blaming of foreigners—particularly the United States—for ills both international and domestic. This is evident in Beijing’s public comments about protests in Hong Kong. One major question inspired by the book to ask going forward is will Xi break or reinvigorate the CCP through his personalist rule? In other words, has Xi eliminated the factionalism and personal networks that were engines of the CCP? Although Xi enjoys the most unchallenged authority since Mao, I do not think Saich believes that Xi has ended these factional dynamics. When Xi dies or hands over power, we should expect CCP factionalism and personal networks to still drive domestic politics in China.

Dr. Ian Forsyth

Dr. Forsyth works as a China analyst with a consulting firm supporting the US Department of Defense in Arlington, VA. He holds a PhD in International relations from the University of Southern California and a JD from Syracuse University. His views are his alone.